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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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1. 0:04–0:07CONCLUSION OF THE FORGOING DISCUSION
2. 0:07–0:12Such are the established general rules and practices.
3. 0:12–0:20If the Buddhists proceeded by the proper method of proof, their doctrine could never arise at all.
4. 0:20–0:31In negative theses such as, Nothing exists, Nothing is real, Nothing is an agent, Nothing is rational, Nothing is the object of anything,
5. 0:31–0:38anything, there is no philosophy, and there is no doctrine, self-contradiction is difficult
6. 0:38–0:46to avoid. If a doctrine is maintained, that doctrine itself cannot occur, if it occurs,
7. 0:46–0:53it is not real, produces no result, is not rational, its cognition has no object, its
8. 0:53–0:58result is no doctrine, and its meaning is no tenet.
9. 0:58–1:03affirming these theses yields precisely such undesirable consequences.
10. 1:03–1:08Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its refutation.
11. 1:08–1:14The Buddhists may say, we accept all these undesirable conclusions.
12. 1:14–1:19No mere acceptance does not remove self-contradiction.
13. 1:19–1:24If nothing exists, how can the meaning of the thesis be known,
14. 1:24–1:29When the thesis itself is included among the things it negates.
15. 1:29–1:36If the thesis is not included among the things negated, how is it rational?
16. 1:36–1:41If the thesis is irrational, how can its meaning be rational?
17. 1:41–1:48It resembles a female serpent that bites itself with its own venom and falls unconscious.
18. 1:48–1:53Defense of the objection and its refutation.
19. 1:53–2:01Can the foregoing defect not be removed by restricting the negation in the thesis with the qualifier in reality?
20. 2:01–2:04Perhaps, but what is this reality?
21. 2:04–2:10Is it rational inquiry or a transcendence of ordinary practice?
22. 2:10–2:14The first alternative has already been refuted.
23. 2:14–2:25If inquiry itself, being in the form of the thesis, is real, the thesis nothing is real is refuted by the reality of the inquiry.
24. 2:25–2:33Like a Mongoose killed by its own offspring, the inquiry will be destroyed by its own result.
25. 2:33–2:41The same self-contradiction occurs under the second alternative, like an object outrunning its own shadow.
26. 2:41–2:47If ordinary practice is transcended, no determinate inquiry is possible.
27. 2:47–2:53If determinate inquiry exists, ordinary practice has not been transcended.
28. 2:53–2:57Further development of the foregoing refutation.
29. 2:57–3:06In these theses, whether the counter-positive of the negation is real or unreal, contradiction follows.
30. 3:06–3:17If it is real, it cannot be wholly negated, if it is unreal, its negation is impossible because the counter-positive does not exist.
31. 3:17–3:25Is mere general cognition of the thing denied sufficient for its negation, without requiring its reality?
32. 3:25–3:32Yes, but then the existence of the thing denied has already been established.
33. 3:32–3:36Nothing is established in any other way.
34. 3:36–3:40Is general cognition or practical usage never indefeasible?
35. 3:40–3:43i.e., can it be falsified?
36. 3:43–3:48It may be falsified in one context, but not in another.
37. 3:48–3:55Cognition of silver in nacre is sublated, whereas cognition of real silver is true.
38. 3:55–4:01Is general cognition sublated everywhere because nothing is real?
39. 4:01–4:10Then we ask, is that cognition sublated by another valid cognition which depends upon the first cognition for its own validity,
40. 4:10–4:15by one that does not so depend, or by a false cognition?
41. 4:15–4:24The first is impossible, an inference that a thing is not cold does not ordinarily sublate the perception of its heat,
42. 4:24–4:30because without knowledge of heat its contrary or absence cannot be known.
43. 4:30–4:33The second alternative is impossible.
44. 4:33–4:41For without cognition of the counter-positive there can be no valid opposing cognition of its negation.
45. 4:41–4:47Under the third alternative, because the sublating cognition is itself false,
46. 4:47–4:54the original thesis may sublate the supposed sublator instead of being sublated by it.
47. 4:54–5:00The Buddhist began the discussion by proving the falsity of everything through valid cognition,
48. 5:00–5:05but ended by accepting universal sublation through false cognition.
49. 5:05–5:08Completion of the refutation
50. 5:08–5:15The foregoing sublation through invalid cognition has not been properly defended either.
51. 5:15–5:18What is false cognition?
52. 5:18–5:25Is it a spontaneously arising perception or merely some undesirable consequence?
53. 5:25–5:36If the first, the Buddhist must admit perception to be true, and since there is no perception that negates the world, the doctrine remains unestablished.
54. 5:36–5:46If the second, ordinary practice is violated, because a merely undesirable possibility does not make anything false.
55. 5:46–5:54Moreover, an opponent may simply refuse to accept the Buddhist's undesirable consequence and oppose it.
56. 5:54–5:59refutation of the reasons in negation-oriented inferences.
57. 5:59–6:08The foregoing refutation also disposes of the various reasons employed in many negation-oriented inferences.
58. 6:08–6:12Those inferences and their reasons are as follows,
59. 6:12–6:17nothing exists because it is known like the snake appearing in a rope.
60. 6:17–6:24Nothing is true because it is cognition like the illusory cognition of a snake in a rope.
61. 6:24–6:31Nothing is an agent or active because it is unreal like a hare's horn.
62. 6:31–6:37Nothing is rational because it cannot be determined like a face reflected in a mirror.
63. 6:37–6:44No object of cognition is real because it is merely imagined like a dream.
64. 6:44–6:47There is no act called seeing.
65. 6:47–6:53Because if there is no object to be seen, the act of seeing also cannot exist,
66. 6:53–6:58just as cutting is impossible when there is nothing to be cut.
67. 6:58–7:05And there is no doctrine, because every so-called doctrine is opposed by another doctrine,
68. 7:05–7:10just as drying heat and wetting water are mutually opposed.
69. 7:10–7:16The reasons in all these inferences necessarily entail a conclusion opposite
70. 7:16–7:22to the very conclusion they seek to prove, at the same time, they presuppose the truth
71. 7:22–7:26of the opponent whom their assertions deny.
72. 7:26–7:32The reasons in the first and second inferences are deviant, because the inferences produced
73. 7:32–7:37by them are themselves something and are themselves cognitions.
74. 7:37–7:42If the inference were nothing, the reason would be fruitless.
75. 7:42–7:49The third and fourth reasons are unestablished because the reality and determinate nature
76. 7:49–7:53of things have already been established.
77. 7:53–7:59The fifth reason is deviant like the first and second because the inference it produces
78. 7:59–8:03has its own object the inferred entity.
79. 8:03–8:08The sixth reason is unestablished, self contradictory and deviant.
80. 8:08–8:14The active character of seeing has already been established, cognitiveity is itself the
81. 8:14–8:22act of cognition or seeing, and the view there is no philosophy is itself a philosophy.
82. 8:22–8:26The seventh reason too is unestablished and deviant.
83. 8:26–8:32There is no contradiction in accepting one doctrine, because the opposed doctrine may
84. 8:32–8:39may be regarded as invalid, moreover, the denial of all doctrines is itself a doctrine.
85. 8:39–8:46Finally, since things are real, all these inferences also suffer from the absence of
86. 8:46–8:49the probandom in the subject.
87. 8:49–8:54Refutation of all the examples given in the inferences.
88. 8:54–9:00Because of the foregoing criticism, the examples given in these inferences also become
89. 9:00–9:08unacceptable. They are a snake appearing in a rope, green cognition, a hare's horn, a
90. 9:08–9:15face reflected in a mirror, cutting when there is nothing to be cut, drying fire and wetting
91. 9:15–9:22water and so forth. The very grounds by which we know the unreality of the snake in the
92. 9:22–9:28rope, the falsity of the cognition of the snake, the inactivity of a hare's horn,
93. 9:28–9:35The irrationality of the face reflected in a mirror, the objectlessness of dream cognition,
94. 9:35–9:41and the impossibility of cutting when there is nothing to be cut also make known the reality
95. 9:41–9:42of the rope.
96. 9:42–9:48The truth of the cognition that distinguishes the rope from the snake, the causal efficacy
97. 9:48–9:53of the cow with respect to horns and of the hurray with.
98. 9:53–9:59two years, the true nature of the mirror, the possession of objects by cognitions different
99. 9:59–10:05from dreams, the reality of the cut object whenever cutting occurs, and the reality of
100. 10:05–10:13the object of cognition. Were this not so, every example would be devoid of the probandom,
101. 10:13–10:20unreality, falsity, and so forth, for if reality exists nowhere, unreality too cannot
102. 10:20–10:29exist. In the final example above, the reason itself is absent. The mutual opposition of
103. 10:29–10:37doctrines has the form of mutual absence, whereas the opposition of fire and water has the form
104. 10:37–10:44of the relation between destroyer and destroyed. The merely superficial similarity of the
105. 10:44–10:50words, opposition, and destruction cannot establish the inference above.
106. 10:50–10:54The Buddhist argument refuting the reality of a whole.
107. 10:54–11:00Let there then be a debate in which the Buddhist and his opponent point out defects in each
108. 11:00–11:03other's views.
