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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.995476)
Duration: 21:15
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33दाड़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़
0:33–0:38that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous.
0:39–0:43Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object.
0:44–0:49The Mtsaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a
0:49–0:54property as qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has
0:54–0:59already been determined by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first
0:59–1:04cognition's validity cannot be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity
1:04–1:09because doubt about validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering
1:09–1:16human conduct arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies,
1:16–1:21granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes
1:21–1:25that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first
1:25–1:30cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition consisting
1:30–1:34in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness, otherwise doubt
1:34–1:41would not arise afterward. Udayanakarya's refutation of the Mishram Saka view.
1:43–1:47The Mishram M. Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes
1:47–1:52as its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness.
1:52–1:57In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers
1:57–2:02apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to
2:02–2:07the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver.
2:07–2:11Therefore reflexive awareness determines both thisness and silverness as qualifiers in the
2:11–2:17property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness
2:17–2:22is, I know this object before me as qualified by both thisness and silverness, not, I know
2:22–2:27both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking
2:27–2:32an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness
2:32–2:36are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing
2:36–2:42in the self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition,
2:42–2:46which makes thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that
2:46–2:51self is the substrate of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not
2:51–2:55indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition. But its object is the first
2:55–3:00cognition, not the qualification by business and sylvan is in the property bearer, this, itself.
3:01–3:05Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined by the causal
3:05–3:10aggregate of reflexive awareness. In a state lacking habituation, because the first cognitions
3:10–3:14validity becomes an object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically through another means.
3:16–3:21Avoidance of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view
3:21–3:28The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known from its own causal aggregate,
3:28–3:31it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means.
3:31–3:36The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first cognition,
3:36–3:40while in the Ba view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an inference.
3:40–3:44Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically,
3:44–3:48prove something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already
3:48–3:49established.
3:49–3:54It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity
3:54–4:00is other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended.
4:00–4:05The validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended,
4:05–4:09therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that
4:09–4:11of the first cognition.
4:11–4:15And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called other relative
4:15–4:20to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable consequence of
4:20–4:24invalidity in cognition would follow.
4:24–4:28The Nayaika replies that in the unhabituated state the validity of the first cognition
4:28–4:32is known neither, as the guru school maintains, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition
4:32–4:36that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the mere aggregate distinct from the
4:36–4:40substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference, in the general senses accepted
4:40–4:45by the Mishra and Bar schools. In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its
4:45–4:50validity becomes an object of doubt. Once the object has been determined, no doubt about
4:50–4:54the object arises in the third moment, and without doubt about validity there is no doubt
4:54–4:59about the object. Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity
4:59–5:03is not deviant. The validity of the disputed first cognition
5:03–5:06is not known from the causal aggregate of the first cognition producing the substrate
5:06–5:10of validity, because even after the first cognition has become determinate, and without
5:10–5:16a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted in the third moment, just like invalidity.
5:16–5:20Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity
5:20–5:24arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such
5:24–5:26a cognition.
5:26–5:31The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies
5:31–5:35validity alone and not its substrate is unsound.
5:35–5:40Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate
5:40–5:44of validity substrate, namely the first cognition.
5:44–5:48Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal
5:48–5:53aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties,
5:53–5:58the doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning.
5:58–6:02Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's
6:02–6:08own causal aggregate is contradictory, knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination,
6:08–6:12knowable in another manner.
6:12–6:18The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference.
6:18–6:22Traditionalist Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely
6:22–6:24negative inference.
6:24–6:29Example, this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire, because
6:29–6:33it produces activity toward fire capable of burning.
6:33–6:38Objection, unless validity is already known, negative pervasion between the reason and the
6:38–6:42probandom cannot be determined, how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition
6:42–6:43of validity?
6:43–6:48Answer, to avoid self-defeat, veridical cognition in general and its objects such as fire are
6:48–6:50initially accepted as established.
6:50–6:55Then, on the basis of that examples being knowable, being an object of prama, is inferred
6:55–6:57in fire.
6:57–7:01Since the probandom is generally familiar in the example, the specific validity of
7:01–7:05the cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandom, and because the probandom has not
7:05–7:09previously been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon or purely affirmative
7:09–7:11reason.
7:11–7:15It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property in all cognitions,
7:15–7:19since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs.
7:19–7:23Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be, not being delimited
7:23–7:28by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example.
