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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 22:25
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0:02–0:09दमसाखव वूँ, अपीकोच डन्सिंग आन आम आंटन इस नों फृुप रशुम्ष्ण।
0:09–0:1431, the msaka says, after the cognition of inexplicability, the peacock does not dance
0:14–0:19anywhere other than the mountain, yet it is dancing, the cognition the peacock is dancing
0:19–0:21on the mountain arises.
0:21–0:25This cognition cannot arise through purely negative inference, because the probandom
0:25–0:30peacock dancing located on the mountain has not previously been established, nor has
0:30–0:35the negative concomitance of its absence been determined.
0:35–0:40is therefore necessary to establish the peacocks dancing on the mountain.
0:40–0:44It should not be said that because the peacocks dancing on the mountain has not previously
0:44–0:48been established, its presumption too is impossible.
0:48–0:53The recollection that dancing is impossible without an established locus, assisted by
0:53–0:58the exclusion of an already established locus, postulates another locus.
0:58–1:04Thus presumption of the peacocks dancing on the mountain is reasonable.
1:04–1:11of the foregoing argument. 32. This argument is not sound.
1:11–1:16The locus of the dancing is established through the inference from general observation. Peacock
1:16–1:22dancing has some locus, because it is dancing. Assisted by the inexplicability of any already
1:22–1:27established alternative locus, this inference apprehends the mountain as the locus of the
1:27–1:29dancing.
1:29–1:33Alternatively, the cognition of Peacock dancing produced by the sentence, the Peacock
1:33–1:38is dancing, after the cognition of inexplicability produced by the sentence, the peacock does
1:38–1:42not dance anywhere except on the mountain, apprehends the mountain, distinct from the
1:42–1:48already established locus, as a specific locus and thereby establishes the peacock's dancing
1:48–1:51is situated on the mountain.
1:51–1:55For this very reason the teacher says, through the inexplicability of cognition of impermanence,
1:55–1:59and with established permanence kept in view, the location of an object produced by cognition
1:59–2:02is established in the earth.
2:02–2:09The Neayakas alternative view, cognition of corpulence from eating at night.
2:09–2:12The peacocks dancing on the mountain can be established through the affirmative negative
2:12–2:13inference.
2:13–2:17The locus of the peacocks dancing is the mountain, because it has a locus and has
2:17–2:21no locus distinct from the mountain.
2:21–2:26Alternatively, the general pervasion may be stated thus, a property that is situated
2:26–2:30in a particular locus and is not situated in any possible locus distinct from that
2:30–2:37locus is situated in that very particular locus. Through this provision, the location of peacock
2:37–2:42dancing on the mountain is established. In the same way, in the statement the corpulent
2:42–2:47devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of devdutta's corpulence can be explained by
2:47–2:52establishing previously unknown eating at night and taking that eating at night into account,
2:52–2:58hence presumption is unnecessary. The Bha doctrine of presumption from what is heard.
2:58–3:0634. The Bomsaka says, in the sentences Devdutta, who does not eat, is corpulent or the corpulent
3:06–3:12Devdutta does not eat during the day, semantic fitness is unavailable. Eating during the day
3:12–3:17is denied, while eating at night, which is a constituent of semantic coherence,
3:17–3:22is not expressed in the sentence. Thus the meaning of the corpulent Devdutta does not
3:22–3:28eat during the day is not coherent without reference to eating at night. When the unuttered
3:28–3:32sentence the corpulent dev-du-t to eats at night is postulated and the reference to nocturnal
3:32–3:37eating is supplied, cognition of the semantic relation among the word meanings arises.
3:38–3:43In this way, the postulation of an unexpressed meaning to render the herd sentence meaningful
3:43–3:49is presumption from what is heard. Establishment of presumption from what is heard.
3:51–3:5735. It should not be said that, for economy, it is sufficient to postulate only eating at
3:57–4:02night and that there is no need to postulate the words expressing nocturnal eating. According
4:02–4:07to the rule governing verbal cognition, the expectancy of words is fulfilled only by other
4:07–4:12words and words apprehend meanings indicated by other words and thereby produce cognition
4:12–4:18of the sentence meaning. Therefore, the production from the heard words of cognition of the relation
4:18–4:24among their meanings is inexplicable without postulating semantically coherent words.
4:24–4:25The word is not a word.
4:25–4:26The word is not a word.
4:26–4:27The word is not a word.
4:27–4:28The word is not a word.
4:28–4:29The word is not a word.
4:29–4:30The word is not a word.
4:30–4:31The word is not a word.
4:31–4:32The word is not a word.
4:32–4:33The word is not a word.
4:33–4:34The word is not a word.
4:34–4:35The word is not a word.
4:35–4:36The word is not a word.
