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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 21:16
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0:02–0:06प्रिमब्फ़शि व्य।, इनहेर्फ्ष देखाए नाद्विश्व रेक।
0:06–0:12To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely
0:12–0:15an error, because a defeating contradiction is present.
0:15–0:19On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness
0:19–0:24in the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed.
0:24–0:27The prima facie objecta says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be
0:27–0:31neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction
0:31–0:34or non-establishment.
0:34–0:38nor is there merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified
0:38–0:41cognition is already established.
0:41–0:45The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that
0:45–0:50is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition.
0:50–0:54On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation,
0:54–0:58such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence.
0:58–1:02Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a relation
1:02–1:06as its object, the probandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata, in cognition
1:06–1:11of absence such a reason would deviate from the probandom. A reason qualified by, accompanied
1:11–1:16by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the probandom as, distinct
1:16–1:20from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition of absence is possible without a
1:20–1:24distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness produced by a special
1:24–1:28qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise possible in qualify cognition
1:28–1:32without mentioning any particular adherence.
1:32–1:36The Prima-Facey objector also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here
1:36–1:40are concerning parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from
1:40–1:45a container-contained relation, therefore adherence is established.
1:45–1:48Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified
1:48–1:52cognition such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition.
1:52–1:57The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience
1:57–2:00is possible merely through the container-contained relation.
2:00–2:05The prima facie objecta says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance,
2:05–2:08and cognition is the locus or substrate.
2:08–2:16Bavu-qualify-hood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation.
2:16–2:20Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation,
2:20–2:24inherent can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation
2:24–2:29by the following inference sound soundness color and the like are related to a sense organ because
2:29–2:34they are perceptible like a part a sense organ apprehends an object related to itself hence
2:34–2:40inheritance itself is not perceived since it is not related to the sense organ. Inherence cannot
2:40–2:44be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier for that would entail an infinite
2:44–2:50regress of relations cognition merely by its own nature produces cognition of the object related
2:50–2:54to it, similarly, inheritance too, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of its
2:54–2:59relata. If an additional relation were admitted for cognition, every entity could, merely by its
2:59–3:04own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it. Nevertheless the fact that
3:04–3:08universals and the light produce cognition of their relata merely by their own nature
3:08–3:12does not eliminate inheritance, otherwise, in the absence of a relation to a sense organ,
3:12–3:15universals, and the light would be imperceptible just as inheritance is.
3:15–3:22This proposal is not correct. Even when inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, a
3:22–3:27self-linking relation must still be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation of substance
3:27–3:31to quality or universal, the self-linking relation alone may be accepted as the apprehensive
3:31–3:36relation, just as in the relation between the ground and an absence. What need is there,
3:36–3:41then, for a separate relation called inheritance? An object is apprehended through the self-linking
3:41–3:44relation between ground and absence. Sound may be apprehended through its
3:44–3:48qualifierhood with respect to what is related to the sense organ. Sound is
3:48–3:51through qualifierhood of a qualifier, and color through qualifierhood of an object
3:51–3:56related to a sense organ. One should not ask here how qualities such as color
3:56–4:00will be known to exist in a substance through a self-linking relation, for
4:00–4:04even after inherences accepted the same difficulty remains, how will those
4:04–4:08entities be known to exist in the substance through inheritance?
4:08–4:15Recutation of the Guru's school. The teachers say, when one part of a pot is
4:15–4:19bait, that same pot successively acquires black and red colors in its two
4:19–4:24parts. These two colors are not produced from the two earlier colors. Since
4:24–4:28color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time.
4:28–4:33Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only
4:33–4:36production and destruction of their relation are possible, and that
4:36–4:39Relation is Inherence.
4:39–4:42This view is not correct.
4:42–4:46The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves
4:46–4:49color to be non-eternal.
4:49–4:53No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance.
4:53–4:58On the guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance,
4:58–5:04smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed.
5:04–5:09of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence of a
5:09–5:12defeating contradiction.