7:28–7:32Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire,
7:32–7:37with respect to fire as qualificant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire, ultimately
7:37–7:42establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire.
7:42–7:46A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his
7:46–7:50own cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying
7:50–7:51validity.
7:51–7:55His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may
7:55–8:00deny validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known either.
8:00–8:05Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity toward fire
8:05–8:09and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the stated form will
8:09–8:15remain unknown. The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier
8:15–8:20produces recollection of validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present,
8:20–8:23or absence of cognition of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it.
8:23–8:29By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition
8:29–8:34of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent from fire
8:34–8:36its qualifier.
8:36–8:40The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this
8:40–8:44recollection born of a prior impression.
8:44–8:49Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible.
8:49–8:52The Navya Nayaka view.
8:52–8:57The Navyanayakas say that the validity of the first cognition, that is, the app...
8:57–9:02The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood
9:02–9:07its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where firehood is absent.
9:07–9:11It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier.
9:11–9:15It does not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making
9:15–9:17firehood its qualifier.
9:17–9:20It does not fail to take fire as qualifacant.
9:20–9:26It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with firehood, or it does not make A.
9:26–9:29Qualifier Absent from Fire It's Qualifier.
9:29–9:34This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier in producing
9:34–9:38activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking
9:38–9:42fire capable of burning is qualifacant.
9:42–9:49Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire.
9:49–9:57of invalidity. All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion,
9:57–10:02the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in other means,
10:02–10:07as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where firehood was absent.
10:08–10:13In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between
10:13–10:18the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as pro-bandim that produces activity
10:18–10:23toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid
10:23–10:24of firehood.
10:24–10:29Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason consisting in
10:29–10:33absence of the absence of the reason that pervades invalidity.
10:33–10:37The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the absence
10:37–10:43of the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the probandom.
10:43–10:47When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the probandom,
10:47–10:51Prior familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is required.
10:51–10:57Without familiarity with the probandum, absence of the probandum cannot be inferred.
10:57–11:06But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference.
11:06–11:13Negative pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar in an example.
11:13–11:18For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because it possesses
11:18–11:22spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without prior familiarity
11:22–11:28with space, because absence of spacehood pervades what is not space.
11:28–11:32It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by validity can be inferred when validity
11:32–11:35is qualifier was not previously known.
11:35–11:40Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier, such a qualified inference is not possible
11:40–11:42at first.
11:42–11:46First there is the inference, validity is present in the first cognition, then from the same
11:46–11:52reason arises the qualified inference, the first cognition is qualified by validity.
11:52–11:56This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is the substrate of the absence of
11:56–12:01a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition, the absence of a pot is on the
12:01–12:03ground.
12:03–12:08In this way absence of cognition having firehood is mowed in a substrate devoid of firehood
12:08–12:10is inferred.
12:10–12:15But a doubt first arises, does this cognition having firehood as mode make firehood a qualifier
12:15–12:20in fire and doubt with firehood, or in something devoid of firehood?
12:20–12:23There is no third alternative.
12:23–12:27Therefore a decisive inference of the probandom is impossible without first apprehending, in
12:27–12:33something possessing firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode.
12:33–12:39The same order applies in an inference concerning the eternality of cognition.
12:39–12:46alternative form of the purely negative inference. Validity may also be determined by another purely
12:46–12:51negative inference. This cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, takes as its object
12:51–12:55something possessing firehood, because it is an objective cognition and does not take as its
12:55–13:00object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid, as in an invalid cognition
13:00–13:07of fire. If objecthood located in the qualifier can is regarded as a separate entity, the
13:07–13:12The probandom will be, this cognition of fire does not make as qualifier firehood located
13:12–13:17in what is not fire, firehood not co-located with firehood, or firehood absent from the
13:17–13:19substrate of objecthood.
13:19–13:24Its positive meaning, being cognition that makes as qualifier firehood located in fire
13:24–13:28or in the substrate of objecthood, is established through presumption.
13:28–13:33The positive form of the probandom has not previously been independently established,
13:33–13:37because no familiar example of it exists.
13:37–13:42In the illusion of fire, fire is not the substrate of objecthood, only the qualificand is its
13:42–13:43substrate.
13:43–13:49Hence the inference does not prove what is already established.
13:49–13:55A count of validity when objecthood is regarded as a separate entity.
