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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.976289)

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54:16

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1. 0:04–0:13Section 4. The Doctrine that the self is not known, proof of the self's unreality and its refutation.
2. 0:13–0:18Let there be no self, because the self is not known.
3. 0:18–0:19No.
4. 0:19–0:29Total non-cognition of the self is itself doubtful, and failure to be known by a particular person applies even to knowable things.
5. 0:29–0:37Can this defect in the proof be removed by adding the qualification not known despite being knowable?
6. 0:37–0:38No.
7. 0:38–0:47The Buddhist and the materialist as well, does not accept the self as knowable or perceptible at all.
8. 0:47–0:50If he did, the dispute would end.
9. 0:50–0:59But Nya-Vayaka philosophers regard the self as knowable and perceptible, so how is the proof defective?
10. 0:59–1:07No. This is an independent inference of the Buddhist based on his own accepted view.
11. 1:07–1:13If the opponent suddenly changed his position and denied the perceptibility of the self,
12. 1:13–1:19the inference would collapse because the reason would no longer be present in the subject.
13. 1:19–1:27Again, if the opponent accepted the self as perceptible yet also admitted that it is not perceived,
14. 1:27–1:34perceived, the reason might somehow remain present in the subject, but this is impossible.
15. 1:34–1:40Perceptibility is a property that entails perception of the perceptible object.
16. 1:40–1:43This is the essence of the refutation.
17. 1:43–1:49Its fuller development may be worked out by following the method used earlier in refuting
18. 1:49–1:54arguments such as an unreal object is indestructible.
19. 1:54–2:03of the reality of the self and its defense. But what is the proof of the self's existence?
20. 2:03–2:11Certainly Perception. The awareness I exist is the direct experience of every living being.
21. 2:11–2:17This awareness can be neither objectless nor doubtful in its object because it is not
22. 2:17–2:24produced by words and is not sublated by any opposing cognition. Nor is it produced
23. 2:24–2:32by a reason in an inference. Even a person who has no cognition of any reason possesses
24. 2:32–2:41self-awareness. Nor is it memory, what was never previously experienced cannot be remembered.
25. 2:41–2:46It is also improper to say that this is a beginningless objectless cognition produced
26. 2:46–2:53by a beginningless tendency. The same could be said about ordinary cognitions of blue,
27. 2:53–3:00yellow, and the like. If self-awareness can be made unreliable by calling it the result
28. 3:00–3:06of a beginningless tendency, on what basis can cognition of blue, yellow, and the rest
29. 3:06–3:08be trusted?
30. 3:08–3:10Conclusion of the Proof
31. 3:10–3:17For this reason, the pointless supposition that cognition arises from a supernatural beginningless
32. 3:17–3:24tendency must be abandoned, and some external cause or ground of self-cognition must be
33. 3:24–3:31admitted. This ground may be the statement of a trustworthy or untrustworthy person,
34. 3:31–3:39a valid or invalid reason, or veridical or illusory perception. Since the first and
35. 3:39–3:45second grounds do not apply to cognitions of blue and the like, such cognition falls
36. 3:45–3:52under the third, so does self-cognition. If self-cognition arises after a non-conceptual
37. 3:52–4:01cognition of the self, its perceptual object is real. If it arises from illusory perception,
38. 4:01–4:07somewhere beneath it there must be a veridical non-conceptual cognition, consequently, it
39. 4:07–4:14will indirectly poses a real object. Objection that the self is unreal because it is not
40. 4:14–4:22known by the external senses and its refutation. The fact that the self is not known by the
41. 4:22–4:30external senses does not make self-cognition groundless or objectless. If it did, cognition
42. 4:30–4:37of intellect or consciousness would also become groundless and objectless. If the self-awareness
43. 4:37–4:43of consciousness is the basis of its reality, then in the case of the self to the mental
44. 4:43–4:51perception of the self is proof. There is therefore no difference between the two cases.
45. 4:51–4:58Refutation of the objection that the body may be the object of self-cognition.
46. 4:58–5:06Can the body be the object of self-cognition? No. If the body, senses, intellect, or
47. 5:06–5:12their aggregate, without any qualification, were the object of self-cognition, any person's
48. 5:12–5:19body, senses, and so forth could become the object of anyone's self-cognition, anyone
49. 5:19–5:27could regard anybody as his own. If it is said that self-cognition takes as its object only
50. 5:27–5:34the body related to oneself, the meaning of one's own must be clarified. For a thing
51. 5:34–5:42to be one's own means not to be different from oneself. Therefore, when a person knows
52. 5:42–5:50his self, the cognition, I exist arises because knower and known are identical. For this reason
53. 5:50–5:58pots and the like, which can never know themselves, cannot become the object of self-cognition.
54. 5:58–6:05If this is so, then in your Buddhist view to self-cognition will be merely a superimposition
55. 6:05–6:12upon the body, because the body is different from the experiencer. Refutation of the object
56. 6:12–6:15that consciousness is the self.
57. 6:15–6:20But is self-experience not veridical with respect to consciousness?
58. 6:20–6:21No.
59. 6:21–6:25Consciousness is experienced as an activity,
60. 6:25–6:31and the agent of the activity is experienced as wholly distinct from it.
61. 6:31–6:34Just as in the experience I cut,
62. 6:34–6:36so in the experience I know,
63. 6:36–6:40the agent is experienced as the cause of the action.
64. 6:40–6:48Do blue, yellow and the like appear as forms of cognition in cognitions of blue and yellow,
65. 6:48–6:54while selfhood appears in consciousness as its form and nature.
66. 6:54–6:59Then the status of the form of the known object and the form of cognition would be
67. 6:59–7:01the same.
68. 7:01–7:06Just as blue is different from the cognition of blue, the self would be different from
69. 7:06–7:12Self-Cognition, our purpose of establishing the difference between self and consciousness
70. 7:12–7:15would thus be fulfilled.
71. 7:15–7:19Should the preceding cognition that is the material cause of self-cognition then be
72. 7:19–7:24regarded as appearing in the form of the self.
73. 7:24–7:30If cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like are causes of self-cognition, then just
74. 7:30–7:37as these cognitions respectively make blue and yellow their forms, those forms too should
75. 7:37–7:45appear in self-cognition. A qualified object cannot appear unless its form appears. Should
76. 7:45–7:51a stream of activating cognitions, distinct from the stream of object cognitions, then
77. 7:51–7:57be the knowing self, serving as the material cause of self-cognition and called by us
78. 7:57–8:04store consciousness. Then accept the knower as a beginningless and endless self that is
79. 8:04–8:11the material cause of the activating cognitions. Yet whether this self is itself a stream of
80. 8:11–8:18cognitions or an entity distinct from that stream remains to be determined, this question
81. 8:18–8:25has already been sufficiently considered. Inferential proof of the self. But what
82. 8:25–8:30inference establishes the existence of the Self.
83. 8:30–8:33The answer is recognition.
84. 8:33–8:39Yet it has not been established that recognition of a permanent Self is veridical, if it is
85. 8:39–8:46false, it opposes the unity of the Self, and if mere ordinary recognition is taken as
86. 8:46–8:53the reason, the reason deviates because recognition of the unity of a burning flame is false.
87. 8:53–9:00No, the objector has failed to understand the intended meaning of the reason.
88. 9:00–9:04Ordinary recognition is not intended here.
89. 9:04–9:07What then, is intended?
90. 9:07–9:12An invariable successive relation between cause and effect.
91. 9:12–9:17No that too appears opposed to the unity of the self.
92. 9:17–9:20We do not say that either.
93. 9:20–9:26What is intended, then, is the determinate cognition that the earlier and later cognitions
94. 9:26–9:30were produced by one and the same agent.
95. 9:30–9:36Could this cognition not arise merely because the earlier cognition is the material cause
96. 9:36–9:38of the later cognition?
97. 9:38–9:44No, a philosophically coherent material cause relation of this kind between cognitions
98. 9:44–9:49is not admitted on the doctrine of permanence.
99. 9:49–9:55Even on the momentarist view, the mere fact that one cognition is similar in nature to
100. 9:55–10:00another and is produced from it does not constitute material causation.
101. 10:00–10:06Otherwise, the teacher's cognition and the pupil's cognition too would become connected
102. 10:06–10:10by a material-caused relation.
103. 10:10–10:13Objection to the proof and its answer.
104. 10:13–10:17Could ignorance of the difference among the objects of recognition be added to the
105. 10:17–10:24definition previously given and that itself be taken as a new definition of the material
106. 10:24–10:31cause-effect relation, the difference between the teachers and pupils' cognitions is known.
107. 10:31–10:33No.
108. 10:33–10:39In the present case there is no ignorance of the differences among the distinct cognitions,
109. 10:39–10:44therefore their unity is not recognized at all.
110. 10:44–10:50What is there not in this case also ignorance of the differences among the bodies from which
111. 10:50–10:53the separate cognitions arise?
112. 10:53–11:00If so, a newborn infant has not even a faint awareness of its former body, therefore it
113. 11:00–11:07has neither knowledge nor ignorance of the difference between the present and former bodies.
