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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 21:16
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Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:06प्रिमः फैसी वृ, इनहेरन्स is not an apprehensive relation.
0:06–0:12To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely
0:12–0:15an error, because a defeating contradiction is present.
0:15–0:19On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness
0:19–0:24in the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed.
0:24–0:27The prima facie objector says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be
0:27–0:31neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction
0:31–0:34or non-establishment.
0:34–0:38nor is there merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified
0:38–0:41cognition is already established.
0:41–0:45The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that
0:45–0:50is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition.
0:50–0:54On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation,
0:54–0:58such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence.
0:58–1:01Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a
1:01–1:06relation as its object, the pro-bandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata,
1:06–1:10in cognition of absence such a reason would deviate from the pro-bandom. A reason qualified
1:10–1:14by, accompanied by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the
1:14–1:18pro-bandom as, distinct from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition
1:18–1:23of absence is possible without a distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness
1:23–1:27produced by a special qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise
1:27–1:31possible in qualified cognition without mentioning any particular inheritance.
1:31–1:37The prima facie objecta also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here are concerning
1:37–1:42parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from a container-contained
1:42–1:45relation, therefore inheritance is established.
1:45–1:48Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified cognition
1:48–1:52such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition.
1:52–1:57The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience is
1:57–2:00possible merely through the container-contained relation.
2:00–2:05The Prima-Facey objector says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance,
2:05–2:08and cognition is the locus or substrate.
2:08–2:16Bavu Qualifierhood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation.
2:16–2:20Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation,
2:20–2:24Inherence can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation by
2:24–2:29the following inference, sound, soundness, color, and the like are related to a sense-organ,
2:29–2:31because they are perceptible, like a part.
2:31–2:35A sense-organ apprehends an object related to itself, hence inheritance itself is not
2:35–2:39perceived, since it is not related to the sense-organ.
2:39–2:43Inherence cannot be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier,
2:43–2:46for that would entail an infinite regress of relations.
2:46–2:51Cognition, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of the object related to it, similarly,
2:51–2:56Inherence 2, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of its relata.
2:56–2:59If an additional relation were admitted for cognition, every entity could, merely by its
2:59–3:03own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it.
3:03–3:07Nevertheless the fact that universals and the light produce cognition of their relata
3:07–3:11merely by their own nature does not eliminate Inherence, otherwise, in the absence of
3:11–3:14a relation to a sense organ, universals, and the light would be imperceptible just
3:14–3:19as inheritance is. This proposal is not correct. Even when
3:19–3:23inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, a self-linking relation must still
3:23–3:28be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation of substance to quality or universal, the
3:28–3:32self-linking relation alone may be accepted as the apprehensive relation, just as in
3:32–3:37the relation between the ground and an absence. What need is there, then, for a separate
3:37–3:41relation called inheritance? An object is apprehended through the self-linking
3:41–3:44relation between ground and absence. Sound may be apprehended through its
3:44–3:48qualifierhood with respect to what is related to the sense organ. Sound is
3:48–3:51through qualifierhood of a qualifier, and color through qualifierhood of an
3:51–3:56object related to a sense organ. One should not ask here how qualities such
3:56–3:59as color will be known to exist in a substance through a self-linking
3:59–4:03relation, for even after inherences accepted the same difficulty remains.
4:03–4:06How will those entities be known to exist in the substance through
4:06–4:09inheritance.
4:09–4:13Recutation of the guru school.
4:13–4:17The teachers say, when one part of a pot is bait, that same pot successively acquires
4:17–4:22black and red colors in its two parts, these two colors are not produced from the two earlier
4:22–4:24colors.
4:24–4:30Since color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time.
4:30–4:34Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only production
4:34–4:39and destruction of their relation are possible, and that relation is inheritance.
4:39–4:42This view is not correct.
4:42–4:46The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves
4:46–4:49color to be non-eternal.
4:49–4:53No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance.
4:53–4:58On the guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance,
4:58–5:04the smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed.
5:04–5:08Cognition of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence
5:08–5:12of a defeating contradiction.
5:12–5:17The Cedantans reply, Inherence can be inferred.