5:12–5:17The sedentans reply, Inherence can be inferred.
5:17–5:20The sedention concludes, the inference that establishes inheritance as an apprehensive
5:20–5:25relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals take
5:25–5:29the relation of their qualifiers as an object, because they are qualified cognitions, like
5:29–5:33the cognition of a man carrying a staff.
5:33–5:36of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this
5:36–5:40inference because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the
5:40–5:44qualifier relation in the form of a self-linking relation nor does the
5:44–5:47inference establish a relation wholly different on the ground that qualify
5:47–5:50cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking relation as their
5:50–5:54object by the force of subjecthood and through economy the qualifier
5:54–5:57relation that is the object of qualified cognitions of qualities actions
5:57–6:00and universals is established as one and the same relation
6:00–6:05inherent, not a self-linking relation. Self-linking relations are innumerable,
6:05–6:09owing to the innumerable natures of particular individuals, and are not a common relation.
6:11–6:15Alternatively, let the probandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let the reason be
6:15–6:20qualified by, while being veridical. The qualifier relation that causes qualifier cognition is
6:20–6:25established as the single relation of inheritance, because a recurrent effect is regulated by a
6:25–6:30a recurrent cause. Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent. It is not
6:30–6:34the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to qualified cognition.
6:35–6:39If perceptual qualified cognition neither took a relation as its object nor were produced by a
6:39–6:43relation, a separate qualified cognition would likewise have to be admitted in a collected
6:43–6:48cognition of horses and cows. The Navya Nyaya inference
6:48–6:55Novya Naiyayikas say, a qualified cognition of equality, action, or universal takes as
6:55–6:59its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified
6:59–7:03cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified
7:03–7:08cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier. In qualified cognition
7:08–7:13of absence the reason does not deviate from the probandom. This inference does not
7:13–7:18fail to establish inheritance, because it rests upon an unconditioned pervasion.
7:18–7:23This is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from unqualified cognition.
7:23–7:28Alternatively, the inference establishes inheritance as the apprehensive relation of a quality, action,
7:28–7:32or universal related to a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the like is produced
7:32–7:36by a relation belonging to an entity connected with a sense organ, because it is a produced
7:36–7:38perception.
7:38–7:42By the force of subjecthood the relation is established as one recurrent relation.
7:42–7:46A recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause, the qualifierhood of color and
7:46–7:49like in a particular object connected with the sense organ is individual specific,
7:49–7:55non-recurrent, and therefore not a recurrent cause. Hence, through economy, only the recurrent
7:55–7:58inheritance is established as the cause of perceptions of color, taste, and the like.
8:00–8:04This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only conjunction and
8:04–8:09qualifierhood as apprehensive relations. Since qualifierhood is the particular
8:09–8:14nature of an individual, it is non-recurrent, inheritance is needed to explain apprehension
8:14–8:18through the fourfold relations involving inheritance.
8:18–8:23Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, inheritance itself is also established
8:23–8:29as apprehensible because both RELATA are perceptible.
8:29–8:32Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation.
8:32–8:37Objection, since conjunction and inheritance are mutually exclusive, and perception of
8:37–8:41absence is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be
8:41–8:46accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence.
8:46–8:51Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present
8:51–8:56together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also arise,
8:56–9:00because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same as that belonging
9:00–9:02to cloth absence.
9:02–9:06It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there, because the qualifedness of
9:06–9:09cloth absence is different.
9:09–9:13If the absence of cloth absence is itself an absence, then through the same relation of
9:13–9:17qualifiteness that absence would certainly be present there, and if it is a positive
9:17–9:21entity, then cloth alone would have to be accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified
9:21–9:23cognition.
9:23–9:28If qualifiteness differs in accordance with each distinct absence, no single qualifiteness
9:28–9:31will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition of absence.
9:31–9:35Only a non-recurrent, individual specific qualifiteness would then have to be accepted
9:35–9:40as the apprehensive relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence.