114. 11:07–11:13Yet the present body is regarded as causally connected with the former body, otherwise,
115. 11:13–11:19How could the infant remember the taste of its mother's milk on the basis of a previous
116. 11:19–11:20experience?
117. 11:20–11:27Moreover, the pot and pot sherds would not stand in a cause-effect relation because they
118. 11:27–11:31are always known as distinct objects.
119. 11:31–11:36Should causation then be based upon the co-occurrence of cause and effect?
120. 11:36–11:37No.
121. 11:37–11:44On the momentarist view real co-occurrence is impossible because cause and effect, both
122. 11:44–11:48being momentary cannot be present at the same time.
123. 11:48–11:56If imagined co-occurrence is admitted, it would apply to non-coexistent things as well.
124. 11:56–12:01Body and consciousness to appear to be present together.
125. 12:01–12:04Refutation of another possible objection.
126. 12:04–12:11The foregoing objections refute both definitions of the two kinds of material cause relation,
127. 12:11–12:17one definition is held to apply to the members of a continuous series, the other to discontinuous
128. 12:17–12:20transformation.
129. 12:20–12:26The first is defined as being the object of a non-illusory cognition of unity based upon
130. 12:26–12:32similarity among the related things, the second as standing in the relation of an
131. 12:32–12:39original form and its transformation. Further development of the refutation.
132. 12:39–12:46Concerning the second kind of material causation, it may now be asked, how is it determined that
133. 12:46–12:53a piece of charcoal or ash is a transformation of the original wood? Why can it not be a
134. 12:53–13:00transformation of fire? The answer may be that wood becomes charcoal only after coming
135. 13:00–13:07into contact with fire. But it is equally possible that charcoal is produced from fire
136. 13:07–13:14conjoined with wood. It may then be said that the material cause of an earth elemental
137. 13:14–13:22thing must itself be earth elemental. But on what ground is this certain? The answer
138. 13:22–13:28is that causation is observed to be determined by similarity within a continuous momentary
139. 13:28–13:36series. But how is that established? It will be said that the successive members of a series
140. 13:36–13:45are regarded as one because of a veridical cognition of similarity. What then is this similarity
141. 13:45–13:53generic unity or coexistence? Both alternatives have already been shown incoherent. Does
142. 13:53–13:57What similarity mean belonging to the same series?
143. 13:57–14:03And if belonging to the same series means that one member of the series is produced
144. 14:03–14:10from another, the efficient cause and its effect will also be related in the same way.
145. 14:10–14:16If generic unity itself is the material cause relation, how can material causation
146. 14:16–14:22be determined by itself, since generic unity is being identified with that very
147. 14:22–14:28relation? Is the recognition of unity among successive cognitions itself the nature of
148. 14:28–14:36the material cause relation? No, this view entails self dependence. Another definition
149. 14:36–14:43of material causation and its refutation. Can the capacity to be recognized as one and
150. 14:43–14:50the same thing define material causation? Then the nature of this capacity must first
151. 14:50–14:58be understood. Is it some special power of the cognitions? If so, it cannot be confined
152. 14:58–15:05to one particular individual and regarded as differing from individual to individual.
153. 15:05–15:11If one individual is capable of production, other similar individuals too must necessarily
154. 15:11–15:18be capable of production. Otherwise, even the productivity of a particular moment
155. 15:18–15:24or momentary individual could not be determined because the precise identification of the productive
156. 15:24–15:29moment or momentary individual is not easy.
157. 15:29–15:35All worldly practice would consequently come to a standstill, since there would be no knowledge
158. 15:35–15:39of what is beneficial or harmful.
159. 15:39–15:45The distinctive effect natures of causes would also disappear and no relation of invariable
160. 15:45–15:50concomitance between any two things could be established.
161. 15:50–15:57Nor is this capacity invariably connected with any determinate stream of cognitions, no property
162. 15:57–16:05is available that distinguishes the teacher's stream of cognitions from the pupil's stream.
163. 16:05–16:09Objection to the final statement and its refutation.
164. 16:09–16:14Can cognitions within a particular stream poses a distinctive property absent from
165. 16:14–16:23other streams? No, no such property is known. We perceive no generic difference whatsoever
166. 16:23–16:30between the streams of cognition of teacher and pupil. Could a difference exist while remaining
167. 16:30–16:37invisible so that the foregoing reason is not sublated? No, a property residing in
168. 16:37–16:44a visible thing cannot itself be invisible. If this were admitted, familiar smoke could
169. 16:44–16:52be regarded as possessing some invisible property such as ghosthood. Then every smoke would
170. 16:52–17:00not be an effect of fire, only some particular smoke would be regarded as produced by fire,
171. 17:00–17:06just as on the Buddhist view only one particular momentary cognition is produced by another
172. 17:06–17:13particular momentary cognition. Under such conditions, cognition of fire in general would
173. 17:13–17:20not arise from cognition of smoke in general. Can it be said that only the first smoke in
174. 17:20–17:28a stream of smoke is an effect of fire? No, even concerning that first smoke, doubt
175. 17:28–17:35may arise whether it was produced from fire or from some invisible cause. Therefore,
176. 17:35–17:42If causes are established as generically different, corresponding generic differences must be
177. 17:42–17:49admitted in their effects even if those effects appear externally alike, because generic difference
178. 17:49–17:54among causes determines generic difference among effects.
179. 17:54–17:59Otherwise, generic difference among effects would be accidental.
180. 17:59–18:06And if causes are generically alike but effects differ, the difference among the effects establishes
181. 18:06–18:10a generic difference among the auxiliary causes.
182. 18:10–18:15This is the rational explanation of the entire matter.
183. 18:15–18:22If it is not accepted, the reality of an afterlife cannot be established either.
184. 18:22–18:28The stream of cognition constituting a person's present life might suddenly cease without
185. 18:28–18:32producing another stream constituting a future life.
186. 18:32–18:39Furthermore, a special kind of cognition could arise from an unconscious cause, and a special
187. 18:39–18:45kind of unconscious thing could arise from cognition, if the cause-effect relation were
188. 18:45–18:48not governed by the rule stated above.
189. 18:48–18:55Indeed, although all smoke is directly perceived as belonging to one class, one might still
190. 18:55–19:02raise the doubt that some smoke is produced not by fire but by a ghost.
191. 19:02–19:06Another explanation of recognition and its refutation.
192. 19:06–19:14Let it then be admitted that recognition is determined by some particular auxiliary cause.
193. 19:14–19:19Very well, we call this alleged special cause the agent.
194. 19:19–19:26It may be asked, however, on what special ground this agent is regarded as one entity rather
195. 19:26–19:29than a stream of auxiliary causes.
196. 19:29–19:36The answer would be that an object produced by one agent falls outside the class of objects
197. 19:36–19:43produced by many agents, whereas a stream of momentary causes does not.
198. 19:43–19:48If it is said that the stream has some distinctive feature separating it from objects
199. 19:48–19:55produced by many agents, we must examine what precisely that feature is.
200. 19:55–20:01Only four alternatives are possible. It is the nature of an individually efficacious
201. 20:01–20:07cognition. It resembles the generic nature of an individually efficacious cognition.
202. 20:07–20:14It depends upon some particular cause for its own arising or it depends upon a stream
203. 20:14–20:21of causes. The first alternative is impossible because a stream is not identical with any
204. 20:21–20:29single momentary individual. The second overextends because a generic property such as cognition
205. 20:29–20:36hood occurs in the cognitions of distinct individuals as well. The fourth is indeterminate because
206. 20:36–20:42Because a causal stream is equally present in the cognitions of different individuals.
207. 20:42–20:50Therefore, once the other alternatives are eliminated, only the third must be accepted
208. 20:50–20:53dependence upon a particular cause.
209. 20:53–21:00Further development and defense of a new objection to the first explanation of recognition.
210. 21:00–21:08Alternatively, even if a cause-effect relation exists, that relation alone does not determine
211. 21:08–21:15recognition. To make this clear, we ask, does the omniscient Buddha recognize his cognitions
212. 21:15–21:23as produced by one and the same agent or not? If he does, that very fact establishes
213. 21:23–21:30both the unity of the agent of recognition and its difference from the cognitions.
214. 21:30–21:37knows that cognitions are unstable. Yet even the omniscient one cannot know the agent of
215. 21:37–21:44recognition as momentary, because he first experiences and then teaches to become an
216. 21:44–21:52instructor and guide of seekers, he must endure beyond a single moment. If the omniscient
217. 21:52–21:58one does not recognize his cognitions as having one cause, it is clear that mere
218. 21:58–22:05causal relation does not determine recognition. If one thing does not arise in the presence
219. 22:05–22:12of another, the first cannot be called the cause of the second. Can it be said that the
220. 22:12–22:19omniscient one certainly has such recognition, but it is not veridical and therefore cannot
221. 22:19–22:25establish one agent of the cognitions? Then does even the omniscient one become
222. 22:25–22:32deluded and have false recognition? It may be said that this is a deliberately made false
223. 22:32–22:39superimposition and is therefore harmless. But since the causal relation among cognitions
224. 22:39–22:46is the same for the omniscient one and ordinary people, how can the omniscient one's recognition
225. 22:46–22:53be a knowingly false imposition while that of others is not? Is recognition different
226. 22:53–22:59because the omniscient one apprehends the differences among the cognitions while ordinary people
227. 22:59–23:01do not.
