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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:06This section
0:06–0:10The fundamental process of comparison is as follows.
0:10–0:19Instruction, when a person has never seen a gavaia, someone who knows it says, the animal that resembles a cow is a gavaia.
0:19–0:27Perception and recollection, when the person later sees such an animal in a forest, the instructive statement is recalled.
0:27–0:32Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this animal is the
0:32–0:37referent of the word gavaia. This determinant cognition is called upamiti
0:37–0:43and its means is called comparison or upamana. The section contains a major
0:43–0:48debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning similarity. According to
0:48–0:54them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category. According to the
0:54–1:01text, does the Neayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view? Is similarity an independent category,
1:01–1:08or merely the presence of certain common properties? According to the comparison section of the
1:08–1:14Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly rejects the claim that similarity is an autonomous or
1:14–1:20separately existing category. The Neayaka position is as follows.
1:20–1:28Not a separate category, similarity is neither an independent entity nor a distinct ontological class.
1:28–1:38Possession of common properties, similarity is not a separate thing but merely the presence or possession in one object of several properties common to another related object.
1:38–1:43For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties common to a cow.
1:43–1:50According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity.
1:50–1:57When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than the presence of shared properties.
1:57–2:05Thus, the Govaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form, and these give rise to the cognition of similarity.
2:05–2:10Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity.
2:10–2:22When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow in the instruction, what resembles a cow as a gavaia is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination, this animal is a gavaia.
2:23–2:30The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called upamiti, the result of upamana.
2:30–2:40When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia.
2:40–2:50The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word.
2:50–2:57The person understands that the word gavaia applies to that animal on account of a distinctive ground, gavaiahood.
2:57–3:00An important question arises here.
3:00–3:05Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and verbal
3:05–3:10testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Neayakas regard it as a wholly
3:10–3:14distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception
3:14–3:17or testimony?
3:17–3:19This is a very important question.
3:19–3:25The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal
3:25–3:30testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons.
3:30–3:35Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then a
3:35–3:39person who had never heard the instruction, a gavaya resembles a cow, would also come
3:39–3:43to know the word gavaya merely by seeing the animal.
3:43–3:46This does not happen.
3:46–3:51Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement,
3:51–3:55A person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon hearing
3:55–3:59the instruction, even without seeing the animal.
3:59–4:02This too is impossible.
4:02–4:06Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through
4:06–4:11the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process of
4:11–4:13a distinct kind.
4:13–4:17In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the relation between
4:17–4:20the word and its meaning.
4:20–4:25This cognition of similarity, distinct from both testimony and perception, is therefore
4:25–4:29the means of knowledge called comparison.
4:29–4:34Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life.
4:34–4:39Suppose a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name.
4:39–4:44Instruction, a friend says, broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color
4:44–4:47is deep green.
4:47–4:52and recollection, several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees a green
4:52–4:58vegetable resembling cauliflower. On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered.
5:00–5:05Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this green vegetable is the
5:05–5:11referent of the word broccoli. Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's
5:11–5:15statement, the person has fully learned the meaning of the new word broccoli.
5:15–5:20This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge.
5:20–5:24Suppose a child has never seen a zebra.
5:24–5:32Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse, but its body has black and white stripes.
5:32–5:39Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and sees a striped, horse-like animal.
5:39–5:42The teacher's statement is then recalled.
5:42–5:50called. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra.
5:50–5:56Through resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra.
5:56–6:01This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life.
6:01–6:06The final part of the comparison section makes an important point. Suppose someone
6:06–6:10gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal that does
6:10–6:17not resemble a cow is not a gavaia. According to the work, even a negative instructional
6:17–6:22statement such as an animal unlike a cow is not a gavaia fully assists in understanding
6:22–6:27the meaning of a new word through the cognition of similarity. Although the statement is negative,
6:27–6:32the speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate the similarity between a gavaia and
6:32–6:39a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by an indirect route, toward the same similarity
6:39–6:43through which the hearer grasps the words referent.
6:43–6:49With this subject, the comparison section of the Tathasintmai comes to an end.
6:49–6:54The text is a profound philosophical analysis of the manner in which comparison or similarity
6:54–6:56cognition operates.
