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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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asr-draft

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No

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not-reviewed

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small

Detected language

en (0.96324)

Duration

57:02

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Open preserved recording

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1. 0:04–0:09अबजेक्षन तो दिन्फरिंस अस्टबलिशिं गोड अन्सर अच्चि।
2. 0:09–0:16Is not the reason in that inference, being an effect, opposed to a special kind of effect
3. 0:16–0:21hood, namely, being produced by an embodied agent?
4. 0:21–0:27The presence of the reason in the subject, the world, indicates that the creator is eternal
5. 0:27–0:33and omniscient, whereas the concomitance between effect hood and agency indicates creation
6. 0:33–0:38by an embodied agent, the two are mutually opposed.
7. 0:38–0:50No. That special qualification of Effecthood is not conveyed by the concomitance and therefore is not apprehended at the time of inference.
8. 0:50–1:02If such a qualification were known before the inference, it would necessarily be known as coexisting with the properties conveyed by the presence of the reason in the subject.
9. 1:02–1:09Consequently, the question of opposition between the two properties would never arise.
10. 1:09–1:15But how are wholly imperceptible properties, such as eternality and omniscience admitted
11. 1:15–1:17in the Creator?
12. 1:17–1:23The answer is that they are known in the course of inference for oneself.
13. 1:23–1:27Can an inference made for oneself produce such knowledge?
14. 1:27–1:36Yes, the very function of a means of knowledge is to produce cognition of something that would otherwise remain unknown.
15. 1:36–1:45But the opposition of one property to another cannot be determined until the other property is actually known.
16. 1:45–1:50This is a distinctive feature of cognition of opposition.
17. 1:50–1:58What then is the power of inference by which an otherwise unknown property or entity becomes known.
18. 1:58–2:09This power consists in three kinds of relation based upon three kinds of necessity concerning prior requirement and impossibility.
19. 2:09–2:19A relation based upon the necessity of prior requirement is called positive and one based upon impossibility is called negative.
20. 2:19–2:252nd Objection to the Inference Establishing God and its Refutation
21. 2:25–2:31Let the present inference then be defective because a counter-inference is possible,
22. 2:31–2:37the world has no agent, because it is not produced by an embodied being.
23. 2:37–2:38No.
24. 2:38–2:49There is no such defect, because the qualification, by an embodied being added to the reason is superfluous and serves no purpose.
25. 2:49–3:01Therefore, the qualified reason is not invariably concomitant with the probandom and is not equally strong as the reason of the original inference.
26. 3:01–3:15Does this qualification not remove the defect of the absence of the reason from the subject that would occur if the simple reason being unproduced were used, since a created object is not unproduced?
27. 3:15–3:16No.
28. 3:16–3:24In attempting to remove one defect, another, the absence of concomitance, is introduced.
29. 3:24–3:29If this qualification were effective despite the defect of being superfuous,
30. 3:29–3:38the following inference would also be valid, an entity whose causation is disputed is not produced by unseen merit,
31. 3:38–3:42because it is not produced by an embodied being.
32. 3:42–3:47This inference would oppose divine creation of the world.
33. 3:47–3:533rd objection to the inference establishing God and its rejoinder.
34. 3:53–3:58Let this inference then be rejected through certain reductions.
35. 3:58–4:03For example, if there were no body, there would be no intellect,
36. 4:03–4:07which is a partial effect of the body.
37. 4:07–4:11But if an eternal intellect does not require a body,
38. 4:11–4:17Then eternal effort will likewise require neither intellect nor desire.
39. 4:17–4:25Consequently, the Divine Agent of the world must be regarded as devoid of intellect and desire.
40. 4:25–4:27No!
41. 4:27–4:29Effort possesses two special features.
42. 4:29–4:36It arises from cognition, and its object is the very object of that cognition.
43. 4:36–4:40This effort is what is called agency.
44. 4:40–4:46Since divine effort is eternal, it may not require cognition as its productive cause,
45. 4:46–4:52but how can its need of cognition for determining its object be denied?
46. 4:52–4:57Effort is not by its own nature directed toward any object,
47. 4:57–5:03if it were intrinsically object directed, it would be identical with cognition.
48. 5:03–5:09The principal difference between cognition and effort is simply that effort does not by
49. 5:09–5:13itself illuminate any object.
50. 5:13–5:17Should effort then be regarded as objectless?
51. 5:17–5:18No.
52. 5:18–5:23If so, it could not be the cause of action and the rest.
53. 5:23–5:28How, moreover, is the reality of divine effort established?
54. 5:28–5:32Let it remain unestablished, it may be said.
55. 5:32–5:36No, the proof of it is faultless.
56. 5:36–5:40If there is a defect in the proof, let it be shown.
57. 5:40–5:43Does effort take all things as its object,
58. 5:43–5:48so that cognition is not needed to determine its object?
59. 5:48–5:56No, it has already been stated that effort is not intrinsically directed toward any object,
60. 5:56–5:59for otherwise it would itself be cognition.
61. 5:59–6:05Can effort acquire an object without cognition, like vital effort?
62. 6:05–6:11No. Vital effort belongs to an entirely different class.
63. 6:11–6:30If both belong to the same class, vital activities such as inhalation and exhalation would become subject to desire or desire would cease to be a cause of effort because some effort, like vital effort, arises without desire.
64. 6:30–6:40Therefore, whatever is effort has its objecthood determined only by cognition and desire, this objecthood must be established.
65. 6:40–6:47Objection that knowledge of invariable concomitance is impossible and its answer.
66. 6:47–7:03Adopting the manner of a Buddhist logician, the opponent proudly declares, even after the presence of the reason in similar instances and its absence from the similar instances have been observed hundreds of times,
67. 7:03–7:09The reason is still found to deviate from the probandom and even if no deviation has
68. 7:09–7:16been observed in the definition of invariable concomitance, it cannot thereby be secured
69. 7:16–7:19against the defect of deviation.
70. 7:19–7:26Therefore, some other definition of invariable concomitance is required.
71. 7:26–7:32That definition must be either the absence of a condition in the reason, the casualty
72. 7:32–7:38of the probandom with respect to the reason or opposition to the contrary view.
73. 7:38–7:42The first alternative is unacceptable.
74. 7:42–7:48There is no means of determining the absence of invisible conditions in the reason nor
75. 7:48–7:54is there a role that every condition must necessarily be visible.
76. 7:54–7:58The second alternative is also unacceptable.
77. 7:58–8:04Consciousness is determined by positive and negative concomitance.
78. 8:04–8:10This concomitance would relate either to a visible conscious body or merely to consciousness
79. 8:10–8:15irrespective of the distinction between visible and invisible bodies.
80. 8:15–8:19The first alternative will not work.
81. 8:19–8:26A tree produces effects even though it possesses no visible conscious body and this definition
82. 8:26–8:31does not help establish that the creator of the world is bodiless.
83. 8:31–8:35The second alternative too is untenable.
84. 8:35–8:42It is easy to understand the absence of the Potter when the Pot is absent, but it is impossible
85. 8:42–8:48on any occasion to determine the absence of all visible conscious beings.
86. 8:48–8:54The mere absence of visible Potters and the like does not imply the absence of every
87. 8:54–9:02visible conscious creature. If it did, because the potter is absent when a sprout arises
88. 9:02–9:08in a tree, all conscious agents would have to be regarded as absent, and God too would
89. 9:08–9:15not be the agent of the sprout. The question may then be asked, how do we infer another
90. 9:15–9:22person's stream of consciousness? The answer is that just as the absence of a potter
91. 9:22–9:28does not entail the absence of all visible and invisible consciousness, so when another
92. 9:28–9:35person's body moves, the absence of my own consciousness there does not imply the absence
93. 9:35–9:38of every consciousness.
94. 9:38–9:45But this is a separate problem, not a special question concerning the nature of causation.
95. 9:45–9:51Stated clearly, its answer is this, the body in its generic form, irrespective
96. 9:51–9:58of the distinction between one's own and another's is invariably connected with consciousness
97. 9:58–10:04on the basis of this general positive and negative concomitance, a causal relation between
98. 10:04–10:09consciousness and bodily motion is determined.
99. 10:09–10:15The casualty of another person's consciousness with respect to bodily motion is known from
100. 10:15–10:20this general relation observed in one's own body.
101. 10:20–10:26The third alternative is also unacceptable, because the contrary view that an effect can
102. 10:26–10:32arise even in the absence of consciousness cannot be decisively refuted.
103. 10:32–10:38The regularity of an effect with respect to place, time, and the light can be explained
104. 10:38–10:44by an accidental causal complex possessing a specific capacity to produce that particular
105. 10:44–10:50effect and brought into proximity with the effect by its own causes.
106. 10:50–10:56Answer to the Objection All this is irresponsible babble.
107. 10:56–11:01A rational resolution of all three alternatives is possible.
108. 11:01–11:08The fact is that one property can stand in four kinds of relation to another property,
109. 11:08–11:15may be opposed to it, over pervasive of it, co-extensive with it, or pervaded by it.
110. 11:15–11:19A fifth possibility does not exist.
111. 11:19–11:26Opposition and non-opposition, coexistence and non-coexistence, over extension and non-over
112. 11:26–11:31extension are by their very nature mutually opposed.
113. 11:31–11:38of these four, the first two, an opposed property and an over pervasive property cannot generate
114. 11:38–11:43doubt that a condition causing defect in the reason is present.