228. 23:01–23:07No ordinary people to understand the differences among object cognitions.
229. 23:07–23:14Do ordinary people know only the differences among objects and not among cognitions?
230. 23:14–23:18No they to understand cognitions as distinct.
231. 23:18–23:24Recognition of cognitions is known even when the differences among their objects are not
232. 23:24–23:25clear.
233. 23:25–23:32If, despite knowledge of difference, identity in the form of cognition is superimposed upon
234. 23:32–23:39the cognitions, then, because they are earth elemental, recognition of unity should also
235. 23:39–23:47occur between a tree and a stump, a stump and charcoal, and charcoal and ash.
236. 23:47–23:55and refutation of the objection that recognition arises from ignorance of store consciousness.
237. 23:55–24:00Let the explanation then be that ignorance of the several store consciousnesses causes
238. 24:00–24:07recognition. No. On this view store consciousness would either be wholly different from the
239. 24:07–24:14object directed cognitions associated with eye consciousness or it would be some accidental
240. 24:14–24:20I consciousness included within the stream of object directed cognition.
241. 24:20–24:23The first alternative is impossible.
242. 24:23–24:29To distinct streams of I consciousness, one object directed and the other self directed
243. 24:29–24:32are never experienced.
244. 24:32–24:39Even if such two streams were admitted, there would be no causal relation between them,
245. 24:39–24:45Consequently, no relation would exist between the objects of the two recognitions either.
246. 24:45–24:52That is, the I recognized in the object directed form would be different from the I recognized
247. 24:52–24:55in the self directed form.
248. 24:55–25:01If, despite the absence of causal relation, the objects of both recognized can it be
249. 25:01–25:07said that only store consciousness and not object directed cognition is the material
250. 25:07–25:14cause, so the defect of one entity residing in many substrates does not arise?
251. 25:14–25:15No.
252. 25:15–25:22If so, object-directed cognition could not even be the efficient cause of another object-directed
253. 25:22–25:28cognition because in the Buddhist view efficient causation is invariably connected with material
254. 25:28–25:34causation whatever is the material cause of one thing is also the efficient cause
255. 25:34–25:36of something else.
256. 25:36–25:43If this rule is not accepted, some member of a stream may remain merely an efficient
257. 25:43–25:46cause without being the material cause of the next member.
258. 25:46–25:52Consequently, the stream would terminate at that fruitless member.
259. 25:52–25:56All cognitions are alike in so far as they are cognitions.
260. 25:56–26:03Therefore, if one is fruitless, similar cognitions in other streams will also be
261. 26:03–26:04fruitless.
262. 26:04–26:11If this consequence is accepted, the final member of every stream, being fruitless, will
263. 26:11–26:18be regarded as unreal, and if the final member is unreal, its predecessor too will be fruitless
264. 26:18–26:20and unreal.
265. 26:20–26:24In this way the entire stream becomes unreal.
266. 26:24–26:31What a marvelous device for establishing causation as the basis of recognition.
267. 26:31–26:37If in order to preserve the efficient casualty of store consciousness, it is held that store
268. 26:37–26:43consciousness is the material cause of a third cognition distinct from both object directed
269. 26:43–26:50and self directed cognition, the cognitions of one stream, not being causally related
270. 26:50–26:54to one another, cannot become the objects of recognition.
271. 26:54–27:01Furthermore, each store consciousness would be regarded as the material cause of some cognition
272. 27:01–27:08outside its own stream, consequently, infinitely many new streams of cognition would have to
273. 27:08–27:11be admitted in the world.
274. 27:11–27:17In summary, if object-directed cognition is not the material cause of any cognition,
275. 27:17–27:23it cannot be an efficient cause either and becomes wholly fruitless.
276. 27:23–27:29If it produces a cognition outside its own stream, an infinite regress follows and since
277. 27:29–27:36there is no causal relation between store consciousness and these external cognitions,
278. 27:36–27:40they too cannot become objects of recognition.
279. 27:40–27:47If both kinds of cognition are regarded as material causes of object directed cognition,
280. 27:47–27:52one entity must be admitted to reside in many substrates.
281. 27:52–28:00refutation of the second alternative above. The second alternative is also untenable. If
282. 28:00–28:06accepted, ignorance of difference concerning this second kind of cognition would relate
283. 28:06–28:13either to its own nature or to the nature of its object. If it relates to the cognition's
284. 28:13–28:19own nature, it will either be confined to the first eye consciousness alone or include
285. 28:19–28:26the object directed cognitions as well. The first alternative will not work.
286. 28:26–28:34The sentences I myself knew before, I myself know now, and I myself shall know later express
287. 28:34–28:40a person's cognition of himself. And they relate to three different times, this would
288. 28:40–28:47be impossible without cognition of difference. If the temporal states of the self can somehow
289. 28:47–28:53Now be known as the object of I-consonness, the object of recognition should be that very
290. 28:53–28:57self, not the object directed cognitions.
291. 28:57–29:04It has already been stated that there is no ignorance of the differences among the object
292. 29:04–29:06directed cognitions.
293. 29:06–29:12Nor is there ignorance of difference concerning the object of this cognition.
294. 29:12–29:19If such ignorance is admitted, the object will be either a form of cognition, some other
295. 29:19–29:22thing or an unreal thing.
296. 29:22–29:27The first alternative has already been shown unacceptable.
297. 29:27–29:31The Buddhist himself does not accept the second.
298. 29:31–29:38And whoever accepts such an external thing will accept its multiplicity on the basis
299. 29:38–29:41of the co-appearance of opposed properties.
300. 29:41–29:49If such co-appearance does not occur, the object will not be regarded as many.
301. 29:49–29:53Refutation of the third among the foregoing alternatives.
302. 29:53–29:57The third alternative too is incoherent.
303. 29:57–30:03The real object of eye consciousness has already been established.
304. 30:03–30:09Even if eye consciousness were regarded as objectless, it would not help establish the
305. 30:09–30:17ignorance of difference required for recognition. It has already been stated that false superimposition
306. 30:17–30:24of identity or erroneous cognition requires ignorance of one among six possible kinds of
307. 30:24–30:31difference, but not one of them is available in the present case. The six kinds are real
308. 30:31–30:37difference, unreal difference, difference whose reality is superimposed, difference
309. 30:37–30:45whose unreality is superimposed, non-coexistent difference and indefinable difference. Further
310. 30:45–30:54development of another proof of the unity of the agent. Alternatively, one may ask, on your view,
311. 30:54–31:00does a former experience produce its later memory, or does a latent impression produced
312. 31:00–31:08by the experience do so. If the impression does, is it invisible or directly established?
313. 31:08–31:15If invisible, is there one impression persisting until memory arises or a stream of momentary
314. 31:15–31:22members? If directly established, is it the stream of cognition continuing after the
315. 31:22–31:29experience, something different from that stream or a special feature of the stream?
316. 31:29–31:36this special feature, one must again ask whether it is merely the property of being produced
317. 31:36–31:41from the experience or the property of being generically different from the stream of the
318. 31:41–31:50experiencer. Of these alternatives, the first is incoherent because an unborn thing and
319. 31:50–31:57a wholly destroyed thing are equally inactive. An experience wholly destroyed as soon as
320. 31:57–32:01it arises cannot produce a memory much later.
321. 32:01–32:08Apart from the stream of cognition following the experience, no directly observable effect
322. 32:08–32:14of the experience appears, the admission of a separate entity is contradicted by its
323. 32:14–32:16non-apprehension.
324. 32:16–32:22Nor can the proposed special feature be merely the property of being produced from the
325. 32:22–32:24experience.
326. 32:24–32:31It is not the case that only seed deliberately sown by a labourer in a field germinates while
327. 32:31–32:34seed accidentally dropped there does not.
328. 32:34–32:40Similarly, either an experience of yellow or an experience of blue could produce the
329. 32:40–32:47stream of cognition normally held to arise from experience of blue.
330. 32:47–32:50There would then be no specificity among causes.
331. 32:50–32:59Consequently, what was not experienced could be remembered and what was experienced might not be remembered.
332. 32:59–33:03Objection to the foregoing and its refutation.
333. 33:03–33:10Can it be held that, just as seed produced from rice again produces only rice seed,
334. 33:10–33:17so a cognition of blue produced from cognition of yellow may generate memory of the yellow object
335. 33:17–33:23and in this manner causation between cognition and memory remains regulated?
336. 33:23–33:24No.
337. 33:24–33:30For example, if off to Pigeons, one blue-grey and the other white,
338. 33:30–33:35the blue-grey one is regularly fed milk and the white one blackberry juice,
339. 33:35–33:40thereof spring may respectively become white and blue-grey.
340. 33:40–33:47Thus the mere fact of being produced from something does not determine the nature of what follows.