4:36–4:37The word is not a word.
4:37–4:39The word is not a word.
4:39–4:40The word is not a word.
4:40–4:41The word is not a word.
4:41–4:42The word is not a word.
4:42–4:43The word is not a word.
4:43–4:44The word is not a word.
4:44–4:45The word is not a word.
4:45–4:46The word is not a word.
4:46–4:47The word is not a word.
4:47–4:48The word is not a word.
4:48–4:49The word is not a word.
4:49–4:56of a heard word is contradictory, the intended non-contradictory meaning is postulated.
4:56–4:59According to the Prabhupācāra teachers, in the sentence one who desires heaven should
4:59–5:04perform a sacrifice, it is incoherent for the sacrifice directly to possess the capacity
5:04–5:10to produce heaven as its result. Since an unseen intermediate instrument in the form
5:10–5:16of a porva is not mentioned, a porva is postulated through the optative suffix. When the sacrifice
5:16–5:21is understood together with the pārvā, the grammatical relation between the injunctive
5:21–5:26expression and the familiar words becomes semantically coherent, and the cognition sacrifice, through
5:26–5:32a pārvā, is the principal means to heaven arises. Otherwise a pārvā could not constitute
5:32–5:38the expressed meaning of the optative suffix. The boss conclude that presumption from what
5:38–5:43is heard of this kind produces cognition of the means to heaven. If cognition of
5:43–5:48a poorva did not arise from presumption from what is heard, the optative suffix could not
5:48–5:53express a poorva. Thus, where cognition of the relation between the meaning of one word
5:53–5:58and that of another is inexplicable without the postulation of a semantically coherent
5:58–6:03meaning, presumption from what is heard is a means of knowledge.
6:03–6:04The Neayaka Conclusion
6:04–6:1137. The Neayaka says, Semantic fitness consists in the absence of a means of
6:11–6:16knowledge opposed to semantic coherence, or in the absence of a contradictory form of
6:16–6:19the relation among word meanings.
6:19–6:23In the sentence, the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of the sentence
6:23–6:27meaning relating the word meanings arises despite ignorance of is not eating during
6:27–6:31the day and of is eating at night, because devdutta's corpulence must be accounted
6:31–6:34for by eating.
6:34–6:39In reality, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings is not inexplicable,
6:39–6:43Only the already cognized corpulence is inexplicable.
6:43–6:47To resolve that, eating at night is inferred.
6:47–6:53The unseen aporvo likewise is not the directly expressed meaning of the optative suffix.
6:53–6:57Therefore the presumption accepted by themsaka is not distinct from previously accepted
6:57–6:59inference.
6:59–7:04With this, the discussion of presumption ends.
7:04–7:07The members of a nyaya syllogism.
7:07–7:12Nyaia and its members.
7:12–7:16Inference for the sake of another is established through the method of Nyaia.
7:16–7:20Accordingly, Nyaia and its members are now explained.
7:20–7:28Nyaia has five members, thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion.
7:28–7:32In inference for the sake of another, a speaker presents his conclusion before another person
7:32–7:37through the ordered use of five statements.
7:37–7:41thesis, this mountain possesses fire.
7:41–7:46Reason, because it possesses smoke.
7:46–7:50Example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
7:50–7:54Application, this mountain possesses smoke.
7:54–8:01Conclusion, therefore this mountain possesses fire.
8:01–8:09Through the use of these five statements, the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain arises in the listener's mind,
8:09–8:13and thereafter the inferential cognition this mountain possesses fire arises.
8:13–8:17This aggregate of five statements is called nyaya.
8:17–8:21Each of the five statements of nyaya is called a member.
8:21–8:31Each member produces its own verbal cognition, and the aggregate of the five verbal cognitions produces the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark.
8:31–8:37Hence thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion are the five members of nyaya.
8:37–8:40Definition of nyaya.
8:40–8:472. Nyaya cannot be defined as a sentence describing a reason endowed with five characteristics,
8:47–8:51because such a definition would overextend to a sentence describing defects such as presence
8:51–8:57in a counter instance, and would also apply to the definition of the reason member.
8:57–9:01Nyaya is therefore the group of statements that produces verbal cognitions which assist
9:01–9:06in producing subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential
9:06–9:09cognition.
9:09–9:14The five member statements, as a single aggregate of sentences, produce a qualitative cognition
9:14–9:16of five meanings.
9:16–9:21From this qualitative cognition arises a distinct comprehensive cognition in which the qualifiers
9:21–9:27are mutually connected, and finally the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark arises.
9:27–9:32Thus verbal cognition produced by Nyaya is instrumental in producing the subsumptive
9:32–9:35reflection.