115. 11:43–11:49If they did, the inference would either establish only an unproduced thing as produced
116. 11:49–11:57by an agent or force us to regard an unproduced thing along with produced things as agent
117. 11:57–11:59produced.
118. 11:59–12:05If the condition were opposed to the reason, then, while pervading the probandom, it would
119. 12:05–12:11not extend beyond it and would become co-extensive with the probandom.
120. 12:11–12:18Mere unproducedness, opposed to the reason, would then begin to establish agent-producedness.
121. 12:18–12:24If the condition overextended beyond the reason, agent-produced things would have to
122. 12:24–12:28be admitted outside the class of produced things.
123. 12:28–12:35That unproducedness is by nature opposed to being caused, therefore an unproduced thing
124. 12:35–12:40cannot have an agent, which is a special kind of cause.
125. 12:40–12:44The third type is also unacceptable.
126. 12:44–12:49If the condition is co-extensive with the reason, the status of the two is identical
127. 12:49–12:52in every respect.
128. 12:52–12:57If the reason establishes the probandom, the condition will do so as well, therefore
129. 12:57–13:02it creates no doubt about the validity of the reason.
130. 13:02–13:08The fourth type is possible, but it cannot be pervaded by the property being produced
131. 13:08–13:11by an embodied agent.
132. 13:11–13:17If it were, being produced by some embodied person such as a potter, which is regarded
133. 13:17–13:23as pervading the probandom, would be present in a pot but absent from cloth because cloth
134. 13:23–13:31is not made by a potter, consequently, the probandom itself would be shown absent from cloth.
135. 13:31–13:37Nor is the condition co-extensive with creation by an embodied agent.
136. 13:37–13:44If being produced by an embodied agent does not constitute a condition in the reason,
137. 13:44–13:48neither can a property co-extensive with it constitute a condition,
138. 13:48–13:54Otherwise it would cease to be a necessary concomitant of embodiment production.
139. 13:54–14:00Refutation of the view that creation by an embodied agent is a condition.
140. 14:00–14:06Being produced by an embodied agent cannot be a condition in the inference above,
141. 14:06–14:12because it does not pervade the probandom possessing an agent.
142. 14:12–14:17In saying that an agent depends upon a body to produce something,
143. 14:17–14:23The body is regarded as assisting creation by serving as the support of the self.
144. 14:23–14:29But the body is not a universally operative cause of the act of creation.
145. 14:29–14:34It is principally a condition for experiencing pleasure and pain.
146. 14:34–14:39Nor is a body necessary for assembling instruments of action
147. 14:39–14:46because instruments are required only when an agent cannot act directly upon the object.
148. 14:46–14:53God can act upon objects and instruments without the mediation of a body.
149. 14:53–15:03Nor does this condition overextend beyond embodied creation, because the objector himself does not accept a bodyless agent.
150. 15:03–15:15It may be said, since a bodyless agent is possible, doubt about whether the reason is condition prevents the agency of the world from being established by effect hood alone.
151. 15:15–15:23But then the condition has become co-extensive with the probandom and consequently that very
152. 15:23–15:28condition would establish a bodyless agent of the world.
153. 15:28–15:34The opponent himself regards the presence of the condition as doubtful, so even such
154. 15:34–15:37a reply is difficult to maintain.
155. 15:37–15:44Nevertheless, whether the condition exists or not, bodyless agency is established in
156. 15:44–15:52either case. If the condition both pervades and is pervaded by the probandom, it is co-extensive
157. 15:52–15:59with it, once established, it will itself yield the inference of bodyless agency. If
158. 15:59–16:06the condition is not established, the unconditioned reason itself establishes the probandom.
159. 16:06–16:12Only this doubt now remains, is the probandom established by the condition or by the
160. 16:12–16:20reason effect hood. There is no third ground for establishing it. Here also the resolution
161. 16:20–16:27of this doubt. In the absence of a body, impermanent cognition does not arise because
162. 16:27–16:36body and impermanent cognition stand in a necessary cause-effect relation. Therefore, if cognition
163. 16:36–16:40is Eternal, everything will be its object.
164. 16:40–16:46Limitation to particular objects is invariably connected with impermanence.
165. 16:46–16:51The limitation of cognition's objects is determined by the capacity of the relevant
166. 16:51–16:54causal complex.
167. 16:54–17:00Eternal cognition has no such capacity arising from a causal complex and therefore lacks
168. 17:00–17:04the object limitation invariably connected with it.
169. 17:04–17:11belongs only to impermanent cognition. Desire and effort corresponding to cognition that
170. 17:11–17:18takes all things as its object will likewise take all things as their objects, because cognition,
171. 17:18–17:25desire, and effort have the same object. Under these conditions, where is the opportunity
172. 17:25–17:33for the ghostly play of the doubt that only some objects are produced by a bodyless agent?
173. 17:33–17:39Concerning conditions in other inferences should be removed in the same manner.
174. 17:39–17:45Thus the unconditioned relation between Probandom and Reason is established.
175. 17:45–17:50Once the Probandom determined by the Reason has been established,
176. 17:50–17:58the absence of the Reason determined in the reverse order by the absence of the Probandom is also established.
177. 17:58–18:06There is no need to eliminate a separate condition again in order to establish negative commcomitance.
178. 18:06–18:11Refutation of the second objection to invariable commcomitance.
179. 18:11–18:19Regarding the second objection, open your ears, abandon meaningless talk and here are answer.
180. 18:19–18:27First you must be asked whether, when the causes of a pot, the staff, wheel, and the
181. 18:27–18:34like remain inactive, there is or is not a visible or invisible conscious director invariably
182. 18:34–18:39connected with the distinct operations of the pot's causes.
183. 18:39–18:45If no such director is present, how does any doubt remain concerning the absence of
184. 18:45–18:48an invisible conscious director?
185. 18:48–18:55It may be said that the absence of the conscious being whose presence is necessary for production
186. 18:55–18:59must also be considered in the negative comm comitance.
187. 18:59–19:03Very well, no one doubts this.
188. 19:03–19:10Agent and director are equally required in both positive and negative comm comitance.
189. 19:10–19:13But is this agent director embodied?
190. 19:13–19:17Yes, but what does that statement mean?
191. 19:17–19:23Is the conscious being move all the causes through bodily action, or is the body itself
192. 19:23–19:25the instrument employed?
193. 19:25–19:29The first meaning is impossible.
194. 19:29–19:36The body is itself a cause of some result, if its activation depended upon another body,
195. 19:36–19:39an infinite regress would follow.
196. 19:39–19:43Nor is the second meaning universally true.
197. 19:43–19:50In moving a poisonous substance by sheer volition, no bodily action is involved.
198. 19:50–19:56Thus the statement then mean that the conscious being, in so far as embodied, is positively
199. 19:56–20:00and negatively concomitant with the effect.
200. 20:00–20:07If so, it must be explained whether possession of a body is required because the body itself
201. 20:07–20:14is a condition because it is an instrument that moves other causes or because it is merely
202. 20:14–20:19an inborn support obtained as the result of past action.
203. 20:19–20:23There is no objection to the first alternative.
204. 20:23–20:30Where a body is a condition of an effect, it is necessarily required but no sensible
205. 20:30–20:36person will say that it is required even where it is not a condition.
206. 20:36–20:42Under the second alternative, it may be said that what is not directly manipulated is moved
207. 20:42–20:47by an instrument that is directly manipulated.
208. 20:47–20:53But there is no rule that what is not directly manageable by one person cannot be directly
209. 20:53–21:00manageable by another, another person's body is itself an example.
210. 21:00–21:06After the third alternative, the body is as useless as the fruitless teat on a goat's
211. 21:06–21:12neck, because it has no role in determining the concomitance between the operations of
212. 21:12–21:14the causes and the result.
213. 21:14–21:20It is as irrelevant as the presence of light in the positive and negative concomitance
214. 21:20–21:25between smoke and the burning of dry grass.
215. 21:25–21:32If even an inactive and fruitless body is held necessary for every production, then a person
216. 21:32–21:38who makes a pot with the potter's body will also be regarded as moving the staff and the
217. 21:38–21:43like by virtue of possessing a camel's body.
218. 21:43–21:48From the standpoint of being obtained as a result of past life actions, there is
219. 21:48–21:54no difference between the potter's body and the camel's body.
220. 21:54–22:00It may be said that a particular body is necessary for producing a particular object even though
221. 22:00–22:04that body serves no function.
222. 22:04–22:11But serving no function and being necessary for production are mutually contradictory.
223. 22:11–22:18If they are not regarded as a post, a camel's body too may be called necessary for making
224. 22:18–22:19a pot.
225. 22:19–22:26Like a heated iron ball held by tongs, the body is required in production only when it
226. 22:26–22:32is a condition or the support of a condition, not merely because it is a body.
227. 22:32–22:37A body is not the condition or support of every effect.
228. 22:37–22:43Therefore, it cannot be established that different bodies are the basis of different
229. 22:43–22:46productive activities.
230. 22:46–22:51Would the conscious being who is the support of the causes producing a sprout also be the
231. 22:51–22:58support of the causes of every production, so that there is no need to admit many selves?
232. 22:58–23:02No, that is a different question.
233. 23:02–23:08Even when that question arises, the inference of many selves is not based on being the
234. 23:08–23:15support of a production or its causes, but upon inferring emotions such as pleasure,
235. 23:15–23:22pain and fear from external signs such as smiles and from those emotions inferring cells
236. 23:22–23:29who experience them. Therefore, no further discussion is needed here.