5:17–5:20The Cedantin concludes, The inference that establishes inheritance as an apprehensive
5:20–5:25relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals take
5:25–5:29the relation of their qualifiers as an object, because they are qualified cognitions, like
5:29–5:33the cognition of a man carrying a staff.
5:33–5:36Deviation of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this
5:36–5:40inference, because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the qualifier
5:40–5:43relation in the form of a self-linking relation.
5:43–5:47Nor does the inference establish a relation wholly different on the ground that qualify
5:47–5:51cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking relation as their object.
5:51–5:55By the force of subjecthood and through economy, the qualifier relation that is the object
5:55–6:00of qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals is established as one and the
6:00–6:04same relation, inheritance, not a self-linking relation.
6:04–6:07Self-linking relations are innumerable, own to the innumerable natures of particular
6:07–6:11individuals, and are not a common relation.
6:11–6:15Alternatively, let the probandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let the reason
6:15–6:18be qualified by, while being veridical.
6:18–6:22The qualifier relation that causes qualifier cognition is established as the single relation
6:22–6:27of inheritance, because a recurrent effect is regulated by a recurrent cause.
6:27–6:30Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent.
6:30–6:33It is not the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to
6:33–6:35qualifier cognition.
6:35–6:38If perceptual qualifier cognition neither took a relation as its object nor were
6:38–6:42produced by a relation, a separate qualifier cognition would likewise have to be
6:42–6:47admitted in a collective cognition of horses and cows.
6:47–6:50The Navya Naya Inference
6:50–6:55Navya Naya Yaka's say, a qualified cognition of equality, action, or universal takes as
6:55–6:59its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified
6:59–7:03cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified
7:03–7:08cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier.
7:08–7:12In qualified cognition of absence the reason does not deviate from the pro-bandam.
7:12–7:16This inference does not fail to establish inheritance, because it rests upon an unconditioned
7:16–7:21pervasion. Inherence is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from
7:21–7:25unqualified cognition. Alternatively, the inference establishes
7:25–7:29inheritance as the apprehensive relation of equality, action, or universal related to
7:29–7:33a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the like is produced by a relation belonging
7:33–7:38to an entity connected with a sense organ, because it is a produced perception. By
7:38–7:42the force of subjecthood the relation is established as one recurrent relation. A
7:42–7:46The recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause, the qualifierhood of color and the like
7:46–7:51in a particular object connected with the sense organ is individual specific, non-recurrent,
7:51–7:53and therefore not a recurrent cause.
7:53–7:56Hence, through economy, only the recurrent inheritance is established as the cause of
7:56–8:00perceptions of color, taste, and the like.
8:00–8:04This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only conjunction and
8:04–8:08qualifierhood as apprehensive relations.
8:08–8:13Its quality is the nature of an individual, it is non-recurrent, and it is necessary
8:13–8:18to explain apprehension through the fourfold relations involving inheritance.
8:18–8:24Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, it is also established as apprehensible
8:24–8:29because both relata are perceptible.
8:29–8:32Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation.
8:32–8:37Objection, since conjunction and inheritance are mutually exclusive, and perception of absence
8:37–8:42is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be accepted as the
8:42–8:45apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence.
8:45–8:51Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present
8:51–8:55together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also
8:55–8:59arise, because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same
8:59–9:02as that belonging to cloth absence.
9:02–9:06It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there, because the qualifiteness of cloth
9:06–9:09absence is different.
9:09–9:13If the absence of cloth absence is itself an absence, then through the same relation of
9:13–9:17qualifiteness that absence would certainly be present there, and if it is a positive
9:17–9:21entity, then cloth alone would have to be accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified
9:21–9:23cognition.
9:23–9:28If qualifiteness differs in accordance with each distinct absence, no single qualifiteness
9:28–9:31will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition of absence.
9:31–9:36non-recurrent, individual-specific qualifedness would then have to be accepted as the apprehensive
9:36–9:41relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence. But infinitely many such
9:41–9:45non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted, there is then no need to posit infinitely
9:45–9:51many qualifedness relations for absences. The prima facie objector himself accepts the
9:51–9:54qualifierhood of an entity related to the sense organ as the apprehensive relation in
9:54–10:01the perception of inherent unqualifiedness. The arrangement of possessing and lacking color
10:01–10:07Objection, if inheritance is one, how can the different arrangements, possessing color,
10:07–10:10in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible?