6:56–7:01Gangesa Upadyaya refutes the views of other schools, especially the msakas, and of earlier
7:01–7:07scholars within his own tradition, and establishes the Naviyanya position.
7:07–7:13The principal philosophical points of the entire discussion are as follows.
7:13–7:17The nature of similarity, the masakas regard similarity as an independent category distinct
7:17–7:20from the seven accepted categories.
7:20–7:24Gangesa refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession, in one
7:24–7:28object, of properties common to another.
7:28–7:31Difference from inference, some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could
7:31–7:34be known through inference or presumption.
7:34–7:41Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of knowledge.
7:41–7:46The result of comparison, earlier Neayakas such as Janta byheld that the result of comparison
7:46–7:50is merely understanding this animal is a Gavaaya.
7:50–7:54According to Gangesa, however, its true result is the determination that the semantic
7:54–7:59power and referent of the word Gavaaya resides in Gavaayavud, the universal, and
7:59–8:03not merely in one particular animal.
8:03–8:07Let us first understand the dispute between Gangeshet and the earlier Neayakas concerning
8:07–8:11the final result of comparison.
8:11–8:15This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaya.
8:15–8:161.
8:16–8:21The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jatabah, when a person sees the animal in the forest,
8:21–8:25the conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the
8:25–8:26word Gavaaya.
8:26–8:33Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal.
8:33–8:342.
8:34–8:39Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word Gavaya were
8:39–8:43restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second Gavaya encountered
8:43–8:46in the forest the next day?
8:46–8:51Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the determination that the
8:51–8:56semantic power or referent of the word gavaya resides not in one animal but in gavaya hood,
8:56–9:04the universal or common property. In simple terms, the person learns not merely the name of one animal
9:04–9:10but that every animal possessing gavaya hood is called a gavaya. By the same principle,
9:10–9:15the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located in apple hood, the common property
9:15–9:20of all apples. If only one particular red apple were accepted
9:20–9:24as apple, it would be impossible to call a green or yellow specimen seen the next day
9:24–9:30an apple. Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaia is not one particular
9:30–9:36animal but the universal gavaiahood. Inference requires prior knowledge of a
9:36–9:42perversion or universal rule in order to cognize something new. Thus, to infer fire
9:42–9:46from smoke, one must already know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire.
9:48–9:52When a person sees the animal in the forest and learns the meaning of the word gavaia,
9:52–9:57does the person already possess a pervasion cognition such as whatever resembles a cow
9:57–10:01is the referent of the word gavaia, or does the comparison arise directly after hearing
10:01–10:07the instruction and seeing the animal? The logical process is as follows.
10:07–10:13The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form
10:13–10:20differs in certain respects. The instructive statement is then recalled. The important
10:20–10:25point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of a pervasion such as
10:25–10:31wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent. The meaning is grasped directly
10:31–10:37through the conjunction of the instruction and perception. After seeing the animal and
10:37–10:41recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion, this animal is the referent
10:41–10:46of the word gavaia, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one animal but
10:46–10:50extends to the entire universal gavaiahood.
10:50–10:55This is the final result of comparison, Upamini.
10:55–10:59That is, the person understands that the word gavaia applies to the particular animal
10:59–11:04seen in the forest and that its referent is gavaiahood, the universal.
11:04–11:091. Why is comparison different from perception?
11:09–11:14If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving any
11:14–11:19instruction, can the name gavaya be known merely by sight?
11:19–11:23Inference requires previously established knowledge of pervasion, as in the relation
11:23–11:29between fire and smoke. No such pervasion cognition is required to understand the
11:29–11:33word gavaya upon seeing the animal, recollection of the instructional statement together
11:33–11:37with the perception of similarity reveals the relation between word and meaning.
11:39–11:43Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition
11:43–11:48differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means of knowledge?
11:49–11:54Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition distinct
11:54–12:01from both perception and inference. Different from perception, merely seeing a wild animal cannot
12:01–12:06revealed that its name is Gavaia or that it is the referent of that word. Perception can
12:06–12:10display form and features but not the relation between a name and its meaning.
12:12–12:17Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or perversion,
12:17–12:23as in the relation of smoke and fire. In comparison, however, without any prior universal rule,
12:23–12:28a person understands the referent merely by seeing similarity and recalling the instruction.
12:28–12:37conclusion. The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and
12:37–12:42the perception of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference.