9:35–9:38Definition of the members of Nyaya
9:38–9:43The five statements that produce verbal cognitions, which in turn produce a qualitative cognition
9:43–9:48assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential
9:48–9:53cognition, are called the five members of Nyaya.
9:53–9:57Under this definition, the sentence of subsumptive reflection smoke pervaded by fire is present
9:57–10:01on this mountain, is neither Nyaya nor a member of Nyaya.
10:01–10:05Because Nyaya produces the subsumptive reflection, while the members of Nyaya produce the
10:05–10:10qualifying verbal cognitions that assist that reflection.
10:10–10:17The application statement alone is not nyaya, refutation of an objection.
10:17–10:21An objection may be raised, the application statement smoke pervaded by fire is present
10:21–10:26on this mom, also assists the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, hence
10:26–10:30it should be regarded as non-different from the aggregate of five statements and called
10:30–10:32nyaya.
10:32–10:35This objection is not sound.
10:35–10:40In demonstrative NIA, the five statements are used in the order determined by expectancy.
10:40–10:45The expectancy for the application is fulfilled only after the thesis, reason, and example.
10:45–10:49If the application is used first, the meaning that the reason qualified by pervasion is
10:49–10:53present in the subject will not be clear, and a ground of defeat will arise at the
10:53–10:54very outset.
10:54–11:00Otherwise, any sentence not traditionally accepted among the five members, or even a perceptual
11:00–11:04organ such as the eye, since it assists the subsumptive reflection, would also have to
11:04–11:06be called nyaya.
11:06–11:11The absence of sentential expectancy in an organ such as the eye is comparable to the
11:11–11:17absence of the requisite expectancy when the application statement is improperly used first.
11:17–11:19Other Scholars' Definition of Nyaya
11:19–11:225.
11:22–11:26Some scholars say, the five-member statements together produce a single qualitative verbal
11:26–11:31cognition, the property of jointly producing such a qualitative verbal cognition is nyayohud.
11:32–11:37Each member statement separately produces an individual qualitative verbal cognition,
11:37–11:42producing such an individual cognition constitutes the nature of the thesis and the other members.
11:44–11:50This view, however, is not reasonable. To apply to nyayud and its members respectively the property
11:50–11:55of producing a joint qualitative verbal cognition through the five statements and the property
11:55–12:00of producing an individual qualitative verbal cognition through each member statement, one
12:00–12:05would require a common, ordered, and non- overextensive form.
12:05–12:09If such a common or overextensive form is accepted, that same form would define both Nyaia and
12:09–12:14its members, otherwise the property of being a thesis would become needlessly intermixed
12:14–12:18with the properties of being a reason and the other members.
12:18–12:23The sentences this mountain possesses fire because of smoke, and so forth separately
12:23–12:27produce distinct qualitative verbal cognitions, such as the mountain is the subject of the
12:27–12:33probandom fire and the mountain possesses the reason smoke. Thus each statement, thesis
12:33–12:39and so forth, produces its own distinct verbal cognition and establishes the separate characteristics
12:39–12:42of the distinct members of Nyaya.
12:42–12:48Gangesa, however, rejects this alternative definition of Nyaya and its members. The
12:48–12:53The property of producing one qualitative verbal cognition from the aggregate of five statements
12:53–12:58and the property of producing separate qualitative verbal cognitions from each member statement
12:58–13:02cannot effectively define Nyaya and the thesis and other members unless a non- overextensive
13:02–13:06and ordered common form is accepted for this purpose.
13:06–13:10If such a non- overextensive common form is accepted, that single property would
13:10–13:14define both Nyaya and the members of Nyaya.
13:14–13:18If distinct non- overextensive properties are accepted, properties such as thesishood would
13:18–13:26become mutually mixed with classes such as reasonhood, producing the defect of class intermixture.
13:26–13:29Definition of the thesis
13:29–13:33Among the five members of Nyaya, the thesis is not merely a sentence that states the
13:33–13:38probandom, otherwise even the word probandom, since it states the probandom, would become
13:38–13:43a thesis, and the definition would overextend.
13:43–13:47The thesis is a sentence that, with respect to the intended inference, produces cognition
13:47–13:52that is neither deficient nor excessive, generates cognition of the sentence meaning, and, by
13:52–13:57assisting the cognition that produces substantive reflection on the reason, becomes a cause
13:57–14:01of the intended inferential cognition.
14:01–14:03An alternative definition of the thesis
14:03–14:057.
14:05–14:09Amitting the qualifiers, neither deficient nor excessive, from the foregoing definition,
14:09–14:13It may simply be said that the thesis is a sentence whose verbal cognition does not have
14:13–14:15the reason as its object.
14:15–14:20By this qualification, the example, and the other members are automatically excluded.