10:10–10:14It cannot be said that inheritance is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the
10:14–10:17relation to color but not so in relation to air.
10:17–10:20If being the nature of the color relation were the very nature of inheritance itself,
10:20–10:24the same inheritance could not also be the nature of the relation to taste, because
10:24–10:26the two would be mutually incompatible.
10:26–10:32Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in
10:32–10:38air and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself
10:38–10:44the substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions, possessing color with respect
10:44–10:51to a pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction.
10:51–10:56Cognition of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as,
10:56–11:02the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation.
11:02–11:06Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future
11:06–11:08pots would be erroneous.
11:08–11:11This objection is not sound.
11:11–11:14If knownness did not belong to past and future pots, discourse concerning them
11:14–11:17would be impossible, because cognition of them has been held to arise through
11:17–11:19cognition of knownness.
11:19–11:24To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition of the object is needlessly cumbersome.
11:24–11:28If only past and future objects are taken as objects of cognition of knownness, then
11:28–11:32in the case of a present pot both the cognition and its object would likewise be objects of
11:32–11:35cognition of knownness, there would be no difference among the objects of cognitions
11:35–11:39of knownness concerning past and present things.
11:39–11:45Prima-facie view, the relation between equality and its possessor is identity.
11:45–11:50Proposal, the relation between qualities such as color and possessors such as
11:50–11:56a pot is not inherent but only identity, that is, selfhood or numerical identity.
11:56–12:00In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of blue color in the pot
12:00–12:05is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and this man carries
12:05–12:07a staff.
12:07–12:12If both, this pot is blue, and this man carries a staff, took only a qualifier relation
12:12–12:16as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together with
12:16–12:21blue pot, and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man, would be equally required.
12:22–12:29Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other there is a qualifier relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition.
12:30–12:43Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of qualifierhood and qualificalanhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus, the blue pot, just as staff possession and manhood occur in one staff bearing man.
12:43–12:49Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in Qualifacan
12:49–12:52words blue and pot is established.
12:52–12:57The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct grounds of usage blueness and
12:57–13:00potness, form a single utterance.
13:00–13:03It is unnecessary to hold that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through
13:03–13:08restoration of an alighted mat up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity,
13:08–13:13the cognition of identity between blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical
13:13–13:19identity. There is no ground for a figurative use based on identity, and no contradiction
13:19–13:22in accepting blue color as the primary meaning.
13:22–13:30Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity. If white and
13:30–13:34cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth would be incongruous
13:34–13:40like this pot is a jar. If white color and cloth were identical, a blind person apprehending
13:40–13:45cloth by touch would also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension of the cloth would
13:45–13:49be required just as non-apprehension of its color is.
13:49–13:53In a cloth dyed red with matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would
13:53–13:58be necessary, otherwise, just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would
13:58–14:00not be apprehended.
14:00–14:05On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing.
14:05–14:09The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like, this cloth is
14:09–14:14a noncloth. When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through
14:14–14:21contact with fire, both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot.
14:21–14:26The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the substance,
14:26–14:30the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property
14:30–14:34and substance. A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not
14:34–14:38the property whiteness, hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without
14:38–14:43apprehension of the quality. The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a
14:43–14:49self-linking relation. The sedhantin replies, if properties such as whiteness are accepted as
14:49–14:54present in a substance, then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other
14:54–15:00sense organs that apprehend the substance. One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility
15:00–15:04by a determinate sense organ, but then the fact that properties such as color residing in a
15:04–15:09substance are apprehensible by a determinate sense organ is itself proof of the distinction
15:09–15:12between quality and its possessor.
15:12–15:17If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color of the cloth,
15:17–15:22would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as, the cloth is blueness,
15:22–15:25would be required.
15:25–15:29Modva view, the relation is difference and non-difference.
15:29–15:34The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity.
15:34–15:39According to the Mavavu, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference and
15:39–15:41non-difference.
15:41–15:44This removes the fault of redundancy.
15:44–15:48The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference
15:48–15:50and non-difference.