12:43–12:48Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called comparison.
12:49–12:56Perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In Nyaya philosophy, these three are among
12:56–13:03the most primary and important means of acquiring knowledge. Perception, pratyaka.
13:05–13:11Meaning, prati, before, blusaka, eye, or sense faculty. The direct cognition produced through
13:11–13:17contact between a sense faculty, eye, ear, nose, tongue, or skin, and an object is called perception.
13:18–13:20Naya regards it as the foremost means of knowledge.
13:22–13:26Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes, or smelling the fragrance
13:26–13:29of a flower through the nose is perceptual cognition of the object.
13:31–13:38Influence, a numana. The word a numana signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition.
13:39–13:43On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision,
13:43–13:46cognition of an unobserved probandom arises.
13:48–13:52Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes,
13:52–13:57there is fire on the mountain. The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke,
13:57–14:07There is fire. Verbal testimony, sabda. Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a
14:07–14:12trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text.
14:13–14:17Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact,
14:17–14:21but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge.
14:22–14:27Example, an experienced physician says, this medicine cures fever, and one takes it.
14:27–14:34The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony.
14:34–14:38Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone, it is raining very heavily in
14:38–14:42Patna now, and the hearer accepts the statement is true.
14:42–14:48Which of the three means, perception, inference, or testimony, is being used?
14:48–14:52The friend is truthful, and apta, and the hearer relies solely upon what the friend has
14:52–14:55said.
14:55–15:01Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy.
15:01–15:05Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are
15:05–15:08principally present.
15:08–15:13True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate knowledge of
15:13–15:17the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded.
15:17–15:22Truthfulness, the person must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is,
15:22–15:26without alteration, deceit, or fraud.
15:26–15:27Impartiality
15:27–15:32The person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal interest that could influence the
15:32–15:34statement.
15:34–15:41A statement made by a person possessing all three qualities is accepted as verbal testimony.
15:41–15:46According to the sage Godama, such a trustworthy person may be a seer, an aria, or a mlechah,
15:46–15:50provided these qualities are present.
15:50–15:53Now consider an example.
15:53–15:57Suppose there is a highly renowned physician who possesses accurate medical knowledge, but
15:57–16:04who accepts a bride from a particular pharmaceutical company and prescribes that company's medicine.
16:04–16:08Under Nyayas 3 conditions, should the physician statement at that time be accepted as fully
16:08–16:11valid verbal testimony?
16:11–16:13No.
16:13–16:20At that time, the physician's statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony.
16:20–16:24Although the physician possesses accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the bride makes
16:24–16:29the physician act from self-interest and destroys impartiality.
16:29–16:34According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly free from attachment, hatred,
16:34–16:37personal greed, and self-interest.
16:37–16:43If greed is present in the speaker's mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative.
16:43–16:48Now that the four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony
16:48–16:53have been understood, an interesting question arises concerning the truth of cognition,
16:53–16:58related to the previously identified topic of truth and error.
16:58–17:02Cognition obtained through perception is not always 100% true.
17:02–17:07At times, the sense faculties lead us into error.
17:07–17:13Naya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, a prama, or illusion.
17:13–17:19Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this.
17:19–17:23Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope
17:23–17:25lying on the road to be a snake.
17:25–17:31The eye and the object, the rope, are present, but darkness causes the cognition to be erroneous.
17:31–17:36Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert,
17:36–17:40but nothing is found upon approaching it.
17:40–17:44A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in a glass filled with water appears bent
17:44–17:47when viewed from outside.
17:47–17:52These circumstances show that although perception is a principal source of cognition, it may
17:52–17:57produce error under defective conditions such as poor light, excessive distance, or limitations
17:57–18:00of the sense faculties.
18:00–18:04This leads to a new situation.
18:04–18:08If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake, how can it be established
18:08–18:11that it is really a rope rather than a snake?
18:11–18:14What should be done to test the cognition's validity?
18:14–18:19Nyaya offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error,
18:19–18:23called the capacity for successful activity.
18:23–18:28The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the action connected with it.
18:28–18:32If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to drink but finds
18:32–18:38no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion.
18:38–18:43Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake.
18:43–18:47If a rope in darkness appears to be a snake, what immediate practical measures can a person
18:47–18:51take to ascertain the truth?