14:20–14:25The conclusion, that is, the fifth member, is not a cause of substantive reflection on
14:25–14:30the reason, because the conclusion produces only cognition of a conclusion that is uncontradicted
14:30–14:33and free from an equally strong counter-reason.
14:33–14:38Alternatively, the thesis may be defined as a sentence that produces a desire for
14:38–14:42cognition concerning the statement of the probandom.
14:42–14:47Or the thesis is that member statement of Nyaya which produces cognition of the probandom but
14:47–14:50does not produce cognition of the reason.
14:50–14:55Under this definition, the reason, example, application, and other members are excluded
14:55–15:01because they chiefly produce cognition of the reason rather than of the probandom.
15:01–15:04Thesishood is not a universal.
15:04–15:118. Some scholars regard thesishood as a universal and support this view by the consistent, non-over-extensive
15:11–15:18technical usage pertaining to theses. This view, however, is not sound. If thesishood
15:18–15:22were a universal, it would intermix with other universals such as being produced by
15:22–15:29Devdatta. Nor is it sound to define a thesis as a sentence that produces a separate cognition
15:29–15:34of the probandom, because a thesis is held to produce a separate cognition of the probandom
15:34–15:37only on the basis of technical usage.
15:37–15:42Neither producing a separate cognition nor cognition of the cognition produced is possible
15:42–15:46without a recurrent property.
15:46–15:50This refutation also rejects the view that a thesis is a sentence which, by mentioning
15:50–15:54a property of something contained in the cognition it produces, expresses cognition
15:54–15:59of the probandom as in the sound is impermanent whereas that same property is not present
15:59–16:04in the cognition produced by the reason statement because it is produced.
16:04–16:08The thesis is not an instrumental member, objection.
16:08–16:139. An objection may be raised. The thesis is not an instrumental member of inference for
16:13–16:18the sake of another, because acceptance of a thesis creates the possibility of contradiction.
16:18–16:21When the disputant or the neutral judge regards the subject as possessing the probandom and
16:21–16:25seeks a means of knowledge concerning it, only the reason statement should receive
16:25–16:27priority.
16:27–16:29This objection is not sound.
16:29–16:33Once opposition has arisen, the probandom, sound is impermanent, must be established
16:33–16:38in accordance with the expectancy of the disputant or the neutral judge.
16:38–16:42After delimiters such as time have been fixed, the reason statement by itself, without the
16:42–16:46thesis, cannot teach the semantic relation of the reason to the probandom.
16:46–16:51The thesis is therefore necessary as an instrumental member of inference for another.
16:51–16:55The objection that the thesis should be stated first is resolved as follows, after
16:55–17:01opposition has been presented, it is necessary to establish only the probandom, sound is impermanent.
17:01–17:05The reason statement, because it is produced, cannot teach the semantic relation without
17:05–17:08an independent statement of the probandom.
17:08–17:13Objection, the thesis is unnecessary and the probandom may be understood implicitly.
17:13–17:1710, nor should it be said that the impermanence of sound, not explicitly stated in the
17:17–17:22opponent's sentence, can be understood implicitly through semantic fitness, making the thesis
17:22–17:23unnecessary.
17:23–17:28If this were accepted, even what is incapable of being established would be understood implicitly,
17:28–17:30leading to overextension.
17:30–17:34Nor is it sound to say that the probandom is known from the opponent's statement of opposition,
17:34–17:38because that statement is overridden by the refutation of the opposition and by establishment
17:38–17:40of the means of knowledge.
17:40–17:44A thesis concerning the probandom is impossible without delimiters such as time and without
17:44–17:48the opponent's opposition, and since the opposing statement terminates after treating
17:48–17:53the subject as endowed with the probandum, it itself becomes free from further expectancy.
17:53–17:57When the word expressing the probandum is repeated, that portion of the opponent's statement
17:57–18:00of opposition becomes the thesis.
18:00–18:06Nor can the probandum be implicitly indicated by the example or another member of Nyaya.
18:06–18:11If this were accepted, mutual dependence would result, because the semantic relation
18:11–18:15of the example, application, and the other members becomes possible only after the
18:15–18:21the probandom has been established by the thesis. Thus the thesis is indispensable for
18:21–18:27apprehending the probandom. The thesis is an instrumental member.
18:27–18:3311. Other scholars say that the neutral judge may state, present a means of knowledge establishing
18:33–18:39the impermanence of sound. But here the expectancy is not for a means of knowledge in general,
18:39–18:44it is for the specific means constituted by producedness qualified by impermanence.
18:44–18:48A qualified reason cannot be employed without stating the probandom.
18:49–18:56Nor is the neutral judge's statement, present here a means of knowledge for the real probandom, suitable in the contexts of both proponent and opponent.