9:40–9:44But infinitely many such non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted, there is then no
9:44–9:49need to posit infinitely many qualifedness relations for absences.
9:49–9:52The prima facie objector himself accepts the qualifierhood of an entity related to
9:52–9:58the sense organ as the apprehensive relation in the perception of inherent unqualifiedness.
9:58–10:01The arrangement of possessing and lacking color
10:01–10:07Objection, if inheritance is one, how can the different arrangements, possessing color,
10:07–10:10in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible?
10:10–10:14It cannot be said that inheritance is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the
10:14–10:17relation to color but not so in relation to air.
10:17–10:20If being the nature of the color relation were the very nature of inheritance itself,
10:20–10:24the same inheritance could not also be the nature of the relation to taste, because
10:24–10:26the two would be mutually incompatible.
10:26–10:32Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in
10:32–10:38air and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself
10:38–10:44the substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions, possessing color with respect
10:44–10:51to a pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction.
10:51–10:56Cognition of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as,
10:56–11:02the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation.
11:02–11:06Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future
11:06–11:08pots would be erroneous.
11:08–11:11This objection is not sound.
11:11–11:14If knownness did not belong to past and future pots, discourse concerning them would be
11:14–11:18impossible, because cognition of them has been held to arise through cognition of
11:18–11:19knownness.
11:19–11:23To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition of the object is needlessly cumbersome.
11:23–11:27If only past and future objects are taken as objects of cognition of knownness,
11:27–11:33then in the case of a present pop both the cognition and its object would likewise be objects of cognition of knownness,
11:33–11:38there would be no difference among the objects of cognitions of knownness concerning past and present things.
11:39–11:44Prima-facie view, the relation between equality and its possessor is identity.
11:44–11:50Proposal, the relation between qualities such as color and possessors such as a pot is not
11:50–11:56inherent but only identity, that is, selfhood or numerical identity.
11:56–12:00In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of blue color in the pot
12:00–12:05is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and this man carries
12:05–12:07a staff.
12:07–12:12If both, this pot is blue, and, this man carries a staff, took only a qualifier relation
12:12–12:16as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together with blue pot,
12:16–12:21and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man, would be equally required.
12:22–12:26Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other there is a qualifier
12:26–12:29relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition.
12:30–12:34Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of
12:34–12:39qualifierhood and qualificanhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus,
12:39–12:43The blue pot, just as staph possession and manhood occur in one staph-bearing man.
12:44–12:49Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in qualifikan words
12:49–12:55blue and pot is established. The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct
12:55–13:01grounds of usage blueness and potness, form a single utterance. It is unnecessary to hold
13:01–13:05that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through restoration of an elighted
13:05–13:10matt-up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity, the cognition of identity between
13:10–13:16blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical identity. There is no ground for a figurative
13:16–13:21use based on identity, and no contradiction in accepting blue color as the primary meaning.
13:23–13:27Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity.
13:29–13:33If white and cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth,
13:33–13:39would be incongruous like, this pot is a jar. If white color and cloth were identical, a blind
13:39–13:44person apprehending cloth by touch would also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension
13:44–13:50of the cloth would be required just as non-apprehension of its color is. In a cloth dyed red with
13:50–13:55matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would be necessary, otherwise,
13:55–13:59just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would not be apprehended.
13:59–14:04On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing.
14:04–14:10The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like this cloth is a non-cloth.
14:10–14:15When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through contact with fire,
14:15–14:19both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot.
14:19–14:25The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the
14:25–14:30substance, the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property
14:30–14:35and substance. A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not the property
14:35–14:39whiteness, hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without apprehension of the quality.
14:40–14:44The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a self-linking relation.
14:45–14:50The Siddhantin replies, if properties such as whiteness are accepted as present in a substance,
14:50–14:55then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other sense organs that apprehend the
14:55–15:01substance. One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility by a determinate sense organ,
15:01–15:06but then the fact that properties such as color residing in a substance are apprehensible by a
15:06–15:11determinate sense organ is itself proof of the distinction between quality and its possessor.
