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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.996814)

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23:53

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1. 0:02–0:34रेकॉताषिन अद दिवूँ, फिष्टि फोर, तिस वूँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँ�
2. 0:34–0:38reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements
3. 0:38–0:42employed by the proponent.
4. 0:42–0:45The view of Suwadsa.
5. 0:45–0:4655.
6. 0:46–0:50Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely
7. 0:50–0:53affirmative inference.
8. 0:53–0:57For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property
9. 0:57–1:01distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general
10. 1:01–1:06property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the
11. 1:06–1:13mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter
12. 1:13–1:19positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence,
13. 1:19–1:25like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect
14. 1:25–1:33When near opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless.
15. 1:33–1:39With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends.
16. 1:39–1:42Prima-facive view of non-establishment.
17. 1:42–1:49Absence of perversion and absence of the reason in the subject are not jointly non-establishment,
18. 1:49–1:52because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion.
19. 1:52–1:59fashion. Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
20. 2:02–2:07The Prima-Facey opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both,
21. 2:07–2:12occurring successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject.
22. 2:14–2:18If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences,
23. 2:18–2:22the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences
24. 2:22–2:28and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual
25. 2:28–2:33absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession.
26. 2:34–2:39Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of
27. 2:39–2:44the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence.
28. 2:46–2:52This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain
29. 2:52–2:56because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely
30. 2:56–3:00through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject
31. 3:00–3:05propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary.
32. 3:05–3:10Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of
33. 3:10–3:13perversion and subject propertyhood.
34. 3:13–3:18If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be
35. 3:18–3:21treated as separate fallacious reasons.
36. 3:21–3:26Or is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly
37. 3:26–3:30through cognition of the qualified absence?
38. 3:30–3:35Individual absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of
39. 3:35–3:38non-establishment.
40. 3:38–3:41Qualified absence is not the defect.
41. 3:41–3:4258.
42. 3:42–3:47In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment.
43. 3:47–3:52Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute
44. 3:52–3:57non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary
45. 3:57–4:00qualifier.
46. 4:00–4:05Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences
47. 4:05–4:07and is therefore dependent.
48. 4:07–4:11The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence.
49. 4:11–4:15There is no need to raise the qualified absence.
50. 4:15–4:19For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected.
51. 4:19–4:24The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification
52. 4:24–4:29is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual
53. 4:29–4:31absences.
54. 4:31–4:35Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary
55. 4:35–4:39in their own forms and defeat the proponent.
56. 4:39–4:42If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not
57. 4:42–4:47non-establish provision, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition,
58. 4:47–4:53it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without
59. 4:53–4:58cognition of deviation, then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture
60. 4:58–5:04with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary
61. 5:04–5:09qualifier. This reputation also rejects the view
62. 5:09–5:13that either absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
63. 5:14–5:19An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown.
64. 5:20–5:24The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless.
65. 5:26–5:30Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
66. 5:32–5:3759. Some scholars say that absence of veritical cognition of perversion and of the reasons
67. 5:37–5:42occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of
68. 5:42–5:48the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present,
69. 5:48–5:55inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because veridical cognition
70. 5:55–6:01is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when veridical cognition itself is unknown,
71. 6:01–6:06cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment.
72. 6:07–6:15Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason.
73. 6:15–6:20The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and veridical cognition
74. 6:20–6:25of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence
75. 6:25–6:30of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible.
76. 6:30–6:34Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood
77. 6:34–6:40of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless.
78. 6:40–6:45Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified
79. 6:45–6:50by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid
80. 6:50–6:51reason.
81. 6:51–6:56It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion
82. 6:56–6:59and subject propertyhood of every reason.
83. 6:59–7:03If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood
84. 7:03–7:08is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy
85. 7:08–7:13the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment.
86. 7:13–7:17If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its
87. 7:17–7:22own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference,
88. 7:22–7:24inference based on error would become impossible.
89. 7:24–7:28In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object
90. 7:28–7:32of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition,
91. 7:32–7:35therefore it could not be a fallacious reason.
