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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.993755)

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21:06

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1. 0:02–0:06DOCTRIN, VALIDITY IS PRODUCED BY AMERIT
2. 0:06–0:12The Neayaka replies that, on the Msokka view, invalid cognition too would in the same way
3. 0:12–0:16have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not
4. 0:16–0:20extrinsically from any additional defect.
5. 0:20–0:25For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or
6. 0:25–0:31uncommon causes of cognition, no separate defect could be a cause of its production.
7. 0:31–0:35It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding
8. 0:35–0:40to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition.
9. 0:40–0:45Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature
10. 0:45–0:49and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects.
11. 0:49–0:53An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should
12. 0:53–0:58valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause?
13. 0:58–1:04Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension,
14. 1:04–1:09In similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals.
15. 1:09–1:15Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive
16. 1:15–1:17to production of the effect and recurrent.
17. 1:17–1:23Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also
18. 1:23–1:26be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
19. 1:26–1:32Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous
20. 1:32–1:35to the clay that causes a pot.
21. 1:35–1:41Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental.
22. 1:41–1:46An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and
23. 1:46–1:50this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot
24. 1:50–1:54cognition, hence there is no causal deviation.
25. 1:54–1:58Therefore the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by
26. 1:58–2:03a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous
27. 2:03–2:10to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general
28. 2:10–2:14is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting
29. 2:14–2:19its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition, does
30. 2:19–2:24not suffer from proving what is already established.
31. 2:24–2:28This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect.
32. 2:28–2:33The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must
33. 2:33–2:37also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
34. 2:37–2:42The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and
35. 2:42–2:47is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot.
36. 2:47–2:54To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted.
37. 2:54–2:58In effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this
38. 2:58–3:03contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so
39. 3:03–3:06there is no deviation in the causal relation.
40. 3:06–3:11Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the
41. 3:11–3:16cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition
42. 3:16–3:20establishes the effect hood of cognition.
43. 3:20–3:23Where does the following inference prove what is already established?
44. 3:23–3:28Valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid
45. 3:28–3:31cognition, it is a produced cognition.
46. 3:31–3:36The reason is that the Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid
47. 3:36–3:40cognition in general.
48. 3:40–3:44Examples and justification of other inferences
49. 3:44–3:49Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effected, because, like invalidity, it is
50. 3:49–3:53a property residing in all effects without obstruction.
51. 3:53–3:58But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood because it is
52. 3:58–4:03nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood.
53. 4:03–4:08There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties as
54. 4:08–4:11delimiters of effect hood.
55. 4:11–4:14Granted that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person
56. 4:14–4:19serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects
57. 4:19–4:25in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the
58. 4:25–4:31production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property
59. 4:31–4:36delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct from the causality determined
60. 4:36–4:40by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognition hood, because it pervades effect
61. 4:40–4:46hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood. This is required in order to admit a recurrent
62. 4:46–4:52effect. It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an
63. 4:52–4:56effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality
64. 4:56–5:00determined by the cause of invalid cognition because it is a property
65. 5:00–5:03delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pothood.
66. 5:04–5:09Therefore valid cognition like a pot is an effect produced extrinsically by a
67. 5:09–5:15distinct cause. Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an
68. 5:15–5:19an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined
69. 5:19–5:24by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect
70. 5:24–5:27to absent from visual illusion, like Pothood.
71. 5:27–5:33Again, being a non-eternal deritical cognition of silver delimits an effect to determining
72. 5:33–5:37a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of
73. 5:37–5:42invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect to absent
74. 5:42–5:46from an illusion of silver, like Pothood.
75. 5:46–5:50Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver
76. 5:50–5:54makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent from
77. 5:54–5:56silver its mode.
78. 5:56–6:01Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced
79. 6:01–6:06extrinsically by a distinct cause.
80. 6:06–6:10Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the
81. 6:10–6:14causes of validity and invalidity.
