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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:04Gageeos Conclusion
0:04–0:118. Gagee concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither
0:11–0:15makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition
0:15–0:20or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition
0:20–0:24is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition,
0:24–0:29is the qualificant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because
0:29–0:34its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like
0:34–0:39are cognized, a doubt such as, is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible.
0:40–0:44Consequently the Niyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic
0:44–0:48character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reason smoke and all
0:48–0:52individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means
0:52–0:56cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire.
0:56–1:00The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded.
1:00–1:117. The theory of the extraneous condition.
1:11–1:17Upadhibita. Introduction.
1:17–1:241. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandum,
1:24–1:29therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandum cannot be ascertained.
1:29–1:34For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter.
1:34–1:43definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that
1:43–1:49pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason.
1:51–1:56But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition
1:56–2:01that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defective mutual dependence
2:01–2:06arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition
2:06–2:13of Provision, and Cognition of Provision causes Cognition of Freedom from an extraneous condition.
2:13–2:18An alternative definition of an extraneous condition.
2:18–2:193.
2:19–2:22Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows.
2:22–2:26Its Provision of the Probandom is the state in which it is not the counter positive of
2:26–2:30an absolute absence of the Probandom occurring in a locus possessing the Probandom, and
2:30–2:34its non-Provision of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive of
2:34–2:39an absolute absence of the probandom occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other
2:39–2:44words, an extraneous condition is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in
2:44–2:49the locus of the reason, but not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring
2:49–2:55in the locus of the probandom. But this alternative definition is untenable.
2:55–3:00It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited
3:00–3:05by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the
3:05–3:07reason.
3:07–3:12Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions.
3:12–3:19For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom
3:19–3:24perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced
3:24–3:28by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason
3:28–3:33property being mitra's sun, are not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need
3:33–3:39not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons
3:39–3:46deviation from the probandom. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum
3:46–3:51of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is dark
3:51–3:55because it is mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic
3:55–4:00as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates
4:00–4:05from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness.
4:05–4:09If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded
4:09–4:15as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine.
4:15–4:20Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended.
4:20–4:24In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property
4:24–4:28of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition,
4:28–4:34yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension
4:34–4:40and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject
4:40–4:46must be an extraneous condition. Five, it may be objected here, in the
4:46–4:49inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because it is distinct from what
4:49–4:54is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies the reason. That is,
4:54–4:58The reason is stated as, being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs on
4:58–5:02the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished.
5:02–5:06But, mountain, is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs
5:06–5:11on the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative
5:11–5:13inference.
5:13–5:15This objection is untenable.
5:15–5:19In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced, subject otherness occurring
5:19–5:23in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the pro-bandom,
5:23–5:27the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the
5:27–5:30counter instance of the absence of the probandom.
5:30–5:36It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result.
5:36–5:41For generic subject-otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom
5:41–5:46cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject-mountain.
5:46–5:50Therefore the expression the subject-mountain is useful, and subject-otherness occurring
5:50–5:55on the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition.
5:55–6:01An alternative definition of subject-otherness as an extraneous condition.
6:01–6:026.
6:02–6:05A second definition may be proposed as follows.
6:05–6:09What is other than the subject, occurring in the subject and actually pervading the
6:09–6:12probandom, is an extraneous condition.
6:12–6:17Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous
6:17–6:21condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the
6:21–6:26probandom is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the
6:26–6:28probandom.
6:28–6:33Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness.
6:33–6:38If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates
6:38–6:42doubt about the probandom and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions
6:42–6:46in general would disappear.
6:46–6:51refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added.
6:53–7:037. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition.
7:04–7:15Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced.
7:16–7:19But this proposal is untenable.
7:19–7:25Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance,
7:25–7:31because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances.
7:31–7:37Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood,
7:37–7:42contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished.
7:42–7:48Subject Otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the reason.
7:48–7:55When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandom and the subject becomes possible.
7:55–8:05Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present.
8:05–8:10For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition.
8:10–8:14The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of
8:14–8:19the probandam and the counter-instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous
8:19–8:21condition.