13:55–14:00Other teachers say that, in an illusion of fire, the objecthood residing in the qualifier
14:00–14:04is not distinct from the objecthood residing in the qualificand, therefore that objecthood
14:04–14:10cannot be said to be undelimited by a property not co-located with firehood. For this reason
14:10–14:15the preceding inference does not incur the defect of proving what is already established.
14:16–14:20Objection, a person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel for the jewel and acts toward it may
14:20–14:26by chance obtain the jewel. Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing
14:26–14:30activity that obtains the jewel will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of
14:30–14:35dual cognition. Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a dual does not produce activity
14:35–14:40obtaining the dual, it is cognition of an object different from the dual cognition. The dual is
14:40–14:45obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible. Although
14:45–14:49dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times, the mind can
14:49–14:53know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition and recollection.
14:54–14:56Therefore the reason is not unestablished.
14:56–15:02Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose probandum is absence
15:02–15:07of invalidity, because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive
15:07–15:09instance.
15:09–15:13The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form, the cognition this is
15:13–15:17earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent,
15:17–15:21it does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier, it does not
15:21–15:26make a property absent from the qualificand earthhood its qualifier, while making earthhood
15:26–15:31its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualificand, it is not delimited by a
15:31–15:37qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a property absent from
15:37–15:39earth its qualifier.
15:39–15:43This is because it is a determinant cognition of earthhood taking odor bearing earth as
15:43–15:46qualificand.
15:46–15:50An illusion of earthhood makes earthhood a qualifier and a substrate devoid of
15:50–15:54earthhood, hence the illusion does not make the inference prove what is already established.
15:55–16:00The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificand, whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no
16:00–16:06deviation. The positive probandom, being cognition with earthhood as mode and something possessing
16:06–16:12earthhood is established through presumption. If only cognition taking a distinct object
16:12–16:16hood as object is regarded as determinant, the probandom may be expressed not as,
16:16–16:20this cognition of earth as earth does not make earthhood located in earth its qualifier,
16:20–16:24but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier an earthhood absent from earth,
16:24–16:27not co-located with earthhood, or absent from the substrate of objecthood.
16:28–16:32Its positive meaning, an objecthood that makes us qualifier earthhood co-located with earthhood,
16:32–16:34is established through presumption.
16:36–16:38The view of still other teachers.
16:40–16:44Still other teachers say that the probandom is, absence of cognition that apprehends
16:44–16:47an object delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood.
16:47–16:57The reason is, the cognition this is Earth has as counter positive and objected in which a property not co-located with order is not made the mode, while a property co-located with order is made the mode.
16:57–17:05In this way doubt is not included in the pro-bandam. Alternatively, the pro-bandam may simply be determinate cognition.
17:05–17:11The erroneous cognition the Earth is cold is nevertheless valid in its component concerning Earth.
17:11–17:17In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant,
17:17–17:22because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components.
17:22–17:27Objecthood differs when the qualifican differs, but there is no proof that
17:27–17:34objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs. The form of the affirmative inference,
17:34–17:41the view of other teachers. Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an
17:41–17:45objecthood residing in earth, and that objecthood is delimited by a property
17:45–17:49co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property not co-located
17:49–17:53with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property absent from earth.
17:53–17:57This is because it is cognition of the counter-positive of an objecthood in
17:57–18:00which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode,
18:00–18:03or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not
18:03–18:08located in a non-substrative odor, or it is cognition of the counter-positive
18:08–18:15of an objecthood co-located with odor. But this view is unsound. In such an inference,
18:15–18:21the probandom would be unfamiliar. It must therefore be accepted that in such a purely
18:21–18:26negative inference the positive probandom is established only through presumption.
18:26–18:30Thus a special perversion is known in being cognition that produces activity toward
18:30–18:35the odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively in hands, feet,
18:35–18:40the like. Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that
18:40–18:48property is the reason establishing cognitive validity. Objection and reply concerning apprehension
18:48–18:54of the objecthood of fire capable of burning. It may be objected that the objecthood of
18:54–18:59fire capable of burning, delimited by cognition of fire, cannot be determined by the first
18:59–19:03cognition, this fire is capable of burning, because that cognition does not take itself
19:03–19:08and its objecthood as objects. Nor can that objecthood be determined by a later reflexive
19:08–19:12awareness of fire capable of burning, because the burning capacity of the fire before one
19:12–19:17is not an object of reflexive awareness. Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend
19:17–19:22the burning capacity apprehended by the first cognition. If the firehood located in the
19:22–19:26fire before one and apprehended by the first cognition is made an object of reflexive
19:26–19:31awareness, validity would be known intrinsically. For the same reason it would become impossible
19:31–19:34to determine that cognition of Earth and water takes as its object the substrate of odor
19:34–19:36and viscosity respectively.