82. 6:14–6:18The men's aca objects that in the inference whose probandom is, being produced by a cause
83. 6:18–6:22different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid
84. 6:22–6:24cognition is an extraneous condition.
85. 6:24–6:28It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition, because
86. 6:28–6:32naiyayika's regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of
87. 6:32–6:36inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance.
88. 6:36–6:40The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary,
89. 6:40–6:45But because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both.
90. 6:45–6:49Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative
91. 6:49–6:53reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance,
92. 6:53–6:56and difference from the subject is absent there.
93. 6:56–6:59This objection is unsound.
94. 6:59–7:02Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the
95. 7:02–7:06reason is pervaded by the pro-bandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot
96. 7:06–7:10evaporate the probandum or make the reason deviant.
97. 7:10–7:15The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus
98. 7:15–7:20validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone.
99. 7:20–7:25A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely
100. 7:25–7:31distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like Stathwood delimiting causality.
101. 7:31–7:33This reasoning is unsound.
102. 7:33–7:38When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise,
103. 7:38–7:41but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent.
104. 7:41–7:47Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted
105. 7:47–7:49as a cause of valid cognition.
106. 7:49–7:55Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete
107. 7:55–8:00sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, in valid cognition
108. 8:00–8:02arises in their absence.
109. 8:02–8:07It prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid
110. 8:07–8:13cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition.
111. 8:13–8:16Absence of merit is not a cause.
112. 8:16–8:20Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot
113. 8:20–8:24be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent.
114. 8:24–8:28Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object,
115. 8:28–8:33of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition.
116. 8:33–8:37It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object
117. 8:37–8:41can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only existent
118. 8:41–8:46objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects.
119. 8:46–8:50Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there
120. 8:50–8:53is no proof for such a rule.
121. 8:53–8:57It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent
122. 8:57–9:00object causes only valid cognition of an existent object.
123. 9:00–9:05Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition
124. 9:05–9:09of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent
125. 9:09–9:10object.
126. 9:10–9:15Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, that for one and the
127. 9:15–9:19same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence
128. 9:19–9:22cannot reside in the same substrate.
129. 9:22–9:26Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsarca view, which makes absence of defect
130. 9:26–9:31the cause of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels
131. 9:31–9:36the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions.
132. 9:36–9:40It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily
133. 9:40–9:45arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition
134. 9:45–9:50of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects
135. 9:50–9:55need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need
136. 9:55–10:01not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either.
137. 10:01–10:05Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause.
138. 10:05–10:09A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature
139. 10:09–10:13and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid
140. 10:13–10:14cognition.
141. 10:14–10:18Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid
142. 10:18–10:19cognition.
143. 10:19–10:23Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and
144. 10:23–10:27deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition.
145. 10:28–10:32Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect,
146. 10:32–10:35once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises.
147. 10:37–10:41A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property.
148. 10:41–10:45If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in
149. 10:45–10:49general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the
150. 10:49–10:54counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence,
151. 10:54–10:59and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself. If defined as inhibiting valid
152. 10:59–11:04cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even considering a correct inferential reason would
153. 11:04–11:09become a defect, an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid. If it is said that
154. 11:09–11:13certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies equally to merits.
155. 11:13–11:21Saka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition.
156. 11:21–11:26The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither
157. 11:26–11:28valid nor invalid cognition.
158. 11:28–11:33Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that
159. 11:33–11:40bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises.
160. 11:40–11:45The mere absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect
161. 11:45–11:49should be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well.
162. 11:49–11:54Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because the
163. 11:54–12:00tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch.
164. 12:00–12:04It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I
165. 12:04–12:08am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises
166. 12:08–12:10from a merit.
167. 12:10–12:14answer, the cause of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception
168. 12:14–12:18of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity error
169. 12:18–12:20does not arise.
170. 12:20–12:25It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition of
171. 12:25–12:30that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same class,
172. 12:30–12:32and not in its absence.
173. 12:32–12:36Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should
174. 12:36–12:40likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere.
175. 12:40–12:45Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair
176. 12:45–12:50located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with
177. 12:50–12:53other hair of the same class.