8:21–8:26Refutation of the objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition.
8:26–8:32Eight, the objection that subject-otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition
8:32–8:36because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating
8:36–8:39rejoinder known as a jati is rejected.
8:39–8:43subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
8:43–8:48therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect.
8:48–8:53This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness
8:53–8:57from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded
8:57–8:59as the extraneous condition.
8:59–9:03Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable
9:03–9:07of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it certainly
9:07–9:11possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition.
9:11–9:18The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation.
9:18–9:22It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom
9:22–9:27through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
9:27–9:32therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation.
9:32–9:36But the absence of subject otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of
9:36–9:40probandum because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance.
9:41–9:47Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation
9:47–9:51after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
9:52–9:57Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the
9:57–10:02ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established
10:02–10:07as pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition that
10:07–10:13pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both reason and extraneous
10:13–10:18condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes only one side.
10:19–10:24For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason pervaded by the
10:24–10:28probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous condition that
10:28–10:33that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum.
10:33–10:38Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in
10:38–10:41establishing the probandum and its absence.
10:41–10:45Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the
10:45–10:50probandum and is the seed of vitiation.
10:50–10:56An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason.
10:56–11:01It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting
11:01–11:04an equally strong counter reason.
11:04–11:07This objection is untenable.
11:07–11:11If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion
11:11–11:14to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally
11:14–11:19strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter
11:19–11:22reason against an inference already possessing one.
11:22–11:27Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter-reason, the defect
11:27–11:32of subject-otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference
11:32–11:37fire is not hot because it is produced, would not qualify as an extraneous condition either,
11:37–11:42because denial of the probandom through subject-otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence
11:42–11:45of the probandom.
11:45–11:48Objection to treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition
11:48–11:5411. It may be said that the rule concerning subject-otherness as an extraneous condition
11:54–11:59does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated
11:59–12:03inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject-otherness is not an
12:03–12:09extraneous condition. Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject
12:09–12:15but the probandom is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is
12:15–12:20produced, non-fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule
12:20–12:24of subject otherness does not apply directly.
12:24–12:29But this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject
12:29–12:33instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what
12:33–12:38occurs in the subject fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore
12:38–12:43subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases.
12:43–12:47Conclusion, Subject Otherness is an extraneous condition.
12:47–12:5312, the many forms of subject otherness, such as being distinct from what occurs in a part
12:53–12:57of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being the
12:57–13:01substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both
13:01–13:06lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there
13:06–13:10is fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke.
13:10–13:15In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon pseudo-reason cannot
13:15–13:19persist, and an equally strong counter-reason also arises from the counter-positive of the
13:19–13:24absence of subject-otherness occurring in the subject-mountain.
13:24–13:28The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong
13:28–13:34counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason
13:34–13:36and becomes a defect.
13:36–13:41Both the relation between reason and probandum and that between probandum and extraneous condition
13:41–13:46oppose the similarity that causes cognition of pervasion, therefore ascertainment of pervasion
13:46–13:52becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the probandum.
13:52–13:56In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason
13:56–13:59deviates from the probandum.
13:59–14:03Such defect is fully present in subject otherness as well.
14:03–14:08Udayanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about
14:08–14:11deviation.
14:11–14:15One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that
14:15–14:19all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the
14:19–14:25foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject-otherness
14:25–14:27as well.
14:27–14:30Udayanakarya's definition of an extraneous condition
14:30–14:3813. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition,
14:38–14:43the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is unsuitable.
14:44–14:49Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous
14:49–14:55condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong counter-reason.
14:56–15:01The qualifier co-extensive with the probandom in the definition is entirely pointless,
15:01–15:06because it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an extraneous condition,
15:06–15:13that is, its causation of cognition of deviation. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an
15:13–15:21extraneous condition, first proposal. 14. It may be proposed that the property which prompts both
15:21–15:25the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition.
15:26–15:30A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the probandom's
15:30–15:34affirmative and negative concomitance because the probandom may remain in the absence of that
15:34–15:39property and the absence of the probandom may remain in its presence. Under this definition,
15:39–15:41subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition.
