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Episode3_Part10_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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asr-draft
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en (0.996979)
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21:37
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Timestamped machine output

  1. 0:02–0:33यद मेथिली बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित
  2. 0:33–0:37is established on the basis of an obstructive property.
  3. 0:38–0:42In other words, only after being the substratum of desire,
  4. 0:42–0:46or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance that is the self does negative
  5. 0:46–0:49inference established the determinant form of the probandom.
  6. 0:51–0:53Second objection, the reason would become affirmative.
  7. 0:55–1:00Again it may be objected, and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight
  8. 1:00–1:05substances because it occurs in that substance, once an example is established the reason becomes
  9. 1:05–1:12affirmative. Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative
  10. 1:12–1:18provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commonness is defective
  11. 1:18–1:23only when it produces a counter reason, in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical
  12. 1:23–1:29reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, in inferences such
  13. 1:29–1:34such as gold as light because it is luminous or sound as non-eternal because it possesses
  14. 1:34–1:40soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally.
  15. 1:40–1:44Negative inference is not unnecessary.
  16. 1:44–1:49Objection, once the absence of desire in the Eighth Substances has been established,
  17. 1:49–1:54desires residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality,
  18. 1:54–1:56therefore negative inference is unnecessary.
  19. 1:56–2:03Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides
  20. 2:03–2:04in the self.
  21. 2:04–2:08The specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances is not established
  22. 2:08–2:11without negative perversion.
  23. 2:11–2:15If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject,
  24. 2:15–2:19the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only
  25. 2:19–2:22through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the
  26. 2:22–2:26basis of a pervasive property.
  27. 2:26–2:30Concomitance with the Eight Substances need not be established separately.
  28. 2:32–2:37Objection, God's desire does not occur in the Eight Substances but does occur in the Self,
  29. 2:37–2:39therefore the Self differs from the Eight Substances.
  30. 2:40–2:43But how is the substratum that is the Self directly known?
  31. 2:46–2:50The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire
  32. 2:50–2:55may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other
  33. 2:55–2:59eight substances arises through negative inference.
  34. 2:59–3:04In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably
  35. 3:04–3:07known through another means of knowledge.
  36. 3:07–3:11Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the
  37. 3:11–3:14self.
  38. 3:14–3:19Views of some scholars concerning negative inference.
  39. 3:19–3:2050.
  40. 3:20–3:23Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the
  41. 3:23–3:27the eight substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire
  42. 3:27–3:31in the eight substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference
  43. 3:31–3:35the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances.
  44. 3:35–3:40Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter
  45. 3:40–3:47reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger.
  46. 3:47–3:55Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference
  47. 3:55–3:58is the probandom of purely negative inference.
  48. 3:58–4:03A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference.
  49. 4:03–4:09Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water,
  50. 4:09–4:14therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in Earth.
  51. 4:14–4:20In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of Earthhood is already directly known.
  52. 4:20–4:25Selfhood can be established in a living body.
  53. 4:25–4:33In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects
  54. 4:33–4:41such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire.
  55. 4:41–4:44Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire,
  56. 4:44–4:49the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example.
  57. 4:49–4:5552, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example.
  58. 4:55–4:59living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence, because desire
  59. 4:59–5:04is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire
  60. 5:04–5:09or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading
  61. 5:09–5:13inertness, inertness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire.
  62. 5:14–5:18Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with a
  63. 5:18–5:22self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property
  64. 5:22–5:25delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire.
  65. 5:27–5:31Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus.
  66. 5:33–5:3853, in this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference
  67. 5:38–5:43invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person.
  68. 5:44–5:48In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent
  69. 5:48–5:53person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property.
  70. 5:53–6:04Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent.
  71. 6:04–6:11This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition.
  72. 6:11–6:19It may be objected that if the pro-bandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the pro-bandom arise merely from cognition of the reason?
  73. 6:19–6:21This objection is untenable.
  74. 6:21–6:26When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present,
  75. 6:26–6:30a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier,
  76. 6:30–6:36just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier.
  77. 6:36–6:44Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the probandom and negative inference.
  78. 6:44–6:51This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandum is present in the subject,
  79. 6:51–6:56because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum.
  80. 6:56–7:04Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary.
