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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:33विःवावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावाव
0:33–0:39To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the
0:39–0:44effect arises in the next moment, and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise,
0:44–0:48it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such.
0:48–0:52Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle
0:52–0:56has this character of being in effect.
0:56–1:00The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established
1:00–1:05by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency
1:05–1:07as the operation.
1:07–1:12In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire, may the act I
1:12–1:16have begun be completed without obstruction.
1:16–1:19This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already
1:19–1:24establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction
1:24–1:26would be invalid.
1:26–1:30And in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation.
1:30–1:34There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and
1:34–1:38even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the
1:38–1:40other deities.
1:40–1:44In beginningless Sazra, praise of Vinayaka must at some time have been performed by
1:44–1:49someone, hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of Vinayaka.
1:49–1:53If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason
1:53–1:56is the extreme strength of the obstacle.
1:56–2:02Refutation of the other view and summary of the prima facie position.
2:02–2:06This view of the other teachers is not correct.
2:06–2:10The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be the operation through
2:10–2:15which invocation produces completion, because, as an enduring relational absence, it is
2:15–2:19merely a cooperating cause of completion.
2:19–2:22It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational
2:22–2:27absence and that this form is also present in prior absence. This is not correct, for
2:27–2:32then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation. If an absolute absence
2:32–2:37established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal status, the same objection
2:37–2:42applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence of its cause.
2:42–2:47The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed,
2:47–2:50therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been
2:50–2:54established through destruction of its cause.
2:54–2:59Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from absence of its cause, invocation
2:59–3:03neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward completion.
3:03–3:09Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle, persisting
3:09–3:13until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation, there
3:13–3:18is no need to posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them.
3:18–3:23Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka, the regular
3:23–3:28practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established.
3:28–3:33If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot
3:33–3:38be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete
3:38–3:40despite its presence.
3:40–3:45It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs
3:45–3:47after little invocation.
3:47–3:52If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause
3:52–3:54and result.
3:54–3:58Nor can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking and
3:58–4:03little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant
4:03–4:07invocation does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without
4:07–4:10it or with only a little.
4:10–4:14On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle
4:14–4:19is suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slide obstacle is suspected, little
4:19–4:23invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference to such
4:23–4:28a Vedic statement. In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete an
4:28–4:33act, while at other times the act is completed in its absence. Even if, much, means three
4:33–4:39or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule can be framed. Therefore
4:39–4:44no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage. In conclusion, auspicious
4:44–4:47This invocation is a subsidiary act, a principal act.
4:47–4:51This is the summary of the prima facie position.
4:51–4:57Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles.
4:57–5:03Gangesa's decisive view is this, auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun
5:03–5:08undertaking, a principal act, rather, like expiation, it is a principal act whose result
5:08–5:11is the destruction of obstacles.
5:11–5:16It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing and undertaking already
5:16–5:18begun.
5:18–5:22Learned people perform at both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known,
5:22–5:28an absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act.
5:28–5:31Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire, may the act I have begun be completed
5:31–5:33without obstruction.
5:33–5:37Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the
5:37–5:41obstacle, just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire,
5:41–5:46may I attain heaven? Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without
5:46–5:50apprehending its qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included
5:50–5:54in the desire for unobstructed completion of an act.
5:54–5:58Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness, because there
5:58–6:03is irregularity in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness,
6:03–6:07sometimes fails to occur even after it has been performed.
6:07–6:12Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when the impediment
6:12–6:16capable of producing an obstacle is absent.
6:16–6:20The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness, whether accompanied
6:20–6:25by subsidiaries and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a deity.
6:25–6:31Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty,
6:31–6:37has performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty.
6:37–6:41The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining auspiciousness
6:41–6:46is not sound. Sometimes an undertaking remains incomplete because a previously accumulated
6:46–6:50obstacle is excessively powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises after auspiciousness
6:50–6:54has been performed, and sometimes the actual causes known from ordinary practice are
6:54–6:59absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an obstacle present in the desired undertaking is
6:59–7:03impossible without auspiciousness, therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with
7:03–7:08respect to destruction of obstacles is established.