18:57–19:06Hence sentential expectancy concerning the reason does not arise without a thesis expressing the probandom, and the semantic relation between reason and probandom is not expressed without the thesis.
19:07–19:10Therefore the thesis is an instrumental member of inference for another.
19:11–19:13A statement of the reason is necessary.
19:14–19:2012. After stating the thesis concerning the probandom, a sentence expressing the reason
19:20–19:25and containing the ablative case must be used, because only thereby is the expectancy for
19:25–19:30a reason is cause fulfilled. If some other sentence is uttered instead of the expected
19:30–19:36reason statement, a ground of defeat arises. The general linguistic rule is that expectancy
19:36–19:41terminates only through use of the expected sentence. Therefore a reason statement is
19:41–19:45necessary after the statement of the probandom.
19:45–19:49Definition of the reason.
19:49–19:53Reasonhood is the property of an expression containing the ablative case which produces
19:53–19:58verbal cognition without stating the probandom and produces a verbal cognition assisting the
19:58–20:04subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition.
20:04–20:08Alternatively, the reason is that member statement of Nyaya in which the ablative
20:08–20:13case expresses the causal status of the reason.
20:13–20:17Or the reason is that member of Nyaya which produces a verbal cognition that generates
20:17–20:20expectancy for an example.
20:20–20:25Or the reason is a sentence which, with the intention of producing inferential cognition,
20:25–20:31produces a cognition not mentioning the pro-bandom and ending in the ablative case.
20:31–20:35Or the reason is an ablative-containing sentence that removes the expectancy for a
20:35–20:41cause produced by the thesis. Or the reason is a sentence ending in the fifth case, used
20:41–20:47with the intention of producing inferential cognition. The meaning of the reason expression
20:47–20:54must indicate cognition of the reason. Otherwise a meaning unrelated to the reason would remain,
20:54–20:58and since the reason would not actually be in the ablative relation, it would not
20:58–21:03become a cause of inference of the probandom. Therefore expectancy for a cause is fulfilled
21:03–21:09only by cognition of a reason connected with the ablative meaning.
21:09–21:13Definitions of affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative reasons.
21:13–21:1914. According to some scholars, reasonhood is the property of a sentence producing cognition
21:19–21:24that contains a universal, as the cognition produced by, because it possesses smoke, contains
21:24–21:28the universal smokehood, while that universal is absent from the cognitions produced
21:28–21:31by the thesis and the other members.
21:31–21:34Other scholars reject this view.
21:34–21:39Without understanding the general nature of a universal, cognition containing that universal
21:39–21:44cannot be apprehended from a particular sentence, hence the definition of reasonhood should
21:44–21:47not depend on a universal.
21:47–21:52An affirmative reason is a member of Nyaya which, containing an ablative case that expresses
21:52–21:57the causal status of the reason, produces expectancy for an example expressing affirmative
21:57–21:59perversion.
21:59–22:03In the definition of a negative reason, an expression denoting negative perversion is
22:03–22:08substituted for the expression denoting affirmative perversion.
22:08–22:13An affirmative negative reason is a member of gnya that produces expectancy for examples
22:13–22:18of both kinds, affirmative and negative.
22:18–22:22definitions of the affirmative negative and purely affirmative reasons.