  81. 7:04–7:1154 may be objected that recollection of the probandum, earth's difference from the other eight substances,
  82. 7:11–7:15is impossible before that difference is actually established.
  83. 7:15–7:19Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject earth possesses
  84. 7:19–7:23the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence
  85. 7:23–7:27of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be
  86. 7:27–7:29impossible.
  87. 7:29–7:31This objection is untenable.
  88. 7:31–7:36In earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established
  89. 7:36–7:38by the absence of the absence of earthhood.
  90. 7:38–7:42Here earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom
  91. 7:42–7:44difference from others.
  92. 7:44–7:48only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative
  93. 7:48–7:52for establishing the probandom.
  94. 7:52–7:56This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself.
  95. 7:56–8:01In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances
  96. 8:01–8:06is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged,
  97. 8:06–8:10therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method.
  98. 8:10–8:17With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end.
  99. 8:17–8:21The theory of presumption.
  100. 8:21–8:22Objection.
  101. 8:22–8:26Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge.
  102. 8:26–8:271.
  103. 8:27–8:32Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no
  104. 8:32–8:36need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge.
  105. 8:36–8:40Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can
  106. 8:40–8:45be achieved through purely negative inference itself.
  107. 8:45–8:48The Msaka view of presumption based on doubt.
  108. 8:48–8:552. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Msaka view is as follows.
  109. 8:55–9:00That Devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another
  110. 9:00–9:02scientifically accepted cause.
  111. 9:02–9:07Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdatta, who lives for a hundred
  112. 9:07–9:10years, stays only inside the house.
  113. 9:10–9:15When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdatta, is not found in the
  114. 9:15–9:21house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption
  115. 9:21–9:26of Devdutta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdutta
  116. 9:26–9:31is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdutta alive or not?
  117. 9:31–9:36According to the men'saka, Devdutta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning
  118. 9:36–9:40his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdutta's
  119. 9:40–9:43being alive and his necessary presence.
  120. 9:43–9:47Without supposing Devadatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these
  121. 9:47–9:52two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living Devadatta is outside the house, rises
  122. 9:52–9:56only after the entire specified causal complex.
  123. 9:56–9:59Either the absence of Devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through
  124. 9:59–10:03affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being
  125. 10:03–10:07alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary
  126. 10:07–10:12cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning Devadatta's
  127. 10:12–10:17being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption, because the extraordinary cause
  128. 10:17–10:23of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual
  129. 10:23–10:27contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house,
  130. 10:27–10:31produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption.
  131. 10:31–10:36On this view Devdatta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference,
  132. 10:36–10:40Deb Dutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house.
  133. 10:41–10:46But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain,
  134. 10:46–10:51therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means
  135. 10:51–10:57of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection.
  136. 11:00–11:043. It may be objective that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives
  137. 11:04–11:08of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one
  138. 11:08–11:13alternative would also become inevitable. Nor is it tenable that a previously established
  139. 11:13–11:18doubt causes supposition. If devidata's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive
  140. 11:18–11:23would cease, and if being alive is certain, devidata's presence outside can be known through
  141. 11:23–11:27inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about
  142. 11:27–11:31being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would
  143. 11:31–11:36have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead
  144. 11:36–11:41person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence.
  145. 11:43–11:49But this argument is untenable. Doubt about dead-dut does being alive produced by the specified
  146. 11:49–11:54causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a
  147. 11:54–11:59dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does
  148. 11:59–12:05not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non-
  149. 12:05–12:09non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive, the living devdutta, is
  150. 12:09–12:13not itself doubt about devduttas being alive.
  151. 12:13–12:17Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent.
  152. 12:17–12:22For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devduttas
  153. 12:22–12:26being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then
  154. 12:26–12:29is supposition of external presence possible?
  155. 12:29–12:33No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed.
  156. 12:33–12:37If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and
  157. 12:37–12:41preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external
  158. 12:41–12:44presence preserves his known being alive.
  159. 12:44–12:49As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal.
  160. 12:49–12:55Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view.
  161. 12:55–12:565.
  162. 12:56–13:00When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger
  163. 13:00–13:01negates the weaker.
  164. 13:01–13:07Consequently, doubt concerning Devdatta's being alive or dead does not arise.
  165. 13:07–13:11Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when his being alive and his absence
  166. 13:11–13:15inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt
  167. 13:15–13:18about being alive.