237. 23:29–23:34Refutation of the Third Objection to Invariable Comcomitance
238. 23:34–23:41Regarding the Third Objection 2, close the eyes clouded by envy and here are rational
239. 23:41–23:48statement. In this world no effect can arise apart from the cycle of various kinds of causal
240. 23:48–23:57factors and this cycle is determined by a conscious agent. If it were not, the definitions
241. 23:57–24:04of the distinct causal factors could not be fixed at all. A locus is that whose nature
242. 24:04–24:11is determined by the agent or object because it supports something. A point of departure
243. 24:11–24:17is that whose nature is determined by the act of separation and the thing separated,
244. 24:17–24:23these two delimited. A recipient is that whose nature is determined by the action
245. 24:23–24:31intended as an instrument because the action aims to affect the object. The object is
246. 24:31–24:37that whose nature is determined by the instrument because the object is invariably connected
247. 24:37–24:44with the instrument. The nature of the instrument is determined by the principal agent because
248. 24:44–24:51the instrument is the immediate object of the agent's action. The nature of the principal
249. 24:51–24:58agent is determined by all the other causal factors because an agent is required for
250. 24:58–25:05all their operations. But when the agent is defined as the substrate of properties such
251. 25:05–25:13as cognition, desire and effort, there is neither circularity nor mutual dependence. Thus, if
252. 25:13–25:20there is no principal agent, the subsidiary causal factors determined by it will not
253. 25:20–25:26exist either, consequently, one must accept the possibility of an effect arising without
254. 25:26–25:34a cause. This is a very serious defect in the proposed view. It may be said that this
255. 25:34–25:40consequence follows only if all subsidiary causal factors are invariably concomitant
256. 25:40–25:46with the principal agent, but that very concomitance is doubtful.
257. 25:46–25:53No. How can the concomitance be absent? Apart from the six causal roles, there
258. 25:53–25:59is no subsidiary factor not determined by the principal agent.
259. 25:59–26:07Their definitions are impossible unless determination by the principal agent is included in them.
260. 26:07–26:13If an effect can arise without a principal agent, the organization of the effect must
261. 26:13–26:17likewise be possible without the other causal factors.
262. 26:17–26:24Ultimately, an effect could arise even when all causal factors are absent.
263. 26:24–26:30When all subsidiary factors are absent, no entity or general cause called a causal factor
264. 26:30–26:32remains.
265. 26:32–26:40And if one causal factor is accepted, the existence of all the others cannot be avoided,
266. 26:40–26:45because their natures are mutually implicated in one another.
267. 26:45–26:52to the foregoing view and its answer. The Buddhist objects that the foregoing analysis
268. 26:52–26:59of the distinct causal factors is merely the opponent's own doctrine. On his view, whatever
269. 26:59–27:06conscious or unconscious thing stands in positive and negative concomitance with an effect
270. 27:06–27:13is called its cause. Sometimes conscious and unconscious causes jointly produce an
271. 27:13–27:20effect in that case each is a principal cause in its own place. The distinction that one
272. 27:20–27:27is material and the other efficient or one principal and the other subsidiary is determined
273. 27:27–27:35on some basis. This statement is incorrect. If an effect can arise without a principal
274. 27:35–27:43agent, it should likewise arise without a material cause. It cannot be said that, because
275. 27:43–27:49an effect is generically similar to its cause, a material cause must be accepted and being
276. 27:49–27:57proven, cannot be ignored. If only the material cause produced the effect, the effect would
277. 27:57–28:04remain generically similar to the material cause despite differences among efficient causes.
278. 28:04–28:11Or, if an effect arose solely from a material cause similar in class to itself, it would
279. 28:11–28:15have no need of an efficient cause.
280. 28:15–28:21But does an effect not arise from a causal complex rather than from one cause?
281. 28:21–28:24Yes, but why?
282. 28:24–28:30If the reason is that only a material cause joined with an efficient cause is established
283. 28:30–28:37as causal through positive and negative concomitance, it may be said that this concomitance is observed
284. 28:37–28:40only among visible things.
285. 28:40–28:46The objection may be raised that visibility of the cause is irrelevant.
286. 28:46–28:52Very well, then visibility should not be required in the case of a conscious cause
287. 28:52–28:53either.
288. 28:53–29:00Just as material and efficient causes jointly produce their effect, conscious and unconscious
289. 29:00–29:04causes will jointly produce an effect.
290. 29:04–29:10In the absence of either, the efficacy of the other will also be fruitless.
291. 29:10–29:17Moreover, things such as a lump of clay or a staff are observed to depend upon something
292. 29:17–29:19else for their motion.
293. 29:19–29:27A full analysis is required to determine whether this dependence is fixed by their generic nature,
294. 29:27–29:35by the influence of a particular unseen merit of the agent, or merely by their unconsciousness.
295. 29:35–29:40Refutation of the first and second among the three alternatives above.
296. 29:40–29:45The first of these alternatives is unacceptable.
297. 29:45–29:56If the very nature of the staff and the like made them dependent, a loom and other things different from a staff would become independent causes.
298. 29:56–30:05If a loom is regarded as dependent because of loomhood, the staff and the like would become independent.
299. 30:05–30:12Nor can the dependence of a staff and the like be confined only to their casualty in making a pot.
300. 30:12–30:17Otherwise the staff would become an independent cause when driving cattle.
301. 30:18–30:26The second alternative is also unacceptable. If destiny is not confined to objects of a
302. 30:26–30:33particular class, the staff that is a cause of a pot could by destiny itself be regarded as an
303. 30:33–30:40independent cause of the pot. If not, state the common property of the things that destiny has
304. 30:40–30:45made causes. No single common property appears among pots,
305. 30:45–30:51cloths, carts, pans, and the like, or among staffs, looms,
306. 30:51–30:56chisels, tongs, and the like. Can such a common property be
307. 30:56–31:00inferred on the ground that pots and the like are produced by
308. 31:00–31:06embodied persons? No. Pothood and the like, each its own
309. 31:06–31:13property, constitute the grounds of inference, there is no such common property among things
310. 31:13–31:20of distinct classes. Suppose some similar shape or arrangement in the distinct objects
311. 31:20–31:27is such a property. But can they be regarded as created by a conscious agent on the basis
312. 31:27–31:36of that arrangement alone? No. Even without such arrangement, water, fire and the like
313. 31:36–31:39are directed by conscious persons.
314. 31:39–31:46There is no rule that only things moved through the body are moved by consciousness, otherwise
315. 31:46–31:53the body itself would become an independent agent because no second body moves it.
316. 31:53–32:00Therefore, a staff and the like are dependent precisely because they are unconscious.
317. 32:00–32:08This unconsciousness is also present in atons, unseen merit and the like, therefore all of
318. 32:08–32:12them will be under the control of a conscious being.
319. 32:12–32:20Thus the property having a cause is established as invariably concomitant with being an effect.
320. 32:20–32:26Space and the other counter examples are costless and are not effects.
321. 32:26–32:35In this way both positive and negative concomitance between being caused and effect hood are established.
322. 32:35–32:40The nature of the invariable concomitance required for inference.
323. 32:40–32:44What then is invariable concomitance?
324. 32:44–32:47A natural relation.
325. 32:47–32:50What does natural mean?
326. 32:50–32:52Absence of a condition.
327. 32:52–32:54What is a condition?
328. 32:54–33:00A cause different from the reason that determines the presence of the probandom.
329. 33:00–33:02What is its definition?
330. 33:02–33:07Pervading the probandom without being pervaded by the reason.
331. 33:07–33:11How is it determined whether a condition exists?
332. 33:11–33:17If the possible presence of the reason in a counter example lacking the probandom is
333. 33:17–33:24not refuted, a condition is admitted, if it is refuted, the condition is denied.
334. 33:24–33:31What refutes this possibility? A reductio supported by repeated experiences of positive
335. 33:31–33:38and negative concomitance, the authority of this argument cannot be doubted. This
336. 33:38–33:46reductio, in its five forms, self-dependence, mutual dependence, circularity, infinite regress,
337. 33:46–33:52And the like sometimes establishes concomitance by removing deviation of the reason and sometimes
338. 33:52–33:57by removing the condition that grounds the deviation.
339. 33:57–34:01The result is the same in both cases.
340. 34:01–34:06Examples of these five kinds are available in this very work.
341. 34:06–34:10An objection and its answer.
342. 34:10–34:16The Buddhist, weakened by our argument, now turns it against us, in the same manner in
343. 34:16–34:23which God's existence is established, a Hare's horn too can be established.
344. 34:23–34:29The negation supplied by perception is confined only to perceptible things.
345. 34:29–34:35The property of possessing a horn cannot be denied of a hurry merely because a Hare's
346. 34:35–34:42horn is not perceptible, since negation of the pervader does not negate the pervaded.
347. 34:42–34:48The objector here regards perceptibility as the pervaded property, because according to
348. 34:48–34:56him both visible and invisible horns are possible. The perceptibility of a horn may be due to
349. 34:56–35:03its being produced, therefore, in the absence of producedness, the existence of an unproduced
350. 35:03–35:11hares horn may be regarded as possible. This rejoinder cannot disturb one who has already
351. 35:11–35:18established a great truth such as the existence of God because it is pointless. Nevertheless,
352. 35:18–35:25it may be said that such an argument would bring this repute upon a respected opponent
353. 35:25–35:28and should therefore not be ignored.
354. 35:28–35:33Let our supporters be at ease, we shall answer it.
355. 35:33–35:39The person who seeks to establish the reality of a hair's own through linguistic convention
356. 35:39–35:46should be asked whether by the word, own, he understands something like hair or an object
357. 35:46–35:48like an ordinary home.