15:42–15:49But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance
15:49–15:54of the probandom means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the
15:54–15:57the reason deviates from the probandum.
15:57–16:02This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason.
16:02–16:07Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum serves no purpose in producing the defect
16:07–16:10and is therefore pointless.
16:10–16:17An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal.
16:17–16:2215, again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is
16:22–16:24reflected upon another object.
16:24–16:28For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because
16:28–16:31the hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal.
16:31–16:36Similarly, the probandom pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous
16:36–16:40condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel
16:40–16:44is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there
16:44–16:46is fire.
16:46–16:50The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because
16:50–16:55it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded
16:55–17:01that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition.
17:01–17:08Use of the word extraneous condition 16. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically
17:08–17:12pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous condition, because it does not produce a
17:12–17:18defect? Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the
17:18–17:22ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent.
17:22–17:26The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces
17:26–17:30cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom.
17:30–17:34The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a
17:34–17:38co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another.
17:38–17:42For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain,
17:42–17:47the word condition is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result.
17:47–17:52In a treatise, the etymology of the word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary
17:52–17:56usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate.
17:56–18:00The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandum while not pervading
18:00–18:01the reason.
18:01–18:06In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense.
18:06–18:11An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of another
18:11–18:13decisive criterion.
18:13–18:1917. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the
18:19–18:23reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded
18:23–18:28by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from the probandom, because deviation
18:28–18:34occurs even in the absence of such an object. For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal
18:34–18:38because it is a quality, no ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood,
18:38–18:42Rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no ability.
18:42–18:46There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood, that is, the reason qualityhood
18:46–18:49deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality.
18:49–18:53But the absence of an object co-extensive with the pro-bandom is concomitant with the absence
18:53–18:56of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom.
18:56–19:00The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the pro-bandom
19:00–19:03does not deviate from the pro-bandom.
19:03–19:10In a case of deviation, the probandom itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition.
19:10–19:14Although identical with the probandom, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandom but
19:14–19:18does not pervade the reason.
19:18–19:23Refutation of the Other Scholar's View 18.
19:23–19:25This view also fails.
19:25–19:29It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as
19:29–19:35the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion
19:35–19:40too is untenable, because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule.
19:40–19:45Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion
19:45–19:47of non-deviation.
19:47–19:51Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the
19:51–19:56reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to
19:56–20:00be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded
20:00–20:04by the probandum, leading to infinite regress.
20:04–20:09In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the state of
20:09–20:13pervading the probandum, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition
20:13–20:18that pervades the probandum while not pervading the reason.
20:18–20:22Cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition
20:22–20:27of perversion, nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition
20:27–20:31from arising in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of
20:31–20:33cognition of deviation.
20:33–20:38But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely for
20:38–20:42that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons
20:42–20:46causing cognition of deviation.
20:46–20:51of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition.
20:51–20:5719. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property
20:57–21:02of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood,
21:02–21:06because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited
21:06–21:10by a property of the reason.
21:10–21:14Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable,
21:14–21:18non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition.
21:18–21:24Non-audibility pervades the proband and nameability delimited by qualityhood, because the property
21:24–21:28of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade
21:28–21:31the reason no ability.
21:31–21:35Therefore non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and
21:35–21:38undesirable consequence.
21:38–21:42This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet
21:42–21:47fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction
21:47–21:51with wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of
21:51–21:53the reason occurring in the subject.