15:50–15:55Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving difference
15:55–15:58and non-difference.
15:58–16:02Coreference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical,
16:02–16:08Hence even the absence of mere coreference can establish difference and non-difference.
16:08–16:11It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore
16:11–16:14cannot constitute one relation.
16:14–16:19Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed like conjunction and its absence.
16:19–16:23When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience, this pot is red, but not black,
16:23–16:28therefore mutual absence of black colour is established in the substrate of red colour.
16:28–16:32For this reason the Siddhantin II ought to accept the relation of difference and non-difference.
16:32–16:39Inference, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it, because
16:39–16:44it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence, like absolute
16:44–16:46absence.
16:46–16:50Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason, because the counter positives
16:50–16:54of prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively.
16:54–17:01By this inference difference and non-difference is established as an apprehensive relation.
17:01–17:05RETHUITATION OF THE DOCTRON OF DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE
17:05–17:10The Siddhantan replies, The absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very
17:10–17:15locus of that thing is delimited by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction
17:15–17:19with a monkey in a tree that is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another
17:19–17:21part of the tree.
17:21–17:25In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by red
17:25–17:31color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited
17:31–17:33by black color.
17:33–17:37Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different as delimited by blue color, because
17:37–17:42in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence of the blue color delimited
17:42–17:44pot.
17:44–17:48But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence of the mutual absence
17:48–17:53of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the pot delimited by potness.
17:54–17:59A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and the same locus under the same delimiter,
17:59–18:04though they can under different delimiters. Even when both difference and non-difference
18:04–18:10are absent in the pot delimited by potness, the experience this pot is blue remains possible.
18:11–18:16The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be mutual absence,
18:16–18:20but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of mutual absence.
18:21–18:26The Siddhant in replies that absence of mutual absence is precisely the ground of usage concerning
18:26–18:32non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue, only the inheritance of blue color
18:32–18:38appears as related to the pot. Once relation objecthood is accepted, a cognition such as
18:38–18:44this pot possesses blueness is indeed expected, in the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes
18:44–18:48the locus of blue color through an alighted mat-up suffix or through a secondary use based
18:48–18:50on identity.
18:50–18:55Proposal, Qualifierhood alone is the apprehender.
18:55–19:00Proposal, in the perception of sound, color, and the like, let only the Qualifierhood
19:00–19:05belonging to an object related to the sense organ be accepted as the apprehensive relation.
19:05–19:09What need is there then to accept Inherence and the other relations?
19:09–19:12It may be said that Inherence is the cause of Qualifierhood, and conjunction
19:12–19:16come in here and the other relations are causes of the qualifier hood belonging to an
19:16–19:22object related to a sense organ, because qualifier hood is impossible without such relations.
19:22–19:26Reply, Inherence, conjunction come in here and the like may be causes only of the nature
19:26–19:30of qualifier hood, not causes producing the status of qualifier hood as an apprehensive
19:30–19:36relation. Qualifier hood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation.
19:36–19:39If it is said, without inheritance and the like, qualifier hood in color and
19:39–19:44so forth is not cognized, the reply is that qualifierhood is an apprehensive relation not
19:44–19:48because it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature.
19:48–19:53This view is not correct. Sound and the like are objects of perception. In an inference
19:53–19:57of relation to the sense organ, the qualifierhood of sound and the like is apprehended only
19:57–20:02after inheritance has been apprehended. Therefore inheritance, remembered earlier,
20:02–20:06and not qualifierhood remembered at the end, is the object of perceptual cognition,
20:06–20:08that is, the apprehensive relation.
20:09–20:15Qualifierhood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence, prima facie diu.
20:17–20:21Objection, qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ is not the
20:21–20:25apprehensive relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception of absence of
20:25–20:28waterhood in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be required.
20:30–20:33Therefore only qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible
20:33–20:36subject should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of
20:36–20:41waterhood. Absence of manifest color in the gross element air, absence of
20:41–20:44fragrance in a flower, or absence of bitterness in molasses is not perceived
20:44–20:48by the eye and other sense organs, it is inferred only from non-apprehension of
20:48–20:52an eligible counter positive. Nor is qualifierhood belonging to an object
20:52–20:55related to a sense organ the apprehensive relation of cognition of
20:55–20:59absence, otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would be perceived.
