MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part19_RadioPlay.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996721)
Duration: 21:14
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:32विः कविता, नाटक विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कव
0:32–0:37such as body, bodily part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, efficient causes such as
0:37–0:43sandalwood themselves explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like.
0:43–0:47Conclusion, mind is atomic.
0:47–0:52Naoyaka conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet
0:52–0:56at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises.
0:56–1:00Mind, whose non conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is
1:00–1:06successive assisting regulator of each sense organ. Therefore mind is atomic, all pervasiveness
1:06–1:11is defeated by subject establishing proof. This is also established by inference, while
1:11–1:16mitrezi produces cognition, his nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their
1:16–1:21respective objects, lack the conjunction with mind required to produce perceptions of all those
1:21–1:25objects simultaneously, because all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions
1:25–1:31at one and the same time. Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject,
1:31–1:35otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow.
1:37–1:40Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception.
1:42–1:46It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of
1:46–1:51cognition. Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise
1:51–1:56even when one desires to know a part. Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort
1:56–2:00that directs mind toward the desired sense organ, without attention of mind it is not
2:00–2:06a direct cause of perceptual cognition. Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators
2:06–2:12of sequence. Nor is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents
2:12–2:17simultaneous cognition. When all conditions accept conjunction with mind are present,
2:17–2:23The unseen factor too must be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost.
2:23–2:27The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit,
2:27–2:33because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively.
2:33–2:38Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects
2:38–2:42At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ.
2:42–2:46This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions
2:46–2:51prevent cognition through the other sense organs. Since mind is atomic, conjunction with
2:51–2:56many sense organs at one time is impossible. Thus experiences such as hearing a song while
2:56–3:00watching a dance are aggregates of cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not
3:00–3:03simultaneously.
3:03–3:09Delimiters in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in
3:09–3:13the ear, conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the ear as
3:13–3:18delimited by each sound. Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the ear is
3:18–3:24delimited by a particular sound. Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear,
3:24–3:27while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly.
3:29–3:31The Objection of 20 Songs
3:33–3:37Memsaka Objection, if 20 songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know
3:37–3:42all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all 20 sounds and perception
3:42–3:46of all songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present,
3:46–3:50therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition.
3:52–3:54Proposal of Cognition of Indifference
3:56–4:02One Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired
4:02–4:08noise is merely a cognition of indifference. Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of
4:08–4:13of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition of indifference.
4:13–4:18Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no
4:18–4:20other sound.
4:20–4:24On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise
4:24–4:30of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds.
4:30–4:35Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration.
4:35–4:40Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception
4:40–4:45of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound.
4:45–4:51Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance,
4:51–4:55as cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds.
4:55–5:00In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood
5:00–5:05and g-hood are not known, desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension
5:05–5:08of its particular universal.
5:08–5:13The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds.
5:13–5:17Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at
5:17–5:23one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise.
5:23–5:27The Neayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend
5:27–5:32individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity
5:32–5:38of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively.
5:38–5:44Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind.
5:44–5:48When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited
5:48–5:49by the objects.
5:49–5:53It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, the
5:53–5:58complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct.
5:58–6:04The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously.
6:04–6:08The Objection of Five Cognitions
6:08–6:14The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are simultaneously
6:14–6:18present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural
6:18–6:21to regard them as simultaneous.
6:21–6:26The Nyayaka replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in
6:26–6:31so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous.
6:31–6:35The alternative of five minds is rejected.
6:35–6:41The alternative, let mind be five-fold, one for each sense-organ, is inconsistent.
6:41–6:46If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort,
6:46–6:51and self-experience would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds
6:51–6:54could not be experienced by one person as connected.
6:54–6:58Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self.
7:00–7:03Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts.
7:05–7:11The men's arc is final objection. If mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely in the region of the body,
7:11–7:14not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts.
7:15–7:20How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in dance,
7:20–7:23or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous?
7:23–7:2820 efforts cannot occur together and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because
7:28–7:31there is no defeating cognition.
7:31–7:35Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous.
7:35–7:40Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action.
7:40–7:45The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by
7:45–7:47that desire.
7:47–7:51Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the
7:51–7:57body and its parts. If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal
7:57–8:02complexes of 20 efforts delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many
8:02–8:08movements of dance are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body.
