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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Detected language: en (0.9976)
Duration: 22:13
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0:02–0:06Activity is not established from non-apprehension of difference.
0:06–0:13Uncorroborated activity is not established merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver.
0:13–0:18In the mutually opposed collective cognitions, this is both shell and silver,
0:18–0:25and this is both silver and shell, activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver would occur simultaneously.
0:25–0:30The objection that there is no proof supporting such collective cognition is also unsound.
0:30–0:36The causal complexes of both collective illusions concerning shell and silver coexist, therefore
0:36–0:40production of the illusion, this is both shell and silver, is established by experience like
0:40–0:44the veridical collected cognition, this is both shell and silver.
0:44–0:48If its absence were accepted, experience of duality and the like in collected cognition
0:48–0:49would disappear.
0:49–0:53The Nayaika need not posit doubt here, because through the power of a sensory defect the
0:53–0:57differences of both shell and silver may be apprehended in each, but the Memsaka
0:57–1:01must admit a separate doubt, is this shell or silver, because the distinct differences
1:01–1:06of shell and silver cannot both be apprehended in one and the same object.
1:06–1:13Refutation of the view that activity and withdrawal arise from non-apprehension of their differences.
1:13–1:17It may be objected that activity and withdrawal arise respectively from non-apprehension
1:17–1:21of silver's difference in the shell and shell's difference in silver, because recollection
1:21–1:25of silverness and shellness respectively produces recollection of silver and shell.
1:25–1:29In recollection, only silver as endowed with silverness and shell as endowed with shellness
1:29–1:34are apprehended, not, shell endowed with silverness, or, silver endowed with shellness.
1:34–1:38Thus a person seeking a black gram seed in a heap of black powder acts toward that powder
1:38–1:43because he fails to apprehend its difference from the gram recalled through black color.
1:43–1:47Superimposition of silverness experienced in the shell does not produce both activity
1:47–1:50and withdrawal, otherwise the naiyaika would have to posit separate cognitions of
1:50–1:53shell and silver everywhere.
1:53–1:56But this reasoning is unsound.
1:56–2:00When desired silver and undesired shell are remembered through a semblance of testimony
2:00–2:06or perceptual illusion, activity and withdrawal do not arise from cognition of that quality.
2:06–2:11The Neayaka accepts that cognition of one quality can recall both shell and silver,
2:11–2:17through a sensory defect, mutually opposed qualified cognitions of both arise.
2:17–2:21Activity and withdrawal also do not arise merely from a sensory defect, because the
2:21–2:26The defect is absent in veridical cognition of silver in shell produced by a sound sense
2:26–2:27faculty.
2:27–2:33A general defect does not yield uncorroborated activity, the kinds of defect differ according
2:33–2:38to perception, inference, and testimony.
2:38–2:42Another proposal of the neoprabhakra.
2:42–2:46The neoprabhakra says that an intense desire to remember the property brightness residing
2:46–2:51in the shell arises with respect to silver because that property is more closely related
2:51–2:53to silverness.
2:53–2:57Since in the shell the property is less closely related to shellness, the desire to recall
2:57–2:59it there is weak.
2:59–3:04The more intense desire to remember the property in silver inhibits the weaker desire to remember
3:04–3:08it in the shell, therefore withdrawal from the shell and activity towards silver do
3:08–3:11not occur together.
3:11–3:14This proposal too is unsound.
3:14–3:18In the illusion, this is both shell and silver, produced by a semblance of testimony,
3:18–3:23Both silverness and shellness are equally recalled through words, and thus activity and withdrawal
3:23–3:25would still occur simultaneously.
3:25–3:30Conversely, if silverness and shellness are taken as respectively more and less closely
3:30–3:35related, doubt of intense and weak alternatives in the form is this shell or silver, becomes
3:35–3:37unavoidable.
3:37–3:42There is no proof supporting such a construction of intense and weak desire, intensity of desire
3:42–3:45is itself not evident.
3:45–3:50On Saka objection, non-correspondence of activity is objecthood with respect to the undesired
3:50–3:53object.
3:53–3:58The M Saka says that qualified cognition of silver causes corroborated activity, while
3:58–4:02non-apprehension of difference from silver causes uncorroborated activity, both points
4:02–4:05have already been admitted.
4:05–4:09But truth and falsity of qualified cognition cannot be treated as causes, because their
4:09–4:13causality has not yet been established.
4:13–4:18of the desired silver immediately present causes activity in general, and cognition of
4:18–4:24the undesired shell causes withdrawal in general, hence there is no lack of recurrence. Therefore
4:24–4:31it is unnecessary to make one qualified cognition alone the cause of both activity and withdrawal.
4:31–4:36Truth or falsity of qualified cognition is not a cause of activity, because admitting
4:36–4:42its causality creates needless complexity. The undesirable consequence would also follow
4:42–4:46that apprehension of the shell's difference from silver causes withdrawal from the desired silver.
4:47–4:53A general effect does not arise without a specific cause, here two specific causes are available,
4:53–4:57qualified cognition of silver and non-apprehension of silver's difference from the shell.