Plain text

दमसाखव वूँ, अपीकोच डन्सिंग आन आम आंटन इस नों फृुप रशुम्ष्ण। 31, the msaka says, after the cognition of inexplicability, the peacock does not dance anywhere other than the mountain, yet it is dancing, the cognition the peacock is dancing on the mountain arises. This cognition cannot arise through purely negative inference, because the probandom peacock dancing located on the mountain has not previously been established, nor has the negative concomitance of its absence been determined. is therefore necessary to establish the peacocks dancing on the mountain. It should not be said that because the peacocks dancing on the mountain has not previously been established, its presumption too is impossible. The recollection that dancing is impossible without an established locus, assisted by the exclusion of an already established locus, postulates another locus. Thus presumption of the peacocks dancing on the mountain is reasonable. of the foregoing argument. 32. This argument is not sound. The locus of the dancing is established through the inference from general observation. Peacock dancing has some locus, because it is dancing. Assisted by the inexplicability of any already established alternative locus, this inference apprehends the mountain as the locus of the dancing. Alternatively, the cognition of Peacock dancing produced by the sentence, the Peacock is dancing, after the cognition of inexplicability produced by the sentence, the peacock does not dance anywhere except on the mountain, apprehends the mountain, distinct from the already established locus, as a specific locus and thereby establishes the peacock's dancing is situated on the mountain. For this very reason the teacher says, through the inexplicability of cognition of impermanence, and with established permanence kept in view, the location of an object produced by cognition is established in the earth. The Neayakas alternative view, cognition of corpulence from eating at night. The peacocks dancing on the mountain can be established through the affirmative negative inference. The locus of the peacocks dancing is the mountain, because it has a locus and has no locus distinct from the mountain. Alternatively, the general pervasion may be stated thus, a property that is situated in a particular locus and is not situated in any possible locus distinct from that locus is situated in that very particular locus. Through this provision, the location of peacock dancing on the mountain is established. In the same way, in the statement the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of devdutta's corpulence can be explained by establishing previously unknown eating at night and taking that eating at night into account, hence presumption is unnecessary. The Bha doctrine of presumption from what is heard. 34. The Bomsaka says, in the sentences Devdutta, who does not eat, is corpulent or the corpulent Devdutta does not eat during the day, semantic fitness is unavailable. Eating during the day is denied, while eating at night, which is a constituent of semantic coherence, is not expressed in the sentence. Thus the meaning of the corpulent Devdutta does not eat during the day is not coherent without reference to eating at night. When the unuttered sentence the corpulent dev-du-t to eats at night is postulated and the reference to nocturnal eating is supplied, cognition of the semantic relation among the word meanings arises. In this way, the postulation of an unexpressed meaning to render the herd sentence meaningful is presumption from what is heard. Establishment of presumption from what is heard. 35. It should not be said that, for economy, it is sufficient to postulate only eating at night and that there is no need to postulate the words expressing nocturnal eating. According to the rule governing verbal cognition, the expectancy of words is fulfilled only by other words and words apprehend meanings indicated by other words and thereby produce cognition of the sentence meaning. Therefore, the production from the heard words of cognition of the relation among their meanings is inexplicable without postulating semantically coherent words. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. The word is not a word. of a heard word is contradictory, the intended non-contradictory meaning is postulated. According to the Prabhupācāra teachers, in the sentence one who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice, it is incoherent for the sacrifice directly to possess the capacity to produce heaven as its result. Since an unseen intermediate instrument in the form of a porva is not mentioned, a porva is postulated through the optative suffix. When the sacrifice is understood together with the pārvā, the grammatical relation between the injunctive expression and the familiar words becomes semantically coherent, and the cognition sacrifice, through a pārvā, is the principal means to heaven arises. Otherwise a pārvā could not constitute the expressed meaning of the optative suffix. The boss conclude that presumption from what is heard of this kind produces cognition of the means to heaven. If cognition of a poorva did not arise from presumption from what is heard, the optative suffix could not express a poorva. Thus, where cognition of the relation between the meaning of one word and that of another is inexplicable without the postulation of a semantically coherent meaning, presumption from what is heard is a means of knowledge. The Neayaka Conclusion 37. The Neayaka says, Semantic fitness consists in the absence of a means of knowledge opposed to semantic coherence, or in the absence of a contradictory form of the relation among word meanings. In the sentence, the corpulent devdutta does not eat during the day, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings arises despite ignorance of is not eating during the day and of is eating at night, because devdutta's corpulence must be accounted for by eating. In reality, cognition of the sentence meaning relating the word meanings is not inexplicable, Only the already cognized corpulence is inexplicable. To resolve that, eating at night is inferred. The unseen aporvo likewise is not the directly expressed meaning of the optative suffix. Therefore the presumption accepted by themsaka is not distinct from previously accepted inference. With this, the discussion of presumption ends. The members of a nyaya syllogism. Nyaia and its members. Inference for the sake of another is established through the method of Nyaia. Accordingly, Nyaia and its members are now explained. Nyaia has five members, thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. In inference for the sake of another, a speaker presents his conclusion before another person through the ordered use of five statements. thesis, this mountain possesses fire. Reason, because it possesses smoke. Example, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. Application, this mountain possesses smoke. Conclusion, therefore this mountain possesses fire. Through the use of these five statements, the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain arises in the listener's mind, and thereafter the inferential cognition this mountain possesses fire arises. This aggregate of five statements is called nyaya. Each of the five statements of nyaya is called a member. Each member produces its own verbal cognition, and the aggregate of the five verbal cognitions produces the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark. Hence thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion are the five members of nyaya. Definition of nyaya. 