358. 35:48–35:55If the first, there is the defect of re-establishing what is already established, together with
359. 35:55–36:01opposition to ordinary usage, because in common practice the word horn denotes something
360. 36:01–36:04wholly different from hair.
361. 36:04–36:10If the second, the universal property of hornhood is manifested by an object possessing
362. 36:10–36:16a particular configuration, how, then, can that property be manifested in atoms and
363. 36:16–36:23the like, which lack this configuration. If it can, Othood and other Universals can
364. 36:23–36:32also be manifested there. Once this is accepted, Universals will mutually overextend or effects
365. 36:32–36:39will arise without causes. Positive and negative concomitance will cease to prove
366. 36:39–36:47casualty. Everything becomes inverted in such a confused doctrine. Therefore, the existence
367. 36:47–36:53of an invisible or eternal hair's horn is wholly impossible.
368. 36:53–37:00Whence could arise the basis for an inference of something contradicted by perception? Objection
369. 37:00–37:07to the foregoing answer and its answer. If manifestation of a universal property requires
370. 37:07–37:14a particular configuration of its substrate, God's cognition cannot be eternal because cognition
371. 37:14–37:21hood appears only when some transformation occurs in the senses and the like.
372. 37:21–37:31No. Cognition hood neither negates nor implies eternality. Just as barrenness negates motherhood,
373. 37:31–37:37cognition hood does not negate eternality. If cognition hood negated eternality,
374. 37:37–37:45spots, clots and other unconscious impermanent things would also possess cognition.
375. 37:45–37:48Nor does Eternality negate Cognition-hood.
376. 37:48–37:55No opposition between them has been established because the contrary possibility has not been
377. 37:55–37:56sublated.
378. 37:56–38:03The two inferences, every observed cognition is impermanent and no Eternal thing has been
379. 38:03–38:09observed to possess cognition are respectively defective through limiting conditions in the
380. 38:09–38:17form of objecthood and objectlessness. They are exactly like the inference that establishes
381. 38:17–38:22all color as impermanent but is conditioned by being knowable only by the eye.
382. 38:23–38:29Nor is transformation of the senses the cause of the manifestation of cognition hood.
383. 38:29–38:35Whether there is objecthood or no dependence upon a sense organ,
384. 38:35–38:39every knowable thing causes the manifestation of cognitionhood.
385. 38:39–38:47Transformation of a sense organ independently of objecthood cannot cause cognitionhood to appear,
386. 38:47–38:51otherwise it would manifest other properties as well.
387. 38:51–38:53Minor Objections
388. 38:53–38:57Now here certain subsidiary objections.
389. 38:57–39:06If God alone is the Creator, the world would not possess manifold forms and would be produced continuously.
390. 39:06–39:17If God depends upon unseen merit to make the world, the admission of God is unnecessary. Unseen merit alone could produce the world.
391. 39:17–39:22If God acts for his own benefit, he ceases to be God.
392. 39:22–39:28If he acts for the benefit of others, the world should be free from suffering.
393. 39:28–39:34If his effort has no purpose, he becomes like an unconscious creature.
394. 39:34–39:38There is no proof that God is one.
395. 39:38–39:43And if there are many gods, they will not be omniscient,
396. 39:43–39:48because each god will know only the causal complex of the effect he creates.
397. 39:48–39:51Answers to the foregoing objections.
398. 39:51–40:00If, within the cycle of causes, one cause is first accepted and all the others are discarded
399. 40:00–40:05as unnecessary, ultimately every cause becomes unnecessary.
400. 40:05–40:12It may be said that what is established as a cause through positive and negative concomitance
401. 40:12–40:14is not unnecessary.
402. 40:14–40:21well, then a cause established by inference is not unnecessary either, because both are
403. 40:21–40:29established with equal evidential force. Moreover, if the very purpose for which an entity has
404. 40:29–40:36been admitted is made the ground of its superfluity, the casualty of unseen merit everywhere
405. 40:36–40:42will make all known causes unnecessary. Unknown causes are inferred only on the
406. 40:42–40:51basis of known causes. God's effort is directed toward the benefit of other living beings,
407. 40:51–40:58because God has no selfish interest of his own. The creation of suffering does not contradict
408. 40:58–41:04his compassion, the occasional infliction of pain by parents, teachers, physicians, and
409. 41:04–41:11the light illustrates this. Is suffering created because of God's wickedness?
410. 41:11–41:20No. There is no wickedness in God. The absence of wickedness follows from the absence of delusion
411. 41:20–41:25and the absence of delusion from God's omniscience.
412. 41:25–41:32Refutation of the view that God is not omniscient. There is no dispute that the being who
413. 41:32–41:39who produces diodes also knows invisible atoms and knows all six kinds of real entities, from
414. 41:39–41:46the triads produced from atoms up to the living beings enjoyment of diverse objects.
415. 41:46–41:51All these constitute the material causes of the world.
416. 41:51–41:57The nature of a material cause cannot be known unless both the determining property
417. 41:57–42:01and the object determined by it are known.
418. 42:01–42:07The rule is that an entity capable of making or knowing one thing of a certain class is
419. 42:07–42:13capable of making or knowing all things of that class, because capacity is determined
420. 42:13–42:17by the relevant generic property.
421. 42:17–42:23It may be objected that even a capable entity does not make or know anything when auxiliary
422. 42:23–42:26causes are unavailable.
423. 42:26–42:33these two, the first not producing an effect despite possessing capacity is acceptable because
424. 42:33–42:42the production of things is confined to determinate times and places. The second not knowing despite
425. 42:42–42:48possessing capacity would be possible only if that entity's cognition were produced but
426. 42:48–42:57God's cognition is not produced. Why? In the absence of a body, senses residing in
427. 42:57–43:04the body will also be absent. When the casualty of something has been established by positive
428. 43:04–43:10and negative concomitance, if that cause is absent, the relevant effect cannot be
429. 43:10–43:16be produced by another cause, otherwise the effect would be costless.
430. 43:16–43:18No effect is costless.
431. 43:18–43:25Therefore, it is self-evident that God's capacity for cognition, desire, and effort
432. 43:25–43:30concerning one object extends to all objects of that class.
433. 43:30–43:34In this manner God's omniscience is established.
434. 43:34–43:37A question and its answer.
435. 43:37–43:42How can the creator of the world be bodiless?
436. 43:42–43:45Because no visible body of his is perceived.
437. 43:45–43:50If an invisible body is admitted and it possesses parts and
438. 43:50–43:56determinate shape, he could not generate a frog inside solid stone without breaking
439. 43:56–43:58the stone.
440. 43:58–44:02Nor can his body be minute like an atom.
441. 44:02–44:07An atom contains no empty interior and therefore cannot support
442. 44:07–44:15the mind, without mind and senses it does not satisfy the definition of a body. If a mind
443. 44:15–44:21located outside the body could produce cognition, the body would be useless in the production
444. 44:21–44:30of cognition. Does the distant sun not produce a frog inside a stone? No. The sun is not
445. 44:30–44:36the cause of the effort that produces the frog's body. Effort resides in the
446. 44:36–44:43body and therefore its influence cannot cross the body's limits. If effort were regarded
447. 44:43–44:50as all-pervasive, it would not depend upon a body as a non-inherent cause, consequently,
448. 44:50–44:58it would be costless, and being costless would itself establish its eternality. A body cannot
449. 44:58–45:04become the object of effort merely because it is an object of cognition, otherwise our
450. 45:04–45:09effort to could produce effects in things distant from the body.
451. 45:09–45:15Do the sun and the light produce motion through inheritance in something conjoined with them,
452. 45:15–45:20space being conjoined with the sun, and the causes producing the frog being conjoined with
453. 45:20–45:22the frog?
454. 45:22–45:23No.
455. 45:23–45:28What is intended here is the immediate cause of motion.
456. 45:28–45:34How then, does one who knows the science of snake poison remove venom without touching
457. 45:34–45:37another person's body?
458. 45:37–45:43In such a case, the exorcist's effort is directly connected with the consciousness of
459. 45:43–45:47a deity who revives the snake-bitten person.
460. 45:47–45:53Or the exorcist's own effort assisted by the mantra, God's effort, or merit produced
461. 45:53–45:59by the mantra is causally connected with the motion that removes the venom.
462. 45:59–46:06But at the beginning of creation there is not the slightest possibility of any body's existence,
463. 46:06–46:10therefore, a body cannot be the cause of creation.
464. 46:10–46:18For this reason, the omniscience of the maker of the world is beyond dispute.
465. 46:18–46:21Establishing the authority of scripture.
466. 46:21–46:29there is an omniscient creator, how can he also be a teacher? The answer is that, besides
467. 46:29–46:36being a capable speaker, he is wholly devoted to the welfare of others. One who discerns
468. 46:36–46:43good and evil and is benevolent will certainly show the ignorant the proper path, provided
469. 46:43–46:50his speech, articulation, and the like are fortless. Just as an ordinary person
470. 46:50–46:57tells a blind man on the road, turn right, not left, so God shows the path to all human
471. 46:57–47:04beings. But how can speech organs, articulation, and the light be established for a bodyless
472. 47:04–47:11God, when the capacity of an organ consists in its various movements and clear sound
473. 47:11–47:18cannot arise without such movement? The answer is that God can initiate clear sound
474. 47:18–47:23even without himself being the substrate of these causes.