19:36–19:42Answer, when reflexive awareness arises of fire making firehood its mode, burning capacity
19:42–19:45is apprehended in the fire that is its object.
19:45–19:49Consequently, objecthood with respect to burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended
19:49–19:53in the first cognition of fire also presented by recollection.
19:53–19:57Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented by recollection, the
19:57–20:01Property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively is mentally
20:01–20:04determined with clarity.
20:04–20:08For after a qualified determination that something is the substrate of odor and the like, a person
20:08–20:13experiences, I apprehended earth-hood and so forth in the substrate of odor and the like.
20:13–20:17This is like the qualified determination of pavazian in smoke presented by recollection,
20:17–20:22or the qualified cognition of fragrance in sandalwood through a visual cognition.
20:22–20:26It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of earth-hood
20:26–20:31is mode in the substrate of odor, just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status
20:31–20:37of the substrate of odor is qualifacant. Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood
20:37–20:42is motorizes, cognition occurs of being cognition with earthhood is mode in the substrate of
20:42–20:47earthhood. Likewise, absence of a mode absent from earth, or absence of a mode absent from
20:47–20:52the qualifacant, for example, absence in earth cognition of cognition making pothood
20:52–20:58its mode is mentally determined with clarity. Thus validity might be intrinsically determined
20:58–21:05by cognition's own causal aggregate. But this argument is unsound. The validity present
21:05–21:10in a first cognition made available for recollection by another first cognition cannot avoid
21:10–21:11being apprehended extrinsically.

Plain text

दाड़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़़ that no doubt arises concerning an object whose cognition is not suspected of being erroneous. Therefore it is proper to regard doubt about validity as the root cause of doubt about an object. The Mtsaka again says that the nature of validity is the arising of cognition with a property as qualifier in the substrate where that property is present. This condition has already been determined by the causal aggregate of the first cognition, therefore the first cognition's validity cannot be doubted. Nor should it be said that this condition is not validity because doubt about validity remains even after that condition has been determined, for unwavering human conduct arises from the determination of precisely that condition. The Naya Yaka replies, granted that this condition is the nature of validity. Nevertheless, experience establishes that after reflexive awareness arises there is doubt both about the validity of the first cognition and about the presence of that validity in the object. Therefore the condition consisting in validity's presence in the object cannot be an object of reflexive awareness, otherwise doubt would not arise afterward. Udayanakarya's refutation of the Mishram Saka view. The Mishram M. Saka says that reflexive awareness alone proves that the first cognition takes as its object, this object before me, a property bearer qualified by both business and silverness. In reflexive awareness the property bearer is identified as qualified by all the qualifiers apprehended by the first cognition. If reflexive awareness were indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition, its form would not be, I know that this object before me is silver. Therefore reflexive awareness determines both thisness and silverness as qualifiers in the property bearer, this. A follower of Udayanakarya replies that the form of reflexive awareness is, I know this object before me as qualified by both thisness and silverness, not, I know both this object and silver. The mind is not independent in producing a cognition taking an external property bearer as its object. In reflexive awareness thisness and silverness are manifested as qualifiers, and such a qualified reflexive awareness is known as residing in the self. Reflexive awareness proves that it takes as its object the first cognition, which makes thisness and silverness qualifiers of the property bearer, this, and that self is the substrate of such reflexive awareness. For this reason reflexive awareness is not indeterminate with respect to the object of the first cognition. But its object is the first cognition, not the qualification by business and sylvan is in the property bearer, this, itself. Therefore the validity of the first cognition is not intrinsically determined by the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness. In a state lacking habituation, because the first cognitions validity becomes an object of doubt, it is determined extrinsically through another means. Avoidance of the defect of proving what is already established in the teacher's view The Memsaka objects that, although the validity of the first cognition is intrinsically known from its own causal aggregate, it is sometimes also known extrinsically through another means. The causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is, other, relative to that of the first cognition, while in the Ba view validity is known through the causal aggregate of an inference. Therefore Udaya Nakarya's inference that, validity is known extrinsically, prove something already established and suffers from the defect of proving what is already established. It cannot be said that the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness apprehending validity is other than the causal aggregate of the first cognition whose validity is apprehended. The validity of the causes of the apprehending cognition is itself sometimes apprehended, therefore the causal