8:08–8:13Thus the Atomic Mind is established. The special qualities of the self, cognition,
8:13–8:18pleasure, pain, and the like are established as apprehensible by the Atomic Mind, the
8:18–8:24The definition of perception is not under-extended in perceptions of pleasure and the like.
8:24–8:32Here ends the theory of the atomicity of mind in the perception section of the Tathasintmai.
8:32–8:37The theory of subsequent cognition.
8:37–8:43Mzaka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:43–8:48The Mzaka says, a present first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known,
8:48–8:54A second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it.
8:54–8:59The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:59–9:04Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition,
9:04–9:08absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of
9:08–9:10the first cognition.
9:10–9:13Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
9:13–9:18Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such
9:18–9:23as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the
9:23–9:27time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative
9:27–9:31concomitance of subsequent cognition.
9:31–9:34Cognition has itself as its object.
9:34–9:39Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable
9:39–9:43of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed.
9:43–9:47Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition
9:47–9:51is required for usage concerning desire and the like.
9:51–9:55It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage
9:55–10:00is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second
10:00–10:01cognition.
10:01–10:05The men's arc replies that the first cognition is itself its own object.
10:05–10:09A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself
10:09–10:11as its object.
10:11–10:15Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no
10:15–10:17mutual dependence.
10:17–10:21Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the
10:21–10:26power of usage, inheritance, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise
10:26–10:29an infinite regress follows.
10:29–10:34Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition.
10:34–10:38The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference.
10:38–10:43How can cognition itself be its own object under identity is unsound.
10:43–10:47Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective
10:47–10:49cognition.
10:49–10:53Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is possible
10:53–10:56without dependence on a relation.
10:56–11:00Just as cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition
11:00–11:04produces usage concerning itself.
11:04–11:07What is the nature of this special nature?
11:07–11:12Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot
11:12–11:18be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience.
11:18–11:22The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe
11:22–11:24it.
11:24–11:29Self-objectivity is self-luminosity.
11:29–11:32It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second
11:32–11:36mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first
11:36–11:38cognition possible without a second.
11:38–11:43Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental
11:43–11:45cognition.
11:45–11:49Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness.
11:49–11:52A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage
11:52–11:56concerning the distinct object's pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no
11:56–12:01separate existence, so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted.
12:01–12:04In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce
12:04–12:08behavior toward silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed
12:08–12:13by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non-apprehension of difference
12:13–12:18from remembered silver cores activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal
12:18–12:21status. Thus cognition self objectivity means
12:21–12:26its self luminosity or capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean
12:26–12:30that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise
12:30–12:34memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition
12:34–12:37itself had been its own object.
12:37–12:41The theory of tripartite perception
12:41–12:45Proponents of tripartite perception say that the claim, usage concerning cognition does
12:45–12:51not require a second mental cognition, aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition.
12:51–12:55Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition.
12:55–12:59Every cognition of the form, I know this, simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition,
12:59–13:00unknown.
13:00–13:05The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action,
13:05–13:09therefore cognition has a tripartite form.
13:09–13:13Inconsistency of being illuminated by another.
13:13–13:18The Nayayika objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent
13:18–13:22cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward.
13:22–13:25The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the
13:25–13:29self-liminosity of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition
13:29–13:34is cumbersome. Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-luminosity,
13:34–13:38otherwise the nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition.
13:40–13:44Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition,
13:44–13:47because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions.
13:48–13:52The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition,
13:52–13:55another cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result.
13:55–14:00Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition, an
14:00–14:05infinite regress arises in knowing the property, cognition is not mental.
14:05–14:09Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of
14:09–14:12an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is
14:12–14:15unavoidable.
14:15–14:20Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality
14:20–14:23The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the
14:23–14:28itself, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition
14:28–14:31is accepted as mental and infinite regress follows.
14:31–14:36Counter inferences are also possible, cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition
14:36–14:41produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception.
14:41–14:45If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished,
14:45–14:49because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established.
14:49–14:53The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus, because
14:53–14:56cognition is self-luminous.
14:56–15:02Self-objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself.
15:02–15:06This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by
15:06–15:11contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself.
15:11–15:15Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known, deviates in pots
15:15–15:19and the like and is fruitless.
15:19–15:24Condition produced by sense object contact is perceptual.