  168. 13:18–13:21For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence outside the house should be regarded
  169. 13:21–13:25as arising through purely negative inference, living Devdatta is outside the house because
  170. 13:25–13:30he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house.
  171. 13:30–13:34it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption
  172. 13:34–13:38from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive.
  173. 13:38–13:42Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both
  174. 13:42–13:46cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external
  175. 13:46–13:50presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause
  176. 13:50–13:54ascertainment of that same object.
  177. 13:54–13:57contradiction of the two ascertainments.
  178. 13:57–14:016. This position is unacceptable.
  179. 14:01–14:06A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex
  180. 14:06–14:11reasons as follows. The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible
  181. 14:11–14:16through non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta in the
  182. 14:16–14:22house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments
  183. 14:22–14:27Devdutta is alive in the house and Devdutta is not in the house, must be sublated, both
  184. 14:27–14:33contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid.
  185. 14:33–14:37Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death,
  186. 14:37–14:42or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external
  187. 14:42–14:43presence.
  188. 14:43–14:48In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the
  189. 14:48–14:53house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives
  190. 14:53–14:57for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house
  191. 14:57–15:03are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta
  192. 15:03–15:09who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated.
  193. 15:09–15:13Doubt produces the supposition of external presence.
  194. 15:13–15:197. Devdatta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period,
  195. 15:19–15:25and long period, as in, Devdatta is alive today and Devdatta will be alive tomorrow.
  196. 15:25–15:30If such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning
  197. 15:30–15:35time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the
  198. 15:35–15:39provision of Devdatta's presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those
  199. 15:39–15:43provisions is less extensive.
  200. 15:43–15:46Devadatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more
  201. 15:46–15:50economical than supposing death, which is negative.
  202. 15:50–15:54It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical than external
  203. 15:54–15:58presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual
  204. 15:58–16:00absence from the house.
  205. 16:00–16:04Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore
  206. 16:04–16:08external presence which preserves being alive is what should be supposed.
  207. 16:09–16:14Consequently, cognition of Dev Dutta's external presence can also arise through an
  208. 16:14–16:17inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption.
  209. 16:18–16:22Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex,
  210. 16:22–16:26with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity,
  211. 16:26–16:28supposes Dev Dutta's external presence.
  212. 16:30–16:33Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
  213. 16:34–16:408. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical
  214. 16:40–16:45meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning
  215. 16:45–16:49an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's external
  216. 16:49–16:54presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering
  217. 16:54–16:59economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines
  218. 16:59–17:04the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this
  219. 17:04–17:09This way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other
  220. 17:09–17:11means of knowledge.
  221. 17:11–17:15When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than
  222. 17:15–17:19presumption can establish dev-dut-tas external presence.
  223. 17:19–17:25Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
  224. 17:25–17:29Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt.
  225. 17:29–17:319.
  226. 17:31–17:36It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning,
  227. 17:36–17:40veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force
  228. 17:40–17:45of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which Devadatta is either
  229. 17:45–17:51in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a
  230. 17:51–17:56sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the
  231. 17:56–18:01same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and
  232. 18:01–18:04may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence.
  233. 18:06–18:10It may be said that cognition resembling super sensory perception is valid only when it is
  234. 18:10–18:16non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one
  235. 18:16–18:20of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the
  236. 18:20–18:24house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest.
  237. 18:26–18:30Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the
  238. 18:30–18:33capacity to produce veridical cognition of devidata's presence outside the house.
  239. 18:34–18:38With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end.
  240. 18:40–18:44Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt
  241. 18:46–18:5010. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated.
  242. 18:51–18:55The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually
  243. 18:55–19:00contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical
  244. 19:00–19:05reasoning, sublates Devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains Devduttas'
  245. 19:05–19:08being alive as a qualifier of the reason.
  246. 19:08–19:13In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devduttas' presence outside the
  247. 19:13–19:15house.
  248. 19:15–19:18This may be explained as follows.
  249. 19:18–19:23If the evidence for Devduttas' being alive is regarded as sublated, Devduttas' death
  250. 19:23–19:27is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside
  251. 19:27–19:29the house.
  252. 19:29–19:33Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred
  253. 19:33–19:40years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated.