aggregate of reflexive awareness is not wholly other than that of the first cognition. And if the causal aggregate of a cognition that apprehends validity is called other relative to that of a cognition that does not apprehend validity, the undesirable consequence of invalidity in cognition would follow. The Nayaika replies that in the unhabituated state the validity of the first cognition is known neither, as the guru school maintains, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition that is its substrate, nor intrinsically from the mere aggregate distinct from the substrate, the causes of reflexive awareness or inference, in the general senses accepted by the Mishra and Bar schools. In the third moment after the first cognition arises, its validity becomes an object of doubt. Once the object has been determined, no doubt about the object arises in the third moment, and without doubt about validity there is no doubt about the object. Therefore the reason in the inference proving extrinsic validity is not deviant. The validity of the disputed first cognition is not known from the causal aggregate of the first cognition producing the substrate of validity, because even after the first cognition has become determinate, and without a separate doubt about invalidity, its validity is doubted in the third moment, just like invalidity. Nor is the validity of an unhabituated first cognition an object of a cognition of validity arising before doubt about validity, because validity remains doubtful even after such a cognition. The argument that no contradiction arises if the word self and intrinsically signifies validity alone and not its substrate is unsound. Self is used relationally and therefore, in context, also denotes the causal aggregate of validity substrate, namely the first cognition. Otherwise self could sometimes be other and other sometimes self, since being a causal aggregate of cognition and being different from such an aggregate or common properties, the doubt is validity known intrinsically or extrinsically, would lose all meaning. Some teachers express the point thus, because the view that validity is known from cognition's own causal aggregate is contradictory, knowable extrinsically means, by specific elimination, knowable in another manner. The traditionalist view, knowledge of validity through inference. Traditionalist Neayakas say that the first cognition of validity is produced by a purely negative inference. Example, this cognition of fire is not delimited by a property absent from fire, because it produces activity toward fire capable of burning. Objection, unless validity is already known, negative pervasion between the reason and the probandom cannot be determined, how then can a purely negative inference produce cognition of validity? Answer, to avoid self-defeat, veridical cognition in general and its objects such as fire are initially accepted as established. Then, on the basis of that examples being knowable, being an object of prama, is inferred in fire. Since the probandom is generally familiar in the example, the specific validity of the cognition of fire is not an unfamiliar probandom, and because the probandom has not previously been determined specifically, there is no defect of an uncommon or purely affirmative reason. It may again be said that validity is not one recurrent property in all cognitions, since object and mode differ, the validity of each cognition differs. Therefore the probandom concerning cognition of fire would merely be, not being delimited by a mode absent from fire, but this probandom is not familiar in the example. Answer, by the force of presence in the subject, the inferred condition, the cognition of fire, with respect to fire as qualificant, is not delimited by a mode absent from fire, ultimately establishes precisely the validity of the cognition whose object is fire. A further objection, on the first occasion a person cannot infer the validity of his own cognition, because at that time he does not know the self-defeat involved in denying validity. His own denial of validity depends on prior knowledge of validity, another person may deny validity without previously knowing it, and thus the self-defeat of another is not known either. Even after the diversity of the reason is known through the coherence of activity toward fire and the incoherence of non-activity, the subject endowed with validity in the stated form will remain unknown. The traditionalist replies that a latent impression generated earlier produces recollection of validity in general, cognition of a qualifier where it is present, or absence of cognition of that qualifier in a substrate devoid of it. By the force of presence in the subject, this general validity, when inferred in cognition of fire, assumes the form a cognition of fire that does not make firehood absent from fire its qualifier. The requirement of prior knowledge of validity in denying it oneself is fulfilled by this recollection born of a prior impression. Therefore a purely negative inference is not impossible. The Navya Nayaka view. The Navyanayakas say that the validity of the first cognition, that is, the app... The purely negative inference may be stated thus, this cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, does not make firehood a qualifier in a substrate where firehood is absent. It does not make a property residing in what is not fire its qualifier. It does not make a qualifier absent from its substrate its qualifier, while making firehood its qualifier. It does not fail to take fire as qualifacant. It is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with firehood, or it does not make A. Qualifier Absent from Fire It's Qualifier. This is because it is a determinate cognition making firehood its qualifier in producing activity toward fire capable of burning, or a determinate cognition of firehood taking fire capable