109. 11:03–11:07Very well, let us see how such a debate proceeds.
110. 11:07–11:14To refute the opponent's view, the Buddhist may argue as follows, what is called real cannot
111. 11:14–11:21be gross in size because then incompatible properties would not be absent from it.
112. 11:21–11:28Nor can it be minute in size because then it would appear only as minute.
113. 11:28–11:34It cannot be independent of another because then it would be eternal.
114. 11:34–11:41Nor can it be dependent upon another, because then it would be neither real nor unreal,
115. 11:41–11:47if real and dependent, its cause could not produce it because it would already exist,
116. 11:47–11:53and if unreal, no cause could ever bring it into existence.
117. 11:53–11:59It cannot be one, because then it would not appear in many forms like the collection
118. 11:59–12:02of a substance and its many qualities.
119. 12:02–12:10Nor can it be many, because then its nature would appear fragmented and manifold.
120. 12:10–12:15It cannot be all-pervasive, because then it would be motionless.
121. 12:15–12:21Nor can it be non-pervasive, because then it could not be known as real, the same thing
122. 12:21–12:27cannot be both existent and non-existent at the same time.
123. 12:27–12:34These arguments contain such defects as mutual contradiction, absence of the invariable concomitance
124. 12:34–12:41required for a reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence, treating an acceptable consequence
125. 12:41–12:48as a defect, supporting the opponent's contrary view, and absence of the negative concomitance
126. 12:48–12:51required for inference.
127. 12:51–12:56These defects will now be examined in detail.
128. 12:56–13:03of the defects in the foregoing arguments. Just as, of the two mutually contradictory
129. 13:03–13:10arguments, smoke is not absent from this mountain, because then fire would be absent and there
130. 13:10–13:17is no fire on this mountain, because then it would appear as possessing fire, both cannot
131. 13:17–13:23be true together and one must therefore be defective, so to the mutually contradictory
132. 13:23–13:31arguments here cannot all be valid together. The affirmation of grossness is nothing other
133. 13:31–13:38than the negation of minuteness and the affirmation of minuteness is nothing other than the negation
134. 13:38–13:45of grossness. Moreover, the invariable concomitance between the absence of the consequence and
135. 13:45–13:51the absence of the prima facie position, the basis of an argument by reversal of the
136. 13:51–13:59consequence has not been established. If that concomitance were admitted as established,
137. 13:59–14:06the reality of the concomitant terms and their substrates would also be established, the final
138. 14:06–14:13conclusion nothing exists would then cease to be true, and the dispute would end. The
139. 14:13–14:19consequence shown by the first inference while denying grossness is acceptable to us
140. 14:19–14:27on the Nya-Vaika side. We admit the absence of mutually incompatible properties in a whole
141. 14:27–14:34known in both determinate and indeterminate forms, this will be explained later.
142. 14:34–14:41The second thesis also supports our own position. The negation of minuteness produces cognition
143. 14:41–14:47of grossness and the usage of a word for a thing in the form in which it appears
144. 14:47–14:51is invariably connected with its appearing in that form.
145. 14:51–14:55The same holds of the third thesis.
146. 14:55–15:02The negation of independence in a thing produces cognition of its dependence at the same time.
147. 15:02–15:09The affirmation of independence is invariably connected with the affirmation of Eternality.
148. 15:09–15:14The consequence stated in the fourth argument is unestablished.
149. 15:14–15:22Since reality and unreality are mutually opposed, their joint negation is just as impossible
150. 15:22–15:25as their joint affirmation.
151. 15:25–15:30The fifth thesis is wholly acceptable to Danya, Vaika position.
152. 15:30–15:37In a thing regarded as many, the negation of unity produces cognition of plurality, and
153. 15:37–15:43the practice of speaking of a thing in many forms is invariably connected with its appearing
154. 15:43–15:50in many forms. The sixth thesis too is acceptable to us.
155. 15:50–15:56Objection to the reality of difference. The foregoing argument stated that if a whole
156. 15:56–16:03is many, difference would be established as the very nature of the thing. Against this,
157. 16:03–16:11the Buddhists say that the reality of difference cannot be established at all. What, after
158. 16:11–16:13After all, is this difference?
159. 16:13–16:20Is it the thing's own nature, the mutual absence of the things, or a property distinct from
160. 16:20–16:21the thing?
161. 16:21–16:25The first alternative is impossible.
162. 16:25–16:31If a thing and its own nature are one and the same, the sentence, the pot is different
163. 16:31–16:34becomes a meaningless repetition.
164. 16:34–16:42The second alternative is also impossible because cognition of difference would then depend upon
165. 16:42–16:49itself. Mutual absence cannot be known unless the counter positive object has already been
166. 16:49–16:54determined or known but knowing the counter positive as different from the difference
167. 16:54–17:02is itself cognition of difference. The third alternative likewise produces an infinite
168. 17:02–17:09rigorous. If difference is a property residing in a distinct thing and itself different from
169. 17:09–17:15that thing, then, because it is different from its own object, it cannot make that object
170. 17:15–17:21different and if it is identical with the thing, a second property of difference must
171. 17:21–17:29be admitted in order to establish its own difference. Thus an infinite series begins.
172. 17:29–17:34How then can difference ever be established?
173. 17:34–17:37Objection to the Critique of Difference.
174. 17:37–17:42Does this mean that cognition of difference never occurs?
175. 17:42–17:46Or does cognition of difference occur but is eternal?
176. 17:46–17:50Or is it momentary but costless?
177. 17:50–17:53Or is it cost but objectless?
178. 17:53–17:57Or does it have an object but one that can be sublated?
179. 17:57–18:05The first alternative is self-contradictory in every respect and deserves no answer.
180. 18:05–18:11The second conflicts with the state of dreamless sleep devoid of cognition and should therefore
181. 18:11–18:13be abandoned.
182. 18:13–18:18The third contradicts experience and is unacceptable.
183. 18:18–18:24The fourth is to be rejected for the very reason that the expression cognition of difference
184. 18:24–18:31itself indicates difference as its object, whether difference actually exists or not.
185. 18:31–18:38As for the fifth alternative, let us consider whether its object is one of the three just
186. 18:38–18:44mentioned, the nature of the object that is the substrate of difference, mutual absence,
187. 18:44–18:51or a distinct property residing in the substrate, or something different from all three.
188. 18:51–18:57If its object is different from all three, how can the defects stated above affect the fifth
189. 18:57–18:58alternative?
190. 18:58–19:06To suppose so would be an injustice like arresting a holy man for a thief's crime.
191. 19:06–19:10Defense of the first account of difference.
192. 19:10–19:16If the object of cognition of difference is one of the three alternatives above and if
193. 19:16–19:21If a property distinct from the object that is the substrate of difference is regarded
194. 19:21–19:28as the nature of difference, we need not accept an infinite series of another property of that
195. 19:28–19:33property and yet another property of that one.
196. 19:33–19:39But there is no need to abandon the original property of difference.
197. 19:39–19:44An infinite regress does not refute the first admission of a property, it merely
198. 19:44–19:51prevents the admission of an endless chain of properties, just as one fragrance does
199. 19:51–19:56not require the admission of a second fragrance within it.
200. 19:56–20:02Defense of the second account of difference. If the object of cognition of difference is
201. 20:02–20:10mutual absence, the defect of depending upon itself may be raised here as well. But
202. 20:10–20:17that defect would oppose the arising of cognition of difference, whereas such cognition is actually
203. 20:17–20:25observed to arise. It must therefore be admitted that the cause producing it is something different
204. 20:25–20:32from it. The fact that cognition of difference is not its own cause does not entail that
205. 20:32–20:40it never arises. It may be said here that this cognition is a product of ignorance and therefore
206. 20:40–20:48requires no other cause. But merely calling it a product of ignorance does not remove
207. 20:48–20:56the defect of self dependence. If it did, ordinary things such as pots and clocks too,
208. 20:56–21:02being products of ignorance, would be regarded as arising by themselves and would require
209. 21:02–21:10no causes such as a potter. It may further be said, if cognition of difference is regarded
210. 21:10–21:16as its own cause, the defect of self dependence arises, therefore its cause must be something
211. 21:16–21:24else, but because that cause cannot be clearly defined, it is called ignorance. If this
212. 21:24–21:30alone is intended, our dispute is merely about a name, what we call the cause of
213. 21:30–21:38cognition you call ignorance. In fact, this cause can be clearly defined. When the substrate
214. 21:38–21:45of a negation is not cognized as its counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not remembered
215. 21:45–21:51as the nature of the substrate of the negation, cognition of the mutual difference between
216. 21:51–21:57the counter-positive and the substrate of negation arises. In this way the cause
217. 21:57–22:02of cognition of difference can be determined.
218. 22:02–22:05Defense of the third account of difference.
219. 22:05–22:11If a thing's own nature is regarded as the object of cognition of difference, the
220. 22:11–22:17co-referential use of the word different with the word denoting the thing may be abandoned
221. 22:17–22:20as grammatically unnatural.
