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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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Detected language: en (0.993589)
Duration: 23:12
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:08विः दिद वोट प्रवेज तो प्रवाव्ण्धम बगड नाट के रेजन नाट न एक्ष्ट्रिनिएस कन दिषन.
0:08–0:1420. It may be proposed that whatever does not pervade the reason but does pervade the probandom
0:14–0:19is the extraneous condition. According to this view, in the inference, this is the counter-positive
0:19–0:23of destruction because it is produced, existence would become an extraneous condition because
0:23–0:28it pervades the probandom, being the counter-positive of destruction delimited by the reason-producedness,
0:28–0:32but does not pervade the reason-producedness. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is
0:32–0:37dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous
0:37–0:42condition because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable.
0:43–0:48Under this definition, possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition
0:48–0:53and the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
0:53–0:58although it pervades the probandum perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject.
0:59–1:03Likewise, in the inference water is knowable because it possesses taste,
1:03–1:06Earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability
1:06–1:13delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke
1:13–1:18on the mountain because there is fire. The reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandum
1:18–1:24smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading
1:24–1:30the probandum delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous
1:30–1:37condition. The defect of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both
1:37–1:43foregoing alternative definitions face a problem. Deviation of the reason from the unqualified
1:43–1:48probandom or establishment of the unqualified absence of the probandom would become possible
1:48–1:53only after deviation of the reason from a qualified probandom or the qualified absence
1:53–1:58of the probandom had been established through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence
1:58–2:04of such a condition. Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning
2:04–2:10a different matter would arise. The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the
2:10–2:15unqualified probandom or the unqualified absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified
2:15–2:20probandom or the qualified absence of the probandom.
2:20–2:23It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the
2:23–2:27reason from the unqualified probandom, deviation from the qualified probandom should
2:27–2:32first be established. But this answer too is unacceptable because it would incur the defect
2:32–2:36of prematurely and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified pro-bandom.
2:38–2:46Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason
2:46–2:52from the unqualified pro-bandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from the
2:52–2:57qualified pro-bandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition
2:57–3:00is needed to establish it.
3:00–3:03This argument is untenable.
3:03–3:07In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark
3:07–3:12because it is Mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition
3:12–3:17that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandum, because that condition
3:17–3:22does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandum.
3:22–3:26Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that
3:26–3:31pervades the probandum delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces
3:31–3:36the reason's deviation from the probandum. Therefore no separate description or establishment
3:36–3:41of a deviant extraneous condition is required.
3:41–3:48The doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa. 23, granted, but that which does not pervade
3:48–3:55the reason while pervading the finally determined probandum is a deviant extraneous condition.
3:55–3:59of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reasons presence in
3:59–4:05the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from
4:05–4:10the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness
4:10–4:14is a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason
4:14–4:20knowability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality.
4:20–4:24On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality
4:24–4:29alone becomes the extraneous condition. In support of this view, the following rule is
4:29–4:33given, an opponent should raise an extraneous condition that pervades the finally determined
4:33–4:37probandom, because primacy belongs to the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the
4:37–4:41reason's deviation from the probandom, even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the
4:41–4:46proponent is not present in that extraneous condition. This doctrine also clarifies the
4:46–4:51view that the property pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the reason is
4:51–4:56a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandom ultimately becomes the finally determined
4:56–4:59probandom.
4:59–5:05Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition.
5:05–5:1124. This doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand. According to it, in the
5:11–5:16inference a dia does not in here in a non-eternal substance because it is a produced substance
5:16–5:21lacking magnitude, inheritance and a substance devoid of touch would become an extraneous
5:21–5:26condition because possession of parts has been established in the dyad.
5:26–5:32In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandom.
5:32–5:37Whatever property pervades this probandom but not the reason, being a produced substance
5:37–5:43lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result.
5:43–5:47Moreover, when the sound probandom fire is established on the mountain through the
5:47–5:53subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum
5:53–5:58smoke is not established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain,
5:58–6:03the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason
6:03–6:08is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because
6:08–6:12of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition
6:12–6:15cannot qualify as pervading the probandum.
6:15–6:20Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end.
6:20–6:2725. Here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition.
6:27–6:33That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandom is the extraneous condition.
6:33–6:39In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the
6:39–6:44finally determine probandom is called an extraneous condition.
6:44–6:49In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color
6:49–6:54is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility
6:54–6:58owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color.
6:58–7:02But in the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire
7:02–7:07causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke does
7:07–7:11not deviate from the probandum fire owing to the deviation of the causal complex of fire.
7:13–7:21The reason deviates from the probandum. 26. The probandum familiar in the subject and
7:21–7:26delimited by a property of the subject is regarded, through the relation of collocation,
7:26–7:29as the finally determined probandum delimited by that same property.