341. 33:47–34:01Analogies from other things may be found for the view that a stream of cognition continuing after an experience of blue can poses a feature distinguishing it from a stream lacking blue cognition.
342. 34:01–34:16The fruit of an emblic tree watered with milk later becomes sweet, cotton seed irrigated with lacti abandons its whiteness, acquires a red color and transmits that color to the flower.
343. 34:16–34:20But cognition and memory are not like this.
344. 34:20–34:28like this. Crystal, though placed near a hibiscus or another flower, does not acquire its color
345. 34:28–34:35and retains its whiteness. Similarly, cognition, though affected by its object, remains merely
346. 34:35–34:42cognition. If the Buddhist says that all object forms are present in cognition, some
347. 34:42–34:49clear and some indistinct, then despite blind faith in his own school's doctrine opposing
348. 34:49–34:56the coexistence of contradictory properties, he has lost all fear of accepting that very
349. 34:56–35:05coexistence. One entity cannot be simultaneously clear and unclear. I see no meaning in calling
350. 35:05–35:11indistinct that which is self-luminous by its very nature.
351. 35:11–35:17Refutation of the final alternative above. Even if cognition is regarded as formless,
352. 35:17–35:22It is certainly clear with respect to all its objects.
353. 35:22–35:29Things with respect to which cognition is not clear are not its objects at all.
354. 35:29–35:36If indistinct things to are regarded as objects of cognition, the distinction between object
355. 35:36–35:39and non-object becomes indeterminate.
356. 35:39–35:46The coexistence of clarity and indistinctness can be admitted only in a composite thing,
357. 35:46–35:49This has already been examined.
358. 35:49–35:55Therefore, only the final alternative remains, an invisible latent impression produced by
359. 35:55–35:58experience produces memory.
360. 35:58–36:02But this impression cannot be a stream.
361. 36:02–36:10If it were a stream, its effect, memory, would arise within that very stream of impressions,
362. 36:10–36:14because memory would be related to that stream alone.
363. 36:14–36:20The self included within the stream of activating cognitions would then not acquire memory or
364. 36:20–36:25recognition through the awakening of the impression.
365. 36:25–36:31If the impression and its effect resided in different substrates, one person could remember
366. 36:31–36:34another person's experience.
367. 36:34–36:40If it is said that the impression produces memory in a stream having the same material
368. 36:40–36:46cause as its own material cause and that the stream of object directed cognition including
369. 36:46–36:53the self is of this kind, a stream of impressions produced by cognition of a yellow object would
370. 36:53–36:57also produce memory of a blue object.
371. 36:57–37:04Therefore, however unwelcome it may seem, one must accept that an impression produces
372. 37:04–37:12memory only in its own material cause, there is no other solution. Thus, because memory
373. 37:12–37:18of an experience occurs at a time different from that experience, the persistence of the
374. 37:18–37:26impression and of its material cause is established by itself and cannot be denied.
375. 37:26–37:31Objection to the foregoing view and its refutation nor can the Buddhist view admit
376. 37:31–37:39a permanent and invisible impression. If such an impression is cognitive in nature, it cannot
377. 37:39–37:48be invisible because Buddhists regard all cognition as self-luminous. If it is different from cognition,
378. 37:48–37:54cognition cannot be its material cause. If the impression is regarded as a distinct
379. 37:54–38:02stream of invisible cognition, memory, pleasure, pain, and the like would also be included within
380. 38:02–38:09that stream and become invisible. Therefore, memory of the kind described above certainly
381. 38:09–38:17arises from some cause if it were costless, its arising would be unregulated. Yet being
382. 38:17–38:25caused is incompatible with arising from many causes. Therefore, from the absence of being
383. 38:25–38:31caused in a thing having many causes, the concomitance is established that being caused
384. 38:31–38:38accompanies arising from one cause. Under this account, a positive example of the
385. 38:38–38:45two terms of the concomitance is also found in the movement of a dancer's eyebrow.
386. 38:45–38:51of the eyebrow movement or of the aggregate of atoms constituting the eyebrow as the same
387. 38:51–38:55is not based upon ignorance.
388. 38:55–39:01But this recognition must be qualified as follows, no property opposed to the object's
389. 39:01–39:04nature occurs in it.
390. 39:04–39:09Without this qualification, the reason would deviate in a recognition such as the child
391. 39:09–39:16whom you saw before is the very person whom I see now, because recognition of personal
392. 39:16–39:23unity here is not an unfailing ground of real unity. Objection to the foregoing conclusion
393. 39:23–39:30and its answer. Does the qualification above not apply to the body because the body itself
394. 39:30–39:38is conscious? No. The body is not conscious because it is a body, has a determinate
395. 39:38–39:46shape is a material entity and possesses qualities such as color, smell and taste.
396. 39:46–39:52Nor can the arrangement or organization of the five great elements be conscious because
397. 39:52–39:58this arrangement does not remain the same from day to day if consciousness belonged
398. 39:58–40:04to it and experience from one day would be forgotten the next.
399. 40:04–40:09This is not confined to separate limbs of the body either.
400. 40:09–40:16If it were, when a hand, foot or other limb were cut off, the experience of that severed
401. 40:16–40:19limb could not be remembered.
402. 40:19–40:25If the body itself were conscious, a newborn infant could not make its first movement
403. 40:25–40:32because no effort is possible in the absence of desire and aversion.
404. 40:32–40:40Another cannot arise until there is recognition that a certain object produces a desired result.
405. 40:40–40:46Such recognition cannot arise without memory of the invariable concomitance between that
406. 40:46–40:53object and its agreeable result, yet the infant has not experienced that relation in this
407. 40:53–40:54life.
408. 40:54–41:00The body that experienced the concomitance belonged to a previous life, once that body
409. 41:00–41:08had become ashes, another body taking its place could not remember the previous experience.
410. 41:08–41:14But in this life the causal relation between experience and the initiation of action is
411. 41:14–41:22clearly established. Therefore, without experience no initiation of action would occur, otherwise
412. 41:22–41:30action would become unregulated. For the same reason, the senses too are not conscious.
413. 41:30–41:38We apprehend one and the same object through both seeing and touching. The mind too is not
414. 41:38–41:45conscious because it is inferred only as an instrument. Thus the foregoing concomitance
415. 41:45–41:52is established and the reality of a self that passes from one birth to another is
416. 41:52–41:59also established. This self is beginningless because it is itself devoid of desire, while
417. 41:59–42:07worriedly production is understood to involve an agent possessing desire. It is also endless
418. 42:07–42:15because a real and beginningless entity is indestructible. The self is an eternal substance
419. 42:15–42:21but has no determinate shape. It is formless because it is motionless. It is motionless
420. 42:21–42:28because it is eternal, is available in our inward perception and is the substrate of perceptible
421. 42:28–42:30qualities.
422. 42:30–42:34Reduction in support of the foregoing conclusion
423. 42:34–42:39The following reductures support the foregoing conclusion.
424. 42:39–42:46If the self had a beginning, its first initiation of action could never occur.
425. 42:46–42:53If it had an end, its existence could not persist despite being beginningless.
426. 42:53–42:57If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities.
427. 42:57–43:04If it were not all-pervasive, fire, air, and the like would become motionless.
428. 43:04–43:11Motion cannot arise merely through the body's conjunction with fire, air, and the like.
429. 43:11–43:18Such motion occurs through the motion of some moving entity, but no such medium is available
430. 43:18–43:21in the present case.
431. 43:21–43:27Space conjoined with the body is itself motionless, therefore its conjunction cannot set anything
432. 43:27–43:29in motion.
433. 43:29–43:35If a motionless thing produced motion, every kind of motion could arise.
434. 43:35–43:42If an eternal entity possessed determinate shape, it could not be the substrate of qualities
435. 43:42–43:48perceptible to us, an eternal entity with determinate shape and specific qualities would
436. 43:48–43:51produce other objects as well.
437. 43:51–43:58If an eternal entity possessed motion, it would possess determinate shape.
438. 43:58–44:02This is the essence of philosophical teaching on the matter.
439. 44:02–44:08Some say that the self is atomic in dimension like the mind, because it is the substrate
440. 44:08–44:13of conjunction, which is the non inherent cause of cognition.
441. 44:13–44:19An objection is that the scriptural statement the self is subtler than the subtle opposes
442. 44:19–44:25the all-pervasiveness of the self and contradicts the inference.
443. 44:25–44:29But this objection is not sustainable.
444. 44:29–44:35If the self were not all-pervasive, the mind could not be atomic in dimension.
445. 44:35–44:41The ordered succession of all activity is possible because conjunction between self and
446. 44:41–44:45mind occurs successively.
447. 44:45–44:51When the quoted Upaniadic statement is cited, its first portion, in which the self is
448. 44:51–44:56said to be greater than the great, has been omitted.
449. 44:56–45:03to the necessity of self-knowledge and its rejoinder. Let the objection then be this,
450. 45:03–45:10even though the self has been established as real, it should still be abandoned. A person
451. 45:10–45:16who possesses awareness of selfhood becomes attached to what benefits him and ours or
452. 45:16–45:23hostile toward what harms him. Attachment and aversion are the roots of bondage in
453. 45:23–45:32one who has no cognition of the self, has no cognition of benefit or harm either, therefore
454. 45:32–45:38he will neither love nor hate anyone and will not be caught in sasra.