222. 22:20–22:27But this linguistic difficulty provides no reason to abandon the reality of difference.
223. 22:27–22:35Is the co-referential use of the word different with a word denoting an object never accepted?
224. 22:35–22:38It is accepted, but only in a special context.
225. 22:38–22:42It is not natural everyday usage.
226. 22:42–22:49No sensible person, when asking for a pot or directing someone to look at a cloth, uses
227. 22:49–22:51the word different.
228. 22:51–22:57Yet just as the co-referential sentence, a pot is a jar may be uttered to instruct
229. 22:57–23:04someone who does not understand that the words, pot and jar are synonymous, so the sentence,
230. 23:04–23:10the pot is different may be uttered to instruct someone who does not understand the pot's
231. 23:10–23:13distinctive nature.
232. 23:13–23:16There is no defect in such usage.
233. 23:16–23:19The final view concerning difference.
234. 23:19–23:26Although all three conceptions of difference have been defended, what is the final truth?
235. 23:26–23:33The answer is that all three forms are valid according to the nature of the thing.
236. 23:33–23:38For example, in the cognition, the cloth is different from the pot.
237. 23:38–23:45The cloth appears not to be the same as the pot, appears in a form other than the pot,
238. 23:45–23:50and appears to possess a generic property that is absent from the pot.
239. 23:50–23:57These are respectively difference as the things own nature, mutual absence and difference in
240. 23:57–24:00the form of a distinct property.
241. 24:00–24:07Of these three, only the first form occurs in the category of absence because no further
242. 24:07–24:14absence or property such as a universal can be admitted to reside in an absence.
243. 24:14–24:18In the three categories of reality universal,
244. 24:18–24:25Articularity and Inherence, the first two forms of difference are available because no other
245. 24:25–24:30property resides in them, the third form does not occur.
246. 24:30–24:37In the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action, all three forms of difference
247. 24:37–24:38apply.
248. 24:38–24:46Thus one says, this is cloth, not a pot, and this is an object woven from threads.
249. 24:46–24:51This is smell, not color, and it is fragrant.
250. 24:51–24:57This is motion, not upward throwing, and it is oblique motion.
251. 24:57–25:06Difference as intrinsic nature is defined as a things appearing in its own form and not in another form.
252. 25:06–25:15Mutual absence is defined as being the object of an indifeasible negative cognition produced by a negative expression used
253. 25:15–25:20co-referentially with the word denoting the substrate of negation.
254. 25:20–25:32Difference or opposition grounded in nature is defined as incompatibility of natures, that is, the inability of to mutually opposed properties to coexist.
255. 25:32–25:36All forms of difference should be understood in this manner.
256. 25:36–25:40Defense of the Seventh Thesis
257. 25:40–25:44The seventh thesis above is wholly acceptable.
258. 25:44–25:50The denial of all-pervasiveness in a whole produces cognition of its limited extension.
259. 25:50–25:56Moreover, all-pervasiveness is invariably connected with immobility.
260. 25:56–26:00Partial acceptance of the Eighth Thesis
261. 26:00–26:06The eighth thesis is acceptable with the qualification in some contexts.
262. 26:06–26:13A property is predicated of one substrate precisely because it is not predicated of another,
263. 26:13–26:17and in this sense it is not all-pervasive.
264. 26:17–26:22But can it be said that the property is nowhere predictable?
265. 26:22–26:23No.
266. 26:23–26:29There is no basis of invariable concomitance for such an assertion.
267. 26:29–26:35On the contrary, limited existence and universal non-predicability are opposed.
268. 26:35–26:42There is no concomitance such that whatever is non-pervasive is nowhere predictable.
269. 26:42–26:48To be non-pervasive means to exist in some places, whereas according to the Buddhist,
270. 26:48–26:53to be nowhere predictable means to be non-existent everywhere.
271. 26:53–26:57These two are in fact mutually opposed.
272. 26:57–27:01Objection to the foregoing and its refutation.
273. 27:01–27:06But how can a thing that is by nature affirmable also be negatable?
274. 27:06–27:12The answer is that what is opposed to affirmability is a negative property,
275. 27:12–27:17not being the object or counter-positive of a negation.
276. 27:17–27:21But how is the negation of an existent thing possible?
277. 27:21–27:25There is no defect in admitting it.
278. 27:25–27:30Would this not make existence and non-existence mutually compatible?
279. 27:30–27:32No.
280. 27:32–27:38If existence and non-existence are viewed with reference to different loci or contexts,
281. 27:38–27:41no defect arises.
282. 27:41–27:49No one accepts both the existence and non-existence of the same thing in the same locus and context,
283. 27:49–27:53therefore the charge of contradiction cannot be raised against us.
284. 27:54–28:01In this manner, the apparent opposition of existence and non-existence in certain situations
285. 28:01–28:06can be removed by viewing them with reference to different temporal loci.
286. 28:06–28:12Another objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation.
287. 28:12–28:24Let the reality of a whole then be refuted by the objection based upon the simultaneous presence of mutually opposed properties such as knowledge and ignorance.
288. 28:24–28:28No opposition is not established here.
289. 28:28–28:42The fact is that there is no experience in which an object known by a particular person at a particular place and time remains unknown to that very person at the same place and time.
290. 28:42–28:46Nor does anyone maintain such a view.
291. 28:46–28:53But is it not the case that one part of an object is known while another part remains unknown?
292. 28:53–28:55Yes.
293. 28:55–29:04This means only that while the whole object is known, some of its parts are known and others remain unknown.
294. 29:04–29:16Such a statement follows the common linguistic practice of transferring an affirmation or negation made with respect to the substantive onto its qualifiers.
295. 29:16–29:21In reality, knowledge and ignorance are properties of the parts,
296. 29:21–29:28but the Buddhist transfers them to the whole and presents the foregoing undesirable consequence.
297. 29:28–29:34A second objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation.
298. 29:34–29:43The same answer also resolves the alleged contradiction that one part of a whole is covered while another is uncovered.
299. 29:43–29:48Yet the question remains, when some of its parts are covered,
300. 29:48–29:56why does the entire grossly extended hole not appear exactly as it does when no part is covered?
301. 29:56–30:02The answer is that such a possibility cannot be admitted at all.
302. 30:02–30:08The particular dimension of a limited part is different from the dimension of the whole
303. 30:08–30:15and the causal conditions producing cognition of that limited dimension are also specific.
304. 30:15–30:24When those causal conditions are absent, the limited dimension is not known even though the whole is cognized.
305. 30:24–30:29A third objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation.
306. 30:29–30:36Since the coexistence of mutually opposed properties in a whole has been shown to be unestablished,
307. 30:36–30:43The simultaneous presence of motion and rest in that same object is also unestablished.
308. 30:44–30:51When, because of a difference in causal conditions, motion arises only in certain particular parts
309. 30:51–30:59of the entire object, the whole as a whole remains at rest. But if so, will the moving
310. 30:59–31:05and stationary parts not become separated from one another? When their conjunction
311. 31:05–31:13is destroyed, will the entire whole not also be destroyed? Let it be so. But is this not
312. 31:13–31:21contrary to your original view? No, in some situations we accept such a result. Then you
313. 31:21–31:29must accept it in every situation. Let us accept that, but how does it affect the reality
314. 31:29–31:31of the whole.
315. 31:31–31:37We do not hold that every motion of a part necessarily produces a distinction opposed
316. 31:37–31:42to the conjunction by which the whole is constituted.
317. 31:42–31:47Only when certain specific causes operate does a particular kind of motion produce
318. 31:47–31:52the distinction that becomes the cause of the whole's destruction.
319. 31:52–31:57Objection to the foregoing answer and its refutation.
320. 31:57–32:03This same answer refutes the following argument, if the palm moves, the atoms constituting the
321. 32:03–32:05palm also move.
322. 32:05–32:12Consequently, those atoms will become separated from the stationary arm and its atoms.
323. 32:12–32:18Then, according to the rule that whatever acquires conjunction or disjunction from
324. 32:18–32:24something also acquires conjunction or disjunction with the whole produced from that thing,
325. 32:24–32:29The arm and palm will become separated from each other.
326. 32:29–32:35When their conjunction is destroyed, the entire body will be destroyed.
327. 32:35–32:41But the motion of the palm's atoms does not necessarily produce distinction between
328. 32:41–32:44the arm and those atoms.
329. 32:44–32:49Is not failure to produce distinction contrary to the nature of motion, since motion is
330. 32:49–32:52held to be a cause of distinction?
331. 32:52–32:54No.
332. 32:54–33:00The nature of motion is established by its producing distinction from regions of space
333. 33:00–33:02traversed by the moving limb.
334. 33:02–33:08A similar situation is observed in motion produced by impact.
335. 33:08–33:13Why, however, do motions differ in this way?
336. 33:13–33:18Because it has already been stated that the causes producing a motion destructive
337. 33:18–33:21of an effect are specific.
338. 33:21–33:28But if the hole can remain at rest even while its parts move, then the hole will be neither
339. 33:28–33:35conjoined with nor disjoint from those regions of space with which its parts become conjoined
340. 33:35–33:37or disjoint.