4:58–5:02Therefore mere non-apprehension of difference causes uncorroborated activity toward the
5:02–5:07shell and withdrawal from silver, in the absence of qualified cognition of silver and
5:07–5:11shell there is no corroborated activity or withdrawal.
5:11–5:16The Nayaika says that if silver and shell have not been apprehended as mutually different,
5:16–5:20the general causal complex being present, uncorroborated activity and withdrawal would
5:20–5:21arise.
5:21–5:25If it is said that activity toward real silver is not uncorroborated, then for that very
5:25–5:30reason non-apprehension of difference cannot be the cause of uncorroborated activity.
5:30–5:35The non-correspondence of activity or withdrawal is its failure to accord with the object,
5:35–5:39or non-correspondence of a cause is not determined from its effect.
5:39–5:43The MMSAKA replies that non-correspondence means activity toward an undesired object
5:43–5:46and withdrawal from a desired object.
5:46–5:50Then if non-apprehension of different causes both uncorroborated acts, how can corroborated
5:50–5:55activity toward the desired object and corroborated withdrawal from the undesired object also
5:55–5:57arise from it?
5:57–6:00Non-apprehension of difference lacks the capacity to produce these two corroborated
6:00–6:02acts.
6:02–6:08The Naya Yaka reply, cognition of the desired object causes activity.
6:08–6:13The Naya Yaka replies that cognition produces activity toward its own object.
6:13–6:17Therefore, for parsimony, one and the same cognition is accepted as causing both a child's
6:17–6:23first activity and corroborated activity in general, when no inhibitor is present.
6:23–6:26Cognition apprehending the shell as a desired object causes activity toward the shell
6:26–6:30because it takes the shell as its object, cognition does not produce activity toward
6:30–6:35something that is not its object. It may be objected that uncorroborated activity
6:35–6:39toward the shell arises merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver
6:39–6:42together with the necessary apprehension or recollection of silver, thus
6:42–6:46cognition produces activity even toward a non-object. It is then unnecessary to
6:46–6:50make cognition the cause of a child's first activity. But this position is
6:50–6:54unsound. Because of the means of cognition employed for the first
6:54–6:58time, qualified cognition must also be accepted as a cause of uncorroborated
6:58–7:03activity. No other cause contrary to the original causal postulate may be admitted without a
7:03–7:09sublating proof. Complexity in a causal postulate established from the effect is not a defect.
7:09–7:13Otherwise the causality of word power with respect to future effects would also have
7:13–7:16to be abandoned as more cumbersome than the verbal cognition of an already established
7:16–7:21effect, and only the guru view would follow.
7:21–7:27Cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference or causes respectively
7:27–7:32One may maintain that cognition produces activity toward its own object, which is true.
7:32–7:36But uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises from the foundational cognition, this
7:36–7:41is silver, not from a cognition of the desired object, this shell is desired.
7:41–7:44Cognition of the desired silver merely delimits the causality present in non-apprehension
7:44–7:48of the shell's difference from silver, for parsimony it is an additional element like
7:48–7:51inertia that is not otherwise established.
7:51–7:55The status of being an object of cognition of silver, that is, being the object of
7:55–8:00cognition favorable to activity toward that object is absent from the shell, otherwise
8:00–8:04cognition of silver would take the shell as its object. The men's arc a two accepts that cognition
8:04–8:09of desired silver produces corroborated activity. Such cognition is itself cognition favorable to
8:09–8:15activity and therefore is not a mere delimiter. The Nayaika replies that on the basis of independent
8:15–8:20positive and negative concomitants, cognition of the desired object causes activity and is not
8:20–8:25miliade limiter of causality. Cognition of the desired object cannot be made miliade limiter,
8:25–8:29because positive and negative concomitance between non-apprehension of difference and
8:29–8:32uncorroborated activity toward the shell cannot be established without including
8:32–8:37cognition of the desired object. Positive and negative concomitance between
8:37–8:40cognition of the desired object and corroborated activity has been admitted together with
8:40–8:44non-apprehension of difference, hence non-apprehension of difference is not
8:44–8:48unnecessary like Pothood. If cognition of desired silver produces activity even
8:48–8:53when its difference from the shell is not apprehended, the reversed claim that cognition of silver is
8:53–8:57the cause and non-apprehension of difference merely delimits its causality is groundless.
8:57–9:01Therefore independent positive and negative concomitance establishes cognition of the desired
9:01–9:05object and non-apprehension of difference as causes respectively of corroborated and
9:05–9:11uncorroborated activity. Veridical cognition of desired silver causes activity in general,
9:11–9:15therefore uncorroborated activity toward the undesired shell must arise from invalid cognition
9:15–9:19of the desired object because no effect occurs without the accepted cause.
9:20–9:24Activity toward the desired object does not delimit effect hood because that supposition
9:24–9:29is needlessly complex. In the absence of an inhibitor, related entities are generally
9:29–9:33accepted as cause and effect, there is no need to make the condition of activity a causal
9:33–9:40qualification. Further refutation of the view that cognition alone is the cause, restatement
9:40–9:46of misapprehension. It may be said that in corroborated activity, the foundational cognition,
9:46–9:51this is silver, accidentally takes desired silver as its object and produces activity.