455. 45:38–45:45Thus, just as a forest dwelling expert in poisons is constantly intent upon removing
456. 45:45–45:50poison, the seeker of liberation should remain constantly engaged in establishing
457. 45:50–45:51non-self.
458. 45:51–45:55No, this is not the correct view.
459. 45:55–46:03A person without awareness of the self cannot become a seeker of liberation at all.
460. 46:03–46:09In the absence of self-knowledge no one will desire release from suffering or attainment
461. 46:09–46:11of happiness.
462. 46:11–46:17The desire to obtain heavenly pleasure or liberation remains in a person only so long
463. 46:17–46:21as he strives toward these goals.
464. 46:21–46:29desire ceases, both effort and its result sees. This view of non-self will only strengthen
465. 46:29–46:36atheistic tendencies, and those tendencies will produce innumerable destructive consequences
466. 46:36–46:43filled with uncontrolled craving for objects of sensory pleasure. Were this not so, how
467. 46:43–46:49could one climb onto the roof of one's house and fearlessly proclaim, as long as
468. 46:49–46:53As we live, let us enjoy pleasure.
469. 46:53–46:59As for the statement that a person loves, what benefits him and hates what harms him, it is
470. 46:59–47:02certainly true.
471. 47:02–47:08One who regards liberation as beneficial will become attached to its causes, seek them
472. 47:08–47:14out and obtain the desired result by hating or remaining indifferent to the causes that
473. 47:14–47:19obstruct liberation, there is no other way.
474. 47:19–47:27Anyone who regards enjoyment as beneficial will likewise remove obstacles and obtain enjoyment.
475. 47:27–47:32The delvated have mistaken their true benefit for harm.
476. 47:32–47:38Even in veterinary practice one does not observe anyone becoming fond of what he regards as
477. 47:38–47:44harmful to himself or turning away from what he regards as beneficial.
478. 47:44–47:50A second objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its refutation.
479. 47:50–47:56But even apart from the foregoing, should the self not be abandoned like the senses
480. 47:56–48:00and the rest, because it is the basis of suffering?
481. 48:00–48:07Yes, in the form in which it is the basis of suffering, it should certainly be abandoned.
482. 48:07–48:12The self qualified by limiting agents produces suffering.
483. 48:12–48:18But why should the self not be abandoned even in its unqualified state?
484. 48:18–48:23No, that is neither possible nor fruitful.
485. 48:23–48:29Abandonment of the self cannot mean its destruction, because the self is eternal.
486. 48:29–48:34Nor can it mean separation from it, because it is all-pervasive.
487. 48:34–48:40Nor is non-apprehension of it abandonment, the more one tries to avoid self-knowledge,
488. 48:40–48:44The more awareness of the self increases.
489. 48:44–48:49Can one avoid self-awareness by remaining indifferent to it?
490. 48:49–48:55Surely we have remained indifferent to this matter for so long, yet self-awareness has
491. 48:55–48:57not ceased.
492. 48:57–49:01Such an effort is also fruitless.
493. 49:01–49:07Abandonment of the qualified self is necessary for the destruction of suffering, but for
494. 49:07–49:12Or what result would the unqualified self be abandoned?
495. 49:12–49:15From fear that it might again become qualified?
496. 49:15–49:20No, there is no ground for such a fear.
497. 49:20–49:22Why then?
498. 49:22–49:26Contemplate the unqualified self continuously?
499. 49:26–49:30Because continuous meditation upon it brings liberation.
500. 49:30–49:35What is the nature of contemplation of the self?
501. 49:35–49:45knowledge. Discrimination from what? From non-self entities such as the body. Proof of discriminative
502. 49:45–49:52knowledge of self and non-self. Both inference and scripture prove that discriminative knowledge
503. 49:52–50:00of self and non-self is necessary. For one who mistakes the non-self for the self, the
504. 50:00–50:04The body becomes the beginning and end of existence.
505. 50:04–50:10Attached to the body, he intensely craves all the things of the world that provide bodily
506. 50:10–50:14pleasure and hates unpleasant things.
507. 50:14–50:21But one who knows the self as an independent entity is not affected by this attachment
508. 50:21–50:23and aversion.
509. 50:23–50:30A person who has abandoned all limitations has no attachment to offspring or wealth because
510. 50:30–50:38they do not serve his true welfare. Nothing can cut, dry, or burn the self. It lies beyond
511. 50:38–50:46the scope of scriptural injunction and prohibition. Scriptural commands apply only when a person
512. 50:46–50:54is limited by birth, caste, age, property, and sacraments. Therefore, the false cognition
513. 50:54–51:00that mistakes non-self for self is the cause of bondage in sasrā.
514. 51:00–51:07Right knowledge removes this false awareness. That right knowledge arises successively through
515. 51:07–51:13hearing scriptural statements, reflecting upon them, continuous meditation, and the
516. 51:13–51:20like. When the causes of attachment and aversion have been removed, their effects to are
517. 51:20–51:27destroyed. Accumulated merit and demerit are exhausted through the experience of their fruits.
518. 51:28–51:32This is the essence of the proof of the foregoing thesis.
519. 51:33–51:40Scriptural proof of the foregoing view. The essence of scripture is contained in the
520. 51:40–51:46Upaniatic statement cited above and in other statements saying that neither good nor evil
521. 51:46–51:53touches the December-died entity. But is scripture not unreliable because statements
522. 51:53–51:59concerning the unreality of the world are false, distinct doctrines mutually contradict
523. 51:59–52:04one another, and repetitive passages contain needless duplication?
524. 52:04–52:11No. Scriptural statements have different intentions.
525. 52:11–52:15Statements calling the world false intend that the seeker of liberation know the
526. 52:15–52:20the Self as transcending the world and its objects.
527. 52:20–52:28Statements of non-dual truth intend that knowledge of the independent Self brings liberation.
528. 52:28–52:34Statements that appear repetitive intend to convey the difficulty of knowing the Self.
529. 52:34–52:40Statements describing the Self as beyond the mind intend the abandonment of all external
530. 52:40–52:42effort.
531. 52:42–52:49calling the self-bliss intend that the self alone is to be known.
532. 52:49–52:54Statements calling primordial nature conscious aim to teach the necessity of meditation for
533. 52:54–52:57realization of the self.
534. 52:57–53:03Just as a forest dweller accustomed to dealing with venomous creatures strives to restore
535. 53:03–53:09consciousness to a person rendered unconscious by a snake bite, so the practitioner of
536. 53:09–53:14the Self strives for the realization of Self-consciousness.
537. 53:14–53:20Statements supporting Sakyat theories of primordial nature and the light should be interpreted
538. 53:20–53:22in the same manner.
539. 53:22–53:29If such an interpretation is not accepted, on what ground can it be said that Kapila
540. 53:29–53:33understands scripture better than Jammini?
541. 53:33–53:38And if both are learned in scripture, why do their interpretations of it differ so
542. 53:38–53:40so greatly.
543. 53:40–53:44Proof of the authority of scripture.
544. 53:44–53:47What proves the authority of scripture?
545. 53:47–53:51It's being the instruction of a trustworthy being.
546. 53:51–53:54Is this fact not unestablished?
547. 53:54–53:55No.
548. 53:55–54:01The reality of a trustworthy being who is the creator of the world is established by
549. 54:01–54:03inference.
550. 54:03–54:10The inference is this world, whose production is disputed, has an agent because it is an
551. 54:10–54:10effect.