341. 33:37–33:38No.
342. 33:38–33:44The conjunction and disjunction of the produced hole arise from the conjunctions and disjunctions
343. 33:44–33:46of its parts.
344. 33:46–33:53To understand the nature of this process properly, one must study the vayika doctrine.
345. 33:53–33:59But according to this view, even while the parts on which the whole rests are moving,
346. 33:59–34:02the whole should appear stationary.
347. 34:02–34:06Yes, this is not unacceptable to us.
348. 34:06–34:13When only the hand trembles, the entire body is not observed to tremble.
349. 34:13–34:20objections to the foregoing view and their refutation. Or rather, the fact is that when
350. 34:20–34:27the support in which a stationary object appears to be located moves, that object too is experienced
351. 34:27–34:35as if moving as in the case of a face seen in a mirror or the moon reflected in water.
352. 34:35–34:42When the mirror or water moves, the stationary face or moon appears to move. Let us therefore
353. 34:42–34:49abandon this pointless dispute here. But if the motion of the support is superimposed
354. 34:49–34:56upon the supported object, why does the entire whole not always appear to move? When the
355. 34:56–35:03parts on all sides move, the entire object also appears to move, there is no defect in
356. 35:03–35:11admitting this. When the parts do not move, how can the whole appear to move? But some
357. 35:11–35:17Some parts move while others remain at rest, the body supported upon them should then appear
358. 35:17–35:25both moving and stationary at once, just as the moon reflected in water appears both moving
359. 35:25–35:26and stationary.
360. 35:26–35:34Yes, this is possible if there is fragmentation among the supports of the parts.
361. 35:34–35:40The illusion of two moons does not arise in one uniformly still reservoir.
362. 35:40–35:47The same moon appears moving in flowing water and stationary in still water.
363. 35:47–35:52But does not the moon appear in thousands of forms in water?
364. 35:52–35:59Yes, precisely because the waves break the uniformity of the water.
365. 35:59–36:02Objection to the foregoing and its refutation.
366. 36:02–36:08Then limbs such as the hand and the body, though mutually conjoined, should be capable
367. 36:08–36:15of existing unconjoined because the body remains at rest even when the hand moves.
368. 36:15–36:23No. The Buddhists themselves do not accept the concomitance that, of to mutually conjoined
369. 36:23–36:29things, the movement of one while the other remains at rest establishes their unconjoined
370. 36:29–36:38existence. How then, can they derive an undesirable consequence from this? When a consequence
371. 36:38–36:46is raised as a reduction, the underlying concomitance must at least be accepted by the opponent.
372. 36:46–36:51But the non-Buddhist side does not accept this concomitance either.
373. 36:51–36:58Is this concomitance not observed in the example of wet cloth and water?
374. 36:58–37:04Water dripping from the cloth moves while the cloth remains at rest and once separated
375. 37:04–37:06the two exist unconjoined.
376. 37:06–37:13Yes, but the opposite is observed in the example of threads and cloth.
377. 37:13–37:19Though their motions differ, cloth cannot exist apart from the threads.
378. 37:19–37:25Could this conjoined existence be merely illusory and not actually true?
379. 37:25–37:31Then why should the unconjoined existence in the example of cloth and water be accepted
380. 37:31–37:33as true?
381. 37:33–37:40If the reason is that cognition of their unconjoined existence is indifeasable there, no cognition
382. 37:40–37:47obstructs the admission of the conjoined existence of threads and cloth either.
383. 37:47–37:54Therefore some other proof opposed to this conjoined existence must be offered.
384. 37:54–37:59Should the motion of the parts and the rest of the whole be regarded as opposed to the
385. 37:59–38:06the conjoined existence of threads and cloth. The reverse may equally be said, the motion
386. 38:06–38:14of the parts and the rest of the whole sublate the unconjoined existence of part and whole.
387. 38:14–38:20Objection to the refutation and its refutation. But is not the presence and absence of red
388. 38:20–38:28color in different parts of a whole opposed to its unity? No. In such a situation
389. 38:28–38:36In the cognition, the entire object is red is illusory, such a hole is not in fact red.
390. 38:36–38:41Then will the presence in different parts of conjunction with the substance that produces
391. 38:41–38:48red color and the absence of that conjunction not be opposed to the nature of the hole?
392. 38:48–38:49No.
393. 38:49–38:55If the hole is regarded as a collection of atoms, the possibility of this contradiction
394. 38:55–39:03has already been refuted. But what is the answer in the Vijnavdeen view, which does not admit
395. 39:03–39:10atoms distinct from consciousness? There to the same answer applies on the basis of the
396. 39:10–39:18distinct loci determining redness and non-redness. Difference of locus removes the contradiction.
397. 39:18–39:25If red and non-red are regarded as mutually opposed even when residing in different loci,
398. 39:25–39:32the invariable concomitance between variegation and the coexistence of these two opposed properties
399. 39:32–39:39cannot be established because conjunction and its absence can never coexist.
400. 39:39–39:46But if that concomitance is regarded as established, one must accept the coexistence of conjunction
401. 39:46–39:53and absence of conjunction without contradiction because of the difference of locus.
402. 39:53–39:59Would the reality of conjunction be abandoned because, unlike other things, it coexists
403. 39:59–40:01with its opposed absence?
404. 40:01–40:03No.
405. 40:03–40:09If this were done, all other things too would have to be abandoned, because unlike conjunction
406. 40:09–40:15they do not coexist with their opposed absences.
407. 40:15–40:19Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its refutation.
408. 40:19–40:26Get the elimination of all things then be accepted as proper, so that absolute emptiness may
409. 40:26–40:28be established.
410. 40:28–40:34But a thing can be eliminated or rejected only when some property is established in it that
411. 40:34–40:39is necessarily incompatible with every real thing.
412. 40:39–40:46If a thing possesses a property that excludes unreal things, that very fact establishes
413. 40:46–40:47its reality.
414. 40:47–40:54Moreover, the negation of a thing is impossible without cognition of the thing negated.
415. 40:54–41:00Is not a hare's horn negated through an imagined cognition of it?
416. 41:00–41:04No, this view has already been refuted.
417. 41:04–41:09If conjunction is called unreal and imagined without any reason,
418. 41:09–41:14anything whatever may be called unreal in the same way.
419. 41:14–41:24The reason for regarding a hair's horn as unreal does not apply to conjunction because conjunction is both knowable and known.
420. 41:24–41:40If conjunction is regarded as non-existent merely because it is different from other things, ignorance of it would depend upon its non-existence and its non-existence upon ignorance of it, producing circularity.
421. 41:40–41:45Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation.
422. 41:45–41:55Can it not be held that, just as recognition of phonemes is explained by taking the universal property of sound as its real object,
423. 41:55–42:05so a cognition that appears to have conjunction as its object may be explained without accepting the reality of conjunction or its objecthood
424. 42:05–42:11and then the unreality of conjunction may be established from its non-cognition?
425. 42:11–42:12No.
426. 42:12–42:19If a cognition that purports to apprehend an object is not assigned an appropriate real object
427. 42:19–42:25or if its experience is not connected with the corresponding property as its object
428. 42:25–42:33and is simply declared illusory, an inference directly opposed to such cognition can be constructed.
429. 42:33–42:41Someone might then infer that fire is cold despite directly experiencing its heat.
430. 42:41–42:48An appropriate object in the form of a universal property is available for the recognition of phonemes,
431. 42:48–42:57but there is no other appropriate object capable of taking the place of conjunction for the cognition of conjunction.
432. 42:57–43:03If this rule for determining the real object of cognition is not accepted,
433. 43:03–43:08the Buddhist's own cognition of invariable concomitance between variegation
434. 43:08–43:15and the alleged coexistence of mutually opposed properties may likewise be declared erroneous
435. 43:15–43:19and explained without accepting any real object for it.
436. 43:19–43:26Unless this difficulty is overcome, how can a reduction lacking concomitance proceed?
437. 43:26–43:33Therefore, just as with cognitions of other objects, the reality of conjunction as the
438. 43:33–43:38object of the cognition of conjunction must be accepted.
439. 43:38–43:44Effects such as the production of sound from conjunction and the crushing of objects establish
440. 43:44–43:46its reality.
441. 43:46–43:52There is no ground for regarding this cognition as illusory.
442. 43:52–43:59objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation. Let the contradiction then be that
443. 43:59–44:07the same object is both situated and not situated in a place. No, this does not satisfy the
444. 44:07–44:14definition of contradiction. When an object's conjunction with one place is admitted, its
445. 44:14–44:21conjunction with another place is denied, here not being in that place means being
446. 44:21–44:28being situated in another place. Certainly, being situated and not situated in the very
447. 44:28–44:36same place are mutually opposed, but who accepts both together? Can it not be said that perception
448. 44:36–44:42apprehending an object's conjunction with one substrate excludes its conjunction with
449. 44:42–44:48another substrate, and through this exclusion manifests a contradiction generated by the
450. 44:48–44:55denial of conjunction with the first substrate. This would be so only if perception of an
451. 44:55–45:03object as conjoined with one substrate necessarily denied its conjunction with every other substrate.