15:24–15:27The simple first cognition is self-luminous.
15:27–15:30Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an
15:30–15:35object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate
15:35–15:36cognition.
15:36–15:40Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because
15:40–15:45self-objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature.
15:45–15:49produced by sense object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual.
15:49–15:54Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the self.
15:54–15:58Determinant perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition,
15:58–16:02but cognition produced by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous.
16:02–16:06Illumination of the cognitive object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause.
16:06–16:11NAYAYAKA REFUTATION OF SELF LUMINOSITY
16:11–16:18The Nayaika replies, Perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition,
16:18–16:24because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver.
16:24–16:28Activity arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition
16:28–16:30is not established by experience.
16:30–16:34The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, arises after the first cognition, this
16:34–16:38experience cannot be discarded.
16:38–16:42Being subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress,
16:42–16:45because not every cognition must be known again.
16:45–16:49Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent
16:49–16:50cognition.
16:50–16:54Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof
16:54–16:58of the form, I know every cognition.
16:58–17:02Cognition is not its own object.
17:02–17:05Agency is being the inhering locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus
17:05–17:09the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being
17:09–17:14the meaning of a verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver,
17:14–17:18cognition itself is not its own object, because no sense object contact is available to make
17:18–17:24cognition an object. Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this appears.
17:25–17:29Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and
17:29–17:33therefore cannot qualify the first cognition. It is not proper to call the
17:33–17:38the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the word cognition is produced
17:38–17:42by an initial cognition of the self. Although the self is itself an object of the first
17:42–17:47cognition, not every cognition thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition
17:47–17:51is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore does not
17:51–17:55generate an objecthood related to itself. The first cognition is perceptual because
17:55–18:00it is the locus of sense-contact, because it is produced by contact with mind, it is
18:00–18:02mental.
18:02–18:06establishing subsequent cognition.
18:06–18:11The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition
18:11–18:15produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not the
18:15–18:20locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because it
18:20–18:24is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of the
18:24–18:26self, and is not produced by itself.
18:26–18:30Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the
18:30–18:35lock us of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition.
18:35–18:40Known this or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition.
18:40–18:43When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory
18:43–18:47is present, subsequent cognition arises.
18:47–18:51When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are
18:51–18:55present, the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions
18:55–18:59do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously.
18:59–19:06Replying Reply Concerning the Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition
19:06–19:10Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced
19:10–19:13by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye.
19:13–19:17The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the
19:17–19:21object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent
19:21–19:24cognition through contact in the form of knownness.
19:24–19:29God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects.
19:29–19:33The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition
19:33–19:36creates an infinite regress is unsound.
19:36–19:40Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an
19:40–19:44object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ.
19:44–19:49It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known.
19:49–19:52When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual
19:52–19:56cause for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent
19:56–19:59cognition can be inhibited.
19:59–20:05Necessary Knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity.
20:05–20:09The men's arka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition
20:09–20:14is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self,
20:14–20:17every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-luminous.
20:17–20:20Reply, no such pervasion is established.
20:20–20:24If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition,
20:24–20:30infinite chain arises. Nor can self-luminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object
20:30–20:35related to a sense organ is perceived. If, though a cause is present, an effect fails
20:35–20:39because of an inhibitor, the causal order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is
20:39–20:45accepted as arising without the postulated cause, the rule of causality is destroyed.
20:45–20:49Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another
20:49–20:52inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would
20:52–20:58not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-liminosity, or inhibition by perception
20:58–21:03of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition.