92. 7:35–7:40This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of deridical cognition of perversion
93. 7:40–7:46or absence of deridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment.
94. 7:46–7:52Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition
95. 7:52–7:56does not under extend.
96. 7:56–8:02Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment.
97. 8:02–8:04Let it be granted.
98. 8:04–8:09of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment,
99. 8:09–8:12and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment.
100. 8:14–8:19For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject,
101. 8:19–8:24inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood.
102. 8:25–8:29Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject,
103. 8:29–8:34inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain.
104. 8:35–8:39It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious
105. 8:39–8:41reason valid.
106. 8:41–8:47Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason.
107. 8:47–8:51Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect
108. 8:51–8:53of the reason.
109. 8:53–8:57Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion
110. 8:57–9:02and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment.
111. 9:02–9:07of a property qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference,
112. 9:07–9:14hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result.
113. 9:14–9:15Refutation
114. 9:15–9:2062, no, this view is not sound.
115. 9:20–9:25It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment.
116. 9:25–9:30If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of
117. 9:30–9:36deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment.
118. 9:36–9:40And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty
119. 9:40–9:44of perversion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment
120. 9:44–9:48concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious
121. 9:48–9:52reasons, since certainty of perversion is possible even when cognition of such
122. 9:52–9:55non-establishment is present.
123. 9:55–9:59To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first
124. 9:59–10:05be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary
125. 10:05–10:10both for cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration
126. 10:10–10:16in inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would
127. 10:16–10:21not be preserved. If pervasion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid
128. 10:21–10:27reasons, if absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely
129. 10:27–10:32valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it
130. 10:32–10:40could no longer be fallacious. Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious.
131. 10:40–10:44A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when perversion and
132. 10:44–10:50subject propertyhood actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain.
133. 10:50–10:53This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production
134. 10:53–10:57of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious
135. 10:57–11:03even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of
136. 11:03–11:07perversion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized
137. 11:07–11:13defects such as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment
138. 11:13–11:18of perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general.
139. 11:18–11:25This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would
140. 11:25–11:30ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons
141. 11:30–11:35are accepted on the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject
142. 11:35–11:39and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons.
143. 11:39–11:44In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because
144. 11:44–11:50of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor
145. 11:50–11:55but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning
146. 11:55–12:00does not arise if fire itself is absent.
147. 12:00–12:05Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons.
148. 12:05–12:09It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious
149. 12:09–12:11reason.
150. 12:11–12:15But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease
151. 12:15–12:17to be causes of inference.
152. 12:17–12:22If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject propertyhood occurred
153. 12:22–12:27only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious
154. 12:27–12:28reason.
155. 12:28–12:32And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause
156. 12:32–12:37of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause,
157. 12:37–12:43and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless.
158. 12:43–12:47Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
159. 12:47–12:50Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to
160. 12:50–12:55inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence, is
161. 12:55–12:58fallacious reasonhood.
162. 12:58–13:02Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength
163. 13:02–13:04is counterbalance.
164. 13:04–13:08Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment,
165. 13:08–13:14and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory.
166. 13:14–13:20It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment.
167. 13:20–13:24When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason
168. 13:24–13:29is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of
169. 13:29–13:33difference functions separately in erroneous cognition.
170. 13:33–13:36But this view too is not sound.
171. 13:36–13:40Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of perversion and absence of subject
172. 13:40–13:44propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier.
173. 13:44–13:48Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervation and
174. 13:48–13:53subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of
175. 13:53–13:57non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of
176. 13:57–14:03non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment
177. 14:03–14:08The established doctrine is now stated.
178. 14:08–14:13Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment of
179. 14:13–14:19perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration of each separately
180. 14:19–14:23obstructs inference in its own form.
181. 14:23–14:27Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of
182. 14:27–14:32perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment,
183. 14:32–14:39qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form.
184. 14:41–14:45Definitions are fashioned according to experience. Experience is not bent to fit definitions.