452. 45:03–45:11But in fact it does not. A perception apprehending one object as conjoined with many things
453. 45:11–45:18if regarded as exclusionary, would either exclude conjunction with all things, exclude
454. 45:18–45:22no conjunction, or exclude its own object.
455. 45:22–45:29Under none of these alternatives, thus perception manifest any contradiction.
456. 45:29–45:35After all, the Buddhists to admit that one atom is simultaneously conjoint with many
457. 45:35–45:37atoms.
458. 45:37–45:44refutation of another objection above. This same answer refutes the objection concerning
459. 45:44–45:52how a whole resides in its parts. The existence of a whole in its parts is exactly like the
460. 45:52–45:59existence of one atom among other atoms or its conjunction with them.
461. 45:59–46:05The next objection. Let the contradiction then consist in the coexistence of different
462. 46:05–46:13colors in a multicolored object. Such an object cannot have one color because then it would
463. 46:13–46:20not be multicolored. Nor can its colors be many because many colors cannot reside by
464. 46:20–46:27inheritance in the same whole if the substrate is one the dependent colors should be one.
465. 46:27–46:34Moreover, if the colors are many they cannot pervade the entire whole because all the
466. 46:34–46:39The colors are not observed in every part of the object.
467. 46:39–46:45Nor can the many colors be non-pervasive, if so, they would become properties residing
468. 46:45–46:50in the same substrate together with their own absences.
469. 46:50–46:58If despite such a nature, many colors can coexist with their own absences, the distinction
470. 46:58–47:02between opposition and non-opposition disappears.
471. 47:02–47:10Or can the whole be utterly colorless, for then its perceptibility would be endangered?
472. 47:10–47:12Refutation of the Objection
473. 47:12–47:18If the foregoing contradiction rests upon the assumption that multicoloredness is an aggregate
474. 47:18–47:25of many colors, or that many mutually opposed properties are present in a single color,
475. 47:25–47:31so that multicolor cannot be one, we have no objection to the reasoning.
476. 47:31–47:39But we do not hold such an assumption. Multicolourdness is not multiplicity, if it were, a collection
477. 47:39–47:47of many white objects would also appear multicoloured. Nor is it the inheritance of mutually opposed
478. 47:47–47:53qualities in one object, because the mutual opposition of the qualities itself makes
479. 47:53–48:02such inheritance impossible. In fact, multicolourdness, like buneus and the rest is a special generic
480. 48:02–48:10property. It appears in a whole when different kinds of colors occur in its different parts.
481. 48:10–48:16It does not appear in a whole all of whose parts have the same color. For this very
482. 48:16–48:24reason, a minute hole composed of 3 atoms, though in reality multicolored, is not known
483. 48:24–48:32as multicolored, because its parts are imperceptible. This answer explains why a hole with a monochrome
484. 48:32–48:40surface does not appear multicolored on that surface. But if the hole itself is multicolored,
485. 48:40–48:45Why does it appear white because of a white surface?
486. 48:45–48:50Because in that situation the color of the surface or parts is superimposed upon the
487. 48:50–48:56entire hole and the hole appears to possess that color.
488. 48:56–49:02For this same reason, where the colors of the parts are not visible, as in a minute
489. 49:02–49:08hole composed of 3 atoms, the color of the external light is superimposed upon the
490. 49:08–49:16hole and it appears stunning. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation.
491. 49:16–49:22If multicolourness is a special property, why does multicolourness appear when many objects
492. 49:22–49:28of different colors are assembled together, although no new hole composed of differently
493. 49:28–49:35coloured parts has arisen there? The answer is that if multicolourd means one object
494. 49:35–49:42produced from parts of different colors, a collection of separate one yard pieces of differently
495. 49:42–49:50colored cloth cannot be called multicolored. But no one will deny the use of the word multicolored
496. 49:50–49:59for that collection in the second sense of many kinds of objects. The word is polysmos.
497. 49:59–50:04But when objects of different colors are placed near one another without producing any
498. 50:04–50:11Any new object, thus cognition of multicolourness in the first sense not arise?
499. 50:11–50:17It does, but its cause is the illusion that a new object of varied colours has a rise
500. 50:17–50:19in there.
501. 50:19–50:26This is like the appearance that a new vast magnitude has a rise in when many heats of
502. 50:26–50:29grain are placed close together.
503. 50:29–50:36A new objection to the reality of a hole based on the denial of atoms and its refutation.
504. 50:36–50:42Let the hole then be abandoned because the atoms from which it would be composed do not
505. 50:42–50:44themselves exist.
506. 50:44–50:51The question is this, when one atom is conjoined with many other atoms, does it join them
507. 50:51–50:55through some of its parts or in its entirety?
508. 50:55–50:58There is no third alternative.
509. 50:58–51:05The first is impossible because an atom is partless, if it had parts, it would no longer be an
510. 51:05–51:07atom.
511. 51:07–51:14The second is also impossible, once it has become wholly conjoint with one atom, it cannot
512. 51:14–51:17be conjoint with another.
513. 51:17–51:24A thing wholly located in only one place cannot at the same time be located in another place
514. 51:24–51:25as well.
515. 51:25–51:34refutation of the objection. No, this objection is improper. The conjunction of atoms is exactly
516. 51:34–51:41analogous to the relation of cognition to its objects. One may ask, does a cognition that
517. 51:41–51:48apprehends real or unreal objects or assumes their forms, do so in its entirety or through
518. 51:48–51:56some of its parts. The first alternative is impossible. If cognition wholly apprehended
519. 51:56–52:04one object, the same cognition could not assume the forms of both blue and yellow. A cognition
520. 52:04–52:10wholly absorbed in the blue object or blue form cannot also be absorbed in the yellow
521. 52:10–52:18object or yellow form. The second alternative too is impossible because cognition has no
522. 52:18–52:27parts. What then prevents us from regarding cognition as formless and objectless? We accept
523. 52:27–52:34this. Very well, but does this mean that the known object is false or that nothing is
524. 52:34–52:43known? The first alternative will not work. Even if blue, yellow and the like are regarded
525. 52:43–52:50as non-existent, the question remains how they are cognized. The whole cognition cannot apprehend
526. 52:50–52:57blue because then yellow and the rest would remain unknown and no part of cognition can
527. 52:57–53:04apprehend it because cognition has been admitted to be partless. The second alternative is
528. 53:04–53:12also impossible. If nothing appears, nothing exists, how then could the very question
529. 53:12–53:17arise whether an object is wholly or partially present?
530. 53:17–53:21Defense of the objection and its refutation.
531. 53:21–53:24Let the answer then be this.
532. 53:24–53:32Whole means everything without leaving anything over, while part means a portion of some complete
533. 53:32–53:34thing or collection.
534. 53:34–53:39Cognition is not an aggregate but a unitary entity.
535. 53:39–53:46How then can the question of partial or total apprehension by cognition be raised?
536. 53:46–53:52And how can the assertion that cognition neither apprehends an object nor assumes its form be
537. 53:52–53:54maintained?
538. 53:54–54:01If it is said that no other mode of apprehension can be conceived, the answer is that cognition
539. 54:01–54:05apprehends its object through its own nature.
540. 54:05–54:06Excellent.
541. 54:06–54:13This clever member of the fraternity of logicians has at last stated the truth.
542. 54:13–54:20Out of mere envy of us he had concealed the correct answer for so long and the same answer
543. 54:20–54:24applies equally to atoms.
544. 54:24–54:29Refutation of an earlier objection to the reality of a whole.
545. 54:29–54:36This answer also refutes the alleged contradiction of being and not being in the same place.
546. 54:36–54:42For example, it may be held that a perception having the form of blue excludes the forms
547. 54:42–54:48of yellow and the rest, because the presence of the yellow form is connected with the
548. 54:48–54:54absence of the blue form, which is held to be denied by cognition.
549. 54:54–54:59The question will then arise, how can the same cognition simultaneously possess
550. 54:59–55:04the many forms of blue, yellow, and the rest?
551. 55:04–55:10This question is analogous to the question concerning the alleged coexistence of existence
552. 55:10–55:15and non-existence in the same place in the case of a whole.
553. 55:15–55:21The Buddhist may answer this question as follows, the difficulty would arise only if being
554. 55:21–55:27blue-formed were invariably connected with not being yellow-formed.
555. 55:27–55:28But it is not.
556. 55:28–55:35A cognition bearing both blue and yellow forms is known as a single cognition.
557. 55:35–55:42If each cognition were necessarily confined to only one form, collective cognition of
558. 55:42–55:45many objects would never arise.
559. 55:45–55:49The same result applies to atoms and holes.
560. 55:49–55:56It is not the case that one atom conjoined with many other atoms or one hole inhering
561. 55:56–56:04in many parts is not known as one entity. If it were so, cognition of the relation of
562. 56:04–56:12one thing to many things could never arise. Thus the consequence is the same in both cases.
563. 56:12–56:18The fact that the state of cognition differs from that of an atom or a hole produces no
564. 56:18–56:20useful result here.