7:30–7:35This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood,
7:35–7:36and sometimes kitchenhood or the like.
7:38–7:44The reasons deviation from the probandum due to the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows.
7:45–7:54A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandum because the extraneous condition pervading the probandum itself deviates from the probandum.
7:54–7:59This extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandum.
7:59–8:07An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum.
8:07–8:14Consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum.
8:14–8:23For example, in the inference destruction is non-eternal existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction.
8:23–8:32In the inference air is perceptible, possession of manifest color, serving as an extraneous condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air.
8:32–8:39Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandom.
8:39–8:51When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the qualificand, that is, from the unqualified probandom.
8:51–8:55No defective irrelevant diversion arises.
8:55–9:0227. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the
9:02–9:07qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the
9:07–9:12qualificand, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises.
9:12–9:16For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible
9:16–9:21touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier
9:21–9:26perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts
9:26–9:30with the qualificaln probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject.
9:32–9:36If the reasons deviation from the qualificaln probandum were not held to depend upon its
9:36–9:42deviation from the unqualified qualificaln probandum, cognition of deviation from the
9:42–9:47qualificaln probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualificaln
9:47–9:52unqualified probandome depends upon deviation from the unqualified qualifcant probandome or
9:52–9:57the original probandome, establishing deviation from the qualified probandome does not incur
9:57–10:01the defect of irrelevant diversion.
10:01–10:07Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion.
10:07–10:1228, alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous
10:12–10:16condition may be explained as follows.
10:16–10:20In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
10:20–10:25the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility
10:25–10:30because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but
10:30–10:33it does not deviate from substancehood.
10:33–10:37Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the reason
10:37–10:42being Mitra's son deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property
10:42–10:47pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's
10:47–10:51sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar.
10:51–10:55Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it is not the counter-positive
10:55–11:00of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being Mitra's sun, and such
11:00–11:06non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar.
11:06–11:11Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates
11:11–11:17from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom. Such extraneous condition
11:17–11:22hood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore, in the inference, destruction
11:22–11:27is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant diversion arises even
11:27–11:33though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the extraneous condition.
11:33–11:38Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect. In this inference there is no pseudo
11:38–11:44reason other than the extraneous condition. Therefore only the extraneous condition is
11:44–11:49recognized as the defect. It may be objective that under this definition non-audibility would
11:49–11:54become an extraneous condition in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable,
11:54–11:58and earthhood in the inference, water is knowable because it possesses taste. But this is
11:58–12:02untenable because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative pro-bandom
12:02–12:06establishes the probandom, while non-audibility and earthhood do not pervade the qualified
12:06–12:09probandom.
12:09–12:13Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition.
12:13–12:1429.
12:14–12:18It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the
12:18–12:22definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that
12:22–12:26is not an extraneous condition, because cognition of the visiating power of an extraneous
12:26–12:30condition is destroyed, for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited
12:30–12:34by a property of the subject, is free from defect.
12:34–12:36This objection is untenable.
12:36–12:40In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions
12:40–12:46pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained.
12:46–12:49Mere observation of the reason's invariable relation with the probandom, without the
12:49–12:53assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not
12:53–12:56ascertainment that the extraneous condition pervades it.
12:56–13:01Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition.
13:02–13:10Possession of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not.
13:10–13:2330. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom is present.
13:23–13:33But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous conditions.
13:34–13:42Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition.
13:42–13:46condition, in an inference concerning the darkness of mitra's sun, being produced by
13:46–13:51vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality
13:51–13:55of a produced object, existence is an extraneous condition.
13:55–13:59The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel increases the intensity of the probandum
13:59–14:04smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitants not otherwise established proves causality
14:04–14:08with respect to the perceptibility of a substance, medical treatises explain causality
14:08–14:11through vegetable cooking in the darkness of mitra's sun, and the impossibility
14:11–14:16of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object. Therefore each of the
14:16–14:21foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective probandom.
14:21–14:27Objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
14:27–14:3231, maybe objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known
14:32–14:38through evidence. If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible.
14:38–14:42but this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favourable
14:42–14:47hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect.
14:47–14:52Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the pervasion
14:52–14:58is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition,
14:58–15:02because an equal means generates doubt about pervasion.
15:02–15:07Where favourable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation, either extraneous condition
15:07–15:12and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions pervasion
15:12–15:15of the probandum is ascertained.
15:15–15:20Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity of an extraneous condition, therefore
15:20–15:24it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that produces doubt about the reasons deviation
15:24–15:27from the probandum.
15:27–15:32Reply, subject otherness is a defect.
15:32–15:3732, some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandum just as it pervades
15:37–15:43the absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject-otherness
15:43–15:47and the means producing cognition, through subject-otherness, that the reason deviates
15:47–15:53from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its absence
15:53–15:57would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandom
15:57–16:02and something pervading its absence would occur there.