7:08–7:11Auspiciousness destroys obstacles.
7:11–7:16It cannot be said that a suspected obstacle is removed through expiation, because expiation
7:16–7:20is not enjoined where there is merely a suspicion of sin.
7:20–7:24Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness is conditional
7:24–7:30on desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible.
7:30–7:34Obstinence is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment among the causes
7:34–7:35of a begun act.
7:35–7:42When the obstacle destroying absence is lacking, completion of the act does not arise.
7:42–7:46Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles, it
7:46–7:50cannot be performed when no obstacle exists.
7:50–7:53Revelation inferred from the regular conduct of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at
7:53–7:56the commencement of a desired act, just as the Rambeye is performed at the beginning
7:56–7:59of the Darsapramsa sacrifice.
7:59–8:04The relational absence of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion.
8:04–8:08Sometimes this absence is established automatically by the act's own causes, and sometimes it
8:08–8:10is produced by auspiciousness.
8:10–8:14The completion without auspiciousness of an act undertaken by an inattentive person or
8:14–8:20an atheist may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles continuing from a previous birth.
8:20–8:24It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is sometimes established automatically
8:24–8:31by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness becomes impossible.
8:31–8:35Auspiciousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is performed so long
8:35–8:38as suspicion of an obstacle remains.
8:38–8:43For this reason it is performed even in the middle of an act if suspicion of an obstacle
8:43–8:44arises.
8:44–8:48At the beginning of a great undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful
8:48–8:53obstacle is suspected, and it has already been explained how auspiciousness is performed
8:53–9:00when an obstacle is suspected. The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers.
9:02–9:06Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction,
9:06–9:10one should perform auspiciousness. It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity,
9:10–9:14because this definition has neither universal perversion nor necessary sequence.
9:15–9:19Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing as
9:19–9:23its uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic knowledge
9:23–9:27of the act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become an object
9:27–9:30of practical engagement.
9:30–9:34Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned people with
9:34–9:37the desire, may the act be completed without obstruction.
9:37–9:41The Veda is not an effect of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice
9:41–9:45would produce mutual dependence between scripture and such practice.
9:45–9:48Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a Veda-enjoined act performed with the
9:48–9:52desire for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes the desired
9:52–9:56undertaking, because no separate Vedic sentence in joining auspiciousness is available.
9:57–10:02Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called auspicious in SMTI. The Veda is not produced
10:02–10:08from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an act enjoined by the Veda.
10:09–10:13The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not nearly one should perform
10:13–10:18auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an act
10:18–10:24should praise a deity. The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context.
10:25–10:28The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity,
10:28–10:32obeisance, and the like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic-enjoined
10:32–10:37act destroys obstacles or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction,
10:37–10:39from the desire to complete an act without obstruction.
10:41–10:48The word auspiciousness has many meanings. Therefore bathing in the Ganges and similar
10:48–10:53acts, though destructive of obstacles, are not auspiciousness in the strict sense, because
10:53–10:57no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance as auspiciousness.
10:57–11:02Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as, those engaged
11:02–11:06in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence, and performers of
11:06–11:11sacrifices that ward off sin should look into a mirror at dawn, are called auspicious
11:11–11:16in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act.
11:16–11:22the word auspiciousness has many meanings. Otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance,
11:22–11:26and all such acts would have to be performed obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book.
11:28–11:32The word atha is itself auspicious because it destroys obstacles.
11:33–11:37Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds o and atha first emerged after
11:37–11:43breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious. It should not be said that
11:43–11:47that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great sage Gautama's use of this
11:47–11:53word at the opening of the science of Nyaya would be needless repetition.
11:53–11:58Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as endowed with qualities.
11:58–12:03Obasance is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself.
12:03–12:08The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an
12:08–12:11experienced common property.