Plain text

CONCLUSION OF THE FORGOING DISCUSION Such are the established general rules and practices. If the Buddhists proceeded by the proper method of proof, their doctrine could never arise at all. In negative theses such as, Nothing exists, Nothing is real, Nothing is an agent, Nothing is rational, Nothing is the object of anything, anything, there is no philosophy, and there is no doctrine, self-contradiction is difficult to avoid. If a doctrine is maintained, that doctrine itself cannot occur, if it occurs, it is not real, produces no result, is not rational, its cognition has no object, its result is no doctrine, and its meaning is no tenet. affirming these theses yields precisely such undesirable consequences. Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its refutation. The Buddhists may say, we accept all these undesirable conclusions. No mere acceptance does not remove self-contradiction. If nothing exists, how can the meaning of the thesis be known, When the thesis itself is included among the things it negates. If the thesis is not included among the things negated, how is it rational? If the thesis is irrational, how can its meaning be rational? It resembles a female serpent that bites itself with its own venom and falls unconscious. Defense of the objection and its refutation. Can the foregoing defect not be removed by restricting the negation in the thesis with the qualifier in reality? Perhaps, but what is this reality? Is it rational inquiry or a transcendence of ordinary practice? The first alternative has already been refuted. If inquiry itself, being in the form of the thesis, is real, the thesis nothing is real is refuted by the reality of the inquiry. Like a Mongoose killed by its own offspring, the inquiry will be destroyed by its own result. The same self-contradiction occurs under the second alternative, like an object outrunning its own shadow. If ordinary practice is transcended, no determinate inquiry is possible. If determinate inquiry exists, ordinary practice has not been transcended. Further development of the foregoing refutation. In these theses, whether the counter-positive of the negation is real or unreal, contradiction follows. If it is real, it cannot be wholly negated, if it is unreal, its negation is impossible because the counter-positive does not exist. Is mere general cognition of the thing denied sufficient for its negation, without requiring its reality? Yes, but then the existence of the thing denied has already been established. Nothing is established in any other way. Is general cognition or practical usage never indefeasible? i.e., can it be falsified? It may be falsified in one context, but not in another. Cognition of silver in nacre is sublated, whereas cognition of real silver is true. Is general cognition sublated everywhere because nothing is real? Then we ask, is that cognition sublated by another valid cognition which depends upon the first cognition for its own validity, by one that does not so depend, or by a false cognition? The first is impossible, an inference that a thing is not cold does not ordinarily sublate the perception of its heat, because without knowledge of heat its contrary or absence cannot be known. The second alternative is impossible. For without cognition of the counter-positive there can be no valid opposing cognition of its negation. Under the third alternative, because the sublating cognition is itself false, the original thesis may sublate the supposed sublator instead of being sublated by it. The Buddhist began the discussion by proving the falsity of everything through valid cognition, but ended by accepting universal sublation through false cognition. Completion of the refutation The foregoing sublation through invalid cognition has not been properly defended either. What is false cognition? Is it a spontaneously arising perception or merely some undesirable consequence? If the first, the Buddhist must admit perception to be true, and since there is no perception that negates the world, the doctrine remains unestablished. If the second, ordinary practice is violated, because a merely undesirable possibility does not make anything false. Moreover, an opponent may simply refuse to accept the Buddhist's undesirable consequence and oppose it. refutation of the reasons in negation-oriented inferences. The foregoing refutation also disposes of the various reasons employed in many negation-oriented inferences. Those inferences and their reasons are as follows, nothing exists because it is known like the snake appearing in a rope. Nothing is true because it is cognition like the illusory cognition of a snake in a rope. Nothing is an agent or active because it is unreal like a hare's horn. Nothing is rational because it cannot be determined like a face reflected in a mirror. No object of cognition is real because it is merely imagined like a dream. There is no act called seeing. Because if there is no object to be seen, the act of seeing also cannot exist, just as cutting is impossible when there is nothing to be cut. And there is no doctrine, because every so-called doctrine is opposed by another doctrine, just as drying heat and wetting water are mutually opposed. The reasons in all these inferences necessarily entail a conclusion opposite to the very conclusion they seek to prove, at the same time, they presuppose the truth of the opponent whom their assertions deny. The reasons in the first and second inferences are deviant, because the inferences produced by them are themselves something and are themselves cognitions. If the inference were nothing, the reason would be fruitless. The third and fourth reasons are unestablished because the reality and determinate nature of things have already been established. The fifth reason is deviant like the first and second because the inference it produces has its own object the inferred entity. The sixth reason is unestablished, self contradictory and deviant. The active character of seeing has already been established, cognitiveity is itself the act of cognition or seeing, and the view there is no philosophy is itself a philosophy. The seventh reason too is unestablished and deviant. There is no contradiction in accepting one doctrine, because the opposed doctrine may may be regarded as invalid, moreover, the denial of all doctrines is itself a doctrine. Finally, since things are real, all these inferences also suffer from the absence of the probandom in the subject. Refutation of all the examples given in the inferences. Because of the foregoing criticism, the examples given in these inferences also become unacceptable. They are a snake appearing in a rope, green cognition, a hare's horn, a face reflected in a mirror, cutting when there is nothing to be cut, drying fire and wetting water and so forth. The very grounds by which we know the unreality of the snake in the rope, the falsity of the cognition of the snake, the inactivity of a hare's horn, The irrationality of the face reflected in a mirror, the objectlessness of dream cognition, and the impossibility of cutting when there is nothing to be cut also make known the reality of the rope. The truth of the cognition that distinguishes the rope from the snake, the causal efficacy of the cow with respect to horns and of the hurray with. two years, the true nature of the mirror, the possession of objects by cognitions different from dreams, the reality of the cut object whenever cutting occurs, and the reality of the object of cognition. Were this not so, every example would be devoid of the probandom, unreality, falsity, and so forth, for if reality exists nowhere, unreality too cannot exist. In the final example above, the reason itself is absent. The mutual opposition of doctrines has the form of mutual absence, whereas the opposition of fire and water has the form of the relation between destroyer and destroyed. The merely superficial similarity of the words, opposition, and destruction cannot establish the inference above. The Buddhist argument refuting the reality of a whole. Let there then be a debate in which the Buddhist and his opponent point out defects in each other's views. Very well, let us see how such a debate proceeds. To refute the opponent's view, the Buddhist may argue as follows, what is called real cannot be gross in size because then incompatible properties would not be absent from it. Nor can it be minute in size because then it would appear only as minute. It cannot be independent of another because then it would be eternal. Nor can it be dependent upon another, because then it would be neither real nor unreal, if real and dependent, its cause could not produce it because it would already exist, and if unreal, no cause could ever bring it into existence. It cannot be one, because then it would not appear in many forms like the collection of a substance and its many qualities. Nor can it be many, because then its nature would appear fragmented and manifold. It cannot be all-pervasive, because then it would be motionless. Nor can it be non-pervasive, because then it could not be known as real, the same thing cannot be both existent and non-existent at the same time. These arguments contain such defects as mutual contradiction, absence of the invariable concomitance required for a reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence, treating an acceptable consequence as a defect, supporting the opponent's contrary view, and absence of the negative concomitance required for inference. These defects will now be examined in detail. of the defects in the foregoing arguments. Just as, of the two mutually contradictory arguments, smoke is not absent from this mountain, because then fire would be absent and there is no fire on this mountain, because then it would appear as possessing fire, both cannot be true together and one must therefore be defective, so to the mutually contradictory arguments here cannot all be valid together. The affirmation of grossness is nothing other than the negation of minuteness and the affirmation of minuteness is nothing other than the negation of grossness. Moreover, the invariable concomitance between the absence of the consequence and the absence of the prima facie position, the basis of an argument by reversal of the consequence has not been established. If that concomitance were admitted as established, the reality of the concomitant terms and their substrates would also be established, the final conclusion nothing exists would then cease to be true, and the dispute would end. The consequence shown by the first inference while denying grossness is acceptable to us on the Nya-Vaika side. We admit the absence of mutually incompatible properties in a whole known in both determinate and indeterminate forms, this will be explained later. The second thesis also supports our own position. The negation of minuteness produces cognition of grossness and the usage of a word for a thing in the form in which it appears is invariably connected with its appearing in that form. The same holds of the third thesis. The negation of independence in a thing produces cognition of its dependence at the same time. The affirmation of independence is invariably connected with the affirmation of Eternality. The consequence stated in the fourth argument is unestablished. Since reality and unreality are mutually opposed, their joint negation is just as impossible as their joint affirmation. The fifth thesis is wholly acceptable to Danya, Vaika position. In a thing regarded as many, the negation of unity produces cognition of plurality, and the practice of speaking of a thing in many forms is invariably connected with its appearing in many forms. The sixth thesis too is acceptable to us. Objection to the reality of difference. The foregoing argument stated that if a whole is many, difference would be established as the very nature of the thing. Against this, the Buddhists say that the reality of difference cannot be established at all. What, after After all, is this difference? Is it the thing's own nature, the mutual absence of the things, or a property distinct from the thing? The first alternative is impossible. If a thing and its own nature are one and the same, the sentence, the pot is different becomes a meaningless repetition. The second alternative is also impossible because cognition of difference would then depend upon itself. Mutual absence cannot be known unless the counter positive object has already been determined or known but knowing the counter positive as different from the difference is itself cognition of difference. The third alternative likewise produces an infinite rigorous. If difference is a property residing in a