15:12–15:16If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color
15:16–15:21of the cloth would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as the cloth is blueness
15:21–15:25would be required.
15:25–15:29Modva view, the relation is difference and non-difference.
15:29–15:34The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity.
15:34–15:39According to the modva view, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference
15:39–15:41and non-difference.
15:41–15:44This removes the fault of redundancy.
15:44–15:48The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference
15:48–15:50and non-difference.
15:50–15:55Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving difference
15:55–15:58and non-difference.
15:58–16:02Coreference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical, hence
16:02–16:07even the absence of mere coreference can establish difference and non-difference.
16:07–16:11It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore
16:11–16:16cannot constitute one relation. Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed
16:16–16:21like conjunction and its absence. When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience,
16:21–16:26this pot is red, but not black, therefore mutual absence of black colour is established
16:26–16:30in the substrate of red colour. For this reason the siddhantin too ought to accept
16:30–16:33the relation of difference and non-difference.
16:33–16:39Influence, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it,
16:39–16:44it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence, like absolute absence.
16:45–16:50Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason, because the counter-positives of
16:50–16:56prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively. By this inference difference and non-difference
16:56–17:03is established as an apprehensive relation. RETHUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIFFERENCE AND
17:03–17:05non-difference.
17:05–17:10The Siddhantan replies, the absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very locus
17:10–17:15of that thing is delimited by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction
17:15–17:19with a monkey in a tree that is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another
17:19–17:21part of the tree.
17:21–17:25In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited
17:25–17:30by red color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence
17:30–17:35of the pot delimited by black color. Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different
17:35–17:40as delimited by blue color, because in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence
17:40–17:47of the blue color delimited pot. But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence
17:47–17:51of the mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the
17:51–17:57pot delimited by potness. A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and
17:57–18:03the same locus under the same delimiter, though they can under different delimiters.
18:03–18:07Even when both difference and non-difference are absent in the pot delimited by potness,
18:07–18:11the experience this pot is blue remains possible.
18:11–18:16The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be mutual absence,
18:16–18:21but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of mutual absence.
18:21–18:26The Siddhantin replies that absence of mutual absence is precisely the ground of usage
18:26–18:31concerning non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue, only the
18:31–18:36inheritance of blue color appears as related to the pot. Once relation object
18:36–18:40hood is accepted, a cognition such as this pot possesses blueness is indeed
18:40–18:44expected. In the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes the locus of blue
18:44–18:48color through an alighted mat up suffix or through a secondary use based on
18:48–18:53identity. Proposal, Qualifier hood alone is the
18:53–18:54the apprehender.
18:54–19:00Proposal, in the perception of sound, color, and the like, let only the qualifier hood belonging
19:00–19:05to an object related to the sense organ be accepted as the apprehensive relation.
19:05–19:09What need is there then to accept inheritance and the other relations?
19:09–19:13It may be said that inheritance is the cause of qualifier hood, and conjunction come
19:13–19:16inheritance, and the other relations are causes of the qualifier hood belonging to
19:16–19:20an object related to a sense organ, because qualifier hood is impossible without such
19:20–19:21relations.
19:21–19:26Reply, Inherence, Conjunction come Inherence, and the like may be causes only of the nature
19:26–19:32of Qualifyhood, not causes producing the status of Qualifyhood as an apprehensive relation.
19:32–19:36Qualifyhood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation.
19:36–19:40If it is said, without Inherence and the like, Qualifyhood in colour and so forth
19:40–19:44is not cognized, the reply is that Qualifyhood is an apprehensive relation not because
19:44–19:48it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature.
19:48–19:51This view is not correct.
19:51–19:55and the like are objects of perception. In an inference of relation to the sense organ,
19:55–19:58the qualifier hood of sound and the like is apprehended only after inheritance has been
19:58–20:03apprehended. Therefore, inheritance, remembered earlier, and not qualifier hood remembered at
20:03–20:07the end, is the object of perceptual cognition, that is, the apprehensive relation.