9:51–9:56Then let corroborated activity toward the desired object arise merely from foundational
9:56–10:00cognition, known non-apprehension of difference does not produce corroborated activity.
10:00–10:04Consequently the view, veridical cognition of silver does not take the shell as object
10:04–10:09because it does not cause activity toward the shell, is refuted, otherwise the nature of veridical
10:09–10:13cognition would lack an example. It may further be said that the pervasion,
10:13–10:17all cognition is veridical, opposes the naiyayika theory of misapprehension.
10:18–10:22Qualify cognition and cognition of the desired object, for reasons of parsimony,
10:22–10:26cause activity in general, all scholars accept that in a child's first activity
10:26–10:31cognition causes activity toward its own object. Cognition of the desired object also
10:31–10:35causes false or uncorroborated activity, it is not merely a delimiter of the causality of
10:35–10:40non-apprehension of difference. Therefore misapprehension is not established.
10:41–10:46But this reasoning is unsound. The inference denying misapprehension is based on causality
10:46–10:50known through superfluous positive and negative concomitance, it therefore destroys the alleged
10:50–10:55pervasion, all cognition is veridical. An effect does not arise without an accepted cause.
10:56–11:00There is no sublating proof against the opponent who admits only veridical cognition,
11:00–11:04but the theory of misapprehension can clearly explain the means of unwavering activity
11:04–11:10toward the shell. This refutation also rejects the Memsaka view that, unlike recognition,
11:10–11:16one cognition of objects unrelated to the sense faculty or word is impossible.
11:16–11:22Refutation of the partial Prabhakra view that misapprehension is unnecessary.
11:22–11:25The partial Prabhikara says that silver and shell need not each be apprehended as different
11:25–11:30from both silver and shell, therefore activity and withdrawal do not occur together. Because
11:30–11:34Because of a defect, the difference of the real object present before one from remembered
11:34–11:38silver or shell may be apprehended while that object itself is overlooked, hence invalid
11:38–11:40cognition is unnecessary.
11:40–11:44It is not necessary that every recollection of silver endowed with silverness takes silver
11:44–11:49as object, even though universal relations are alike in silver through universal characteristic
11:49–11:54presentation, a defect may inhibit recollection or perception of all silver.
11:54–11:57Imperceptual qualify cognition silverness is the universal presentation, in memory the
11:57–12:00mind and impression are the presentations.
12:00–12:06The impression has no universal cause, because an impression is not itself a means of knowledge.
12:06–12:09This view is unsound.
12:09–12:13Cognition of one shell and one silver, or of two shells and two silvers, would entail
12:13–12:18apprehension of the shell's difference from silver in all four contrary alternatives.
12:18–12:23Since difference of a shell from itself is impossible, invalid cognition must be
12:23–12:26admitted.
12:26–12:32Negative cognition of an unapprehended non-relation is not an inhibitor.
12:32–12:36Some other Prabhakaras say that the negative cognition, this is not silver, concerning
12:36–12:39silver inhibits activity towards silver.
12:39–12:44This cognition may be non-apprehension of silverness as non-relation, that is, apprehension of
12:44–12:48a relation to the absolute absence of silverness, or non-apprehension of the non-relation
12:48–12:51of difference from silver.
12:51–12:54But this position is unsound.
12:54–12:58If the non-relation of silverness and of difference from silver, which exists elsewhere,
12:58–13:04not apprehended as non-related to the shell, withdrawal from silver would follow. If their
13:04–13:09non-relation to the shell is apprehended, invalid cognition too is established.
13:10–13:14It may be said that withdrawal from silver occurs only when the non-relation of difference from
13:14–13:19silver is not apprehended as related to silver. But non-relation of non-relation is actually
13:19–13:23relation of difference, if non-relation of the relation of difference from silver is apprehended,
13:23–13:28withdrawal from the shell would follow. If the relation of difference from silver is apprehended
13:28–13:33as unrelated to the shell, misapprehension becomes unavoidable. Because activity and withdrawal
13:33–13:37may occur together in the verbal cognition, this is not silver, non-apprehension of difference
13:37–13:40cannot be an inhibitor.
13:40–13:45Recutation of the view that cognition of absence of counter-positiveness to the desired or
13:45–13:52undesired object is the cause. Some others say that activity and withdrawal respectively arise
13:52–13:56from apprehension, in a known difference present in the object before one, of absence of a
13:56–14:01a condition describing counterpositiveness to the desired or undesired object. For example,
14:01–14:05though difference from silver resides in the shell, it is not seen because of a defect,
14:05–14:10while difference from another object is seen. Activity toward the shell arises from apprehension,
14:10–14:14in the difference residing in the shell, of absence of counterpositiveness to silver.