16:02–16:07But this is impossible. Subject-otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the
16:07–16:13probandum and its absence. How, then, could subject-otherness become a doubtful extraneous
16:13–16:18condition that destroys pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandum merely
16:18–16:22because there is doubt that it pervades the probandum?
16:22–16:28This view is untenable. On the basis of being a pervader of the probandum, subject-otherness
16:28–16:33certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason
16:33–16:37deviates from the probandom.
16:37–16:41Objection and extraneous condition is not a defect.
16:41–16:4733. It may again be objected that where an extraneous condition is present and deviates
16:47–16:51from the reasons probandom, but favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing pervasion
16:51–16:56is absent, non-experience of pervasion is appropriate.
16:56–17:00On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning
17:00–17:05are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because it
17:05–17:10fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a
17:10–17:16defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
17:16–17:20The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence
17:20–17:25of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion
17:25–17:29by the probandum, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing
17:29–17:36cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable.
17:36–17:41To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable
17:41–17:46hypothetical reasoning. Consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning
17:46–17:53would be the defect, not the extraneous condition.
17:53–17:58Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued.
17:58–18:03of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect.
18:03–18:0934. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous
18:09–18:13condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts, in one and the
18:13–18:18same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore its relations with
18:18–18:22the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted in different substrata.
18:22–18:26Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation
18:26–18:32the probandom must necessarily be accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical
18:32–18:38reasoning, which produces the absence of provision, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an
18:38–18:44extraneous condition. Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical
18:44–18:51reasoning must be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition.
18:51–18:5835. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of
18:58–19:02the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason.
19:03–19:08In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the
19:08–19:12relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition.
19:13–19:17For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire,
19:17–19:21conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire,
19:21–19:25because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the
19:25–19:31absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference,
19:31–19:36destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood
19:36–19:40establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reason
19:40–19:46producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external
19:46–19:51sense because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest
19:51–19:56color establishes in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum
19:56–19:59of perceptible touch and perceptibility.
19:59–20:04But subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness
20:04–20:08cannot be an extraneous condition.
20:08–20:13The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition.
20:13–20:1936, some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting
20:19–20:24counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive
20:24–20:26of an absence.
20:26–20:30Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition.
20:30–20:35A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual
20:35–20:39of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the
20:39–20:42probandom.
20:42–20:47But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition
20:47–20:51in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would
20:51–20:55arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's pervasion
20:55–20:59by fire.
20:59–21:02Refutation of the YATU author's definition.
21:02–21:0637, this definition is untenable.
21:06–21:09In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as the delimiter of being the
21:09–21:14object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter indicated by the absence
21:14–21:18of a non-locker possessing the property delimiting the counter-positives counter-positiveness
21:18–21:23is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition of a special extraneous
21:23–21:27condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily
21:27–21:32become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yatu authors definitions
21:32–21:35are unacceptable.
21:35–21:41condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion.
21:41–21:4638. Some scholars say that either what pervades the probandom or what does not pervade the
21:46–21:52reason is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject,
21:52–21:57the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another
21:57–22:02pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The
22:02–22:07The Probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because
22:07–22:13the Probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the Probandom.
22:13–22:17Otherwise every inference would be destroyed.
22:17–22:22Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct suitor reason or defect.
22:22–22:28Division of extraneous conditions 39.
22:28–22:31Extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful.
22:31–22:36A condition that certainly pervades the probandum but not the reason, and assists ascertainment
22:36–22:42that the reason deviates from the probandum, is a certain extraneous condition.
22:42–22:46In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire
22:46–22:50produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition.
22:50–22:54Where there is doubt concerning the reason's non-pervasion of the probandum or the condition's
22:54–22:59pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition.