20:09–20:14Qualifier hood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence,
20:14–20:20prima facie d'oe. Objection, qualifier hood belonging to an object related to a sense organ
20:20–20:24is not the apprehensive relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception
20:24–20:28of absence of waterhood in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be
20:28–20:33required. Therefore only qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible
20:33–20:38subject should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of waterhood. Absence
20:38–20:42of manifest colour in the gross element air, absence of fragrance in a flower, or absence
20:42–20:46of bitterness in molasses is not perceived by the eye and other sense organs, it
20:46–20:51It is inferred only from non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive.
20:51–20:54Nor is Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ the apprehensive
20:54–20:58relation of cognition of absence, otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would
20:58–21:00be perceived.
21:00–21:04If absence of sound is perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would have to be accepted
21:04–21:05for absence of sound.
21:05–21:10No, through economy, Qualifierhood alone belonging to an object related to a sense
21:10–21:12organ is the apprehensive relation of absence.

Plain text

प्रिमब्फ़शि व्य।, इनहेर्फ्ष देखाए नाद्विश्व रेक। To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely an error, because a defeating contradiction is present. On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness in the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed. The prima facie objecta says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction or non-establishment. nor is there merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified cognition is already established. The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition. On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation, such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence. Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a relation as its object, the probandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata, in cognition of absence such a reason would deviate from the probandom. A reason qualified by, accompanied by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the probandom as, distinct from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition of absence is possible without a distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness produced by a special qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise possible in qualify cognition without mentioning any particular adherence. The Prima-Facey objector also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here are concerning parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from a container-contained relation, therefore adherence is established. Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified cognition such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition. The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience is possible merely through the container-contained relation. The prima facie objecta says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance, and cognition is the locus or substrate. Bavu-qualify-hood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation. Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation, inherent can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation by the following inference sound soundness color and the like are related to a sense organ because they are perceptible like a part a sense organ apprehends an object related to itself hence inheritance itself is not perceived since it is not related to the sense organ. Inherence cannot be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier for that would entail an infinite regress of relations cognition merely by its own nature produces cognition of the object related to it, similarly, inheritance too, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of its relata. If an additional relation were admitted for cognition, every entity could, merely by its own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it. Nevertheless the fact that universals and the light produce cognition of their relata merely by their own nature does not eliminate inheritance, otherwise, in the absence of a relation to a sense organ, universals, and the light would be imperceptible just as inheritance is. This proposal is not correct. Even when inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, a self-linking relation must still be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation of substance to quality or universal, the self-linking relation alone may be accepted as the apprehensive relation, just as in the relation between the ground and an absence. What need is there, then, for a separate relation called inheritance? An object is apprehended through the self-linking relation between ground and absence. Sound may be apprehended through its qualifierhood with respect to what is related to the sense organ. Sound is through qualifierhood of a qualifier, and color through qualifierhood of an object related to a sense organ. One should not ask here how qualities such as color will be known to exist in a substance through a self-linking relation, for even after inherences accepted the same difficulty remains, how will those entities be known to exist in the substance through inheritance? Recutation of the Guru's school. The teachers say, when one part of a pot is bait, that same pot successively acquires black and red colors in its two parts. These two colors are not produced from the two earlier colors. Since color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time. Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only production and destruction of their relation are possible, and that Relation is Inherence. This view is not correct. The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves color to be non-eternal. No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance. On the guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance, smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed. of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence of a defeating contradiction. The sedentans reply, Inherence can be inferred. The sedention concludes, the inference that establishes inheritance as an apprehensive relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals take the relation of their qualifiers as an object, because they are qualified cognitions, like the cognition of a man carrying a staff. of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this inference because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the qualifier relation in the form of a self-linking relation nor does the inference establish a relation wholly different on the ground that qualify cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking relation as their object by the force of subjecthood and through economy the qualifier relation that is the object of qualified cognitions of qualities actions and universals is established as one and the same relation inherent, not a self-linking relation. Self-linking relations are innumerable, owing to the innumerable natures of particular individuals, and are not a common relation. Alternatively, let the probandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let the reason be qualified by, while being veridical. The qualifier relation that causes qualifier cognition is established as the single relation of inheritance, because a recurrent effect is regulated by a a recurrent cause. Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent. It is not the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to qualified cognition. If perceptual qualified cognition neither took a relation as its object nor were produced by a relation, a separate qualified cognition would likewise have to be admitted in a collected cognition of horses and cows. The Navya Nyaya inference Novya Naiyayikas say, a qualified cognition of equality, action, or universal takes as its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier. In qualified cognition of absence the reason does not deviate from the probandom. This inference does not fail to establish inheritance, because it rests upon an unconditioned pervasion. This is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from unqualified cognition. Alternatively, the inference establishes inheritance as the apprehensive relation of a quality, action, or universal related to a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the like is produced by a relation belonging to an entity connected with a sense organ, because it is a produced perception. By the force of subjecthood the relation is established as one recurrent relation. A recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause, the qualifierhood of color and like in a particular object connected with the sense organ is individual specific, non-recurrent, and therefore not a recurrent cause. Hence, through economy, only the recurrent inheritance is established as the cause of perceptions of color, taste, and the like. This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only conjunction and qualifierhood as apprehensive relations. Since qualifierhood is the particular nature of an individual, it is non-recurrent, inheritance is needed to explain apprehension through the fourfold relations involving inheritance. Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, inheritance itself is also established as apprehensible because both RELATA are perceptible. Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation. Objection, since conjunction and inheritance are mutually exclusive, and perception of absence is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence. Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also arise, because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same as that belonging to cloth absence. It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there, because the qualifedness of cloth absence is different. If the absence of cloth absence is itself an absence, then through the same relation of qualifiteness that absence would certainly be present there, and if it is a positive entity, then cloth alone would have to be accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified cognition. If qualifiteness differs in accordance with each distinct absence, no single qualifiteness will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition of absence. Only a non-recurrent, individual specific qualifiteness would then have to be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence. But infinitely many such non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted, there is then no need to posit infinitely many qualifedness relations for absences. The prima facie objector himself accepts the qualifierhood of an entity related to the sense organ as the apprehensive relation in the perception of inherent unqualifiedness. The arrangement of possessing and lacking color Objection, if inheritance is one, how can the different arrangements, possessing color, in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible? It cannot be said that inheritance is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the relation to color but not so in relation to air. If being the nature of the color relation were the very nature of inheritance itself, the same inheritance could not also be the nature of the relation to taste, because the two would be mutually incompatible. Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in air and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself the substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions, possessing color with respect to a pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction. Cognition of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as, the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation. Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future pots would be erroneous. This objection is not sound. If knownness did not belong to past and future pots, discourse concerning them would be impossible, because cognition of them has been held to arise through cognition of knownness. To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition of the object is needlessly cumbersome. If only past and future objects are taken as objects of cognition of knownness, then in the case of a present pop both the cognition and its object would likewise be objects of cognition of knownness, there would be no difference among the objects of cognitions of knownness concerning past and present things. Prima-facie view, the relation between equality and its possessor is identity. Proposal, the relation between qualities such as color and possessors such as a pot is not inherent but only identity, that is, selfhood or numerical identity. In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of blue color in the pot is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and this man carries a staff. If both, this pot is blue, and, this man carries a staff, took only a qualifier relation as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together with blue pot, and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man, would be equally required. Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other there is a qualifier relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition. Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of qualifierhood and qualificanhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus, The blue pot, just as staph possession and manhood occur in one staph-bearing man. Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in qualifikan words blue and pot is established. The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct grounds of usage blueness and potness, form a single utterance. It is unnecessary to hold that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through restoration of an elighted matt-up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity, the cognition of identity between blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical identity. There is no ground for a figurative use based on identity, and no contradiction in accepting blue color as the primary meaning. Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity. If white and cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth, would be incongruous like, this pot is a jar. If white color and cloth were identical, a blind person apprehending cloth by touch would also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension of the cloth would be required just as non-apprehension of its color is. In a cloth dyed red with matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would be necessary, otherwise, just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would not be apprehended. On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing. The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like this cloth is a non-cloth. When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through contact with fire, both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot. The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the substance, the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property and substance. A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not the property whiteness, hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without apprehension of the quality. The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a self-linking relation. The Siddhantin replies, if properties such as whiteness are accepted as present in a substance, then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other sense organs that apprehend the substance. One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility by a determinate sense organ, but then the fact that properties such as color residing in a substance are apprehensible by a determinate sense organ is itself proof of the distinction between quality and its possessor. If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color of the cloth would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as the cloth is blueness would be required. Modva view, the relation is difference and non-difference. The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity. According to the modva view, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference and non-difference. This removes the fault of redundancy. The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference and non-difference. Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving difference and non-difference. Coreference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical, hence even the absence of mere coreference can establish difference and non-difference. It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore cannot constitute one relation. Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed like conjunction and its absence. When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience, this pot is red, but not black, therefore mutual absence of black colour is established in the substrate of red colour. For this reason the siddhantin too ought to accept the relation of difference and non-difference. Influence, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it, it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence, like absolute absence. Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason, because the counter-positives of prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively. By this inference difference and non-difference is established as an apprehensive relation. RETHUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIFFERENCE AND non-difference. The Siddhantan replies, the absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very locus of that thing is delimited by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction with a monkey in a tree that is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another part of the tree. In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by red color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by black color. Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different as delimited by blue color, because in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot. But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence of the mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the pot delimited by potness. A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and the same locus under the same delimiter, though they can under different delimiters. Even when both difference and non-difference are absent in the pot delimited by potness, the experience this pot is blue remains possible. The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be mutual absence, but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of mutual absence. The Siddhantin replies that absence of mutual absence is precisely the ground of usage concerning non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue, only the inheritance of blue color appears as related to the pot. Once relation object hood is accepted, a cognition such as this pot possesses blueness is indeed expected. In the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes the locus of blue color through an alighted mat up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity. Proposal, Qualifier hood alone is the the apprehender. Proposal, in the perception of sound, color, and the like, let only the qualifier hood belonging to an object related to the sense organ be accepted as the apprehensive relation. What need is there then to accept inheritance and the other relations? It may be said that inheritance is the cause of qualifier hood, and conjunction come inheritance, and the other relations are causes of the qualifier hood belonging to an object related to a sense organ, because qualifier hood is impossible without such relations. Reply, Inherence, Conjunction come Inherence, and the like may be causes only of the nature of Qualifyhood, not causes producing the status of Qualifyhood as an apprehensive relation. Qualifyhood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation. If it is said, without Inherence and the like, Qualifyhood in colour and so forth is not cognized, the reply is that Qualifyhood is an apprehensive relation not because it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature. This view is not correct. and the like are objects of perception. In an inference of relation to the sense organ, the qualifier hood of sound and the like is apprehended only after inheritance has been apprehended. Therefore, inheritance, remembered earlier, and not qualifier hood remembered at the end, is the object of perceptual cognition, that is, the apprehensive relation. Qualifier hood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence, prima facie d'oe. Objection, qualifier hood belonging to an object related to a sense organ is not the apprehensive relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception of absence of waterhood in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be required. Therefore only qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible subject should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of waterhood. Absence of manifest colour in the gross element air, absence of fragrance in a flower, or absence of bitterness in molasses is not perceived by the eye and other sense organs, it It is inferred only from non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive. Nor is Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ the apprehensive relation of cognition of absence, otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would be perceived. If absence of sound is perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would have to be accepted for absence of sound. No, through economy, Qualifierhood alone belonging to an object related to a sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence.

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