20:59–21:03If absence of sound is perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would
21:03–21:08have to be accepted for absence of sound. No, through economy, Qualifier heard alone belonging
21:08–21:12to an object related to a sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence.

Plain text

प्रिमः फैसी वृ, इनहेरन्स is not an apprehensive relation. To suppose that cognition takes the relation of inheritance as its object is itself merely an error, because a defeating contradiction is present. On that supposition one would have to accept the absence of both potness and knownness in the ground, and the cognition, the ground is devoid of a pot, would also be destroyed. The prima facie objector says that the relation between pot absence and the ground can be neither conjunction nor inheritance, nor either of these two on account of contradiction or non-establishment. nor is there merely relation in general, because relation in general as a producer of qualified cognition is already established. The prima facie objecta rejects the proposal that the qualifiers relation regulates, that is, produces, a qualified cognition distinct from an unqualified cognition. On such a view the relevant qualified cognition would establish only some other relation, such as the self-linking relation in cognition of absence. Nor is the alternative acceptable that, by means of the qualification, taking a relation as its object, the pro-bandom says that the relation is distinct from the relata, in cognition of absence such a reason would deviate from the pro-bandom. A reason qualified by, accompanied by absence of a defeater, is also unsuitable, and to describe the pro-bandom as, distinct from the relata, is pointless, because qualified cognition of absence is possible without a distinct relation of inheritance. The distinctiveness produced by a special qualifierhood or by qualifierhood and the like is likewise possible in qualified cognition without mentioning any particular inheritance. The prima facie objecta also rejects the Viagra inference, the experiences, is here are concerning parts, qualities, actions, universals, and their substrates arise from a container-contained relation, therefore inheritance is established. Such an inference fails through deviation of the reason in a collective qualified cognition such as, on the ground there are both absence of a pot and cognition. The qualification, there is no defeater, is unnecessary, because qualified experience is possible merely through the container-contained relation. The Prima-Facey objector says that whatever entity is required for production, continuance, and cognition is the locus or substrate. Bavu Qualifierhood, that is, the self-linking relation, alone is the apprehensive relation. Other teachers hold that, after conjunction has been excluded as the relevant relation, Inherence can be proved as a component of the sense-organ's apprehensive relation by the following inference, sound, soundness, color, and the like are related to a sense-organ, because they are perceptible, like a part. A sense-organ apprehends an object related to itself, hence inheritance itself is not perceived, since it is not related to the sense-organ. Inherence cannot be established merely by calling it the relation of every qualifier, for that would entail an infinite regress of relations. Cognition, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of the object related to it, similarly, Inherence 2, merely by its own nature, produces cognition of its relata. If an additional relation were admitted for cognition, every entity could, merely by its own nature, produce cognition of all things related to it. Nevertheless the fact that universals and the light produce cognition of their relata merely by their own nature does not eliminate Inherence, otherwise, in the absence of a relation to a sense organ, universals, and the light would be imperceptible just as inheritance is. This proposal is not correct. Even when inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, a self-linking relation must still be admitted. Alternatively, in the relation of substance to quality or universal, the self-linking relation alone may be accepted as the apprehensive relation, just as in the relation between the ground and an absence. What need is there, then, for a separate relation called inheritance? An object is apprehended through the self-linking relation between ground and absence. Sound may be apprehended through its qualifierhood with respect to what is related to the sense organ. Sound is through qualifierhood of a qualifier, and color through qualifierhood of an object related to a sense organ. One should not ask here how qualities such as color will be known to exist in a substance through a self-linking relation, for even after inherences accepted the same difficulty remains. How will those entities be known to exist in the substance through inheritance. Recutation of the guru school. The teachers say, when one part of a pot is bait, that same pot successively acquires black and red colors in its two parts, these two colors are not produced from the two earlier colors. Since color is eternal, both colors should exist in the pot at the same time. Production and destruction of the black and red colors are impossible, only production and destruction of their relation are possible, and that relation is inheritance. This view is not correct. The undefeated experience, the black color was destroyed and the red color arose proves color to be non-eternal. No experience speaks of the production or destruction of inheritance. On the guru view inheritance is super sensible, why then not accept that the whole substance, the smell, taste, and