14:15–14:19Since absence of counterpositiveness to the shell is not apprehended because of a defect,
14:19–14:23there is no withdrawal from the shell. Withdrawal from silver arises from apprehension,
14:23–14:28in the remembered difference residing in silver, of absence of counter-positiveness to the shell.
14:28–14:33Since absence of counter-positiveness to silver is not apprehended because of a defect,
14:33–14:38activity, and withdrawal do not occur together. It may be objected that because the condition
14:38–14:41of difference residing in the shell is also present in difference from silver,
14:41–14:46general object cognitions take specific objects as their objects, consequently difference from
14:46–14:51silver may be manifested as difference residing in the shell. Then, when absence of counter-positiveness
14:51–14:55to the shell is apprehended in difference from silver, invalid cognition will be established.
14:56–15:00Answer, because of the defect, despite universal presentation, difference from silver is not
15:00–15:06apprehended as difference residing in the shell. The Neayaka says that experience through positive
15:06–15:11and negative concomitance establishes that the qualified cognition the shell as silver
15:11–15:17causes activity. In veritical cognition, qualified cognition alone produces activity.
15:17–15:28The only dispute is whether an invalid cognition qualified cognition alone is the cause or cognition of absence of the condition of counterpositiveness to silver also causes it.
15:28–15:33Making mere cognition of absence the cause of activity contradicts experience.
15:33–15:41In veritical cognition, absence cognition is not a cause, and positing it is more cumbersome than qualified cognition.
15:41–15:49In activity from verbal cognition, cognition of difference is absent, the same difficulty arises in explaining withdrawal.
15:50–15:54Another view, a property causes activity.
15:55–16:03Another view is that a property apprehended as residing in the desired object, silver, but not in the undesired shell causes activity toward its substrate, silver.
16:04–16:09In desired silver this property is silverness, in the undesired shell it is resemblance to silver.
16:09–16:14Likewise, a property apprehended as residing in the undesired object but not in the desired
16:14–16:17object causes withdrawal from its substrate.
16:17–16:21On this account activity and withdrawal do not occur together.
16:21–16:24But this view is unsound.
16:24–16:28The verbal illusion, this is both shell and silver, would not establish activity toward
16:28–16:33the shell and withdrawal from silver, because the property residing in silver and the property
16:33–16:36residing in the shell are not respectively remembered through the words as being in
16:36–16:39shell and silver.
16:39–16:43Or is it proper to say that after hearing the words both properties are apprehended
16:43–16:47perceptually, then the word would not cause recollection of the property?
16:47–16:52In fact, belief in the deceiver's invariable words, this is both shell and silver, causes
16:52–16:56activity and withdrawal.
16:56–17:00Qualified cognition causes activity.
17:00–17:05Some others say that, because of a defect, silverness in silver is not apprehended
17:05–17:09in invalid cognition, therefore non-apprehension of difference from all remembered properties
17:09–17:15residing in silver does not produce activity towards silver. Activity toward the shell
17:15–17:19arises from non-apprehension of difference from some one property remembered as residing
17:19–17:25in the shell and apprehended as silver. Likewise, withdrawal from the shell does not arise from
17:25–17:30non-apprehension of difference from all properties, but withdrawal from silver arises from non-apprehension
17:30–17:35of difference from one property. Just as activity stops when an existent difference
17:35–17:40is apprehended through another means even though non-apprehension of difference persists,
17:40–17:44apprehension of difference from all properties remembered as residing in silver inhibits
17:44–17:47activity.
17:47–17:48But this is unsound.
17:48–17:53Because of parsimony and positive negative concomitance, the invalid qualified cognition,
17:53–17:57this shell is silver, causes activity, not an elaborate construction of non-apprehension
17:57–17:58of differences.
17:58–18:03Nor is the objection that qualified cognition has no cause sound, as in recognition, impression,
18:03–18:09sense faculty produce one cognition. If recognition is treated as two cognitions, identity of
18:09–18:14the earlier and later cognition disappears. Nor is it true that impression and sense faculty
18:14–18:18do not cooperate with respect to the same object, they cooperate in perception of a
18:18–18:22named object and in production of cognition as that same object. This account is not
18:22–18:27needlessly complex, non-apprehension of different serves as a cooperating cause of qualified
18:27–18:29cognition.
18:29–18:32This is silver is one cognition.
18:32–18:38Objection, though recognition is one cognition, its, that-ness, component is not perceptual
18:38–18:42because it lacks sense-contact, cognition of that-ness arises from an impression.
18:42–18:46Thus only memory-hood belongs to the that-ness component, while perceptuality belongs to
18:46–18:50the identity component of the object present before one.
18:50–18:54Memory-hood and perceptuality are neither universals nor extrinsic conditions, so
18:54–18:57there is no defect of overlap between them.
18:57–19:02Answer, you yourself admit that an object not in contact with the sense faculty is manifested
19:02–19:03through an impression.
19:03–19:09Therefore, on your own view, the invalid qualified cognition, this shell is silver, like recognition,
19:09–19:12can be one cognition when the causal complex is present.
19:12–19:17Perceptuality in both the thatness and silverness components is produced by the sense faculty,
19:17–19:20the two properties do not overlap.