  254. 19:40–19:44When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated and ascertainment
  255. 19:44–19:48of Devdutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference
  256. 19:48–19:53from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only
  257. 19:53–19:58one is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence
  258. 19:58–20:03inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition
  259. 20:03–20:08of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of
  260. 20:08–20:14cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside
  261. 20:14–20:19the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being
  262. 20:19–20:23alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the pervasion
  263. 20:23–20:29of being alive, cognition of devdatta's external presence is obtained solely through inference.
  264. 20:29–20:33For this reason no separate presumption is required.
  265. 20:33–20:37Objection, presumption is necessary.
  266. 20:37–20:4111, it may be objected that without cognition of devdatta's presence outside the house,
  267. 20:41–20:45even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devdatta who lives for a hundred years
  268. 20:45–20:47remains only in the house.
  269. 20:47–20:51Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first.
  270. 20:51–20:55But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition
  271. 20:55–20:58of external presence does not arise from that same cognition.
  272. 20:58–21:02Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of
  273. 21:02–21:03being alive.
  274. 21:03–21:10Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise.
  275. 21:10–21:14Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside
  276. 21:14–21:19the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence?
  277. 21:19–21:24Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces
  278. 21:24–21:29cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside
  279. 21:29–21:32the house.
  280. 21:32–21:33Refutation of the objection

Plain text

यद मेथिली बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कवित is established on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum of desire, or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance that is the self does negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected, and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance, once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason, in the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, in inferences such such as gold as light because it is luminous or sound as non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally. Negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection, once the absence of desire in the Eighth Substances has been established, desires residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self. The specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances is not established without negative perversion. If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property. Concomitance with the Eight Substances need not be established separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the Eight Substances but does occur in the Self, therefore the Self differs from the Eight Substances. But how is the substratum that is the Self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. 50. Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the the eight substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in Earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of Earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire. Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire, the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example. 52, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example. living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence, because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inertness, inertness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53, in this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition. It may be objected that if the pro-bandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the pro-bandom arise merely from cognition of the reason? This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier. Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the probandom and negative inference. This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandum is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum. Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary. 54 may be objected that recollection of the probandum, earth's difference from the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandom, it is enough that the subject earth possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of earthhood. Here earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom difference from others. only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom. This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method. With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end. The theory of presumption. Objection. Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. 1. Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through purely negative inference itself. The Msaka view of presumption based on doubt. 2. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Msaka view is as follows. That Devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another scientifically accepted cause. Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdatta, who lives for a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdatta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdutta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdutta alive or not? According to the men'saka, Devdutta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdutta's being alive and his necessary presence. Without supposing Devadatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living Devadatta is outside the house, rises only after the entire specified causal complex. Either the absence of Devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning Devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption, because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption. On this view Devdatta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Deb Dutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection. 3. It may be objective that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative would also become inevitable. Nor is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition. If devidata's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and if being alive is certain, devidata's presence outside can be known through inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence. But this argument is untenable. Doubt about dead-dut does being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non- non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive, the living devdutta, is not itself doubt about devduttas being alive. Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent. For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devduttas being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then is supposition of external presence possible? No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal. Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view. 5. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger negates the weaker. Consequently, doubt concerning Devdatta's being alive or dead does not arise. Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when his being alive and his absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference, living Devdatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house. it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive. Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause ascertainment of that same object. contradiction of the two ascertainments. 6. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex reasons as follows. The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments Devdutta is alive in the house and Devdutta is not in the house, must be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid. Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death, or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated. Doubt produces the supposition of external presence. 7. Devdatta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period, and long period, as in, Devdatta is alive today and Devdatta will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the provision of Devdatta's presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those provisions is less extensive. Devadatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence which preserves being alive is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Dev Dutta's external presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption. Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Dev Dutta's external presence. Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. 8. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's external presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this This way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish dev-dut-tas external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt. 9. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning, veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which Devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling super sensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce veridical cognition of devidata's presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end. Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt 10. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated. The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning, sublates Devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains Devduttas' being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devduttas' presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence for Devduttas' being alive is regarded as sublated, Devduttas' death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated and ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the pervasion of being alive, cognition of devdatta's external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required. Objection, presumption is necessary. 11, it may be objected that without cognition of devdatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devdatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise. Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house. Refutation of the objection

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