Plain text

Section 4. The Doctrine that the self is not known, proof of the self's unreality and its refutation. Let there be no self, because the self is not known. No. Total non-cognition of the self is itself doubtful, and failure to be known by a particular person applies even to knowable things. Can this defect in the proof be removed by adding the qualification not known despite being knowable? No. The Buddhist and the materialist as well, does not accept the self as knowable or perceptible at all. If he did, the dispute would end. But Nya-Vayaka philosophers regard the self as knowable and perceptible, so how is the proof defective? No. This is an independent inference of the Buddhist based on his own accepted view. If the opponent suddenly changed his position and denied the perceptibility of the self, the inference would collapse because the reason would no longer be present in the subject. Again, if the opponent accepted the self as perceptible yet also admitted that it is not perceived, perceived, the reason might somehow remain present in the subject, but this is impossible. Perceptibility is a property that entails perception of the perceptible object. This is the essence of the refutation. Its fuller development may be worked out by following the method used earlier in refuting arguments such as an unreal object is indestructible. of the reality of the self and its defense. But what is the proof of the self's existence? Certainly Perception. The awareness I exist is the direct experience of every living being. This awareness can be neither objectless nor doubtful in its object because it is not produced by words and is not sublated by any opposing cognition. Nor is it produced by a reason in an inference. Even a person who has no cognition of any reason possesses self-awareness. Nor is it memory, what was never previously experienced cannot be remembered. It is also improper to say that this is a beginningless objectless cognition produced by a beginningless tendency. The same could be said about ordinary cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like. If self-awareness can be made unreliable by calling it the result of a beginningless tendency, on what basis can cognition of blue, yellow, and the rest be trusted? Conclusion of the Proof For this reason, the pointless supposition that cognition arises from a supernatural beginningless tendency must be abandoned, and some external cause or ground of self-cognition must be admitted. This ground may be the statement of a trustworthy or untrustworthy person, a valid or invalid reason, or veridical or illusory perception. Since the first and second grounds do not apply to cognitions of blue and the like, such cognition falls under the third, so does self-cognition. If self-cognition arises after a non-conceptual cognition of the self, its perceptual object is real. If it arises from illusory perception, somewhere beneath it there must be a veridical non-conceptual cognition, consequently, it will indirectly poses a real object. Objection that the self is unreal because it is not known by the external senses and its refutation. The fact that the self is not known by the external senses does not make self-cognition groundless or objectless. If it did, cognition of intellect or consciousness would also become groundless and objectless. If the self-awareness of consciousness is the basis of its reality, then in the case of the self to the mental perception of the self is proof. There is therefore no difference between the two cases. Refutation of the objection that the body may be the object of self-cognition. Can the body be the object of self-cognition? No. If the body, senses, intellect, or their aggregate, without any qualification, were the object of self-cognition, any person's body, senses, and so forth could become the object of anyone's self-cognition, anyone could regard anybody as his own. If it is said that self-cognition takes as its object only the body related to oneself, the meaning of one's own must be clarified. For a thing to be one's own means not to be different from oneself. Therefore, when a person knows his self, the cognition, I exist arises because knower and known are identical. For this reason pots and the like, which can never know themselves, cannot become the object of self-cognition. If this is so, then in your Buddhist view to self-cognition will be merely a superimposition upon the body, because the body is different from the experiencer. Refutation of the object that consciousness is the self. But is self-experience not veridical with respect to consciousness? No. Consciousness is experienced as an activity, and the agent of the activity is experienced as wholly distinct from it. Just as in the experience I cut, so in the experience I know, the agent is experienced as the cause of the action. Do blue, yellow and the like appear as forms of cognition in cognitions of blue and yellow, while selfhood appears in consciousness as its form and nature. Then the status of the form of the known object and the form of cognition would be the same. Just as blue is different from the cognition of blue, the self would be different from Self-Cognition, our purpose of establishing the difference between self and consciousness would thus be fulfilled. Should the preceding cognition that is the material cause of self-cognition then be regarded as appearing in the form of the self. If cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like are causes of self-cognition, then just as these cognitions respectively make blue and yellow their forms, those forms too should appear in self-cognition. A qualified object cannot appear unless its form appears. Should a stream of activating cognitions, distinct from the stream of object cognitions, then be the knowing self, serving as the material cause of self-cognition and called by us store consciousness. Then accept the knower as a beginningless and endless self that is the material cause of the activating cognitions. Yet whether this self is itself a stream of cognitions or an entity distinct from that stream remains to be determined, this question has already been sufficiently considered. Inferential proof of the self. But what inference establishes the existence of the Self. The answer is recognition. Yet it has not been established that recognition of a permanent Self is veridical, if it is false, it opposes the unity of the Self, and if mere ordinary recognition is taken as the reason, the reason deviates because recognition of the unity of a burning flame is false. No, the objector has failed to understand the intended meaning of the reason. Ordinary recognition is not intended here. What then, is intended? An invariable successive relation between cause and effect. No that too appears opposed to the unity of the self. We do not say that either. What is intended, then, is the determinate cognition that the earlier and later cognitions were produced by one and the same agent. Could this cognition not arise merely because the earlier cognition is the material cause of the later cognition? No, a philosophically coherent material cause relation of this kind between cognitions is not admitted on the doctrine of permanence. Even on the momentarist view, the mere fact that one cognition is similar in nature to another and is produced from it does not constitute material causation. Otherwise, the teacher's cognition and the pupil's cognition too would become connected by a material-caused relation. Objection to the proof and its answer. Could ignorance of the difference among the objects of recognition be added to the definition previously given and that itself be taken as a new definition of the material cause-effect relation, the difference between the teachers and pupils' cognitions is known. No. In the present case there is no ignorance of the differences among the distinct cognitions, therefore their unity is not recognized at all. What is there not in this case also ignorance of the differences among the bodies from which the separate cognitions arise? If so, a newborn infant has not even a faint awareness of its former body, therefore it has neither knowledge nor ignorance of the difference between the present and former bodies. Yet the present body is regarded as causally connected with the former body, otherwise, How could the infant remember the taste of its mother's milk on the basis of a previous experience? Moreover, the pot and pot sherds would not stand in a cause-effect relation because they are always known as distinct objects. Should causation then be based upon the co-occurrence of cause and effect? No. On the momentarist view real co-occurrence is impossible because cause and effect, both being momentary cannot be present at the same time. If imagined co-occurrence is admitted, it would apply to non-coexistent things as well. Body and consciousness to appear to be present together. Refutation of another possible objection. The foregoing objections refute both definitions of the two kinds of material cause relation, one definition is held to apply to the members of a continuous series, the other to discontinuous transformation. The first is defined as being the object of a non-illusory cognition of unity based upon similarity among the related things, the second as standing in the relation of an original form and its transformation. Further development of the refutation. Concerning the second kind of material causation, it may now be asked, how is it determined that a piece of charcoal or ash is a transformation of the original wood? Why can it not be a transformation of fire? The answer may be that wood becomes charcoal only after coming into contact with fire. But it is equally possible that charcoal is produced from fire conjoined with wood. It may then be said that the material cause of an earth elemental thing must itself be earth elemental. But on what ground is this certain? The answer is that causation is observed to be determined by similarity within a continuous momentary series. But how is that established? It will be said that the successive members of a series are regarded as one because of a veridical cognition of similarity. What then is this similarity generic unity or coexistence? Both alternatives have already been shown incoherent. Does What similarity mean belonging to the same series? And if belonging to the same series means that one member of the series is produced from another, the efficient cause and its effect will also be related in the same way. If generic unity itself is the material cause relation, how can material causation be determined by itself, since generic unity is being identified with that very relation? Is the recognition of unity among successive cognitions itself the nature of the material cause relation? No, this view entails self dependence. Another definition of material causation and its refutation. Can the capacity to be recognized as one and the same thing define material causation? Then the nature of this capacity must first be understood. Is it some special power of the cognitions? If so, it cannot be confined to one particular individual and regarded as differing from individual to individual. If one individual is capable of production, other similar individuals too must necessarily be capable of production. Otherwise, even the productivity of a particular moment or momentary individual could not be determined because the precise identification of the productive moment or momentary individual is not easy. All worldly practice would consequently come to a standstill, since there would be no knowledge of what is beneficial or harmful. The distinctive effect natures of causes would also disappear and no relation of invariable concomitance between any two things could be established. Nor is this capacity invariably connected with any determinate stream of cognitions, no property is available that distinguishes the teacher's stream of cognitions from the pupil's stream. Objection to the final statement and its refutation. Can cognitions within a particular stream poses a distinctive property absent from other streams? No, no such property is known. We perceive no generic difference whatsoever between the streams of cognition of teacher and pupil. Could a difference exist while remaining invisible so that the foregoing reason is not sublated? No, a property residing in a visible thing cannot itself be invisible. If this were admitted, familiar smoke could be regarded as possessing some invisible property such as ghosthood. Then every smoke would not be an effect of fire, only some particular smoke would be regarded as produced by fire, just as on the Buddhist view only one particular momentary cognition is produced by another particular momentary cognition. Under such conditions, cognition of fire in general would not arise from cognition of smoke in general. Can it be said that only the first smoke in a stream of smoke is an effect of fire? No, even concerning that first smoke, doubt may arise whether it was produced from fire or from some invisible cause. Therefore, If causes are established as generically different, corresponding generic differences must be admitted in their effects even if those effects appear externally alike, because generic difference among causes determines generic difference among effects. Otherwise, generic difference among effects would be accidental. And if causes are generically alike but effects differ, the difference