the rest are eternal, while only inheritance is produced and destroyed. Cognition of the production and destruction of color cannot be called false in the absence of a defeating contradiction. The Cedantans reply, Inherence can be inferred. The Cedantin concludes, The inference that establishes inheritance as an apprehensive relation is this, qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals take the relation of their qualifiers as an object, because they are qualified cognitions, like the cognition of a man carrying a staff. Deviation of the reason in qualified cognitions of absence and the like does not defeat this inference, because cognition qualified by absence takes as its object the qualifier relation in the form of a self-linking relation. Nor does the inference establish a relation wholly different on the ground that qualify cognitions of actions and the like take only a self-linking relation as their object. By the force of subjecthood and through economy, the qualifier relation that is the object of qualified cognitions of qualities, actions, and universals is established as one and the same relation, inheritance, not a self-linking relation. Self-linking relations are innumerable, own to the innumerable natures of particular individuals, and are not a common relation. Alternatively, let the probandom be produced by a qualifier relation, and let the reason be qualified by, while being veridical. The qualifier relation that causes qualifier cognition is established as the single relation of inheritance, because a recurrent effect is regulated by a recurrent cause. Self-linking relations are innumerable and non-recurrent. It is not the case that both inheritance and self-linking relations are irrelevant to qualifier cognition. If perceptual qualifier cognition neither took a relation as its object nor were produced by a relation, a separate qualifier cognition would likewise have to be admitted in a collective cognition of horses and cows. The Navya Naya Inference Navya Naya Yaka's say, a qualified cognition of equality, action, or universal takes as its object a qualifier relation distinct from the related object, because it is a qualified cognition concerning a positive entity that has no other object, or because it is a qualified cognition concerning a qualifier unqualified by any other qualifier. In qualified cognition of absence the reason does not deviate from the pro-bandam. This inference does not fail to establish inheritance, because it rests upon an unconditioned pervasion. Inherence is the regulating relation that distinguishes qualified cognition from unqualified cognition. Alternatively, the inference establishes inheritance as the apprehensive relation of equality, action, or universal related to a sense organ, immediate awareness of qualities and the like is produced by a relation belonging to an entity connected with a sense organ, because it is a produced perception. By the force of subjecthood the relation is established as one recurrent relation. A The recurrent effect requires a recurrent cause, the qualifierhood of color and the like in a particular object connected with the sense organ is individual specific, non-recurrent, and therefore not a recurrent cause. Hence, through economy, only the recurrent inheritance is established as the cause of perceptions of color, taste, and the like. This automatically refutes the parallel view that accepts only conjunction and qualifierhood as apprehensive relations. Its quality is the nature of an individual, it is non-recurrent, and it is necessary to explain apprehension through the fourfold relations involving inheritance. Once inheritance is accepted as an apprehensive relation, it is also established as apprehensible because both relata are perceptible. Qualifiedness is not an apprehensive relation. Objection, since conjunction and inheritance are mutually exclusive, and perception of absence is a qualified cognition, let only the recurrent relation of qualifedness be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of the apprehension of absence. Reply, if qualifedness is one and recurrent like inheritance, then, where cloth is present together with absence of a pot, a qualified cognition of absence of cloth would also arise, because the qualifedness belonging to pot absence would have to be the same as that belonging to cloth absence. It cannot be said, there is no absence of cloth there, because the qualifiteness of cloth absence is different. If the absence of cloth absence is itself an absence, then through the same relation of qualifiteness that absence would certainly be present there, and if it is a positive entity, then cloth alone would have to be accepted as the inhibitor of the qualified cognition. If qualifiteness differs in accordance with each distinct absence, no single qualifiteness will be the relation or cause of qualified cognition of absence. non-recurrent, individual-specific qualifedness would then have to be accepted as the apprehensive relation and cause of perceptual cognition qualified by absence. But infinitely many such non-recurrent qualifierhoods have already been accepted, there is then no need to posit infinitely many qualifedness relations for absences. The prima facie objector himself accepts the qualifierhood of an entity related to the sense organ as the apprehensive relation in the perception of inherent unqualifiedness. The arrangement of possessing and lacking color Objection, if inheritance is one, how can the different arrangements, possessing color, in a pot and give void of color, in air be possible? It cannot be said that inheritance is, in relation to the pot, the very nature of the relation to color but not so in relation