of burning is qualifacant. Whatever is not thus is not so, as in an invalid cognition of fire. of invalidity. All parties accept that, after a sublating cognition and recollection of an illusion, the invalidity of the erroneous cognition is known through mental perception or in other means, as in, I had cognized fire endowed with firehood in a substrate where firehood was absent. In the case of an invalid cognition of fire, negative pervasion is first apprehended between the absence serving as reason and a cognition serving as pro-bandim that produces activity toward fire capable of burning while making firehood a qualifier in a substrate devoid of firehood. Thereafter the probandom, absence of invalidity, is inferred from the reason consisting in absence of the absence of the reason that pervades invalidity. The general rule is that when an absence is apprehended as pervasive of the absence of the reason, the reason establishes the absence of that absence of the probandom. When absence of the reason is apprehended as pervading absence of the probandom, Prior familiarity with the probandum as a counter positive is required. Without familiarity with the probandum, absence of the probandum cannot be inferred. But when absence of the reason pervades presence of the probandum, prior familiarity with the probandum is not a cooperating cause of inference. Negative pervasion can be apprehended even if the probandum has not previously been familiar in an example. For instance, in the inference space is different from what is not space because it possesses spacehood, mutual absence from what is not space is inferred even without prior familiarity with space, because absence of spacehood pervades what is not space. It may be asked how the first cognition qualified by validity can be inferred when validity is qualifier was not previously known. Answer, without knowledge of the qualifier, such a qualified inference is not possible at first. First there is the inference, validity is present in the first cognition, then from the same reason arises the qualified inference, the first cognition is qualified by validity. This is like the qualified cognition, the ground is the substrate of the absence of a pot, which arises after the prior qualitative cognition, the absence of a pot is on the ground. In this way absence of cognition having firehood is mowed in a substrate devoid of firehood is inferred. But a doubt first arises, does this cognition having firehood as mode make firehood a qualifier in fire and doubt with firehood, or in something devoid of firehood? There is no third alternative. Therefore a decisive inference of the probandom is impossible without first apprehending, in something possessing firehood, the property of being cognition with firehood is mode. The same order applies in an inference concerning the eternality of cognition. alternative form of the purely negative inference. Validity may also be determined by another purely negative inference. This cognition of fire, which makes firehood its qualifier, takes as its object something possessing firehood, because it is an objective cognition and does not take as its object something devoid of firehood. Whatever is not so is not valid, as in an invalid cognition of fire. If objecthood located in the qualifier can is regarded as a separate entity, the The probandom will be, this cognition of fire does not make as qualifier firehood located in what is not fire, firehood not co-located with firehood, or firehood absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, being cognition that makes as qualifier firehood located in fire or in the substrate of objecthood, is established through presumption. The positive form of the probandom has not previously been independently established, because no familiar example of it exists. In the illusion of fire, fire is not the substrate of objecthood, only the qualificand is its substrate. Hence the inference does not prove what is already established. A count of validity when objecthood is regarded as a separate entity. Other teachers say that, in an illusion of fire, the objecthood residing in the qualifier is not distinct from the objecthood residing in the qualificand, therefore that objecthood cannot be said to be undelimited by a property not co-located with firehood. For this reason the preceding inference does not incur the defect of proving what is already established. Objection, a person who mistakes the gleam of a jewel for the jewel and acts toward it may by chance obtain the jewel. Then, a determinate cognition having jewelhood as mode and producing activity that obtains the jewel will be a deviant reason in an inference of the validity of dual cognition. Answer, cognition whose object is the gleam of a dual does not produce activity obtaining the dual, it is cognition of an object different from the dual cognition. The dual is obtained merely by chance because otherwise obtaining it would have been impossible. Although dual cognition and the effort that obtains the dual occur at different times, the mind can know their causal relation, as it knows the causal relation between cognition and recollection. Therefore the reason is not unestablished. Nor is there the defect of an uncommon reason in the inference whose probandum is absence of invalidity, because indeterminate cognition has not previously been determined as a positive instance. The purely negative inference concerning earth has this form, the cognition this is earth does not make earthhood a qualifier in a substrate where earthhood is absent, it does not make a property residing in what is not earth its qualifier, it does not make a property absent from the qualificand earthhood its qualifier, while making earthhood its qualifier, it does not fail to make earth its qualificand, it is not delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood, or it does not make