Plain text

Gageeos Conclusion 8. Gagee concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition, is the qualificant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like are cognized, a doubt such as, is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible. Consequently the Niyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reason smoke and all individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire. The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded. 7. The theory of the extraneous condition. Upadhibita. Introduction. 1. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandum, therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandum cannot be ascertained. For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter. definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason. But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defective mutual dependence arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of Provision, and Cognition of Provision causes Cognition of Freedom from an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of an extraneous condition. 3. Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows. Its Provision of the Probandom is the state in which it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence of the Probandom occurring in a locus possessing the Probandom, and its non-Provision of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive of an absolute absence of the probandom occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other words, an extraneous condition is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, but not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandom. But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason property being mitra's sun, are not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is dark because it is mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness. If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine. Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended. In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition, yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition. Five, it may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies the reason. That is, The reason is stated as, being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished. But, mountain, is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs on the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative inference. This objection is untenable. In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced, subject otherness occurring in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the pro-bandom, the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom. It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result. For generic subject-otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject-mountain. Therefore the expression the subject-mountain is useful, and subject-otherness occurring on the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of subject-otherness as an extraneous condition. 6. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject, occurring in the subject and actually pervading the probandom, is an extraneous condition. Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the probandom is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom. Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness. If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates doubt about the probandom and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions in general would disappear. refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added. 7. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition. Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced. But this proposal is untenable. Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance, because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances. Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood, contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished. Subject Otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the reason. When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandom and the subject becomes possible. Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present. For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition. The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandam and the counter-instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous condition. Refutation of the objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. Eight, the objection that subject-otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating rejoinder known as a jati is rejected. subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect. This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded as the extraneous condition. Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition. The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation. It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation. But the absence of subject otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of probandum because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance. Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established as pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both reason and extraneous condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes only one side. For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason pervaded by the probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous condition that that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum. Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in establishing the probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seed of vitiation. An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason. It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting an equally strong counter reason. This objection is untenable. If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter reason against an inference already possessing one. Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter-reason, the defect of subject-otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference fire is not hot because it is produced, would not qualify as an extraneous condition either, because denial of the probandom through subject-otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence of the probandom. Objection to treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition 11. It may be said that the rule concerning subject-otherness as an extraneous condition does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, non-fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness does not apply directly. But this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases. Conclusion, Subject Otherness is an extraneous condition. 12, the many forms of subject otherness, such as being distinct from what occurs in a part of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there is fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke. In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon pseudo-reason cannot persist, and an equally strong counter-reason also arises from the counter-positive of the absence of subject-otherness occurring in the subject-mountain. The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason and becomes a defect. Both the relation between reason and probandum and that between probandum and extraneous condition oppose the similarity that causes cognition of pervasion, therefore ascertainment of pervasion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the probandum. In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason deviates from the probandum. Such defect is fully present in subject otherness as well. Udayanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about deviation. One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject-otherness as well. Udayanakarya's definition of an extraneous condition 13. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition, the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is unsuitable. Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong counter-reason. The qualifier co-extensive with the probandom in the definition is entirely pointless, because it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an extraneous condition, that is, its causation of cognition of deviation. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, first proposal. 14. It may be proposed that the property which prompts both the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition. A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the probandom's affirmative and negative concomitance because the probandom may remain in the absence of that property and the absence of the probandom may remain in its presence. Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition. But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandom means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the the reason deviates from the probandum. This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason. Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum serves no purpose in producing the defect and is therefore pointless. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal. 15, again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is reflected upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because the hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal. Similarly, the probandom pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition. Use of the word extraneous condition 16. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous condition, because it does not produce a defect? Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent. The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom. The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain, the word condition is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate. The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason. In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of another decisive criterion. 17. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from the probandom, because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object. For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, no ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood, Rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no ability. There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood, that is, the reason qualityhood deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive with the pro-bandom is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom. The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the pro-bandom does not deviate from the pro-bandom. In a case of deviation, the probandom itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition. Although identical with the probandom, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandom but does not pervade the reason. Refutation of the Other Scholar's View 18. This view also fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion too is untenable, because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule. Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion of non-deviation. Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded by the probandum, leading to infinite regress. In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the state of pervading the probandum, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while not pervading the reason. Cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition of perversion, nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition from arising in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of cognition of deviation. But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons causing cognition of deviation. of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition. 19. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood, because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition. Non-audibility pervades the proband and nameability delimited by qualityhood, because the property of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade the reason no ability. Therefore non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence. This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction with wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of the reason occurring in the subject.

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