19:20–19:24It may again be said that perceptual cognition of a particular object arises from direct
19:24–19:27sense contact with that particular object, whereas invalid cognition of silver has no
19:27–19:33contact with silver. This objection is unsound. Recognition is perceptual cognition because
19:33–19:38it is produced by sense contact, indirectness cannot be admitted in the thatness or silverness
19:38–19:43component. Impression or memory functions as a presentation establishing perceptuality
19:43–19:50in darkness. Nor is inherent in a related object the cause of directly perceived silverness.
19:50–19:54There is no proof that perception of silverness is impossible without such inheritance.
19:54–19:59Inherence weakened by cognition of a distinction does not cause qualified cognition of silverness,
19:59–20:05because when the cognitive aggregate is fully present, qualified cognition is not delayed.
20:05–20:08Illusion is false cognition.
20:08–20:12Cognition of the qualifier is a presentation of the qualificant, non-apprehension of nonrelation
20:12–20:16between qualifier and qualificant causes qualified perception.
20:16–20:21non-apprehension of non-relation, common to recognition and veridical perception, is also
20:21–20:26possible in illusory invalid cognition. Contact of the eye with a particular silver object
20:26–20:30causes perception of silver, but only in the capacity of presentation of a qualificant
20:30–20:35in general, not as a special relation to that particular silver. For in general, whatever
20:35–20:39entity of a class causes an effect of a class, a particular entity of that class causes
20:39–20:44a particular effect of that class. Contact with particular silver becomes redundant beside
20:44–20:48the other causal conditions for perception of a general qualifcant, therefore no separate
20:48–20:52causal complex need be posited for perception of particular silver, and doing so would be
20:52–20:58needlessly complex. A particular qualifcant or particular qualify cognition may be established
20:58–21:03through presentation of a qualifcant in general. Thus making the causality of qualify cognition
21:03–21:07depend on general presentation of a qualifcant is more economical than making activity
21:07–21:12depend on non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered desired object.
21:12–21:16In fact, the rule that a silver illusion arises from a sensory defect is established in both
21:16–21:18traditions.
21:18–21:22But silver illusion cannot mean non-apprehension of non-relation.
21:22–21:26If absence of non-relation is foundational, it is not established, and if it is absence
21:26–21:30of cognition of the foundation, then, being veridical cognition of the foundation, it
21:30–21:33cannot arise from a defective sense faculty.
21:33–21:37Nor is it correct that a superimposed veridical cognition in place of illusion arises
21:37–21:41solely from a sensory defect, because such veridical cognition arises from an entirely
21:41–21:46different causal aggregate. Therefore illusion must be false, that is, invalid cognition.
21:46–21:51Consequently, it must be admitted that cognition of an object not in contact with the sense
21:51–21:56faculty also arises from a sensory defect. The operation through which a sensory defect
21:56–22:01produces uncorroborated activity is only invalid-qualify cognition, because the causality of the sensory
22:01–22:06defect towards such activity is already admitted. Non-apprehension of difference is not the
22:06–22:09cause of that activity, since its causality remains to be established.

Plain text

Activity is not established from non-apprehension of difference. Uncorroborated activity is not established merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver. In the mutually opposed collective cognitions, this is both shell and silver, and this is both silver and shell, activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver would occur simultaneously. The objection that there is no proof supporting such collective cognition is also unsound. The causal complexes of both collective illusions concerning shell and silver coexist, therefore production of the illusion, this is both shell and silver, is established by experience like the veridical collected cognition, this is both shell and silver. If its absence were accepted, experience of duality and the like in collected cognition would disappear. The Nayaika need not posit doubt here, because through the power of a sensory defect the differences of both shell and silver may be apprehended in each, but the Memsaka must admit a separate doubt, is this shell or silver, because the distinct differences of shell and silver cannot both be apprehended in one and the same object. Refutation of the view that activity and withdrawal arise from non-apprehension of their differences. It may be objected that activity and withdrawal arise respectively from non-apprehension of silver's difference in the shell and shell's difference in silver, because recollection of silverness and shellness respectively produces recollection of silver and shell. In recollection, only silver as endowed with silverness and shell as endowed with shellness are apprehended, not, shell endowed with silverness, or, silver endowed with shellness. Thus a person seeking a black gram seed in a heap of black powder acts toward that powder because he fails to apprehend its difference from the gram recalled through black color. Superimposition of silverness experienced in the shell does not produce both activity and withdrawal, otherwise the naiyaika would have to posit separate cognitions of shell and silver everywhere. But this reasoning is unsound. When desired silver and undesired shell are remembered through a semblance of testimony or perceptual illusion, activity and withdrawal do not arise from cognition of that quality. The Neayaka accepts that cognition of one quality can recall both shell and silver, through a sensory defect, mutually opposed qualified cognitions of both arise. Activity and withdrawal also do not arise merely from a sensory defect, because the The defect is absent in veridical cognition of silver in shell produced by a sound sense faculty. A general defect does not yield uncorroborated activity, the kinds of defect differ according to perception, inference, and testimony. Another proposal of the neoprabhakra. The neoprabhakra says that an intense desire to remember the property brightness residing in the shell arises with respect to silver because that property is more closely related to silverness. Since in the shell the property is less closely related to shellness, the desire to recall it there is weak. The more intense desire to remember the property in silver inhibits the weaker desire to remember it in the shell, therefore