475. 47:23–47:28For the production of an effect established through positive and negative concomitants
476. 47:28–47:36with causes, both the causes and their substrate are required just as a whole cannot arise without
477. 47:36–47:41the aggregate of parts and the substrate of that aggregate.
478. 47:41–47:47But a body is not required as the cause of every effect.
479. 47:47–47:53For this very reason, the casualty of a body in the production of diodes and the like has
480. 47:53–47:56already been rejected.
481. 47:56–48:04God's being the father of the world also supports the inference that he gives scriptural instruction.
482. 48:04–48:06What scripture is this?
483. 48:06–48:10The Veda, Medical Science and the like.
484. 48:10–48:16These are like the roar of a lion, inflicting unbearable pain upon the ears of elephant
485. 48:16–48:20like enemies who hate the Veda.
486. 48:20–48:22Proof of God's Omniscience.
487. 48:22–48:29The medical science composed by God is not unauthoritative, because the truth of its statements
488. 48:29–48:34is frequently established by direct observation.
489. 48:34–48:40When an injunction occasionally fails, the failure is accidental and due to a defect
490. 48:40–48:44in the causal complex of the prescribed procedure.
491. 48:44–48:51When the appropriate causes are assembled, the result certainly follows from them.
492. 48:51–48:57If medical science were groundless, its prescriptions would not be confirmed.
493. 48:57–49:03If even groundless statements could prove true, the statements of untrustworthy persons
494. 49:03–49:07would also have to be regarded as true.
495. 49:07–49:14The prescriptions of medical science are not based merely upon observed positive and
496. 49:14–49:21negative concomitance. Testing the effects of combining and separating numerous medicines
497. 49:21–49:27in different diseases involves infinitely many possibilities. No human being of the present
498. 49:27–49:36age can complete all these tests. Experiments involving poison may produce grave harm. Without
499. 49:36–49:42knowing the true nature of things, what sensible person would himself perform or
500. 49:42–49:48in the name of training make another perform procedures such as incision, drying, cutting,
501. 49:48–49:53cotterization, puncturing veins, and fasting.
502. 49:53–49:58Nor can the basis of present instruction be merely a beginningless chain of teaching
503. 49:58–50:05from teacher to pupil, because ultimately every instruction must rest upon some authoritative
504. 50:05–50:08source of knowledge.
505. 50:08–50:16cannot be eternal merely as an ordinary collection of sentences. Therefore, once the alternatives
506. 50:16–50:23are eliminated, the conclusion is that medical science originated from a being capable of
507. 50:23–50:30directly seeing even invisible things. By this example, or from the reason that it
508. 50:30–50:37is accepted by great persons, the vedha too is established as the composition of an omniscient
509. 50:37–50:45author. The meaning of greatness. If the word great means trustworthy, the reason in the
510. 50:45–50:51inference of the omniscient author of the Veda will be doubtful in the subject, because the
511. 50:51–50:59trustworthiness of Manu and others may be questioned. If it means numerous, the reason deviates
512. 50:59–51:06because works composed by Buddha and others are not regarded as the compositions of the omniscient.
513. 51:07–51:13or those works to would have to be regarded as composed by the omniscient.
514. 51:13–51:18Therefore, the proper meaning of great is excellence in greatness.
515. 51:18–51:21What is this excellence?
516. 51:21–51:28Acceptance of the essential truths stated in all the principal philosophical systems.
517. 51:28–51:32A person's conformity to these truths appears in three ways.
518. 51:32–51:35First, practicing the doctrines accepted.
519. 51:35–51:42Second, employing words regarded as correct by the universally accepted grammar of Pini.
520. 51:42–51:48And third, accepting the truth of certain Vedic statements within medical science,
521. 51:48–51:51which is accepted by learned people.
522. 51:51–51:56To elaborate, there is no philosophical system whose followers,
523. 51:56–51:59Though calling all worldly activity illusory,
524. 51:59–52:05fail to perform the Veda prescribed sacraments from conception rights to funeral rights,
525. 52:05–52:10fail to observe distinctions between touchable and untouchable,
526. 52:10–52:16or fail to perform expiatory practices such as bathing and purification.
527. 52:16–52:22It may be said that not every person accepts every prescription.
528. 52:22–52:32But medical science is not rejected by great persons merely because every person does not accept all of its prescriptions.
529. 52:32–52:40People who accept the true statements of diverse philosophical systems acknowledge the authority of medical science,
530. 52:40–52:45this alone constitutes its support by learned people.
531. 52:45–52:50Do even followers of the Veda obey every Vedic command?
532. 52:50–52:53No, but this causes no difficulty.
533. 52:53–53:00Not every person accepts every prescription of medical science either, different persons
534. 53:00–53:02accept different prescriptions.
535. 53:02–53:09Then, since teachings such as non-violence in the traditions of Buddha and others are
536. 53:09–53:16accepted by great persons, are those teachings not also approved by great persons?
537. 53:16–53:18No.
538. 53:18–53:24There is doubt whether teachers, such as the son of Sudodhana personally experienced the
539. 53:24–53:31efficacy of their teachings or merely publicized Vedic injunctions under their own names in
540. 53:31–53:35order to gain the reverence of disciples.
541. 53:35–53:40This resembles the well-known tale of the cat that practiced austerity to gain the trust
542. 53:40–53:42of mice.
543. 53:42–53:48It is difficult to suppose that they themselves experienced the effects of their distinctive
544. 53:48–53:54teachings because general principles such as non-violence are present in Jain and other
545. 53:54–53:57traditions as well.
546. 53:57–54:03Distinctive Buddhist and Jain practices, drawing consecrated circles, plucking out the hair
547. 54:03–54:08of the head and so on are not universally accepted.
548. 54:08–54:16But special Veda prescribed sacraments, such as conception rites are widely accepted.
549. 54:16–54:24Whether a real difference exists between correct and corrupted forms of words or not, all philosophers
550. 54:24–54:29without dispute accept the practical distinction between them.
551. 54:29–54:35All also regard the teachings of the six limbs of the Veda as true, and the purpose
552. 54:35–54:43of all six is preservation of the Veda. Objection to the foregoing view and its answer. The
553. 54:43–54:50objection is this, let grammar and the light be sciences, whose teachings are universally
554. 54:50–54:56accepted and which preserve the purity of the Veda. But why should grammar be regarded
555. 54:56–55:03as preserving only the Veda? It may equally be said to preserve the teachings of
556. 55:03–55:11of Buddha, liberator of the world. No. Grammarians do not hold such a view, and their grammar
557. 55:11–55:19does not explain expressions used in Buddhist discourse. Buddhist literature does not abound
558. 55:19–55:26in archaic words like the Veda. Most of its words are current in ordinary language, so
559. 55:26–55:32it is not the principal subject of traditional grammar. Traditional grammar does not
560. 55:32–55:38analyze the distinctive words and meanings of Buddhist texts as it does those of the
561. 55:38–55:43Veda. On the contrary, it points out incorrect Buddhist
562. 55:43–55:51usages. Therefore, the universally accepted grammatical tradition supports Vedic usage.
563. 55:51–55:59In the same way, universally accepted medical science supports Vedic instruction. It repeatedly
564. 55:59–56:05recommends sacrifice, charity, recitation, austerity, expiation, and other
565. 56:05–56:10without prescribed acts that promote prosperity and peace.
566. 56:10–56:17This part of medical science cannot be unauthoritative, otherwise its other parts too would have to
567. 56:17–56:20be regarded as unauthoritative.
568. 56:20–56:24Could this portion be a later interpolation?
569. 56:24–56:25No.
570. 56:25–56:32In this science there is an unbroken continuity of teacher-pupil tradition.
571. 56:32–56:39If interpolation is suspected in such a traditionally transmitted science, it may be suspected in
572. 56:39–56:40all sciences.
573. 56:40–56:47Thus, in all the ways described above, the Veda is supported by great persons, such
574. 56:47–56:51support is impossible without an omniscient author.
575. 56:51–56:56Therefore, the Vedas authorship by the Omniscient is established.