to air. If being the nature of the color relation were the very nature of inheritance itself, the same inheritance could not also be the nature of the relation to taste, because the two would be mutually incompatible. Reply, although inheritance of color is present in air, the absolute absence of color is in air and not in the pot. For air, as the locus of the absolute absence of color, is itself the substratum nature of that absence. Thus the cognitions, possessing color with respect to a pot and devoid of color with respect to air are established without contradiction. Cognition of knownness A further objection, a cognition such as, the pot is known, commonly occurs, hence knownness may be accepted as an apprehensive relation. Knownness is undefeated in a present pot, but cognition of knownness in past and future pots would be erroneous. This objection is not sound. If knownness did not belong to past and future pots, discourse concerning them would be impossible, because cognition of them has been held to arise through cognition of knownness. To say that cognition of knownness is the cause of cognition of the object is needlessly cumbersome. If only past and future objects are taken as objects of cognition of knownness, then in the case of a present pot both the cognition and its object would likewise be objects of cognition of knownness, there would be no difference among the objects of cognitions of knownness concerning past and present things. Prima-facie view, the relation between equality and its possessor is identity. Proposal, the relation between qualities such as color and possessors such as a pot is not inherent but only identity, that is, selfhood or numerical identity. In a cognition such as this pot is blue, an undefeated identity of blue color in the pot is experienced, just as the relation of staff possession and the man and this man carries a staff. If both, this pot is blue, and this man carries a staff, took only a qualifier relation as their object, then the cognitions, the pot possesses blueness, together with blue pot, and the man possesses staff possession, together with staff bearing man, would be equally required. Therefore in one case identity alone is the object, while in the other there is a qualifier relation, difference of object accounts for difference of cognition. Alternatively, blueness and potness are delimiting properties respectively of qualifierhood and qualificalanhood and are cognized as occurring in a single locus, the blue pot, just as staff possession and manhood occur in one staff bearing man. Because of this common locus, the grammatical coreference of the qualifier in Qualifacan words blue and pot is established. The words blue and pot, prompted respectively by the distinct grounds of usage blueness and potness, form a single utterance. It is unnecessary to hold that the word blue denotes the possessor of blueness through restoration of an alighted mat up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity, the cognition of identity between blue color and the pot is a cognition of numerical identity. There is no ground for a figurative use based on identity, and no contradiction in accepting blue color as the primary meaning. Reply, the relation between equality and its possessor is not identity. If white and cloth were synonymous, their joint use in this cloth is a white cloth would be incongruous like this pot is a jar. If white color and cloth were identical, a blind person apprehending cloth by touch would also apprehend whiteness, otherwise non-apprehension of the cloth would be required just as non-apprehension of its color is. In a cloth dyed red with matter, apprehension of white color together with the cloth would be necessary, otherwise, just as white color is not apprehended, the cloth too would not be apprehended. On hearing bring a white cloth, the hearer would bring any white thing. The statement this cloth is non-white would be contradictory like, this cloth is a noncloth. When black color is destroyed in red color produced in one pot through contact with fire, both destruction and production would have to occur throughout the entire pot. The prima facie objecta may say, properties such as whiteness are distinct from the substance, the joint use, this cloth is a white cloth, indicates the difference between property and substance. A blind person apprehends the substance that is a white cloth, not the property whiteness, hence apprehension of the substance is possible even without apprehension of the quality. The identity of whiteness and the cloth is not inherent but a self-linking relation. The sedhantin replies, if properties such as whiteness are accepted as present in a substance, then those properties too should be apprehended by tactile and other sense organs that apprehend the substance. One may reply by invoking the rule of apprehensibility by a determinate sense organ, but then the fact that properties such as color residing in a substance are apprehensible by a determinate sense organ is itself proof of the distinction between quality and its possessor. If identity alone were the relation, the differentiating cognition, white as the color of the cloth, would be impossible, instead an identity cognition such as, the cloth is blueness, would be required. Modva view, the relation is difference and non-difference. The foregoing faults apply only to a doctrine of complete identity. According to the Mavavu, the relation between equality and its possessor is difference and non-difference. This removes the fault of redundancy. The two experiences white color is in the pot and the pot is white established difference and non-difference. Alternatively, scripturally established cognition