withdrawal from the shell and activity towards silver do not occur together. This proposal too is unsound. In the illusion, this is both shell and silver, produced by a semblance of testimony, Both silverness and shellness are equally recalled through words, and thus activity and withdrawal would still occur simultaneously. Conversely, if silverness and shellness are taken as respectively more and less closely related, doubt of intense and weak alternatives in the form is this shell or silver, becomes unavoidable. There is no proof supporting such a construction of intense and weak desire, intensity of desire is itself not evident. On Saka objection, non-correspondence of activity is objecthood with respect to the undesired object. The M Saka says that qualified cognition of silver causes corroborated activity, while non-apprehension of difference from silver causes uncorroborated activity, both points have already been admitted. But truth and falsity of qualified cognition cannot be treated as causes, because their causality has not yet been established. of the desired silver immediately present causes activity in general, and cognition of the undesired shell causes withdrawal in general, hence there is no lack of recurrence. Therefore it is unnecessary to make one qualified cognition alone the cause of both activity and withdrawal. Truth or falsity of qualified cognition is not a cause of activity, because admitting its causality creates needless complexity. The undesirable consequence would also follow that apprehension of the shell's difference from silver causes withdrawal from the desired silver. A general effect does not arise without a specific cause, here two specific causes are available, qualified cognition of silver and non-apprehension of silver's difference from the shell. Therefore mere non-apprehension of difference causes uncorroborated activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver, in the absence of qualified cognition of silver and shell there is no corroborated activity or withdrawal. The Nayaika says that if silver and shell have not been apprehended as mutually different, the general causal complex being present, uncorroborated activity and withdrawal would arise. If it is said that activity toward real silver is not uncorroborated, then for that very reason non-apprehension of difference cannot be the cause of uncorroborated activity. The non-correspondence of activity or withdrawal is its failure to accord with the object, or non-correspondence of a cause is not determined from its effect. The MMSAKA replies that non-correspondence means activity toward an undesired object and withdrawal from a desired object. Then if non-apprehension of different causes both uncorroborated acts, how can corroborated activity toward the desired object and corroborated withdrawal from the undesired object also arise from it? Non-apprehension of difference lacks the capacity to produce these two corroborated acts. The Naya Yaka reply, cognition of the desired object causes activity. The Naya Yaka replies that cognition produces activity toward its own object. Therefore, for parsimony, one and the same cognition is accepted as causing both a child's first activity and corroborated activity in general, when no inhibitor is present. Cognition apprehending the shell as a desired object causes activity toward the shell because it takes the shell as its object, cognition does not produce activity toward something that is not its object. It may be objected that uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver together with the necessary apprehension or recollection of silver, thus cognition produces activity even toward a non-object. It is then unnecessary to make cognition the cause of a child's first activity. But this position is unsound. Because of the means of cognition employed for the first time, qualified cognition must also be accepted as a cause of uncorroborated activity. No other cause contrary to the original causal postulate may be admitted without a sublating proof. Complexity in a causal postulate established from the effect is not a defect. Otherwise the causality of word power with respect to future effects would also have to be abandoned as more cumbersome than the verbal cognition of an already established effect, and only the guru view would follow. Cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference or causes respectively One may maintain that cognition produces activity toward its own object, which is true. But uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises from the foundational cognition, this is silver, not from a cognition of the desired object, this shell is desired. Cognition of the desired silver merely delimits the causality present in non-apprehension of the shell's difference from silver, for parsimony it is an additional element like inertia that is not otherwise established. The status of being an object of cognition of silver, that is, being the object of cognition favorable to activity toward that object is absent from the shell, otherwise cognition of silver would take the shell as its object. The men's arc a two accepts that cognition of desired silver produces corroborated activity. Such cognition is itself cognition favorable to activity and therefore is not a mere delimiter. The Nayaika replies that on the basis of independent positive and negative concomitants, cognition of the desired object causes activity and is not miliade limiter of causality. Cognition of the desired object cannot be made miliade limiter, because positive and negative concomitance between non-apprehension of difference and uncorroborated activity toward the shell cannot be established without including cognition of the desired object. Positive and negative concomitance between cognition of the desired object and corroborated activity has been admitted together with non-apprehension of difference, hence non-apprehension of difference is not unnecessary like Pothood. If cognition of desired silver produces activity even when its difference from the shell is not apprehended, the reversed claim that cognition of silver is the cause and non-apprehension of difference merely delimits its causality is groundless. Therefore independent positive and negative concomitance establishes cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference as causes respectively of corroborated and uncorroborated activity. Veridical cognition of desired silver causes activity in general, therefore uncorroborated activity toward the undesired shell must arise from invalid cognition of the desired object because no effect occurs without the accepted cause. Activity toward the desired object does not delimit effect hood because that supposition is needlessly complex. In the absence of