Plain text

अबजेक्षन तो दिन्फरिंस अस्टबलिशिं गोड अन्सर अच्चि। Is not the reason in that inference, being an effect, opposed to a special kind of effect hood, namely, being produced by an embodied agent? The presence of the reason in the subject, the world, indicates that the creator is eternal and omniscient, whereas the concomitance between effect hood and agency indicates creation by an embodied agent, the two are mutually opposed. No. That special qualification of Effecthood is not conveyed by the concomitance and therefore is not apprehended at the time of inference. If such a qualification were known before the inference, it would necessarily be known as coexisting with the properties conveyed by the presence of the reason in the subject. Consequently, the question of opposition between the two properties would never arise. But how are wholly imperceptible properties, such as eternality and omniscience admitted in the Creator? The answer is that they are known in the course of inference for oneself. Can an inference made for oneself produce such knowledge? Yes, the very function of a means of knowledge is to produce cognition of something that would otherwise remain unknown. But the opposition of one property to another cannot be determined until the other property is actually known. This is a distinctive feature of cognition of opposition. What then is the power of inference by which an otherwise unknown property or entity becomes known. This power consists in three kinds of relation based upon three kinds of necessity concerning prior requirement and impossibility. A relation based upon the necessity of prior requirement is called positive and one based upon impossibility is called negative. 2nd Objection to the Inference Establishing God and its Refutation Let the present inference then be defective because a counter-inference is possible, the world has no agent, because it is not produced by an embodied being. No. There is no such defect, because the qualification, by an embodied being added to the reason is superfluous and serves no purpose. Therefore, the qualified reason is not invariably concomitant with the probandom and is not equally strong as the reason of the original inference. Does this qualification not remove the defect of the absence of the reason from the subject that would occur if the simple reason being unproduced were used, since a created object is not unproduced? No. In attempting to remove one defect, another, the absence of concomitance, is introduced. If this qualification were effective despite the defect of being superfuous, the following inference would also be valid, an entity whose causation is disputed is not produced by unseen merit, because it is not produced by an embodied being. This inference would oppose divine creation of the world. 3rd objection to the inference establishing God and its rejoinder. Let this inference then be rejected through certain reductions. For example, if there were no body, there would be no intellect, which is a partial effect of the body. But if an eternal intellect does not require a body, Then eternal effort will likewise require neither intellect nor desire. Consequently, the Divine Agent of the world must be regarded as devoid of intellect and desire. No! Effort possesses two special features. It arises from cognition, and its object is the very object of that cognition. This effort is what is called agency. Since divine effort is eternal, it may not require cognition as its productive cause, but how can its need of cognition for determining its object be denied? Effort is not by its own nature directed toward any object, if it were intrinsically object directed, it would be identical with cognition. The principal difference between cognition and effort is simply that effort does not by itself illuminate any object. Should effort then be regarded as objectless? No. If so, it could not be the cause of action and the rest. How, moreover, is the reality of divine effort established? Let it remain unestablished, it may be said. No, the proof of it is faultless. If there is a defect in the proof, let it be shown. Does effort take all things as its object, so that cognition is not needed to determine its object? No, it has already been stated that effort is not intrinsically directed toward any object, for otherwise it would itself be cognition. Can effort acquire an object without cognition, like vital effort? No. Vital effort belongs to an entirely different class. If both belong to the same class, vital activities such as inhalation and exhalation would become subject to desire or desire would cease to be a cause of effort because some effort, like vital effort, arises without desire. Therefore, whatever is effort has its objecthood determined only by cognition and desire, this objecthood must be established. Objection that knowledge of invariable concomitance is impossible and its answer. Adopting the manner of a Buddhist logician, the opponent proudly declares, even after the presence of the reason in similar instances and its absence from the similar instances have been observed hundreds of times, The reason is still found to deviate from the probandom and even if no deviation has been observed in the definition of invariable concomitance, it cannot thereby be secured against the defect of deviation. Therefore, some other definition of invariable concomitance is required. That definition must be either the absence of a condition in the reason, the casualty of the probandom with respect to the reason or opposition to the contrary view. The first alternative is unacceptable. There is no means of determining the absence of invisible conditions in the reason nor is there a role that every condition must necessarily be visible. The second alternative is also unacceptable. Consciousness is determined by positive and negative concomitance. This concomitance would relate either to a visible conscious body or merely to consciousness irrespective of the distinction between visible and invisible bodies. The first alternative will not work. A tree produces effects even though it possesses no visible conscious body and this definition does not help establish that the creator of the world is bodiless. The second alternative too is untenable. It is easy to understand the absence of the Potter when the Pot is absent, but it is impossible on any occasion to determine the absence of all visible conscious beings. The mere absence of visible Potters and the like does not imply the absence of every visible conscious creature. If it did, because the potter is absent when a sprout arises in a tree, all conscious agents would have to be regarded as absent, and God too would not be the agent of the sprout. The question may then be asked, how do we infer another person's stream of consciousness? The answer is that just as the absence of a potter does not entail the absence of all visible and invisible consciousness, so when another person's body moves, the absence of my own consciousness there does not imply the absence of every consciousness. But this is a separate problem, not a special question concerning the nature of causation. Stated clearly, its answer is this, the body in its generic form, irrespective of the distinction between one's own and another's is invariably connected with consciousness on the basis of this general positive and negative concomitance, a causal relation between consciousness and bodily motion is determined. The casualty of another person's consciousness with respect to bodily motion is known from this general relation observed in one's own body. The third alternative is also unacceptable, because the contrary view that an effect can arise even in the absence of consciousness cannot be decisively refuted. The regularity of an effect with respect to place, time, and the light can be explained by an accidental causal complex possessing a specific capacity to produce that particular effect and brought into proximity with the effect by its own causes. Answer to the Objection All this is irresponsible babble. A rational resolution of all three alternatives is possible. The fact is that one property can stand in four kinds of relation to another property, may be opposed to it, over pervasive of it, co-extensive with it, or pervaded by it. A fifth possibility does not exist. Opposition and non-opposition, coexistence and non-coexistence, over extension and non-over extension are by their very nature mutually opposed. of these four, the first two, an opposed property and an over pervasive property cannot generate doubt that a condition causing defect in the reason is present. If they did, the inference would either establish only an unproduced thing as produced by an agent or force us to regard an unproduced thing along with produced things as agent produced. If the condition were opposed to the reason, then, while pervading the probandom, it would not extend beyond it and would become co-extensive with the probandom. Mere unproducedness, opposed to the reason, would then begin to establish agent-producedness. If the condition overextended beyond the reason, agent-produced things would have to be admitted outside the class of produced things. That unproducedness is by nature opposed to being caused, therefore an unproduced thing cannot have an agent, which is a special kind of cause. The third type is also unacceptable. If the condition is co-extensive with the reason, the status of the two is identical in every respect. If the reason establishes the probandom, the condition will do so as well, therefore it creates no doubt about the validity of the reason. The fourth type is possible, but it cannot be pervaded by the property being produced by an embodied agent. If it were, being produced by some embodied person such as a potter, which is regarded as pervading the probandom, would be present in a pot but absent from cloth because cloth is not made by a potter, consequently, the probandom itself would be shown absent from cloth. Nor is the condition co-extensive with creation by an embodied agent. If being produced by an embodied agent does not constitute a condition in the reason, neither can a property co-extensive with it constitute a condition, Otherwise it would cease to be a necessary concomitant of embodiment production. Refutation of the view that creation by an embodied agent is a condition. Being produced by an embodied agent cannot be a condition in the inference above, because it does not pervade the probandom possessing an agent. In saying that an agent depends upon a body to produce something, The body is regarded as assisting creation by serving as the support of the self. But the body is not a universally operative cause of the act of creation. It is principally a condition for experiencing pleasure and pain. Nor is a body necessary for assembling instruments of action because instruments are required only when an agent cannot act directly upon the object. God can act upon objects and instruments without the mediation of a body. Nor does this condition overextend beyond embodied creation, because the objector himself does not accept a bodyless agent. It may be said, since a bodyless agent is possible, doubt about whether the reason is condition prevents the agency of the world from being established by effect hood alone. But then the condition has become co-extensive with the probandom and consequently that very condition would establish a bodyless agent of the world. The opponent himself regards the presence of the condition as doubtful, so even such a reply is difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, whether the condition exists or not, bodyless agency is established in either case. If the condition both pervades and is pervaded by the probandom, it is co-extensive with it, once established, it will itself yield the inference of bodyless agency. If the condition is not established, the unconditioned reason itself establishes the probandom. Only this doubt now remains, is the probandom established by the condition or by the reason effect hood. There is no third ground for establishing it. Here also the resolution of this doubt. In the absence of a body, impermanent cognition does not arise because body and impermanent cognition stand in a necessary cause-effect relation. Therefore, if cognition is Eternal, everything will be its object. Limitation to particular objects is invariably connected with impermanence. The limitation of cognition's objects is determined by the capacity of the relevant causal complex. Eternal cognition has no such capacity arising from a causal complex and therefore lacks the object limitation invariably connected with it. belongs only to impermanent cognition. Desire and effort corresponding to cognition that takes all things as its object will likewise take all things as their objects, because cognition, desire, and effort have the same object. Under these conditions, where is the opportunity for the ghostly play of the doubt that only some objects are produced by a bodyless agent? Concerning conditions in other inferences should be removed in the same manner. Thus the unconditioned relation between Probandom and Reason is established. Once the Probandom determined by the Reason has been established, the absence of the Reason determined in the reverse order by the absence of the Probandom is also established. There is no need to eliminate a separate condition again in order to establish negative commcomitance. Refutation of the second objection to invariable commcomitance. Regarding the second objection, open your ears, abandon meaningless talk and here are answer. First you must be asked whether, when the causes of a pot, the staff, wheel, and the like remain inactive, there is or is not a visible or invisible conscious director invariably connected with the distinct operations of the pot's causes. If no such director is present, how does any doubt remain concerning the absence of an invisible conscious director? It may be said that the absence of the conscious being whose