22:59–23:04In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable
23:04–23:08cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

Plain text

विः दिद वोट प्रवेज तो प्रवाव्ण्धम बगड नाट के रेजन नाट न एक्ष्ट्रिनिएस कन दिषन. 20. It may be proposed that whatever does not pervade the reason but does pervade the probandom is the extraneous condition. According to this view, in the inference, this is the counter-positive of destruction because it is produced, existence would become an extraneous condition because it pervades the probandom, being the counter-positive of destruction delimited by the reason-producedness, but does not pervade the reason-producedness. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable. Under this definition, possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition and the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, although it pervades the probandum perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject. Likewise, in the inference water is knowable because it possesses taste, Earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. The reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandum smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading the probandum delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition. The defect of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem. Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or establishment of the unqualified absence of the probandom would become possible only after deviation of the reason from a qualified probandom or the qualified absence of the probandom had been established through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition. Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would arise. The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or the unqualified absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified probandom or the qualified absence of the probandom. It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom, deviation from the qualified probandom should first be established. But this answer too is unacceptable because it would incur the defect of prematurely and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified pro-bandom. Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason from the unqualified pro-bandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from the qualified pro-bandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandum, because that condition does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandum. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that pervades the probandum delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces the reason's deviation from the probandum. Therefore no separate description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa. 23, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined probandum is a deviant extraneous condition. of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reasons presence in the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason knowability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality. On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality alone becomes the extraneous condition. In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reason's deviation from the probandom, even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that extraneous condition. This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandom ultimately becomes the finally determined probandom. Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition. 24. This doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand. According to it, in the inference a dia does not in here in a non-eternal substance because it is a produced substance lacking magnitude, inheritance and a substance devoid of touch would become an extraneous condition because possession of parts has been established in the dyad. In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandom. Whatever property pervades this probandom but not the reason, being a produced substance lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result. Moreover, when the sound probandom fire is established on the mountain through the subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum. Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. 25. Here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandom is the extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the finally determine probandom is called an extraneous condition. In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandum fire owing to the deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandum. 26. The probandum familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is regarded, through the relation of collocation, as the finally determined probandum delimited by that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood, and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandum due to the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandum because the extraneous condition pervading the probandum itself deviates from the probandum. This extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandum. An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum. Consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum. For example, in the inference destruction is non-eternal existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction. In the inference air is perceptible, possession of manifest color, serving as an extraneous condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air. Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandom. When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the qualificand, that is, from the unqualified probandom. No defective irrelevant diversion arises. 27. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the qualificand, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises. For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts with the qualificaln probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject. If the reasons deviation from the qualificaln probandum were not held to depend upon its deviation from the unqualified qualificaln probandum, cognition of deviation from the qualificaln probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualificaln unqualified probandome depends upon deviation from the unqualified qualifcant probandome or the original probandome, establishing deviation from the qualified probandome does not incur the defect of irrelevant diversion. Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion. 28, alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition may be explained as follows. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the reason being Mitra's son deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar. Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being Mitra's sun, and such non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar. Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom. Such extraneous condition hood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore, in the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the extraneous condition. Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect. In this inference there is no pseudo reason other than the extraneous condition. Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect. It may be objective that under this definition non-audibility would become an extraneous condition in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference, water is knowable because it possesses taste. But this is untenable because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative pro-bandom establishes the probandom, while non-audibility and earthhood do not pervade the qualified probandom. Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition. 29. It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition, because cognition of the visiating power of an extraneous condition is destroyed, for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject, is free from defect. This objection is untenable. In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained. Mere observation of the reason's invariable relation with the probandom, without the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that the extraneous condition pervades it. Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition. Possession of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not. 30. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom is present. But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition. condition, in an inference concerning the darkness of mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object, existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel increases the intensity of the probandum smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitants not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness of mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective probandom. Objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 31, maybe objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through evidence. If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible. but this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favourable hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect. Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the pervasion is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition, because an equal means generates doubt about pervasion. Where favourable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation, either extraneous condition and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions pervasion of the probandum is ascertained. Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity of an extraneous condition, therefore it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that produces doubt about the reasons deviation from the probandum. Reply, subject otherness is a defect. 32, some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandum just as it pervades the absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject-otherness and the means producing cognition, through subject-otherness, that the reason deviates from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandom and something pervading its absence would occur there. But this is impossible. Subject-otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandum and its absence. How, then, could subject-otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandum merely because there is doubt that it pervades the probandum? This view is untenable. On the basis of being a pervader of the probandum, subject-otherness certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom. Objection and extraneous condition is not a defect. 33. It may again be objected that where an extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reasons probandom, but favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing pervasion is absent, non-experience of pervasion is appropriate. On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because it fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion by the probandum, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable. To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning. Consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning would be the defect, not the extraneous condition. Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued. of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect. 34. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts, in one and the same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore its relations with the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted in different substrata. Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation the probandom must necessarily be accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of provision, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition. Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire, because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference, destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reason producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch and perceptibility. But subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness cannot be an extraneous condition. The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition. 36, some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive of an absence. Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition. A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom. But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's pervasion by fire. Refutation of the YATU author's definition. 37, this definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter indicated by the absence of a non-locker possessing the property delimiting the counter-positives counter-positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yatu authors definitions are unacceptable. condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion. 38. Some scholars say that either what pervades the probandom or what does not pervade the reason is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The The Probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because the Probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the Probandom. Otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct suitor reason or defect. Division of extraneous conditions 39. Extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandum but not the reason, and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandum, is a certain extraneous condition. In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition. Where there is doubt concerning the reason's non-pervasion of the probandum or the condition's pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition. In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

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