an inhibitor, related entities are generally accepted as cause and effect, there is no need to make the condition of activity a causal qualification. Further refutation of the view that cognition alone is the cause, restatement of misapprehension. It may be said that in corroborated activity, the foundational cognition, this is silver, accidentally takes desired silver as its object and produces activity. Then let corroborated activity toward the desired object arise merely from foundational cognition, known non-apprehension of difference does not produce corroborated activity. Consequently the view, veridical cognition of silver does not take the shell as object because it does not cause activity toward the shell, is refuted, otherwise the nature of veridical cognition would lack an example. It may further be said that the pervasion, all cognition is veridical, opposes the naiyayika theory of misapprehension. Qualify cognition and cognition of the desired object, for reasons of parsimony, cause activity in general, all scholars accept that in a child's first activity cognition causes activity toward its own object. Cognition of the desired object also causes false or uncorroborated activity, it is not merely a delimiter of the causality of non-apprehension of difference. Therefore misapprehension is not established. But this reasoning is unsound. The inference denying misapprehension is based on causality known through superfluous positive and negative concomitance, it therefore destroys the alleged pervasion, all cognition is veridical. An effect does not arise without an accepted cause. There is no sublating proof against the opponent who admits only veridical cognition, but the theory of misapprehension can clearly explain the means of unwavering activity toward the shell. This refutation also rejects the Memsaka view that, unlike recognition, one cognition of objects unrelated to the sense faculty or word is impossible. Refutation of the partial Prabhakra view that misapprehension is unnecessary. The partial Prabhikara says that silver and shell need not each be apprehended as different from both silver and shell, therefore activity and withdrawal do not occur together. Because Because of a defect, the difference of the real object present before one from remembered silver or shell may be apprehended while that object itself is overlooked, hence invalid cognition is unnecessary. It is not necessary that every recollection of silver endowed with silverness takes silver as object, even though universal relations are alike in silver through universal characteristic presentation, a defect may inhibit recollection or perception of all silver. Imperceptual qualify cognition silverness is the universal presentation, in memory the mind and impression are the presentations. The impression has no universal cause, because an impression is not itself a means of knowledge. This view is unsound. Cognition of one shell and one silver, or of two shells and two silvers, would entail apprehension of the shell's difference from silver in all four contrary alternatives. Since difference of a shell from itself is impossible, invalid cognition must be admitted. Negative cognition of an unapprehended non-relation is not an inhibitor. Some other Prabhakaras say that the negative cognition, this is not silver, concerning silver inhibits activity towards silver. This cognition may be non-apprehension of silverness as non-relation, that is, apprehension of a relation to the absolute absence of silverness, or non-apprehension of the non-relation of difference from silver. But this position is unsound. If the non-relation of silverness and of difference from silver, which exists elsewhere, not apprehended as non-related to the shell, withdrawal from silver would follow. If their non-relation to the shell is apprehended, invalid cognition too is established. It may be said that withdrawal from silver occurs only when the non-relation of difference from silver is not apprehended as related to silver. But non-relation of non-relation is actually relation of difference, if non-relation of the relation of difference from silver is apprehended, withdrawal from the shell would follow. If the relation of difference from silver is apprehended as unrelated to the shell, misapprehension becomes unavoidable. Because activity and withdrawal may occur together in the verbal cognition, this is not silver, non-apprehension of difference cannot be an inhibitor. Recutation of the view that cognition of absence of counter-positiveness to the desired or undesired object is the cause. Some others say that activity and withdrawal respectively arise from apprehension, in a known difference present in the object before one, of absence of a a condition describing counterpositiveness to the desired or undesired object. For example, though difference from silver resides in the shell, it is not seen because of a defect, while difference from another object is seen. Activity toward the shell arises from apprehension, in the difference residing in the shell, of absence of counterpositiveness to silver. Since absence of counterpositiveness to the shell is not apprehended because of a defect, there is no withdrawal from the shell. Withdrawal from silver arises from apprehension, in the remembered difference residing in silver, of absence of counter-positiveness to the shell. Since absence of counter-positiveness to silver is not apprehended because of a defect, activity, and withdrawal do not occur together. It may be objected that because the condition of difference residing in the shell is also present in difference from silver, general object cognitions take specific objects as their objects, consequently difference from silver may be manifested as difference residing in the shell. Then, when absence of counter-positiveness to the shell is apprehended in difference from silver, invalid cognition will be established. Answer, because of the defect, despite universal presentation, difference from silver is not apprehended as difference residing in the shell. The Neayaka says that experience through positive and negative concomitance establishes that the qualified cognition the shell as silver causes activity. In veritical cognition, qualified cognition alone produces activity. The only dispute is whether an invalid cognition qualified cognition alone is the cause or cognition of absence of the condition of counterpositiveness to silver also causes it. Making mere cognition of absence the cause of activity contradicts experience. In veritical cognition, absence cognition is not a cause, and positing it is more cumbersome than qualified cognition. In activity from verbal cognition, cognition of difference is absent, the same difficulty arises in explaining withdrawal. Another view, a