among the effects establishes a generic difference among the auxiliary causes. This is the rational explanation of the entire matter. If it is not accepted, the reality of an afterlife cannot be established either. The stream of cognition constituting a person's present life might suddenly cease without producing another stream constituting a future life. Furthermore, a special kind of cognition could arise from an unconscious cause, and a special kind of unconscious thing could arise from cognition, if the cause-effect relation were not governed by the rule stated above. Indeed, although all smoke is directly perceived as belonging to one class, one might still raise the doubt that some smoke is produced not by fire but by a ghost. Another explanation of recognition and its refutation. Let it then be admitted that recognition is determined by some particular auxiliary cause. Very well, we call this alleged special cause the agent. It may be asked, however, on what special ground this agent is regarded as one entity rather than a stream of auxiliary causes. The answer would be that an object produced by one agent falls outside the class of objects produced by many agents, whereas a stream of momentary causes does not. If it is said that the stream has some distinctive feature separating it from objects produced by many agents, we must examine what precisely that feature is. Only four alternatives are possible. It is the nature of an individually efficacious cognition. It resembles the generic nature of an individually efficacious cognition. It depends upon some particular cause for its own arising or it depends upon a stream of causes. The first alternative is impossible because a stream is not identical with any single momentary individual. The second overextends because a generic property such as cognition hood occurs in the cognitions of distinct individuals as well. The fourth is indeterminate because Because a causal stream is equally present in the cognitions of different individuals. Therefore, once the other alternatives are eliminated, only the third must be accepted dependence upon a particular cause. Further development and defense of a new objection to the first explanation of recognition. Alternatively, even if a cause-effect relation exists, that relation alone does not determine recognition. To make this clear, we ask, does the omniscient Buddha recognize his cognitions as produced by one and the same agent or not? If he does, that very fact establishes both the unity of the agent of recognition and its difference from the cognitions. knows that cognitions are unstable. Yet even the omniscient one cannot know the agent of recognition as momentary, because he first experiences and then teaches to become an instructor and guide of seekers, he must endure beyond a single moment. If the omniscient one does not recognize his cognitions as having one cause, it is clear that mere causal relation does not determine recognition. If one thing does not arise in the presence of another, the first cannot be called the cause of the second. Can it be said that the omniscient one certainly has such recognition, but it is not veridical and therefore cannot establish one agent of the cognitions? Then does even the omniscient one become deluded and have false recognition? It may be said that this is a deliberately made false superimposition and is therefore harmless. But since the causal relation among cognitions is the same for the omniscient one and ordinary people, how can the omniscient one's recognition be a knowingly false imposition while that of others is not? Is recognition different because the omniscient one apprehends the differences among the cognitions while ordinary people do not. No ordinary people to understand the differences among object cognitions. Do ordinary people know only the differences among objects and not among cognitions? No they to understand cognitions as distinct. Recognition of cognitions is known even when the differences among their objects are not clear. If, despite knowledge of difference, identity in the form of cognition is superimposed upon the cognitions, then, because they are earth elemental, recognition of unity should also occur between a tree and a stump, a stump and charcoal, and charcoal and ash. and refutation of the objection that recognition arises from ignorance of store consciousness. Let the explanation then be that ignorance of the several store consciousnesses causes recognition. No. On this view store consciousness would either be wholly different from the object directed cognitions associated with eye consciousness or it would be some accidental I consciousness included within the stream of object directed cognition. The first alternative is impossible. To distinct streams of I consciousness, one object directed and the other self directed are never experienced. Even if such two streams were admitted, there would be no causal relation between them, Consequently, no relation would exist between the objects of the two recognitions either. That is, the I recognized in the object directed form would be different from the I recognized in the self directed form. If, despite the absence of causal relation, the objects of both recognized can it be said that only store consciousness and not object directed cognition is the material cause, so the defect of one entity residing in many substrates does not arise? No. If so, object-directed cognition could not even be the efficient cause of another object-directed cognition because in the Buddhist view efficient causation is invariably connected with material causation whatever is the material cause of one thing is also the efficient cause of something else. If this rule is not accepted, some member of a stream may remain merely an efficient cause without being the material cause of the next member. Consequently, the stream would terminate at that fruitless member. All cognitions are alike in so far as they are cognitions. Therefore, if one is fruitless, similar cognitions in other streams will also be fruitless. If this consequence is accepted, the final member of every stream, being fruitless, will be regarded as unreal, and if the final member is unreal, its predecessor too will be fruitless and unreal. In this way the entire stream becomes unreal. What a marvelous device for establishing causation as the basis of recognition. If in order to preserve the efficient casualty of store consciousness, it is held that store consciousness is the material cause of a third cognition distinct from both object directed and self directed cognition, the cognitions of one stream, not being causally related to one another, cannot become the objects of recognition. Furthermore, each store consciousness would be regarded as the material cause of some cognition outside its own stream, consequently, infinitely many new streams of cognition would have to be admitted in the world. In summary, if object-directed cognition is not the material cause of any cognition, it cannot be an efficient cause either and becomes wholly fruitless. If it produces a cognition outside its own stream, an infinite regress follows and since there is no causal relation between store consciousness and these external cognitions, they too cannot become objects of recognition. If both kinds of cognition are regarded as material causes of object directed cognition, one entity must be admitted to reside in many substrates. refutation of the second alternative above. The second alternative is also untenable. If accepted, ignorance of difference concerning this second kind of cognition would relate either to its own nature or to the nature of its object. If it relates to the cognition's own nature, it will either be confined to the first eye consciousness alone or include the object directed cognitions as well. The first alternative will not work. The sentences I myself knew before, I myself know now, and I myself shall know later express a person's cognition of himself. And they relate to three different times, this would be impossible without cognition of difference. If the temporal states of the self can somehow Now be known as the object of I-consonness, the object of recognition should be that very self, not the object directed cognitions. It has already been stated that there is no ignorance of the differences among the object directed cognitions. Nor is there ignorance of difference concerning the object of this cognition. If such ignorance is admitted, the object will be either a form of cognition, some other thing or an unreal thing. The first alternative has already been shown unacceptable. The Buddhist himself does not accept the second. And whoever accepts such an external thing will accept its multiplicity on the basis of the co-appearance of opposed properties. If such co-appearance does not occur, the object will not be regarded as many. Refutation of the third among the foregoing alternatives. The third alternative too is incoherent. The real object of eye consciousness has already been established. Even if eye consciousness were regarded as objectless, it would not help establish the ignorance of difference required for recognition. It has already been stated that false superimposition of identity or erroneous cognition requires ignorance of one among six possible kinds of difference, but not one of them is available in the present case. The six kinds are real difference, unreal difference, difference whose reality is superimposed, difference whose unreality is superimposed, non-coexistent difference and indefinable difference. Further development of another proof of the unity of the agent. Alternatively, one may ask, on your view, does a former experience produce its later memory, or does a latent impression produced by the experience do so. If the impression does, is it invisible or directly established? If invisible, is there one impression persisting until memory arises or a stream of momentary members? If directly established, is it the stream of cognition continuing after the experience, something different from that stream or a special feature of the stream? this special feature, one must again ask whether it is merely the property of being produced from the experience or the property of being generically different from the stream of the experiencer. Of these alternatives, the first is incoherent because an unborn thing and a wholly destroyed thing are equally inactive. An experience wholly destroyed as soon as it arises cannot produce a memory much later. Apart from the stream of cognition following the experience, no directly observable effect of the experience appears, the admission of a separate entity is contradicted by its non-apprehension. Nor can the proposed special feature be merely the property of being produced from the experience. It is not the case that only seed deliberately sown by a labourer in a field germinates while seed accidentally dropped there does not. Similarly, either an experience of yellow or an experience of blue could produce the stream of cognition normally held to arise from experience of blue. There would then be no specificity among causes. Consequently, what was not experienced could be remembered and what was experienced might not be remembered. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation. Can it be held that, just as seed produced from rice again produces only rice seed, so a cognition of blue produced from cognition of yellow may generate memory of the yellow object and in this manner causation between cognition and memory remains regulated? No. For example, if off to Pigeons, one blue-grey and the other white, the blue-grey one is regularly fed milk and the white one blackberry juice, thereof spring may respectively become white and blue-grey. Thus the mere fact of being produced from something does not determine the nature of what follows. Analogies from other things may be found for the view that a stream of cognition continuing after an experience of blue can poses a feature distinguishing it from a stream lacking blue cognition. The fruit of an emblic tree watered with milk later becomes sweet, cotton seed irrigated with lacti abandons its whiteness, acquires a red color and transmits that color to the flower. But cognition and memory are not like this. like this. Crystal, though placed near a hibiscus or another flower, does not acquire its color and retains its whiteness. Similarly, cognition, though affected by its object, remains merely cognition. If the Buddhist says that all object forms are present in cognition, some clear and some indistinct, then despite blind faith in his own school's doctrine opposing the coexistence of contradictory properties, he has lost all fear of accepting that very coexistence. One entity cannot be simultaneously clear and unclear. I see no meaning in calling indistinct that which is self-luminous by its very nature. Refutation of the final alternative above. Even if cognition is regarded as formless, It is certainly clear with respect to all its objects. Things with respect to which cognition is not clear are not its objects at all. If indistinct things to are regarded as objects of cognition, the distinction between object and non-object becomes indeterminate. The coexistence of clarity and indistinctness can be admitted only in a composite thing, This has already been examined. Therefore, only the final alternative remains, an invisible latent impression produced by experience