12:11–12:16the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the hands against the head but also
12:16–12:22for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you. On an alternative view,
12:22–12:27distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and verbal obeisance,
12:27–12:32the word obeisance would then have several meanings. Some Prabhakaras say that the word
12:32–12:36cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition that they are preceded by a
12:36–12:41particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only the mental resolve, while the
12:41–12:47other three acts are understood by secondary implication. This view is unsound, because
12:47–12:52one cannot know that an act is preceded by a mental resolve, without first understanding
12:52–12:56the specific bodily or other act.
12:56–13:02The nature of a learned person and of learned practice. A person who accepts the authority
13:02–13:07of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received tradition.
13:07–13:12In defining learned practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by
13:12–13:17the Veda, that is, that it possesses the condition of not being censured.
13:17–13:22Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces super-sensible
13:22–13:26merit brings a begun act to completion.
13:26–13:30Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error.
13:30–13:35The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes
13:35–13:40a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced,
13:40–13:46such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result.
13:46–13:51In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed to heretical
13:51–13:57or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority. Other uses of learned
13:57–14:02and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of agency in acts prohibited
14:02–14:03by the Veda.
14:03–14:09Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda-prohibited
14:09–14:13acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited
14:13–14:15act is unlearned.
14:15–14:20Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda-prohibited act, is not learned, because
14:20–14:24he does not accept the authority of the Veda.
14:24–14:28But it is not proper to regard is learned merely someone free from performing prohibited
14:28–14:32acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Veda's
14:32–14:37authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin.
14:39–14:42Conclusion of the discussion of auspicious invocation.
14:44–14:48Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar
14:48–14:54of the received tradition. Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him,
14:54–14:59because omniscience is required in them. The Veda is inferred from the uncentured
14:59–15:05conduct of such traditionally learned persons. This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars,
15:05–15:10who have not directly observed the conduct of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage
15:10–15:16an auspicious invocation. It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and
15:16–15:20others from that of modern learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu
15:20–15:25and others before engaging in auspiciousness. But then the conduct of modern scholars itself,
15:25–15:29by assisting the inference of man as conduct, may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the
15:29–15:33Veda, what need is there for a separate inference from modern conduct to man as conduct.
15:34–15:38Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition.
15:39–15:43SMTI states that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age,
15:43–15:48provided it is not contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper
15:48–15:52conduct. There is no proof that only the omniscient man of first performed auspicious
15:52–15:59invocation. Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in sintis composed by Manu
15:59–16:05and others, only omniscient persons perform it. An author of sinti need not be omniscient,
16:05–16:10he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a sinti text. Some may further say that
16:10–16:15conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference that invocation is obligatory,
16:15–16:20why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it. The answer is that, in the case of a
16:20–16:27lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary, as I'll admit. With this the discussion
16:27–16:33of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends. The discussion of auspicious invocation
16:33–16:45and the perception section ends. The theory of epistemic validity. The doctrine of determining
16:45–16:55validity slash theory of apprehension. Statement of purpose. After the auspicious invocation,
16:55–16:59the supremely compassionate sage Godama, desiring to rescue the world submerged in the
16:59–17:05mire of suffering, composed in Kik, the science of Nyaya, the most cherished among the 18 branches
17:05–17:10of learning. At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the
17:10–17:15true nature of the 16 categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest
17:15–17:20human good, liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct a
17:20–17:23a discerning person toward the supreme goal.
17:23–17:28But the ordered division of the sixteen categories depends on knowledge of the first category,
17:28–17:30the means of knowledge.
17:30–17:35Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first examines the true nature of a means of knowledge,
17:35–17:39that is, the validity of cognition.
17:39–17:44The Objection of the Madhyamaka Buddhists
17:44–17:47The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold that Nyaya teaches
17:47–17:51the real nature of the sixteen categories beginning with means of knowledge and is
17:51–17:56indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means
17:56–17:59of knowledge is impossible.
17:59–18:03Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining the nature of Prama,
18:03–18:05diridical cognition.