presence is necessary for production must also be considered in the negative comm comitance. Very well, no one doubts this. Agent and director are equally required in both positive and negative comm comitance. But is this agent director embodied? Yes, but what does that statement mean? Is the conscious being move all the causes through bodily action, or is the body itself the instrument employed? The first meaning is impossible. The body is itself a cause of some result, if its activation depended upon another body, an infinite regress would follow. Nor is the second meaning universally true. In moving a poisonous substance by sheer volition, no bodily action is involved. Thus the statement then mean that the conscious being, in so far as embodied, is positively and negatively concomitant with the effect. If so, it must be explained whether possession of a body is required because the body itself is a condition because it is an instrument that moves other causes or because it is merely an inborn support obtained as the result of past action. There is no objection to the first alternative. Where a body is a condition of an effect, it is necessarily required but no sensible person will say that it is required even where it is not a condition. Under the second alternative, it may be said that what is not directly manipulated is moved by an instrument that is directly manipulated. But there is no rule that what is not directly manageable by one person cannot be directly manageable by another, another person's body is itself an example. After the third alternative, the body is as useless as the fruitless teat on a goat's neck, because it has no role in determining the concomitance between the operations of the causes and the result. It is as irrelevant as the presence of light in the positive and negative concomitance between smoke and the burning of dry grass. If even an inactive and fruitless body is held necessary for every production, then a person who makes a pot with the potter's body will also be regarded as moving the staff and the like by virtue of possessing a camel's body. From the standpoint of being obtained as a result of past life actions, there is no difference between the potter's body and the camel's body. It may be said that a particular body is necessary for producing a particular object even though that body serves no function. But serving no function and being necessary for production are mutually contradictory. If they are not regarded as a post, a camel's body too may be called necessary for making a pot. Like a heated iron ball held by tongs, the body is required in production only when it is a condition or the support of a condition, not merely because it is a body. A body is not the condition or support of every effect. Therefore, it cannot be established that different bodies are the basis of different productive activities. Would the conscious being who is the support of the causes producing a sprout also be the support of the causes of every production, so that there is no need to admit many selves? No, that is a different question. Even when that question arises, the inference of many selves is not based on being the support of a production or its causes, but upon inferring emotions such as pleasure, pain and fear from external signs such as smiles and from those emotions inferring cells who experience them. Therefore, no further discussion is needed here. Refutation of the Third Objection to Invariable Comcomitance Regarding the Third Objection 2, close the eyes clouded by envy and here are rational statement. In this world no effect can arise apart from the cycle of various kinds of causal factors and this cycle is determined by a conscious agent. If it were not, the definitions of the distinct causal factors could not be fixed at all. A locus is that whose nature is determined by the agent or object because it supports something. A point of departure is that whose nature is determined by the act of separation and the thing separated, these two delimited. A recipient is that whose nature is determined by the action intended as an instrument because the action aims to affect the object. The object is that whose nature is determined by the instrument because the object is invariably connected with the instrument. The nature of the instrument is determined by the principal agent because the instrument is the immediate object of the agent's action. The nature of the principal agent is determined by all the other causal factors because an agent is required for all their operations. But when the agent is defined as the substrate of properties such as cognition, desire and effort, there is neither circularity nor mutual dependence. Thus, if there is no principal agent, the subsidiary causal factors determined by it will not exist either, consequently, one must accept the possibility of an effect arising without a cause. This is a very serious defect in the proposed view. It may be said that this consequence follows only if all subsidiary causal factors are invariably concomitant with the principal agent, but that very concomitance is doubtful. No. How can the concomitance be absent? Apart from the six causal roles, there is no subsidiary factor not determined by the principal agent. Their definitions are impossible unless determination by the principal agent is included in them. If an effect can arise without a principal agent, the organization of the effect must likewise be possible without the other causal factors. Ultimately, an effect could arise even when all causal factors are absent. When all subsidiary factors are absent, no entity or general cause called a causal factor remains. And if one causal factor is accepted, the existence of all the others cannot be avoided, because their natures are mutually implicated in one another. to the foregoing view and its answer. The Buddhist objects that the foregoing analysis of the distinct causal factors is merely the opponent's own doctrine. On his view, whatever conscious or unconscious thing stands in positive and negative concomitance with an effect is called its cause. Sometimes conscious and unconscious causes jointly produce an effect in that case each is a principal cause in its own place. The distinction that one is material and the other efficient or one principal and the other subsidiary is determined on some basis. This statement is incorrect. If an effect can arise without a principal agent, it should likewise arise without a material cause. It cannot be said that, because an effect is generically similar to its cause, a material cause must be accepted and being proven, cannot be ignored. If only the material cause produced the effect, the effect would remain generically similar to the material cause despite differences among efficient causes. Or, if an effect arose solely from a material cause similar in class to itself, it would have no need of an efficient cause. But does an effect not arise from a causal complex rather than from one cause? Yes, but why? If the reason is that only a material cause joined with an efficient cause is established as causal through positive and negative concomitance, it may be said that this concomitance is observed only among visible things. The objection may be raised that visibility of the cause is irrelevant. Very well, then visibility should not be required in the case of a conscious cause either. Just as material and efficient causes jointly produce their effect, conscious and unconscious causes will jointly produce an effect. In the absence of either, the efficacy of the other will also be fruitless. Moreover, things such as a lump of clay or a staff are observed to depend upon something else for their motion. A full analysis is required to determine whether this dependence is fixed by their generic nature, by the influence of a particular unseen merit of the agent, or merely by their unconsciousness. Refutation of the first and second among the three alternatives above. The first of these alternatives is unacceptable. If the very nature of the staff and the like made them dependent, a loom and other things different from a staff would become independent causes. If a loom is regarded as dependent because of loomhood, the staff and the like would become independent. Nor can the dependence of a staff and the like be confined only to their casualty in making a pot. Otherwise the staff would become an independent cause when driving cattle. The second alternative is also unacceptable. If destiny is not confined to objects of a particular class, the staff that is a cause of a pot could by destiny itself be regarded as an independent cause of the pot. If not, state the common property of the things that destiny has made causes. No single common property appears among pots, cloths, carts, pans, and the like, or among staffs, looms, chisels, tongs, and the like. Can such a common property be inferred on the ground that pots and the like are produced by embodied persons? No. Pothood and the like, each its own property, constitute the grounds of inference, there is no such common property among things of distinct classes. Suppose some similar shape or arrangement in the distinct objects is such a property. But can they be regarded as created by a conscious agent on the basis of that arrangement alone? No. Even without such arrangement, water, fire and the like are directed by conscious persons. There is no rule that only things moved through the body are moved by consciousness, otherwise the body itself would become an independent agent because no second body moves it. Therefore, a staff and the like are dependent precisely because they are unconscious. This unconsciousness is also present in atons, unseen merit and the like, therefore all of them will be under the control of a conscious being. Thus the property having a cause is established as invariably concomitant with being an effect. Space and the other counter examples are costless and are not effects. In this way both positive and negative concomitance between being caused and effect hood are established. The nature of the invariable concomitance required for inference. What then is invariable concomitance? A natural relation. What does natural mean? Absence of a condition. What is a condition? A cause different from the reason that determines the presence of the probandom. What is its definition? Pervading the probandom without being pervaded by the reason. How is it determined whether a condition exists? If the possible presence of the reason in a counter example lacking the probandom is not refuted, a condition is admitted, if it is refuted, the condition is denied. What refutes this possibility? A reductio supported by repeated experiences of positive and negative concomitance, the authority of this argument cannot be doubted. This reductio, in its five forms, self-dependence, mutual dependence, circularity, infinite regress, And the like sometimes establishes concomitance by removing deviation of the reason and sometimes by removing the condition that grounds the deviation. The result is the same in both cases. Examples of these five kinds are available in this very work. An objection and its answer. The Buddhist, weakened by our argument, now turns it against us, in the same manner in which God's existence is established, a Hare's horn too can be established. The negation supplied by perception is confined only to perceptible things. The property of possessing a horn cannot be denied of a hurry merely because a Hare's horn is not perceptible, since negation of the pervader does not negate the pervaded. The objector here regards perceptibility as the pervaded property, because according to him both visible and invisible horns are possible. The perceptibility of a horn may be due to its being produced, therefore, in the absence of producedness, the existence of an unproduced hares horn may be regarded as possible. This rejoinder cannot disturb one who has already established a great truth such as the existence of God because it is pointless. Nevertheless, it may be said that such an argument would bring this repute upon a respected opponent and should therefore not be ignored. Let our supporters be at ease, we shall answer it. The person who seeks to establish the reality of a hair's own through linguistic convention should be asked whether by the word, own, he understands something like hair or an object like an ordinary home. If the first, there is the defect of re-establishing what is already established, together with opposition to ordinary usage, because in common practice the word horn denotes something wholly different from hair. If the second, the universal property of hornhood is manifested by an object possessing a particular configuration, how, then, can that property be manifested in atoms and the like, which lack this configuration. If it can, Othood and other Universals can also be manifested there. Once this is accepted, Universals will mutually overextend or effects will arise without causes. Positive and negative concomitance will cease to prove casualty. Everything becomes inverted in such a confused doctrine. Therefore, the existence of an invisible or eternal hair's horn is wholly impossible. Whence could arise the basis for an inference of something contradicted by perception? Objection to the foregoing answer and its answer. If manifestation of a universal property requires a particular configuration of its substrate, God's cognition cannot be eternal because cognition hood appears only when some transformation occurs in the senses and the like. No. Cognition hood neither negates nor implies eternality. Just as barrenness negates motherhood, cognition hood does not negate eternality. If cognition hood negated eternality, spots, clots and other unconscious impermanent things would also possess cognition. Nor does Eternality negate Cognition-hood. No opposition between them has been established because the contrary possibility has not been sublated. The two inferences, every observed cognition is impermanent and no Eternal