a property absent from earth its qualifier. This is because it is a determinant cognition of earthhood taking odor bearing earth as qualificand. An illusion of earthhood makes earthhood a qualifier and a substrate devoid of earthhood, hence the illusion does not make the inference prove what is already established. The reason takes an odorous entity as qualificand, whereas the illusion does not, hence there is no deviation. The positive probandom, being cognition with earthhood as mode and something possessing earthhood is established through presumption. If only cognition taking a distinct object hood as object is regarded as determinant, the probandom may be expressed not as, this cognition of earth as earth does not make earthhood located in earth its qualifier, but as, this cognition does not make its qualifier an earthhood absent from earth, not co-located with earthhood, or absent from the substrate of objecthood. Its positive meaning, an objecthood that makes us qualifier earthhood co-located with earthhood, is established through presumption. The view of still other teachers. Still other teachers say that the probandom is, absence of cognition that apprehends an object delimited by a qualifier not co-located with earthhood. The reason is, the cognition this is Earth has as counter positive and objected in which a property not co-located with order is not made the mode, while a property co-located with order is made the mode. In this way doubt is not included in the pro-bandam. Alternatively, the pro-bandam may simply be determinate cognition. The erroneous cognition the Earth is cold is nevertheless valid in its component concerning Earth. In a collective cognition combining error and veridical cognition, the reason is not deviant, because such a collective cognition is valid with respect to one of its particular components. Objecthood differs when the qualifican differs, but there is no proof that objecthood differs merely because the qualifier differs. The form of the affirmative inference, the view of other teachers. Other teachers say, the cognition this is earth possesses an objecthood residing in earth, and that objecthood is delimited by a property co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property not co-located with earthhood, or is undilimited by a property absent from earth. This is because it is cognition of the counter-positive of an objecthood in which a property not co-located with odor becomes the mode, or it possesses an objecthood qualified by earthhood that is not located in a non-substrative odor, or it is cognition of the counter-positive of an objecthood co-located with odor. But this view is unsound. In such an inference, the probandom would be unfamiliar. It must therefore be accepted that in such a purely negative inference the positive probandom is established only through presumption. Thus a special perversion is known in being cognition that produces activity toward the odor, viscosity, and fire capable of burning found respectively in hands, feet, the like. Therefore being cognition that makes a property a mode in the substrate of that property is the reason establishing cognitive validity. Objection and reply concerning apprehension of the objecthood of fire capable of burning. It may be objected that the objecthood of fire capable of burning, delimited by cognition of fire, cannot be determined by the first cognition, this fire is capable of burning, because that cognition does not take itself and its objecthood as objects. Nor can that objecthood be determined by a later reflexive awareness of fire capable of burning, because the burning capacity of the fire before one is not an object of reflexive awareness. Reflexive awareness lacks the capacity to re-apprehend the burning capacity apprehended by the first cognition. If the firehood located in the fire before one and apprehended by the first cognition is made an object of reflexive awareness, validity would be known intrinsically. For the same reason it would become impossible to determine that cognition of Earth and water takes as its object the substrate of odor and viscosity respectively. Answer, when reflexive awareness arises of fire making firehood its mode, burning capacity is apprehended in the fire that is its object. Consequently, objecthood with respect to burning capacity presented by recollection is apprehended in the first cognition of fire also presented by recollection. Likewise, in the first cognitions of water and earth presented by recollection, the Property of taking as object the substrate of viscosity and odor respectively is mentally determined with clarity. For after a qualified determination that something is the substrate of odor and the like, a person experiences, I apprehended earth-hood and so forth in the substrate of odor and the like. This is like the qualified determination of pavazian in smoke presented by recollection, or the qualified cognition of fragrance in sandalwood through a visual cognition. It may again be said that in this condition the eye produces cognition of earth-hood is mode in the substrate of odor, just as in cognition of earthhood it produces the status of the substrate of odor is qualifacant. Thereafter, when the cognition this is earth with earthhood is motorizes, cognition occurs of being cognition with earthhood is mode in the substrate of earthhood. Likewise, absence of a mode absent from earth, or absence of a mode absent from the qualifacant, for example, absence in earth cognition of cognition making pothood its mode is mentally determined with clarity. Thus validity might be intrinsically determined by cognition's own causal aggregate. But this argument is unsound. The validity present in a first cognition made available for recollection by another first cognition cannot avoid being apprehended extrinsically.

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