of coreference is a means of proving difference and non-difference. Coreference is impossible between what is wholly different and what is wholly identical, Hence even the absence of mere coreference can establish difference and non-difference. It is no objection that difference and non-difference are mutually contrary natures and therefore cannot constitute one relation. Difference and non-difference are not mutually opposed like conjunction and its absence. When a pot is baked, there is the undefeated experience, this pot is red, but not black, therefore mutual absence of black colour is established in the substrate of red colour. For this reason the Siddhantin II ought to accept the relation of difference and non-difference. Inference, mutual absence, that is, difference, occurs in a locus without pervading it, because it is a property directly pervaded by absence in the form of an eternal absence, like absolute absence. Eternal is not a qualification of absence in the reason, because the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur non-pervasively. By this inference difference and non-difference is established as an apprehensive relation. RETHUITATION OF THE DOCTRON OF DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE The Siddhantan replies, The absence of a thing may occur or be cognized in the very locus of that thing is delimited by different parts or aspects, just as absence of conjunction with a monkey in a tree that is the locus of such conjunction is delimited by another part of the tree. In a pot delimited by black color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by red color, and in the pot delimited by red color there can be mutual absence of the pot delimited by black color. Thus in this pot is blue, the pot may be different as delimited by blue color, because in the pot delimited by potness there is mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot. But non-difference in the pot cannot be accepted as absence of the mutual absence of the blue color delimited pot, because that is incompatible in the pot delimited by potness. A positive entity in its absence cannot coexist in one and the same locus under the same delimiter, though they can under different delimiters. Even when both difference and non-difference are absent in the pot delimited by potness, the experience this pot is blue remains possible. The proponent of difference and non-difference may say, let difference be mutual absence, but let non-difference be some other entity rather than the absence of mutual absence. The Siddhant in replies that absence of mutual absence is precisely the ground of usage concerning non-difference. Hence in the experience, this pot is blue, only the inheritance of blue color appears as related to the pot. Once relation objecthood is accepted, a cognition such as this pot possesses blueness is indeed expected, in the expression blue pot, the word blue denotes the locus of blue color through an alighted mat-up suffix or through a secondary use based on identity. Proposal, Qualifierhood alone is the apprehender. Proposal, in the perception of sound, color, and the like, let only the Qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ be accepted as the apprehensive relation. What need is there then to accept Inherence and the other relations? It may be said that Inherence is the cause of Qualifierhood, and conjunction come in here and the other relations are causes of the qualifier hood belonging to an object related to a sense organ, because qualifier hood is impossible without such relations. Reply, Inherence, conjunction come in here and the like may be causes only of the nature of qualifier hood, not causes producing the status of qualifier hood as an apprehensive relation. Qualifier hood by itself has already been accepted as the apprehensive relation. If it is said, without inheritance and the like, qualifier hood in color and so forth is not cognized, the reply is that qualifierhood is an apprehensive relation not because it is cognized, but because it exists in its own nature. This view is not correct. Sound and the like are objects of perception. In an inference of relation to the sense organ, the qualifierhood of sound and the like is apprehended only after inheritance has been apprehended. Therefore inheritance, remembered earlier, and not qualifierhood remembered at the end, is the object of perceptual cognition, that is, the apprehensive relation. Qualifierhood of an object related to a sense organ as the relation of absence, prima facie diu. Objection, qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ is not the apprehensive relation in perceptual cognition of absence, otherwise perception of absence of waterhood in an atom related to the eye and other sense organs would be required. Therefore only qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense apprehensible subject should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of absence of waterhood. Absence of manifest color in the gross element air, absence of fragrance in a flower, or absence of bitterness in molasses is not perceived by the eye and other sense organs, it is inferred only from non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Nor is qualifierhood belonging to an object related to a sense organ the apprehensive relation of cognition of absence, otherwise absence of waterhood in the eye itself would be perceived. If absence of sound is perceptible, a separate apprehensive relation would have to be accepted for absence of sound. No, through economy, Qualifier heard alone belonging to an object related to a sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence.

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