2. Nyaya cannot be defined as a sentence describing a reason endowed with five characteristics, because such a definition would overextend to a sentence describing defects such as presence in a counter instance, and would also apply to the definition of the reason member. Nyaya is therefore the group of statements that produces verbal cognitions which assist in producing subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential cognition. The five member statements, as a single aggregate of sentences, produce a qualitative cognition of five meanings. From this qualitative cognition arises a distinct comprehensive cognition in which the qualifiers are mutually connected, and finally the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark arises. Thus verbal cognition produced by Nyaya is instrumental in producing the subsumptive reflection. Definition of the members of Nyaya The five statements that produce verbal cognitions, which in turn produce a qualitative cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the final cause of inferential cognition, are called the five members of Nyaya. Under this definition, the sentence of subsumptive reflection smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mountain, is neither Nyaya nor a member of Nyaya. Because Nyaya produces the subsumptive reflection, while the members of Nyaya produce the qualifying verbal cognitions that assist that reflection. The application statement alone is not nyaya, refutation of an objection. An objection may be raised, the application statement smoke pervaded by fire is present on this mom, also assists the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, hence it should be regarded as non-different from the aggregate of five statements and called nyaya. This objection is not sound. In demonstrative NIA, the five statements are used in the order determined by expectancy. The expectancy for the application is fulfilled only after the thesis, reason, and example. If the application is used first, the meaning that the reason qualified by pervasion is present in the subject will not be clear, and a ground of defeat will arise at the very outset. Otherwise, any sentence not traditionally accepted among the five members, or even a perceptual organ such as the eye, since it assists the subsumptive reflection, would also have to be called nyaya. The absence of sentential expectancy in an organ such as the eye is comparable to the absence of the requisite expectancy when the application statement is improperly used first. Other Scholars' Definition of Nyaya 5. Some scholars say, the five-member statements together produce a single qualitative verbal cognition, the property of jointly producing such a qualitative verbal cognition is nyayohud. Each member statement separately produces an individual qualitative verbal cognition, producing such an individual cognition constitutes the nature of the thesis and the other members. This view, however, is not reasonable. To apply to nyayud and its members respectively the property of producing a joint qualitative verbal cognition through the five statements and the property of producing an individual qualitative verbal cognition through each member statement, one would require a common, ordered, and non- overextensive form. If such a common or overextensive form is accepted, that same form would define both Nyaia and its members, otherwise the property of being a thesis would become needlessly intermixed with the properties of being a reason and the other members. The sentences this mountain possesses fire because of smoke, and so forth separately produce distinct qualitative verbal cognitions, such as the mountain is the subject of the probandom fire and the mountain possesses the reason smoke. Thus each statement, thesis and so forth, produces its own distinct verbal cognition and establishes the separate characteristics of the distinct members of Nyaya. Gangesa, however, rejects this alternative definition of Nyaya and its members. The The property of producing one qualitative verbal cognition from the aggregate of five statements and the property of producing separate qualitative verbal cognitions from each member statement cannot effectively define Nyaya and the thesis and other members unless a non- overextensive and ordered common form is accepted for this purpose. If such a non- overextensive common form is accepted, that single property would define both Nyaya and the members of Nyaya. If distinct non- overextensive properties are accepted, properties such as thesishood would become mutually mixed with classes such as reasonhood, producing the defect of class intermixture. Definition of the thesis Among the five members of Nyaya, the thesis is not merely a sentence that states the probandom, otherwise even the word probandom, since it states the probandom, would become a thesis, and the definition would overextend. The thesis is a sentence that, with respect to the intended inference, produces cognition that is neither deficient nor excessive, generates cognition of the sentence meaning, and, by assisting the cognition that produces substantive reflection on the reason, becomes a cause of the intended inferential cognition. An alternative definition of the thesis 7. Amitting the qualifiers, neither deficient nor excessive, from the foregoing definition, It may simply be said that the thesis is a sentence whose verbal cognition does not have the reason as its object. By this qualification, the example, and the other members are automatically excluded. The conclusion, that is, the fifth member, is not a cause of substantive reflection on the reason, because the conclusion produces only cognition of a conclusion that is uncontradicted and free from an equally strong counter-reason. Alternatively, the thesis may be defined as a sentence that produces a desire for cognition concerning the statement of the probandom. Or the thesis is that member statement of Nyaya which produces cognition of the probandom but does not produce cognition of the reason. Under this definition, the reason, example, application, and other members are excluded because they chiefly produce cognition of the reason rather than of the probandom. Thesishood is not a universal. 