18:51–18:54One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to
18:54–18:57see whether the object moves.
18:57–19:01If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope and the torchlight, the
19:01–19:06cognition of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends.
19:06–19:11If it raises its hood, the cognition is shown to be true and the person should flee.
19:11–19:17In this manner, the truth of cognition is tested through the success or failure of action.
19:17–19:22Besides Nyayas' four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal
19:22–19:26testimony, there is another well-known Indian school, the Carvaka philosophy.
19:28–19:31Of the four means, the Carvaka's accept only one, perception.
19:33–19:37Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the senses,
19:37–19:44eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, is true. They therefore completely reject inference,
19:44–19:47comparison, and verbal testimony as sources of true knowledge.
19:47–19:54knowledge. An important issue now arises. Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant
19:54–20:00mountain, fire is inferred there, and that this is a valid means of knowledge. Carvaka
20:00–20:07philosophy does not regard even this as absolutely certain. The Carvaka central argument is that
20:07–20:11knowledge obtained through inference is not always 100% certain and therefore cannot be
20:11–20:15accepted as an infallible means of knowledge.
20:15–20:21According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances.
20:21–20:25Consider several practical examples.
20:25–20:27Smoke or fog?
20:27–20:32Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is inferred.
20:32–20:37On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust.
20:37–20:41The inference was completely wrong.
20:41–20:45from past to future, the Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together in a kitchen
20:45–20:50does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be accompanied by fire.
20:51–20:54We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases.
20:55–20:59Their clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty.
21:01–21:07This raises a serious question. If we accept the Carvaca claim that knowledge obtained through
21:07–21:11inference has no value and only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect would
21:11–21:15this have upon everyday life?
21:15–21:20Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable.
21:20–21:27If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible.
21:27–21:31Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy
21:31–21:34hunger and is not poisonous.
21:34–21:39We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood.
21:39–21:44If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all.
21:44–21:49Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at
21:49–21:51the destination.
21:51–21:55We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall arrive
21:55–21:58safely.
21:58–22:02Taking medicine, when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will
22:02–22:03cure us.
22:03–22:09We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach.
22:09–22:14Understanding in other person's emotions, from someone's face, smile, or tears, we infer
22:14–22:17that the person is happy or sad.
22:17–22:21The emotion within cannot be directly perceived.
22:21–22:25It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot
22:25–22:28be sustained in practical life.
22:28–22:32No worldly activity could continue without inference.
22:32–22:39Where Nyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition.
22:39–22:43Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most
22:43–22:49important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering.
22:49–22:53According to Nyaya, the most fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false
22:53–22:57cognition, ignorance or avidya.
22:57–23:02In his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire
23:02–23:04chain of suffering.
23:04–23:081. False cognition, the first cause.
23:08–23:12It consists in taking a thing to be what it is not, for example, treating the body itself
23:12–23:15as the self, or seeking complete happiness in material objects.

Plain text

This section The fundamental process of comparison is as follows. Instruction, when a person has never seen a gavaia, someone who knows it says, the animal that resembles a cow is a gavaia. Perception and recollection, when the person later sees such an animal in a forest, the instructive statement is recalled. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia. This determinant cognition is called upamiti and its means is called comparison or upamana. The section contains a major debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning similarity. According to them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category. According to the text, does the Neayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view? Is similarity an independent category, or merely the presence of certain common properties? According to the comparison section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly rejects the claim that similarity is an autonomous or separately existing category. The Neayaka position is as follows. Not a separate category, similarity is neither an independent entity nor a distinct ontological class. Possession of common properties, similarity is not a separate thing but merely the presence or possession in one object of several properties common to another related object. For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties common to a cow. According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity. When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than the presence of shared properties. Thus, the Govaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form, and these give rise to the cognition of similarity. Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity. When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow in the instruction, what resembles a cow as a gavaia is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination, this animal is a gavaia. The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called upamiti, the result of upamana. When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia. The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word. The person understands that the word gavaia applies to that animal on account of a distinctive ground, gavaiahood. An important question arises here. Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and verbal testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Neayakas regard it as a wholly distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception or testimony? This is a very important question. The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons. Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then a person who had never heard the instruction, a gavaya resembles a cow, would also come to know the word gavaya merely by seeing the animal. This does not happen. Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement, A person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon hearing the instruction, even without seeing the animal. This too is impossible. Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process of a distinct kind. In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the relation between the word and its meaning. This cognition of similarity, distinct from both testimony and perception, is therefore the means of knowledge called comparison. Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life. Suppose a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name. Instruction, a friend says, broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color is deep green. and recollection, several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees a green vegetable resembling cauliflower. On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this green vegetable is the referent of the word broccoli. Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's statement, the person has fully learned the meaning of the new word broccoli. This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge. Suppose a child has never seen a zebra. Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse, but its body has black and white stripes. Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and sees a striped, horse-like animal. The teacher's statement is then recalled. called. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra. Through resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra. This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life. The final part of the comparison section makes an important point. Suppose someone gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal that does not resemble a cow is not a gavaia. According to the work, even a negative instructional statement such as an animal unlike a cow is not a gavaia fully assists in understanding the meaning of a new word through the cognition of similarity. Although the statement is negative, the speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate the similarity between a gavaia and a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by an indirect route, toward the same similarity through which the hearer grasps the words referent. With this subject, the comparison section of the Tathasintmai comes to an end. The text is a profound philosophical analysis of the manner in which comparison or similarity cognition operates. Gangesa Upadyaya refutes the views of other schools, especially the msakas, and of earlier scholars within his own tradition, and establishes the Naviyanya position. The principal philosophical points of the entire discussion are as follows. The nature of similarity, the masakas regard similarity as an independent category distinct from the seven accepted categories. Gangesa refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession, in one object, of properties common to another. Difference from inference, some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could be known through inference or presumption. Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of knowledge. The result of comparison, earlier Neayakas such as Janta byheld that the result of comparison is merely understanding this animal is a Gavaaya. According to Gangesa, however, its true result is the determination that the semantic power and referent of the word Gavaaya resides in Gavaayavud, the universal, and not merely in one particular animal. Let us first understand the dispute between Gangeshet and the earlier Neayakas concerning the final result of comparison. This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaya. 1. The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jatabah, when a person sees the animal in the forest, the conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the word Gavaaya. Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal. 2. Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word Gavaya were restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second Gavaya encountered in the forest the next day? Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the determination that the semantic power or referent of the word gavaya resides not in one animal but in gavaya hood, the universal or common property. In simple terms, the person learns not merely the name of one animal but that every animal possessing gavaya hood is called a gavaya. By the same principle, the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located in apple hood, the common property of all apples. If only one particular red apple were accepted as apple, it would be impossible to call a green or yellow specimen seen the next day an apple. Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaia is not one particular animal but the universal gavaiahood. Inference requires prior knowledge of a perversion or universal rule in order to cognize something new. Thus, to infer fire from smoke, one must already know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. When a person sees the animal in the forest and learns the meaning of the word gavaia, does the person already possess a pervasion cognition such as whatever resembles a cow is the referent of the word gavaia, or does the comparison arise directly after hearing the instruction and seeing the animal? The logical process is as follows. The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form differs in certain respects. The instructive statement is then recalled. The important point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of a pervasion such as wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent. The meaning is grasped directly through the conjunction of the instruction and perception. After seeing the animal and recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one animal but extends to the entire universal gavaiahood. This is the final result of comparison, Upamini. That is, the person understands that the word gavaia applies to the particular animal seen in the forest and that its referent is gavaiahood, the universal. 1. Why is comparison different from perception? If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving any instruction, can the name gavaya be known merely by sight? Inference requires previously established knowledge of pervasion, as in the relation between fire and smoke. No such pervasion cognition is required to understand the word gavaya upon seeing the animal, recollection of the instructional statement together with the perception of similarity reveals the relation between word and meaning. Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means of knowledge? Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition distinct from both perception and inference. Different from perception, merely seeing a wild animal cannot revealed that its name is Gavaia or that it is the referent of that word. Perception can display form and features but not the relation between a name and its meaning. Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or perversion, as in the relation of smoke and fire. In comparison, however, without any prior universal rule, a person understands the referent merely by seeing similarity and recalling the instruction. conclusion. The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and the perception of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference. Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called comparison. Perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In Nyaya philosophy, these three are among the most primary and important means of acquiring knowledge. Perception, pratyaka. Meaning, prati, before, blusaka, eye, or sense faculty. The direct cognition produced through contact between a sense faculty, eye, ear, nose, tongue, or skin, and an object is called perception. Naya regards it as the foremost means of knowledge. Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes, or smelling the fragrance of a flower through the nose is perceptual cognition of the object. Influence, a numana. The word a numana signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition. On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision, cognition of an unobserved probandom arises. Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes, there is fire on the mountain. The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke, There is fire. Verbal testimony, sabda. Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text. Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact, but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge. Example, an experienced physician says, this medicine cures fever, and one takes it. The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony. Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone, it is raining very heavily in Patna now, and the hearer accepts the statement is true. Which of the three means, perception, inference, or testimony, is being used? The friend is truthful, and apta, and the hearer relies solely upon what the friend has said. Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy. Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are principally present. True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate knowledge of the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded. Truthfulness, the person must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is, without alteration, deceit, or fraud. Impartiality The person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal interest that could influence the statement. A statement made by a person possessing all three qualities is accepted as verbal testimony. According to the sage Godama, such a trustworthy person may be a seer, an aria, or a mlechah, provided these qualities are present. Now consider an example. Suppose there is a highly renowned physician who possesses accurate medical knowledge, but who accepts a bride from a particular pharmaceutical company and prescribes that company's medicine. Under Nyayas 3 conditions, should the physician statement at that time be accepted as fully valid verbal testimony? No. At that time, the physician's statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony. Although the physician possesses accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the bride makes the physician act from self-interest and destroys impartiality. According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly free from attachment, hatred, personal greed, and self-interest. If greed is present in the speaker's mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative. Now that the four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony have been understood, an interesting question arises concerning the truth of cognition, related to the previously identified topic of truth and error. Cognition obtained through perception is not always 100% true. At times, the sense faculties lead us into error. Naya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, a prama, or illusion. Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this. Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope lying on the road to be a snake. The eye and the object, the rope, are present, but darkness causes the cognition to be erroneous. Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert, but nothing is found upon approaching it. A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in a glass filled with water appears bent when viewed from outside. These circumstances show that although perception is a principal source of cognition, it may produce error under defective conditions such as poor light, excessive distance, or limitations of the sense faculties. This leads to a new situation. If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake, how can it be established that it is really a rope rather than a snake? What should be done to test the cognition's validity? Nyaya offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error, called the capacity for successful activity. The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the action connected with it. If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to drink but finds no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion. Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake. If a rope in darkness appears to be a snake, what immediate practical measures can a person take to ascertain the truth? One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to see whether the object moves. If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope and the torchlight, the cognition of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends. If it raises its hood, the cognition is shown to be true and the person should flee. In this manner, the truth of cognition is tested through the success or failure of action. Besides Nyayas' four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony, there is another well-known Indian school, the Carvaka philosophy. Of the four means, the Carvaka's accept only one, perception. Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the senses, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, is true. They therefore completely reject inference, comparison, and verbal testimony as sources of true knowledge. knowledge. An important issue now arises. Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant mountain, fire is inferred there, and that this is a valid means of knowledge. Carvaka philosophy does not regard even this as absolutely certain. The Carvaka central argument is that knowledge obtained through inference is not always 100% certain and therefore cannot be accepted as an infallible means of knowledge. According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances. Consider several practical examples. Smoke or fog? Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is inferred. On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust. The inference was completely wrong. from past to future, the Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together in a kitchen does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be accompanied by fire. We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases. Their clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty. This raises a serious question. If we accept the Carvaca claim that knowledge obtained through inference has no value and only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect would this have upon everyday life? Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable. If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible. Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy hunger and is not poisonous. We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood. If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all. Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at the destination. We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall arrive safely. Taking medicine, when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will cure us. We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach. Understanding in other person's emotions, from someone's face, smile, or tears, we infer that the person is happy or sad. The emotion within cannot be directly perceived. It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot be sustained in practical life. No worldly activity could continue without inference. Where Nyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition. Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering. According to Nyaya, the most fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false cognition, ignorance or avidya. In his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire chain of suffering. 1. False cognition, the first cause. It consists in taking a thing to be what it is not, for example, treating the body itself as the self, or seeking complete happiness in material objects.

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