produces memory. But this impression cannot be a stream. If it were a stream, its effect, memory, would arise within that very stream of impressions, because memory would be related to that stream alone. The self included within the stream of activating cognitions would then not acquire memory or recognition through the awakening of the impression. If the impression and its effect resided in different substrates, one person could remember another person's experience. If it is said that the impression produces memory in a stream having the same material cause as its own material cause and that the stream of object directed cognition including the self is of this kind, a stream of impressions produced by cognition of a yellow object would also produce memory of a blue object. Therefore, however unwelcome it may seem, one must accept that an impression produces memory only in its own material cause, there is no other solution. Thus, because memory of an experience occurs at a time different from that experience, the persistence of the impression and of its material cause is established by itself and cannot be denied. Objection to the foregoing view and its refutation nor can the Buddhist view admit a permanent and invisible impression. If such an impression is cognitive in nature, it cannot be invisible because Buddhists regard all cognition as self-luminous. If it is different from cognition, cognition cannot be its material cause. If the impression is regarded as a distinct stream of invisible cognition, memory, pleasure, pain, and the like would also be included within that stream and become invisible. Therefore, memory of the kind described above certainly arises from some cause if it were costless, its arising would be unregulated. Yet being caused is incompatible with arising from many causes. Therefore, from the absence of being caused in a thing having many causes, the concomitance is established that being caused accompanies arising from one cause. Under this account, a positive example of the two terms of the concomitance is also found in the movement of a dancer's eyebrow. of the eyebrow movement or of the aggregate of atoms constituting the eyebrow as the same is not based upon ignorance. But this recognition must be qualified as follows, no property opposed to the object's nature occurs in it. Without this qualification, the reason would deviate in a recognition such as the child whom you saw before is the very person whom I see now, because recognition of personal unity here is not an unfailing ground of real unity. Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its answer. Does the qualification above not apply to the body because the body itself is conscious? No. The body is not conscious because it is a body, has a determinate shape is a material entity and possesses qualities such as color, smell and taste. Nor can the arrangement or organization of the five great elements be conscious because this arrangement does not remain the same from day to day if consciousness belonged to it and experience from one day would be forgotten the next. This is not confined to separate limbs of the body either. If it were, when a hand, foot or other limb were cut off, the experience of that severed limb could not be remembered. If the body itself were conscious, a newborn infant could not make its first movement because no effort is possible in the absence of desire and aversion. Another cannot arise until there is recognition that a certain object produces a desired result. Such recognition cannot arise without memory of the invariable concomitance between that object and its agreeable result, yet the infant has not experienced that relation in this life. The body that experienced the concomitance belonged to a previous life, once that body had become ashes, another body taking its place could not remember the previous experience. But in this life the causal relation between experience and the initiation of action is clearly established. Therefore, without experience no initiation of action would occur, otherwise action would become unregulated. For the same reason, the senses too are not conscious. We apprehend one and the same object through both seeing and touching. The mind too is not conscious because it is inferred only as an instrument. Thus the foregoing concomitance is established and the reality of a self that passes from one birth to another is also established. This self is beginningless because it is itself devoid of desire, while worriedly production is understood to involve an agent possessing desire. It is also endless because a real and beginningless entity is indestructible. The self is an eternal substance but has no determinate shape. It is formless because it is motionless. It is motionless because it is eternal, is available in our inward perception and is the substrate of perceptible qualities. Reduction in support of the foregoing conclusion The following reductures support the foregoing conclusion. If the self had a beginning, its first initiation of action could never occur. If it had an end, its existence could not persist despite being beginningless. If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities. If it were not all-pervasive, fire, air, and the like would become motionless. Motion cannot arise merely through the body's conjunction with fire, air, and the like. Such motion occurs through the motion of some moving entity, but no such medium is available in the present case. Space conjoined with the body is itself motionless, therefore its conjunction cannot set anything in motion. If a motionless thing produced motion, every kind of motion could arise. If an eternal entity possessed determinate shape, it could not be the substrate of qualities perceptible to us, an eternal entity with determinate shape and specific qualities would produce other objects as well. If an eternal entity possessed motion, it would possess determinate shape. This is the essence of philosophical teaching on the matter. Some say that the self is atomic in dimension like the mind, because it is the substrate of conjunction, which is the non inherent cause of cognition. An objection is that the scriptural statement the self is subtler than the subtle opposes the all-pervasiveness of the self and contradicts the inference. But this objection is not sustainable. If the self were not all-pervasive, the mind could not be atomic in dimension. The ordered succession of all activity is possible because conjunction between self and mind occurs successively. When the quoted Upaniadic statement is cited, its first portion, in which the self is said to be greater than the great, has been omitted. to the necessity of self-knowledge and its rejoinder. Let the objection then be this, even though the self has been established as real, it should still be abandoned. A person who possesses awareness of selfhood becomes attached to what benefits him and ours or hostile toward what harms him. Attachment and aversion are the roots of bondage in one who has no cognition of the self, has no cognition of benefit or harm either, therefore he will neither love nor hate anyone and will not be caught in sasra. Thus, just as a forest dwelling expert in poisons is constantly intent upon removing poison, the seeker of liberation should remain constantly engaged in establishing non-self. No, this is not the correct view. A person without awareness of the self cannot become a seeker of liberation at all. In the absence of self-knowledge no one will desire release from suffering or attainment of happiness. The desire to obtain heavenly pleasure or liberation remains in a person only so long as he strives toward these goals. desire ceases, both effort and its result sees. This view of non-self will only strengthen atheistic tendencies, and those tendencies will produce innumerable destructive consequences filled with uncontrolled craving for objects of sensory pleasure. Were this not so, how could one climb onto the roof of one's house and fearlessly proclaim, as long as As we live, let us enjoy pleasure. As for the statement that a person loves, what benefits him and hates what harms him, it is certainly true. One who regards liberation as beneficial will become attached to its causes, seek them out and obtain the desired result by hating or remaining indifferent to the causes that obstruct liberation, there is no other way. Anyone who regards enjoyment as beneficial will likewise remove obstacles and obtain enjoyment. The delvated have mistaken their true benefit for harm. Even in veterinary practice one does not observe anyone becoming fond of what he regards as harmful to himself or turning away from what he regards as beneficial. A second objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its refutation. But even apart from the foregoing, should the self not be abandoned like the senses and the rest, because it is the basis of suffering? Yes, in the form in which it is the basis of suffering, it should certainly be abandoned. The self qualified by limiting agents produces suffering. But why should the self not be abandoned even in its unqualified state? No, that is neither possible nor fruitful. Abandonment of the self cannot mean its destruction, because the self is eternal. Nor can it mean separation from it, because it is all-pervasive. Nor is non-apprehension of it abandonment, the more one tries to avoid self-knowledge, The more awareness of the self increases. Can one avoid self-awareness by remaining indifferent to it? Surely we have remained indifferent to this matter for so long, yet self-awareness has not ceased. Such an effort is also fruitless. Abandonment of the qualified self is necessary for the destruction of suffering, but for Or what result would the unqualified self be abandoned? From fear that it might again become qualified? No, there is no ground for such a fear. Why then? Contemplate the unqualified self continuously? Because continuous meditation upon it brings liberation. What is the nature of contemplation of the self? knowledge. Discrimination from what? From non-self entities such as the body. Proof of discriminative knowledge of self and non-self. Both inference and scripture prove that discriminative knowledge of self and non-self is necessary. For one who mistakes the non-self for the self, the The body becomes the beginning and end of existence. Attached to the body, he intensely craves all the things of the world that provide bodily pleasure and hates unpleasant things. But one who knows the self as an independent entity is not affected by this attachment and aversion. A person who has abandoned all limitations has no attachment to offspring or wealth because they do not serve his true welfare. Nothing can cut, dry, or burn the self. It lies beyond the scope of scriptural injunction and prohibition. Scriptural commands apply only when a person is limited by birth, caste, age, property, and sacraments. Therefore, the false cognition that mistakes non-self for self is the cause of bondage in sasrā. Right knowledge removes this false awareness. That right knowledge arises successively through hearing scriptural statements, reflecting upon them, continuous meditation, and the like. When the causes of attachment and aversion have been removed, their effects to are destroyed. Accumulated merit and demerit are exhausted through the experience of their fruits. This is the essence of the proof of the foregoing thesis. Scriptural proof of the foregoing view. The essence of scripture is contained in the Upaniatic statement cited above and in other statements saying that neither good nor evil touches the December-died entity. But is scripture not unreliable because statements concerning the unreality of the world are false, distinct doctrines mutually contradict one another, and repetitive passages contain needless duplication? No. Scriptural statements have different intentions. Statements calling the world false intend that the seeker of liberation know the the Self as transcending the world and its objects. Statements of non-dual truth intend that knowledge of the independent Self brings liberation. Statements that appear repetitive intend to convey the difficulty of knowing the Self. Statements describing the Self as beyond the mind intend the abandonment of all external effort. calling the self-bliss intend that the self alone is to be known. Statements calling primordial nature conscious aim to teach the necessity of meditation for realization of the self. Just as a forest dweller accustomed to dealing with venomous creatures strives to restore consciousness to a person rendered unconscious by a snake bite, so the practitioner of the Self strives for the realization of Self-consciousness. Statements supporting Sakyat theories of primordial nature and the light should be interpreted in the same manner. If such an interpretation is not accepted, on what ground can it be said that Kapila understands scripture better than Jammini? And if both are learned in scripture, why do their interpretations of it differ so so greatly. Proof of the authority of scripture. What proves the authority of scripture? It's being the instruction of a trustworthy being. Is this fact not unestablished? No. The reality of a trustworthy being who is the creator of the world is established by inference. The inference is this world, whose production is disputed, has an agent because it is an effect.

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