178. 12:53–12:58Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because
179. 12:58–13:03if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid.
180. 13:03–13:07It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature
181. 13:07–13:13causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence,
182. 13:13–13:16perception of the distinction, will cause valid cognition.
183. 13:16–13:21Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity of
184. 13:21–13:28absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation.
185. 13:28–13:34From Saka view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality.
186. 13:34–13:39Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily
187. 13:39–13:44defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect.
188. 13:44–13:48It should not be said that defects such as jaundice or non-recurrent and therefore must
189. 13:48–13:53be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony,
190. 13:53–13:57non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition.
191. 13:58–14:03It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid
192. 14:03–14:08cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce
193. 14:08–14:13invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are
194. 14:13–14:18non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid
195. 14:18–14:24cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition
196. 14:24–14:29only non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice,
197. 14:29–14:35being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater
198. 14:35–14:41intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition
199. 14:41–14:45of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one
200. 14:45–14:50distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a
201. 14:50–14:54distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid
202. 14:54–14:59cognition, it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid
203. 14:59–15:05cognition of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection, in producing valid visual
204. 15:05–15:10cognition, the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition
205. 15:10–15:14contact is absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect causes invalid cognition.
206. 15:14–15:20If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow
207. 15:20–15:25that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. Invalid cognition,
208. 15:25–15:31being produced by contact, would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the
209. 15:31–15:34formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone
210. 15:34–15:39nor by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition,
211. 15:39–15:45perceptuality is unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition,
212. 15:45–15:48there will be both overextension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence.
213. 15:50–15:55Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and
214. 15:55–16:00in cognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid
215. 16:00–16:07cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an
216. 16:07–16:14additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Naya Yaka reply, merits are specific, not
217. 16:14–16:20recurrent. The Naya Yaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally
218. 16:20–16:25in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition
219. 16:25–16:29of perversion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific
220. 16:29–16:34merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this
221. 16:34–16:39established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are
222. 16:39–16:44specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature
223. 16:44–16:49is a specific merit of perception. The Memsaka proposes that only the cause of perception of
224. 16:49–16:53the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, because absence of valid
225. 16:53–16:58perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception of the
226. 16:58–17:03distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception
227. 17:03–17:07of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then, if perception
228. 17:07–17:12of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in human perception,
229. 17:12–17:16as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing hands and the
230. 17:16–17:21like is known through reflexive awareness. The Naya Yaka will ask how perception of the
231. 17:21–17:26pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception
232. 17:26–17:30of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error.
233. 17:30–17:35On my view too, because a perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of
234. 17:35–17:38an individual arising after doubt or error.
235. 17:38–17:41But this proposal too is unsound.
236. 17:41–17:46Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the
237. 17:46–17:51causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions
238. 17:51–17:55of individuals arising after doubt or error.
239. 17:55–17:59Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition
240. 17:59–18:04arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction.
241. 18:04–18:09Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other means
242. 18:09–18:11of knowledge.
243. 18:11–18:16Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and
244. 18:16–18:19not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that
245. 18:19–18:20of perception.
246. 18:20–18:24Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual
247. 18:24–18:29aggregate is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person
248. 18:29–18:34here. Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while
249. 18:34–18:39contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator
250. 18:39–18:42and sublated would be impossible.
251. 18:42–18:47It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even invalid cognition of
252. 18:47–18:53a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of a post. Nor is only
253. 18:53–18:57valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition as sublator, because
254. 18:57–19:01the semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition
255. 19:01–19:06that is sublated. Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not
256. 19:06–19:10otherwise established as the sublator, here only cognition produced by
257. 19:10–19:14veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has been called the sublator.
258. 19:15–19:19The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of
259. 19:19–19:22the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived,
260. 19:22–19:27and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound.
261. 19:27–19:31Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition.