18:05–18:09But the nature of Prama is established neither intrinsically by the complete set of causes
18:09–18:14of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another means of knowledge, because, as
18:14–18:19will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives.
18:19–18:24An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition?
18:24–18:29Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination
18:29–18:33of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs
18:33–18:37only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained.
18:37–18:41Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or
18:41–18:45doubt about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity
18:45–18:47causes activity.
18:47–18:50The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity
18:50–18:55of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful.
18:55–18:59Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no
18:59–19:04need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment.
19:04–19:06But this argument is unsound.
19:06–19:11The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise,
19:11–19:15which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity
19:15–19:19of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

Plain text

विःवावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावाव To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the effect arises in the next moment, and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise, it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such. Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle has this character of being in effect. The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency as the operation. In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire, may the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction would be invalid. And in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation. There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the other deities. In beginningless Sazra, praise of Vinayaka must at some time have been performed by someone, hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of Vinayaka. If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason is the extreme strength of the obstacle. Refutation of the other view and summary of the prima facie position. This view of the other teachers is not correct. The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be the operation through which invocation produces completion, because, as an enduring relational absence, it is merely a cooperating cause of completion. It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational absence and that this form is also present in prior absence. This is not correct, for then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation. If an absolute absence established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal status, the same objection applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence of its cause. The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed, therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been established through destruction of its cause. Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from absence of its cause, invocation neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward completion. Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle, persisting until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation, there is no need to posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them. Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka, the regular practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established. If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete despite its presence. It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs after little invocation. If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause and result. Nor can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking and little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant invocation does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without it or with only a little. On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle is suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slide obstacle is suspected, little invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference to such a Vedic statement. In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete an act, while at other times the act is completed in its absence. Even if, much, means three or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule can be framed. Therefore no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage. In conclusion, auspicious This invocation is a subsidiary act, a principal act. This is the summary of the prima facie position. Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles. Gangesa's decisive view is this, auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun undertaking, a principal act, rather, like expiation, it is a principal act whose result is the destruction of obstacles. It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing and undertaking already begun. Learned people perform at both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known, an absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act. Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire, may the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the obstacle, just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire, may I attain heaven? Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without apprehending its qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included in the desire for unobstructed completion of an act. Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness, because there is irregularity in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness, sometimes fails to occur even after it has been performed. Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when the impediment capable of producing an obstacle is absent. The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness, whether accompanied by subsidiaries and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a deity. Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty, has performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty. The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining auspiciousness is not sound. Sometimes an undertaking remains incomplete because a previously accumulated obstacle is excessively powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises after auspiciousness has been performed, and sometimes the actual causes known from ordinary practice are absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an obstacle present in the desired undertaking is impossible without auspiciousness, therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with respect to destruction of obstacles is established. Auspiciousness destroys obstacles. It cannot be said that a suspected obstacle is removed through expiation, because expiation is not enjoined where there is merely a suspicion of sin. Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness is conditional on desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible. Obstinence is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment among the causes of a begun act. When the obstacle destroying absence is lacking, completion of the act does not arise. Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles, it cannot be performed when no obstacle exists. Revelation inferred from the regular conduct of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at the commencement of a desired act, just as the Rambeye is performed at the beginning of the Darsapramsa sacrifice. The relational absence of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion. Sometimes this absence is established automatically by the act's own causes, and sometimes it is produced by auspiciousness. The completion without auspiciousness of an act undertaken by an inattentive person or an atheist may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles continuing from a previous birth. It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is sometimes established automatically by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness becomes impossible. Auspiciousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is performed so long as suspicion of an obstacle remains. For this reason it is performed even in the middle of an act if suspicion of an obstacle arises. At the beginning of a great undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful obstacle is suspected, and it has already been explained how auspiciousness is performed when an obstacle is suspected. The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers. Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction, one should perform auspiciousness. It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity, because this definition has neither universal perversion nor necessary sequence. Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing as its uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic knowledge of the act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become an object of practical engagement. Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned people with the desire, may the act be completed without obstruction. The Veda is not an effect of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice would produce mutual dependence between scripture and such practice. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a Veda-enjoined act performed with the desire for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes the desired undertaking, because no separate Vedic sentence in joining auspiciousness is available. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called auspicious in SMTI. The Veda is not produced from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an act enjoined by the Veda. The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not nearly one should perform auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an act should praise a deity. The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context. The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity, obeisance, and the like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic-enjoined act destroys obstacles or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction, from the desire to complete an act without obstruction. The word auspiciousness has many meanings. Therefore bathing in the Ganges and similar acts, though destructive of obstacles, are not auspiciousness in the strict sense, because no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance as auspiciousness. Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as, those engaged in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence, and performers of sacrifices that ward off sin should look into a mirror at dawn, are called auspicious in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act. the word auspiciousness has many meanings. Otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance, and all such acts would have to be performed obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book. The word atha is itself auspicious because it destroys obstacles. Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds o and atha first emerged after breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious. It should not be said that that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great sage Gautama's use of this word at the opening of the science of Nyaya would be needless repetition. Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as endowed with qualities. Obasance is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself. The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an experienced common property. the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the hands against the head but also for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you. On an alternative view, distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and verbal obeisance, the word obeisance would then have several meanings. Some Prabhakaras say that the word cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition that they are preceded by a particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only the mental resolve, while the other three acts are understood by secondary implication. This view is unsound, because one cannot know that an act is preceded by a mental resolve, without first understanding the specific bodily or other act. The nature of a learned person and of learned practice. A person who accepts the authority of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received tradition. In defining learned practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by the Veda, that is, that it possesses the condition of not being censured. Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces super-sensible merit brings a begun act to completion. Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error. The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced, such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result. In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed to heretical or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority. Other uses of learned and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of agency in acts prohibited by the Veda. Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda-prohibited acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited act is unlearned. Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda-prohibited act, is not learned, because he does not accept the authority of the Veda. But it is not proper to regard is learned merely someone free from performing prohibited acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Veda's authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin. Conclusion of the discussion of auspicious invocation. Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar of the received tradition. Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him, because omniscience is required in them. The Veda is inferred from the uncentured conduct of such traditionally learned persons. This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars, who have not directly observed the conduct of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage an auspicious invocation. It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and others from that of modern learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu and others before engaging in auspiciousness. But then the conduct of modern scholars itself, by assisting the inference of man as conduct, may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the Veda, what need is there for a separate inference from modern conduct to man as conduct. Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition. SMTI states that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age, provided it is not contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper conduct. There is no proof that only the omniscient man of first performed auspicious invocation. Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in sintis composed by Manu and others, only omniscient persons perform it. An author of sinti need not be omniscient, he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a sinti text. Some may further say that conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference that invocation is obligatory, why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it. The answer is that, in the case of a lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary, as I'll admit. With this the discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends. The discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends. The theory of epistemic validity. The doctrine of determining validity slash theory of apprehension. Statement of purpose. After the auspicious invocation, the supremely compassionate sage Godama, desiring to rescue the world submerged in the mire of suffering, composed in Kik, the science of Nyaya, the most cherished among the 18 branches of learning. At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the true nature of the 16 categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest human good, liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct a a discerning person toward the supreme goal. But the ordered division of the sixteen categories depends on knowledge of the first category, the means of knowledge. Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first examines the true nature of a means of knowledge, that is, the validity of cognition. The Objection of the Madhyamaka Buddhists The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold that Nyaya teaches the real nature of the sixteen categories beginning with means of knowledge and is indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means of knowledge is impossible. Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining the nature of Prama, diridical cognition. But the nature of Prama is established neither intrinsically by the complete set of causes of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another means of knowledge, because, as will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives. An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition? Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained. Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or doubt about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity causes activity. The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful. Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment. But this argument is unsound. The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise, which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

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