21:03–21:06Therefore elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of
21:06–21:10cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

Plain text

विः कविता, नाटक विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कव such as body, bodily part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, efficient causes such as sandalwood themselves explain the determinant location of pleasure and the like. Conclusion, mind is atomic. Naoyaka conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises. Mind, whose non conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is successive assisting regulator of each sense organ. Therefore mind is atomic, all pervasiveness is defeated by subject establishing proof. This is also established by inference, while mitrezi produces cognition, his nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time. Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow. Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception. It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition. Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when one desires to know a part. Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired sense organ, without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition. Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence. Nor is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition. When all conditions accept conjunction with mind are present, The unseen factor too must be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost. The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit, because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively. Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ. This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions prevent cognition through the other sense organs. Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible. Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching a dance are aggregates of cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously. Delimiters in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the ear, conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the ear as delimited by each sound. Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the ear is delimited by a particular sound. Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly. The Objection of 20 Songs Memsaka Objection, if 20 songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all 20 sounds and perception of all songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition. Proposal of Cognition of Indifference One Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired noise is merely a cognition of indifference. Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition of indifference. Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no other sound. On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds. Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration. Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound. Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance, as cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known, desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal. The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise. The Neayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively. Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind. When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited by the objects. It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, the complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct. The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously. The Objection of Five Cognitions The Memsaka says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound, are simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural to regard them as simultaneous. The Nyayaka replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous. The alternative of five minds is rejected. The alternative, let mind be five-fold, one for each sense-organ, is inconsistent. If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by one person as connected. Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self. Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts. The men's arc is final objection. If mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts. How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in dance, or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous? 20 efforts cannot occur together and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because there is no defeating cognition. Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous. Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action. The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by that desire. Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body and its parts. If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body. Thus the Atomic Mind is established. The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established as apprehensible by the Atomic Mind, the The definition of perception is not under-extended in perceptions of pleasure and the like. Here ends the theory of the atomicity of mind in the perception section of the Tathasintmai. The theory of subsequent cognition. Mzaka objection cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. The Mzaka says, a present first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known, A second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it. The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition, absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of the first cognition. Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Cognition has itself as its object. Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed. Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition is required for usage concerning desire and the like. It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second cognition. The men's arc replies that the first cognition is itself its own object. A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself as its object. Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no mutual dependence. Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the power of usage, inheritance, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise an infinite regress follows. Self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition. The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference. How can cognition itself be its own object under identity is unsound. Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective cognition. Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is possible without dependence on a relation. Just as cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition produces usage concerning itself. What is the nature of this special nature? Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience. The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe it. Self-objectivity is self-luminosity. It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first cognition possible without a second. Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental cognition. Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness. A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning the distinct object's pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence, so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior toward silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non-apprehension of difference from remembered silver cores activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status. Thus cognition self objectivity means its self luminosity or capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition itself had been its own object. The theory of tripartite perception Proponents of tripartite perception say that the claim, usage concerning cognition does not require a second mental cognition, aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition. Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition. Every cognition of the form, I know this, simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition, unknown. The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action, therefore cognition has a tripartite form. Inconsistency of being illuminated by another. The Nayayika objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward. The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-liminosity of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-luminosity, otherwise the nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition. Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition, because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions. The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result. Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition, an infinite regress arises in knowing the property, cognition is not mental. Pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable. Fault in the inference of mental perceptuality The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the itself, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted as mental and infinite regress follows. Counter inferences are also possible, cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception. If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished, because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established. The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus, because cognition is self-luminous. Self-objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself. Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known, deviates in pots and the like and is fruitless. Condition produced by sense object contact is perceptual. The simple first cognition is self-luminous. Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition. Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self-objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature. produced by sense object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual. Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the self. Determinant perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous. Illumination of the cognitive object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause. NAYAYAKA REFUTATION OF SELF LUMINOSITY The Nayaika replies, Perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver. Activity arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, arises after the first cognition, this experience cannot be discarded. Being subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress, because not every cognition must be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition. Cognition is not its own object. Agency is being the inhering locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being the meaning of a verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object. Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this appears. Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore cannot qualify the first cognition. It is not proper to call the the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the word cognition is produced by an initial cognition of the self. Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to itself. The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense-contact, because it is produced by contact with mind, it is mental. establishing subsequent cognition. The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of the self, and is not produced by itself. Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the lock us of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition. Known this or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition. When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory is present, subsequent cognition arises. When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present, the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously. Replying Reply Concerning the Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition Remaining point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye. The Naya Yaka says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent cognition through contact in the form of knownness. God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects. The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition creates an infinite regress is unsound. Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ. It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known. When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual cause for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent cognition can be inhibited. Necessary Knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity. The men's arka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self, every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-luminous. Reply, no such pervasion is established. If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, infinite chain arises. Nor can self-luminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense organ is perceived. If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated cause, the rule of causality is destroyed. Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-liminosity, or inhibition by perception of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition. Therefore elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

← Transcript index