262. 19:32–19:36Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes the illusion of a post,
263. 19:36–19:40the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion and in the identity
264. 19:40–19:45error, I am fair. But in valid cognition of a post arising after doubt because a defect
265. 19:45–19:50is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs. Moreover, inference,
266. 19:50–19:56comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively of a fallacious reason,
267. 19:56–20:00false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting in correct reflection on the
268. 20:00–20:06reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition of sentence meaning are established as
269. 20:06–20:13causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit. Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises
270. 20:13–20:18from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the
271. 20:18–20:23the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established.
272. 20:23–20:27That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition.
273. 20:27–20:32Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid
274. 20:32–20:34perceptual cognition.
275. 20:34–20:39But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction,
276. 20:39–20:41so this is not its cause.
277. 20:41–20:45Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects
278. 20:45–20:51such as an illusory mark. True subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes.
279. 20:52–20:58Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting and correct cognition of sentence meaning,
280. 20:58–21:02therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

Plain text

DOCTRIN, VALIDITY IS PRODUCED BY AMERIT The Neayaka replies that, on the Msokka view, invalid cognition too would in the same way have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not extrinsically from any additional defect. For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or uncommon causes of cognition, no separate defect could be a cause of its production. It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition. Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects. An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause? Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension, In similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals. Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive to production of the effect and recurrent. Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to the clay that causes a pot. Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental. An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation. Therefore the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition, does not suffer from proving what is already established. This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect. The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot. To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted. In effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so there is no deviation in the causal relation. Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition. Where does the following inference prove what is already established? Valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. The reason is that the Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid cognition in general. Examples and justification of other inferences Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effected, because, like invalidity, it is a property residing in all effects without obstruction. But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood because it is nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood. There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties as delimiters of effect hood. Granted that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognition hood, because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood. This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect. It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pothood. Therefore valid cognition like a pot is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect to absent from visual illusion, like Pothood. Again, being a non-eternal deritical cognition of silver delimits an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect to absent from an illusion of silver, like Pothood. Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent from silver its mode. Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes of validity and invalidity. The men's aca objects that in the inference whose probandom is, being produced by a cause different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid cognition is an extraneous condition. It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition, because naiyayika's regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary, But because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there. This objection is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason is pervaded by the pro-bandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot evaporate the probandum or make the reason deviant. The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone. A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like Stathwood delimiting causality. This reasoning is unsound. When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition. Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, in valid cognition arises in their absence. It prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition. Absence of merit is not a cause. Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent. Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object, of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition. It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects. Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object. Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent object. Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, that for one and the same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot reside in the same substrate. Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsarca view, which makes absence of defect the cause of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions. It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either. Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause. A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition. Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises. A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property. If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself. If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid. If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies equally to merits. Saka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition. The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither valid nor invalid cognition. Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises. The mere absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well. Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch. It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a merit. answer, the cause of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity error does not arise. It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition of that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same class, and not in its absence. Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere. Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other hair of the same class. Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid. It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence, perception of the distinction, will cause valid cognition. Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation. From Saka view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality. Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect. It should not be said that defects such as jaundice or non-recurrent and therefore must be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony, non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition. It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition, it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection, in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect causes invalid cognition. If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. Invalid cognition, being produced by contact, would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both overextension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence. Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and in cognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Naya Yaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent. The Naya Yaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of perversion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is a specific merit of perception. The Memsaka proposes that only the cause of perception of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, because absence of valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception of the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then, if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Naya Yaka will ask how perception of the pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. On my view too, because a perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. But this proposal too is unsound. Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions of individuals arising after doubt or error. Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction. Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other means of knowledge. Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception. Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here. Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator and sublated would be impossible. It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of a post. Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition as sublator, because the semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated. Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the sublator, here only cognition produced by veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived, and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion and in the identity error, I am fair. But in valid cognition of a post arising after doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs. Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit. Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established. That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition. Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid perceptual cognition. But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction, so this is not its cause. Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects such as an illusory mark. True subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes. Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting and correct cognition of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

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