property causes activity. Another view is that a property apprehended as residing in the desired object, silver, but not in the undesired shell causes activity toward its substrate, silver. In desired silver this property is silverness, in the undesired shell it is resemblance to silver. Likewise, a property apprehended as residing in the undesired object but not in the desired object causes withdrawal from its substrate. On this account activity and withdrawal do not occur together. But this view is unsound. The verbal illusion, this is both shell and silver, would not establish activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver, because the property residing in silver and the property residing in the shell are not respectively remembered through the words as being in shell and silver. Or is it proper to say that after hearing the words both properties are apprehended perceptually, then the word would not cause recollection of the property? In fact, belief in the deceiver's invariable words, this is both shell and silver, causes activity and withdrawal. Qualified cognition causes activity. Some others say that, because of a defect, silverness in silver is not apprehended in invalid cognition, therefore non-apprehension of difference from all remembered properties residing in silver does not produce activity towards silver. Activity toward the shell arises from non-apprehension of difference from some one property remembered as residing in the shell and apprehended as silver. Likewise, withdrawal from the shell does not arise from non-apprehension of difference from all properties, but withdrawal from silver arises from non-apprehension of difference from one property. Just as activity stops when an existent difference is apprehended through another means even though non-apprehension of difference persists, apprehension of difference from all properties remembered as residing in silver inhibits activity. But this is unsound. Because of parsimony and positive negative concomitance, the invalid qualified cognition, this shell is silver, causes activity, not an elaborate construction of non-apprehension of differences. Nor is the objection that qualified cognition has no cause sound, as in recognition, impression, sense faculty produce one cognition. If recognition is treated as two cognitions, identity of the earlier and later cognition disappears. Nor is it true that impression and sense faculty do not cooperate with respect to the same object, they cooperate in perception of a named object and in production of cognition as that same object. This account is not needlessly complex, non-apprehension of different serves as a cooperating cause of qualified cognition. This is silver is one cognition. Objection, though recognition is one cognition, its, that-ness, component is not perceptual because it lacks sense-contact, cognition of that-ness arises from an impression. Thus only memory-hood belongs to the that-ness component, while perceptuality belongs to the identity component of the object present before one. Memory-hood and perceptuality are neither universals nor extrinsic conditions, so there is no defect of overlap between them. Answer, you yourself admit that an object not in contact with the sense faculty is manifested through an impression. Therefore, on your own view, the invalid qualified cognition, this shell is silver, like recognition, can be one cognition when the causal complex is present. Perceptuality in both the thatness and silverness components is produced by the sense faculty, the two properties do not overlap. It may again be said that perceptual cognition of a particular object arises from direct sense contact with that particular object, whereas invalid cognition of silver has no contact with silver. This objection is unsound. Recognition is perceptual cognition because it is produced by sense contact, indirectness cannot be admitted in the thatness or silverness component. Impression or memory functions as a presentation establishing perceptuality in darkness. Nor is inherent in a related object the cause of directly perceived silverness. There is no proof that perception of silverness is impossible without such inheritance. Inherence weakened by cognition of a distinction does not cause qualified cognition of silverness, because when the cognitive aggregate is fully present, qualified cognition is not delayed. Illusion is false cognition. Cognition of the qualifier is a presentation of the qualificant, non-apprehension of nonrelation between qualifier and qualificant causes qualified perception. non-apprehension of non-relation, common to recognition and veridical perception, is also possible in illusory invalid cognition. Contact of the eye with a particular silver object causes perception of silver, but only in the capacity of presentation of a qualificant in general, not as a special relation to that particular silver. For in general, whatever entity of a class causes an effect of a class, a particular entity of that class causes a particular effect of that class. Contact with particular silver becomes redundant beside the other causal conditions for perception of a general qualifcant, therefore no separate causal complex need be posited for perception of particular silver, and doing so would be needlessly complex. A particular qualifcant or particular qualify cognition may be established through presentation of a qualifcant in general. Thus making the causality of qualify cognition depend on general presentation of a qualifcant is more economical than making activity depend on non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered desired object. In fact, the rule that a silver illusion arises from a sensory defect is established in both traditions. But silver illusion cannot mean non-apprehension of non-relation. If absence of non-relation is foundational, it is not established, and if it is absence of cognition of the foundation, then, being veridical cognition of the foundation, it cannot arise from a defective sense faculty. Nor is it correct that a superimposed veridical cognition in place of illusion arises solely from a sensory defect, because such veridical cognition arises from an entirely different causal aggregate. Therefore illusion must be false, that is, invalid cognition. Consequently, it must be admitted that cognition of an object not in contact with the sense faculty also arises from a sensory defect. The operation through which a sensory defect produces uncorroborated activity is only invalid-qualify cognition, because the causality of the sensory defect towards such activity is already admitted. Non-apprehension of difference is not the cause of that activity, since its causality remains to be established.

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