185. 14:46–14:50The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object of
186. 14:50–14:55subsumptive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the
187. 14:55–14:58established fivefold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted.
188. 14:58–15:04Restatement of the Established Doctrine
189. 15:04–15:09For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence
190. 15:09–15:13of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, while
191. 15:13–15:18defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms
192. 15:18–15:21our own position.
193. 15:21–15:24The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and
194. 15:24–15:28counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction
195. 15:28–15:34are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain
196. 15:34–15:39scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear.
197. 15:39–15:44Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like,
198. 15:44–15:49its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends.
199. 15:49–15:56and defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract.
200. 15:56–16:02Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment.
201. 16:02–16:07Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject
202. 16:07–16:09be raised?
203. 16:09–16:12It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare
204. 16:12–16:17and denied in a cow, so a sky flower may be treated as related to the sky and denied
205. 16:17–16:21in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow
206. 16:21–16:22is impossible.
207. 16:22–16:28Answer, in the inference, a sky flower is fragrant because it is a flower, the sky flower is
208. 16:28–16:33cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference.
209. 16:33–16:38Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualifical
210. 16:38–16:44can in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent.
211. 16:44–16:49In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does not
212. 16:49–16:52contract with another defect.
213. 16:52–16:57Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment
214. 16:57–17:00arises.
215. 17:00–17:05An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion.
216. 17:05–17:09It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous
217. 17:09–17:12condition of the reason.
218. 17:12–17:17If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive
219. 17:17–17:21in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the
220. 17:21–17:24valid reason smoke.
221. 17:24–17:28In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those
222. 17:28–17:33loci deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an extraneous condition,
223. 17:33–17:35is pervasion.
224. 17:35–17:39A property pervasive in the probandum but not pervasive in the reason is the
225. 17:39–17:42distinct extraneous condition.
226. 17:42–17:48Absence of perversion itself is not an extraneous condition, what is pervaded by absence of perversion
227. 17:48–17:50is an extraneous condition.
228. 17:50–17:55An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently, it indicates
229. 17:55–17:59non-establishment of perversion and depends on it.
230. 17:59–18:04Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason.
231. 18:04–18:10And smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property,
232. 18:10–18:13is not an independent extraneous condition.
233. 18:13–18:18In earth is different from water because it possesses odor, earthhood is not an extraneous
234. 18:18–18:24condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of earthhood.
235. 18:24–18:28If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of
236. 18:28–18:32pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise in inference of pervasion
237. 18:32–18:38and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from
238. 18:38–18:42non-establishment of pervasion and is not an independent fallacious reason.
239. 18:43–18:48Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect
240. 18:48–18:52whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason.
241. 18:53–18:57The absence of the probandom in the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference
242. 18:57–19:02when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason.
243. 19:02–19:07Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is apprehended
244. 19:07–19:10only at the time of inference.
245. 19:10–19:13It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like.
246. 19:13–19:17Otherwise, all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference,
247. 19:17–19:21destroying the nature of veridical inference.
248. 19:21–19:24Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions.
249. 19:24–19:3075, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then
250. 19:30–19:34Even for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because
251. 19:34–19:36that person does not know it.
252. 19:36–19:40There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one
253. 19:40–19:43in one's own inference.
254. 19:43–19:46Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other
255. 19:46–19:50inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious
256. 19:50–19:51reasons.
257. 19:51–19:55Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other
258. 19:55–19:57inhibitor is present.
259. 19:57–20:02Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason.
260. 20:02–20:07Collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat.
261. 20:07–20:0876.
262. 20:08–20:12Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition
263. 20:12–20:16of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom
264. 20:16–20:19should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in
265. 20:19–20:21both.
266. 20:21–20:24The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation
267. 20:24–20:29with something pervaded by the absence of the probandum is defeat, for example, firehood,
268. 20:29–20:32and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandum.
269. 20:32–20:36Answer, this is not sound.
270. 20:36–20:40When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandum
271. 20:40–20:45arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandum, deviation
272. 20:45–20:47alone is necessary.