8. Some scholars regard thesishood as a universal and support this view by the consistent, non-over-extensive technical usage pertaining to theses. This view, however, is not sound. If thesishood were a universal, it would intermix with other universals such as being produced by Devdatta. Nor is it sound to define a thesis as a sentence that produces a separate cognition of the probandom, because a thesis is held to produce a separate cognition of the probandom only on the basis of technical usage. Neither producing a separate cognition nor cognition of the cognition produced is possible without a recurrent property. This refutation also rejects the view that a thesis is a sentence which, by mentioning a property of something contained in the cognition it produces, expresses cognition of the probandom as in the sound is impermanent whereas that same property is not present in the cognition produced by the reason statement because it is produced. The thesis is not an instrumental member, objection. 9. An objection may be raised. The thesis is not an instrumental member of inference for the sake of another, because acceptance of a thesis creates the possibility of contradiction. When the disputant or the neutral judge regards the subject as possessing the probandom and seeks a means of knowledge concerning it, only the reason statement should receive priority. This objection is not sound. Once opposition has arisen, the probandom, sound is impermanent, must be established in accordance with the expectancy of the disputant or the neutral judge. After delimiters such as time have been fixed, the reason statement by itself, without the thesis, cannot teach the semantic relation of the reason to the probandom. The thesis is therefore necessary as an instrumental member of inference for another. The objection that the thesis should be stated first is resolved as follows, after opposition has been presented, it is necessary to establish only the probandom, sound is impermanent. The reason statement, because it is produced, cannot teach the semantic relation without an independent statement of the probandom. Objection, the thesis is unnecessary and the probandom may be understood implicitly. 10, nor should it be said that the impermanence of sound, not explicitly stated in the opponent's sentence, can be understood implicitly through semantic fitness, making the thesis unnecessary. If this were accepted, even what is incapable of being established would be understood implicitly, leading to overextension. Nor is it sound to say that the probandom is known from the opponent's statement of opposition, because that statement is overridden by the refutation of the opposition and by establishment of the means of knowledge. A thesis concerning the probandom is impossible without delimiters such as time and without the opponent's opposition, and since the opposing statement terminates after treating the subject as endowed with the probandum, it itself becomes free from further expectancy. When the word expressing the probandum is repeated, that portion of the opponent's statement of opposition becomes the thesis. Nor can the probandum be implicitly indicated by the example or another member of Nyaya. If this were accepted, mutual dependence would result, because the semantic relation of the example, application, and the other members becomes possible only after the the probandom has been established by the thesis. Thus the thesis is indispensable for apprehending the probandom. The thesis is an instrumental member. 11. Other scholars say that the neutral judge may state, present a means of knowledge establishing the impermanence of sound. But here the expectancy is not for a means of knowledge in general, it is for the specific means constituted by producedness qualified by impermanence. A qualified reason cannot be employed without stating the probandom. Nor is the neutral judge's statement, present here a means of knowledge for the real probandom, suitable in the contexts of both proponent and opponent. Hence sentential expectancy concerning the reason does not arise without a thesis expressing the probandom, and the semantic relation between reason and probandom is not expressed without the thesis. Therefore the thesis is an instrumental member of inference for another. A statement of the reason is necessary. 12. After stating the thesis concerning the probandom, a sentence expressing the reason and containing the ablative case must be used, because only thereby is the expectancy for a reason is cause fulfilled. If some other sentence is uttered instead of the expected reason statement, a ground of defeat arises. The general linguistic rule is that expectancy terminates only through use of the expected sentence. Therefore a reason statement is necessary after the statement of the probandom. Definition of the reason. Reasonhood is the property of an expression containing the ablative case which produces verbal cognition without stating the probandom and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. Alternatively, the reason is that member statement of Nyaya in which the ablative case expresses the causal status of the reason. Or the reason is that member of Nyaya which produces a verbal cognition that generates expectancy for an example. Or the reason is a sentence which, with the intention of producing inferential cognition, produces a cognition not mentioning the pro-bandom and ending in the ablative case. Or the reason is an ablative-containing sentence that removes the expectancy for a cause produced by the thesis. Or the reason is a sentence ending in the fifth case, used with the intention of producing inferential cognition. The meaning of the reason expression must indicate cognition of the reason. Otherwise a meaning unrelated to the reason would remain, and since the reason would not actually be in the ablative relation, it would not become a cause of inference of the probandom. Therefore expectancy for a cause is fulfilled only by cognition of a reason connected with the ablative meaning. Definitions of affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative reasons. 14. According to some scholars, reasonhood is the property of a sentence producing cognition that contains a universal, as the cognition produced by, because it possesses smoke, contains the universal smokehood, while that universal is absent from the cognitions produced by the thesis and the other members. Other scholars reject this view. Without understanding the general nature of a universal, cognition containing that universal cannot be apprehended from a particular sentence, hence the definition of reasonhood should not depend on a universal. An affirmative reason is a member of Nyaya which, containing an ablative case that expresses the causal status of the reason, produces expectancy for an example expressing affirmative perversion. In the definition of a negative reason, an expression denoting negative perversion is substituted for the expression denoting affirmative perversion. An affirmative negative reason is a member of gnya that produces expectancy for examples of both kinds, affirmative and negative. definitions of the affirmative negative and purely affirmative reasons.

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