thing has been observed to possess cognition are respectively defective through limiting conditions in the form of objecthood and objectlessness. They are exactly like the inference that establishes all color as impermanent but is conditioned by being knowable only by the eye. Nor is transformation of the senses the cause of the manifestation of cognition hood. Whether there is objecthood or no dependence upon a sense organ, every knowable thing causes the manifestation of cognitionhood. Transformation of a sense organ independently of objecthood cannot cause cognitionhood to appear, otherwise it would manifest other properties as well. Minor Objections Now here certain subsidiary objections. If God alone is the Creator, the world would not possess manifold forms and would be produced continuously. If God depends upon unseen merit to make the world, the admission of God is unnecessary. Unseen merit alone could produce the world. If God acts for his own benefit, he ceases to be God. If he acts for the benefit of others, the world should be free from suffering. If his effort has no purpose, he becomes like an unconscious creature. There is no proof that God is one. And if there are many gods, they will not be omniscient, because each god will know only the causal complex of the effect he creates. Answers to the foregoing objections. If, within the cycle of causes, one cause is first accepted and all the others are discarded as unnecessary, ultimately every cause becomes unnecessary. It may be said that what is established as a cause through positive and negative concomitance is not unnecessary. well, then a cause established by inference is not unnecessary either, because both are established with equal evidential force. Moreover, if the very purpose for which an entity has been admitted is made the ground of its superfluity, the casualty of unseen merit everywhere will make all known causes unnecessary. Unknown causes are inferred only on the basis of known causes. God's effort is directed toward the benefit of other living beings, because God has no selfish interest of his own. The creation of suffering does not contradict his compassion, the occasional infliction of pain by parents, teachers, physicians, and the light illustrates this. Is suffering created because of God's wickedness? No. There is no wickedness in God. The absence of wickedness follows from the absence of delusion and the absence of delusion from God's omniscience. Refutation of the view that God is not omniscient. There is no dispute that the being who who produces diodes also knows invisible atoms and knows all six kinds of real entities, from the triads produced from atoms up to the living beings enjoyment of diverse objects. All these constitute the material causes of the world. The nature of a material cause cannot be known unless both the determining property and the object determined by it are known. The rule is that an entity capable of making or knowing one thing of a certain class is capable of making or knowing all things of that class, because capacity is determined by the relevant generic property. It may be objected that even a capable entity does not make or know anything when auxiliary causes are unavailable. these two, the first not producing an effect despite possessing capacity is acceptable because the production of things is confined to determinate times and places. The second not knowing despite possessing capacity would be possible only if that entity's cognition were produced but God's cognition is not produced. Why? In the absence of a body, senses residing in the body will also be absent. When the casualty of something has been established by positive and negative concomitance, if that cause is absent, the relevant effect cannot be be produced by another cause, otherwise the effect would be costless. No effect is costless. Therefore, it is self-evident that God's capacity for cognition, desire, and effort concerning one object extends to all objects of that class. In this manner God's omniscience is established. A question and its answer. How can the creator of the world be bodiless? Because no visible body of his is perceived. If an invisible body is admitted and it possesses parts and determinate shape, he could not generate a frog inside solid stone without breaking the stone. Nor can his body be minute like an atom. An atom contains no empty interior and therefore cannot support the mind, without mind and senses it does not satisfy the definition of a body. If a mind located outside the body could produce cognition, the body would be useless in the production of cognition. Does the distant sun not produce a frog inside a stone? No. The sun is not the cause of the effort that produces the frog's body. Effort resides in the body and therefore its influence cannot cross the body's limits. If effort were regarded as all-pervasive, it would not depend upon a body as a non-inherent cause, consequently, it would be costless, and being costless would itself establish its eternality. A body cannot become the object of effort merely because it is an object of cognition, otherwise our effort to could produce effects in things distant from the body. Do the sun and the light produce motion through inheritance in something conjoined with them, space being conjoined with the sun, and the causes producing the frog being conjoined with the frog? No. What is intended here is the immediate cause of motion. How then, does one who knows the science of snake poison remove venom without touching another person's body? In such a case, the exorcist's effort is directly connected with the consciousness of a deity who revives the snake-bitten person. Or the exorcist's own effort assisted by the mantra, God's effort, or merit produced by the mantra is causally connected with the motion that removes the venom. But at the beginning of creation there is not the slightest possibility of any body's existence, therefore, a body cannot be the cause of creation. For this reason, the omniscience of the maker of the world is beyond dispute. Establishing the authority of scripture. there is an omniscient creator, how can he also be a teacher? The answer is that, besides being a capable speaker, he is wholly devoted to the welfare of others. One who discerns good and evil and is benevolent will certainly show the ignorant the proper path, provided his speech, articulation, and the like are fortless. Just as an ordinary person tells a blind man on the road, turn right, not left, so God shows the path to all human beings. But how can speech organs, articulation, and the light be established for a bodyless God, when the capacity of an organ consists in its various movements and clear sound cannot arise without such movement? The answer is that God can initiate clear sound even without himself being the substrate of these causes. For the production of an effect established through positive and negative concomitants with causes, both the causes and their substrate are required just as a whole cannot arise without the aggregate of parts and the substrate of that aggregate. But a body is not required as the cause of every effect. For this very reason, the casualty of a body in the production of diodes and the like has already been rejected. God's being the father of the world also supports the inference that he gives scriptural instruction. What scripture is this? The Veda, Medical Science and the like. These are like the roar of a lion, inflicting unbearable pain upon the ears of elephant like enemies who hate the Veda. Proof of God's Omniscience. The medical science composed by God is not unauthoritative, because the truth of its statements is frequently established by direct observation. When an injunction occasionally fails, the failure is accidental and due to a defect in the causal complex of the prescribed procedure. When the appropriate causes are assembled, the result certainly follows from them. If medical science were groundless, its prescriptions would not be confirmed. If even groundless statements could prove true, the statements of untrustworthy persons would also have to be regarded as true. The prescriptions of medical science are not based merely upon observed positive and negative concomitance. Testing the effects of combining and separating numerous medicines in different diseases involves infinitely many possibilities. No human being of the present age can complete all these tests. Experiments involving poison may produce grave harm. Without knowing the true nature of things, what sensible person would himself perform or in the name of training make another perform procedures such as incision, drying, cutting, cotterization, puncturing veins, and fasting. Nor can the basis of present instruction be merely a beginningless chain of teaching from teacher to pupil, because ultimately every instruction must rest upon some authoritative source of knowledge. cannot be eternal merely as an ordinary collection of sentences. Therefore, once the alternatives are eliminated, the conclusion is that medical science originated from a being capable of directly seeing even invisible things. By this example, or from the reason that it is accepted by great persons, the vedha too is established as the composition of an omniscient author. The meaning of greatness. If the word great means trustworthy, the reason in the inference of the omniscient author of the Veda will be doubtful in the subject, because the trustworthiness of Manu and others may be questioned. If it means numerous, the reason deviates because works composed by Buddha and others are not regarded as the compositions of the omniscient. or those works to would have to be regarded as composed by the omniscient. Therefore, the proper meaning of great is excellence in greatness. What is this excellence? Acceptance of the essential truths stated in all the principal philosophical systems. A person's conformity to these truths appears in three ways. First, practicing the doctrines accepted. Second, employing words regarded as correct by the universally accepted grammar of Pini. And third, accepting the truth of certain Vedic statements within medical science, which is accepted by learned people. To elaborate, there is no philosophical system whose followers, Though calling all worldly activity illusory, fail to perform the Veda prescribed sacraments from conception rights to funeral rights, fail to observe distinctions between touchable and untouchable, or fail to perform expiatory practices such as bathing and purification. It may be said that not every person accepts every prescription. But medical science is not rejected by great persons merely because every person does not accept all of its prescriptions. People who accept the true statements of diverse philosophical systems acknowledge the authority of medical science, this alone constitutes its support by learned people. Do even followers of the Veda obey every Vedic command? No, but this causes no difficulty. Not every person accepts every prescription of medical science either, different persons accept different prescriptions. Then, since teachings such as non-violence in the traditions of Buddha and others are accepted by great persons, are those teachings not also approved by great persons? No. There is doubt whether teachers, such as the son of Sudodhana personally experienced the efficacy of their teachings or merely publicized Vedic injunctions under their own names in order to gain the reverence of disciples. This resembles the well-known tale of the cat that practiced austerity to gain the trust of mice. It is difficult to suppose that they themselves experienced the effects of their distinctive teachings because general principles such as non-violence are present in Jain and other traditions as well. Distinctive Buddhist and Jain practices, drawing consecrated circles, plucking out the hair of the head and so on are not universally accepted. But special Veda prescribed sacraments, such as conception rites are widely accepted. Whether a real difference exists between correct and corrupted forms of words or not, all philosophers without dispute accept the practical distinction between them. All also regard the teachings of the six limbs of the Veda as true, and the purpose of all six is preservation of the Veda. Objection to the foregoing view and its answer. The objection is this, let grammar and the light be sciences, whose teachings are universally accepted and which preserve the purity of the Veda. But why should grammar be regarded as preserving only the Veda? It may equally be said to preserve the teachings of of Buddha, liberator of the world. No. Grammarians do not hold such a view, and their grammar does not explain expressions used in Buddhist discourse. Buddhist literature does not abound in archaic words like the Veda. Most of its words are current in ordinary language, so it is not the principal subject of traditional grammar. Traditional grammar does not analyze the distinctive words and meanings of Buddhist texts as it does those of the Veda. On the contrary, it points out incorrect Buddhist usages. Therefore, the universally accepted grammatical tradition supports Vedic usage. In the same way, universally accepted medical science supports Vedic instruction. It repeatedly recommends sacrifice, charity, recitation, austerity, expiation, and other without prescribed acts that promote prosperity and peace. This part of medical science cannot be unauthoritative, otherwise its other parts too would have to be regarded as unauthoritative. Could this portion be a later interpolation? No. In this science there is an unbroken continuity of teacher-pupil tradition. If interpolation is suspected in such a traditionally transmitted science, it may be suspected in all sciences. Thus, in all the ways described above, the Veda is supported by great persons, such support is impossible without an omniscient author. Therefore, the Vedas authorship by the Omniscient is established.

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