273. 20:47–20:53If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandum is a defect,
274. 20:53–20:57of the absence of the probandum and the subject is not defeat.
275. 20:57–21:0377. It may again be said that cognition of the reason's co-location with something pervaded
276. 21:03–21:08by the absence of the probandum can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandum.
277. 21:09–21:13Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the
278. 21:13–21:17absence of the probandum is not clear, only counterbalance would remain.
279. 21:18–21:21If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an
280. 21:21–21:26opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics
281. 21:26–21:31favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious.
282. 21:31–21:34A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength.
283. 21:36–21:40Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without
284. 21:40–21:45excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection,
285. 21:45–21:51only deviation arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom
286. 21:51–21:55cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason.
287. 21:55–21:59Defeat is a separate fallacious reason.
288. 21:59–22:0478. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat,
289. 22:04–22:09but establishment of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom.
290. 22:09–22:13Otherwise mutual dependence would result cognition of uselessness from deviation
291. 22:13–22:16and cognition of deviation from uselessness.
292. 22:16–22:23Answer, absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason.
293. 22:23–22:30Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandom.
294. 22:30–22:38Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason.
295. 22:38–22:45Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently.
296. 22:45–22:56Thus theoretical cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation.
297. 22:56–23:03For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason.
298. 23:03–23:10The theoretical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect.
299. 23:10–23:15Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the
300. 23:15–23:20probandom and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore it should
301. 23:20–23:24be regarded as the same defect in inference.
302. 23:24–23:30Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason.
303. 23:30–23:34Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandom and
304. 23:34–23:38the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference.
305. 23:38–23:42Which absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other
306. 23:42–23:48means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference.
307. 23:48–23:50Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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रेकॉताषिन अद दिवूँ, फिष्टि फोर, तिस वूँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँँ� reasons, an inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter-reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect When near opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends. Prima-facive view of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and absence of the reason in the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. fashion. Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The Prima-Facey opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood. If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. Or is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence? Individual absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect. 58. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence. For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences. Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent. If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not non-establish provision, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier. This reputation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars say that absence of veritical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because veridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when veridical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and veridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible. Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless. Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason. It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment. If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason. This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of deridical cognition of perversion or absence of deridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend. Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted. of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain. It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason. Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason. Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. of a property qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result. Refutation 62, no, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty of perversion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons, since certainty of perversion is possible even when cognition of such non-establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration in inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If pervasion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious. Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when perversion and subject propertyhood actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of perversion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general. This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise if fire itself is absent. Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons. It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious reason. But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes of inference. If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject propertyhood occurred only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence, is fallacious reasonhood. Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength is counterbalance. Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory. It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment. When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition. But this view too is not sound. Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier. Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervation and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment The established doctrine is now stated. Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form. Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form. Definitions are fashioned according to experience. Experience is not bent to fit definitions. The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object of subsumptive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established fivefold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted. Restatement of the Established Doctrine For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, while defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms our own position. The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear. Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends. and defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract. Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment. Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised? It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow, so a sky flower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible. Answer, in the inference, a sky flower is fragrant because it is a flower, the sky flower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference. Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualifical can in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion. It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an extraneous condition, is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandum but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of perversion itself is not an extraneous condition, what is pervaded by absence of perversion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently, it indicates non-establishment of perversion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason. And smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition. In earth is different from water because it possesses odor, earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise in inference of pervasion and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of pervasion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom in the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise, all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference. Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions. 75, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then Even for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason. Collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat. 76. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandum is defeat, for example, firehood, and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandum arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandum, deviation alone is necessary. If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandum is a defect, of the absence of the probandum and the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition of the reason's co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandum can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandum. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandum is not clear, only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious. A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength. Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason. 78. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence would result cognition of uselessness from deviation and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer, absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandom. Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently. Thus theoretical cognition of the absence of the probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. The theoretical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference. Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason. Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandom and the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference. Which absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference. Hear the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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