distinct thing and itself different from that thing, then, because it is different from its own object, it cannot make that object different and if it is identical with the thing, a second property of difference must be admitted in order to establish its own difference. Thus an infinite series begins. How then can difference ever be established? Objection to the Critique of Difference. Does this mean that cognition of difference never occurs? Or does cognition of difference occur but is eternal? Or is it momentary but costless? Or is it cost but objectless? Or does it have an object but one that can be sublated? The first alternative is self-contradictory in every respect and deserves no answer. The second conflicts with the state of dreamless sleep devoid of cognition and should therefore be abandoned. The third contradicts experience and is unacceptable. The fourth is to be rejected for the very reason that the expression cognition of difference itself indicates difference as its object, whether difference actually exists or not. As for the fifth alternative, let us consider whether its object is one of the three just mentioned, the nature of the object that is the substrate of difference, mutual absence, or a distinct property residing in the substrate, or something different from all three. If its object is different from all three, how can the defects stated above affect the fifth alternative? To suppose so would be an injustice like arresting a holy man for a thief's crime. Defense of the first account of difference. If the object of cognition of difference is one of the three alternatives above and if If a property distinct from the object that is the substrate of difference is regarded as the nature of difference, we need not accept an infinite series of another property of that property and yet another property of that one. But there is no need to abandon the original property of difference. An infinite regress does not refute the first admission of a property, it merely prevents the admission of an endless chain of properties, just as one fragrance does not require the admission of a second fragrance within it. Defense of the second account of difference. If the object of cognition of difference is mutual absence, the defect of depending upon itself may be raised here as well. But that defect would oppose the arising of cognition of difference, whereas such cognition is actually observed to arise. It must therefore be admitted that the cause producing it is something different from it. The fact that cognition of difference is not its own cause does not entail that it never arises. It may be said here that this cognition is a product of ignorance and therefore requires no other cause. But merely calling it a product of ignorance does not remove the defect of self dependence. If it did, ordinary things such as pots and clocks too, being products of ignorance, would be regarded as arising by themselves and would require no causes such as a potter. It may further be said, if cognition of difference is regarded as its own cause, the defect of self dependence arises, therefore its cause must be something else, but because that cause cannot be clearly defined, it is called ignorance. If this alone is intended, our dispute is merely about a name, what we call the cause of cognition you call ignorance. In fact, this cause can be clearly defined. When the substrate of a negation is not cognized as its counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not remembered as the nature of the substrate of the negation, cognition of the mutual difference between the counter-positive and the substrate of negation arises. In this way the cause of cognition of difference can be determined. Defense of the third account of difference. If a thing's own nature is regarded as the object of cognition of difference, the co-referential use of the word different with the word denoting the thing may be abandoned as grammatically unnatural. But this linguistic difficulty provides no reason to abandon the reality of difference. Is the co-referential use of the word different with a word denoting an object never accepted? It is accepted, but only in a special context. It is not natural everyday usage. No sensible person, when asking for a pot or directing someone to look at a cloth, uses the word different. Yet just as the co-referential sentence, a pot is a jar may be uttered to instruct someone who does not understand that the words, pot and jar are synonymous, so the sentence, the pot is different may be uttered to instruct someone who does not understand the pot's distinctive nature. There is no defect in such usage. The final view concerning difference. Although all three conceptions of difference have been defended, what is the final truth? The answer is that all three forms are valid according to the nature of the thing. For example, in the cognition, the cloth is different from the pot. The cloth appears not to be the same as the pot, appears in a form other than the pot, and appears to possess a generic property that is absent from the pot. These are respectively difference as the things own nature, mutual absence and difference in the form of a distinct property. Of these three, only the first form occurs in the category of absence because no further absence or property such as a universal can be admitted to reside in an absence. In the three categories of reality universal, Articularity and Inherence, the first two forms of difference are available because no other property resides in them, the third form does not occur. In the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action, all three forms of difference apply. Thus one says, this is cloth, not a pot, and this is an object woven from threads. This is smell, not color, and it is fragrant. This is motion, not upward throwing, and it is oblique motion. Difference as intrinsic nature is defined as a things appearing in its own form and not in another form. Mutual absence is defined as being the object of an indifeasible negative cognition produced by a negative expression used co-referentially with the word denoting the substrate of negation. Difference or opposition grounded in nature is defined as incompatibility of natures, that is, the inability of to mutually opposed properties to coexist. All forms of difference should be understood in this manner. Defense of the Seventh Thesis The seventh thesis above is wholly acceptable. The denial of all-pervasiveness in a whole produces cognition of its limited extension. Moreover, all-pervasiveness is invariably connected with immobility. Partial acceptance of the Eighth Thesis The eighth thesis is acceptable with the qualification in some contexts. A property is predicated of one substrate precisely because it is not predicated of another, and in this sense it is not all-pervasive. But can it be said that the property is nowhere predictable? No. There is no basis of invariable concomitance for such an assertion. On the contrary, limited existence and universal non-predicability are opposed. There is no concomitance such that whatever is non-pervasive is nowhere predictable. To be non-pervasive means to exist in some places, whereas according to the Buddhist, to be nowhere predictable means to be non-existent everywhere. These two are in fact mutually opposed. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation. But how can a thing that is by nature affirmable also be negatable? The answer is that what is opposed to affirmability is a negative property, not being the object or counter-positive of a negation. But how is the negation of an existent thing possible? There is no defect in admitting it. Would this not make existence and non-existence mutually compatible? No. If existence and non-existence are viewed with reference to different loci or contexts, no defect arises. No one accepts both the existence and non-existence of the same thing in the same locus and context, therefore the charge of contradiction cannot be raised against us. In this manner, the apparent opposition of existence and non-existence in certain situations can be removed by viewing them with reference to different temporal loci. Another objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation. Let the reality of a whole then be refuted by the objection based upon the simultaneous presence of mutually opposed properties such as knowledge and ignorance. No opposition is not established here. The fact is that there is no experience in which an object known by a particular person at a particular place and time remains unknown to that very person at the same place and time. Nor does anyone maintain such a view. But is it not the case that one part of an object is known while another part remains unknown? Yes. This means only that while the whole object is known, some of its parts are known and others remain unknown. Such a statement follows the common linguistic practice of transferring an affirmation or negation made with respect to the substantive onto its qualifiers. In reality, knowledge and ignorance are properties of the parts, but the Buddhist transfers them to the whole and presents the foregoing undesirable consequence. A second objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation. The same answer also resolves the alleged contradiction that one part of a whole is covered while another is uncovered. Yet the question remains, when some of its parts are covered, why does the entire grossly extended hole not appear exactly as it does when no part is covered? The answer is that such a possibility cannot be admitted at all. The particular dimension of a limited part is different from the dimension of the whole and the causal conditions producing cognition of that limited dimension are also specific. When those causal conditions are absent, the limited dimension is not known even though the whole is cognized. A third objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation. Since the coexistence of mutually opposed properties in a whole has been shown to be unestablished, The simultaneous presence of motion and rest in that same object is also unestablished. When, because of a difference in causal conditions, motion arises only in certain particular parts of the entire object, the whole as a whole remains at rest. But if so, will the moving and stationary parts not become separated from one another? When their conjunction is destroyed, will the entire whole not also be destroyed? Let it be so. But is this not contrary to your original view? No, in some situations we accept such a result. Then you must accept it in every situation. Let us accept that, but how does it affect the reality of the whole. We do not hold that every motion of a part necessarily produces a distinction opposed to the conjunction by which the whole is constituted. Only when certain specific causes operate does a particular kind of motion produce the distinction that becomes the cause of the whole's destruction. Objection to the foregoing answer and its refutation. This same answer refutes the following argument, if the palm moves, the atoms constituting the palm also move. Consequently, those atoms will become separated from the stationary arm and its atoms. Then, according to the rule that whatever acquires conjunction or disjunction from something also acquires conjunction or disjunction with the whole produced from that thing, The arm and palm will become separated from each other. When their conjunction is destroyed, the entire body will be destroyed. But the motion of the palm's atoms does not necessarily produce distinction between the arm and those atoms. Is not failure to produce distinction contrary to the nature of motion, since motion is held to be a cause of distinction? No. The nature of motion is established by its producing distinction from regions of space traversed by the moving limb. A similar situation is observed in motion produced by impact. Why, however, do motions differ in this way? Because it has already been stated that the causes producing a motion destructive of an effect are specific. But if the hole can remain at rest even while its parts move, then the hole will be neither conjoined with nor disjoint from those regions of space with which its parts become conjoined or disjoint. No. The conjunction and disjunction of the produced hole arise from the conjunctions and disjunctions of its parts. To understand the nature of this process properly, one must study the vayika doctrine. But according to this view, even while the parts on which the whole rests are moving, the whole should appear stationary. Yes, this is not unacceptable to us. When only the hand trembles, the entire body is not observed to tremble. objections to the foregoing view and their refutation. Or rather, the fact is that when the support in which a stationary object appears to be located moves, that object too is experienced as if moving as in the case of a face seen in a mirror or the moon reflected in water. When the mirror or water moves, the stationary face or moon appears to move. Let us therefore abandon this pointless dispute here. But if the motion of the support is superimposed upon the supported object, why does the entire whole not always appear to move? When the parts on all sides move, the entire object also appears to move, there is no defect in admitting this. When the parts do not move, how can the whole appear to move? But some Some parts move while others remain at rest, the body supported upon them should then appear both moving and stationary at once, just as the moon reflected in water appears both moving and stationary. Yes, this is possible if there is fragmentation among the supports of the parts. The illusion of two moons does not arise in one uniformly still reservoir. The same moon appears moving in flowing water and stationary in still water. But does not the moon appear in thousands of forms in water? Yes, precisely because the waves break the uniformity of the water. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation. Then limbs such as the hand and the body, though mutually conjoined, should be capable of existing unconjoined because the body remains at rest even when the hand moves. No. The Buddhists themselves do not accept the concomitance that, of to mutually conjoined things, the movement of one while the other remains at rest establishes their unconjoined existence. How then, can they derive an undesirable consequence from this? When a consequence is raised as a reduction, the underlying concomitance must at least be accepted by the opponent. But the non-Buddhist side does not accept this concomitance either. Is this concomitance not observed in the example of wet cloth and water? Water dripping from the cloth moves while the cloth remains at rest and once separated the two exist unconjoined. Yes, but the opposite is observed in the example of threads and cloth. Though their motions differ, cloth cannot exist apart from the threads. Could this conjoined existence be merely illusory and not actually true? Then why should the unconjoined existence in the example of cloth and water be accepted as true? If the reason is that cognition of their unconjoined existence is indifeasable there, no cognition obstructs the admission of the conjoined existence of threads and cloth either. Therefore some other proof opposed to this conjoined existence must be offered. Should the motion of the parts and the rest of the whole be regarded as opposed to the the conjoined existence of threads and cloth. The reverse may equally be said, the motion of the parts and the rest of the whole sublate the unconjoined existence of part and whole. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. But is not the presence and absence of red color in different parts of a whole opposed to its unity? No. In such a situation In the cognition, the entire object is red is illusory, such a hole is not in fact red. Then will the presence in different parts of conjunction with the substance that produces red color and the absence of that conjunction not be opposed to the nature of the hole? No. If the hole is regarded as a collection of atoms, the possibility of this contradiction has already been refuted. But what is the answer in the Vijnavdeen view, which does not admit atoms distinct from consciousness? There to the same answer applies on the basis of the distinct loci determining redness and non-redness. Difference of locus removes the contradiction. If red and non-red are regarded as mutually opposed even when residing in different loci, the invariable concomitance between variegation and the coexistence of these two opposed properties cannot be established because conjunction and its absence can never coexist. But if that concomitance is regarded as established, one must accept the coexistence of conjunction and absence of conjunction without contradiction because of the difference of locus. Would the reality of conjunction be abandoned because, unlike other things, it coexists with its opposed absence? No. If this were done, all other things too would have to be abandoned, because unlike conjunction they do not coexist with their opposed absences. Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its refutation. Get the elimination of all things then be accepted as proper, so that absolute emptiness may be established. But a thing can be eliminated or rejected only when some property is established in it that is necessarily incompatible with every real thing. If a thing possesses a property that excludes unreal things, that very fact establishes its reality. Moreover, the negation of a thing is impossible without cognition of the thing negated. Is not a hare's horn negated through an imagined cognition of it? No, this view has already been refuted. If conjunction is called unreal and imagined without any reason, anything whatever may be called unreal in the same way. The reason for regarding a hair's horn as unreal does not apply to conjunction because conjunction is both knowable and known. If conjunction is regarded as non-existent merely because it is different from other things, ignorance of it would depend upon its non-existence and its non-existence upon ignorance of it, producing circularity. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation. Can it not be held that, just as recognition of phonemes is explained by taking the universal property of sound as its real object, so a cognition that appears to have conjunction as its object may be explained without accepting the reality of conjunction or its objecthood and then the unreality of conjunction may be established from its non-cognition? No. If a cognition that purports to apprehend an object is not assigned an appropriate real object or if its experience is not connected with the corresponding property as its object and is simply declared illusory, an inference directly opposed to such cognition can be constructed. Someone might then infer that fire is cold despite directly experiencing its heat. An appropriate object in the form of a universal property is available for the recognition of phonemes, but there is no other appropriate object capable of taking the place of conjunction for the cognition of conjunction. If this rule for determining the real object of cognition is not accepted, the Buddhist's own cognition of invariable concomitance between variegation and the alleged coexistence of mutually opposed properties may likewise be declared erroneous and explained without accepting any real object for it. Unless this difficulty is overcome, how can a reduction lacking concomitance proceed? Therefore, just as with cognitions of other objects, the reality of conjunction as the object of the cognition of conjunction must be accepted. Effects such as the production of sound from conjunction and the crushing of objects establish its reality. There is no ground for regarding this cognition as illusory. objection to the reality of a whole and its refutation. Let the contradiction then be that the same object is both situated and not situated in a place. No, this does not satisfy the definition of contradiction. When an object's conjunction with one place is admitted, its conjunction with another place is denied, here not being in that place means being being situated in another place. Certainly, being situated and not situated in the very same place are mutually opposed, but who accepts both together? Can it not be said that perception apprehending an object's conjunction with one substrate excludes its conjunction with another substrate, and through this exclusion manifests a contradiction generated by the denial of conjunction with the first substrate. This would be so only if perception of an object as conjoined with one substrate necessarily denied its conjunction with every other substrate. But in fact it does not. A perception apprehending one object as conjoined with many things if regarded as exclusionary, would either exclude conjunction with all things, exclude no conjunction, or exclude its own object. Under none of these alternatives, thus perception manifest any contradiction. After all, the Buddhists to admit that one atom is simultaneously conjoint with many atoms. refutation of another objection above. This same answer refutes the objection concerning how a whole resides in its parts. The existence of a whole in its parts is exactly like the existence of one atom among other atoms or its conjunction with them. The next objection. Let the contradiction then consist in the coexistence of different colors in a multicolored object. Such an object cannot have one color because then it would not be multicolored. Nor can its colors be many because many colors cannot reside by inheritance in the same whole if the substrate is one the dependent colors should be one. Moreover, if the colors are many they cannot pervade the entire whole because all the The colors are not observed in every part of the object. Nor can the many colors be non-pervasive, if so, they would become properties residing in the same substrate together with their own absences. If despite such a nature, many colors can coexist with their own absences, the distinction between opposition and non-opposition disappears. Or can the whole be utterly colorless, for then its perceptibility would be endangered? Refutation of the Objection If the foregoing contradiction rests upon the assumption that multicoloredness is an aggregate of many colors, or that many mutually opposed properties are present in a single color, so that multicolor cannot be one, we have no objection to the reasoning. But we do not hold such an assumption. Multicolourdness is not multiplicity, if it were, a collection of many white objects would also appear multicoloured. Nor is it the inheritance of mutually opposed qualities in one object, because the mutual opposition of the qualities itself makes such inheritance impossible. In fact, multicolourdness, like buneus and the rest is a special generic property. It appears in a whole when different kinds of colors occur in its different parts. It does not appear in a whole all of whose parts have the same color. For this very reason, a minute hole composed of 3 atoms, though in reality multicolored, is not known as multicolored, because its parts are imperceptible. This answer explains why a hole with a monochrome surface does not appear multicolored on that surface. But if the hole itself is multicolored, Why does it appear white because of a white surface? Because in that situation the color of the surface or parts is superimposed upon the entire hole and the hole appears to possess that color. For this same reason, where the colors of the parts are not visible, as in a minute hole composed of 3 atoms, the color of the external light is superimposed upon the hole and it appears stunning. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation. If multicolourness is a special property, why does multicolourness appear when many objects of different colors are assembled together, although no new hole composed of differently coloured parts has arisen there? The answer is that if multicolourd means one object produced from parts of different colors, a collection of separate one yard pieces of differently colored cloth cannot be called multicolored. But no one will deny the use of the word multicolored for that collection in the second sense of many kinds of objects. The word is polysmos. But when objects of different colors are placed near one another without producing any Any new object, thus cognition of multicolourness in the first sense not arise? It does, but its cause is the illusion that a new object of varied colours has a rise in there. This is like the appearance that a new vast magnitude has a rise in when many heats of grain are placed close together. A new objection to the reality of a hole based on the denial of atoms and its refutation. Let the hole then be abandoned because the atoms from which it would be composed do not themselves exist. The question is this, when one atom is conjoined with many other atoms, does it join them through some of its parts or in its entirety? There is no third alternative. The first is impossible because an atom is partless, if it had parts, it would no longer be an atom. The second is also impossible, once it has become wholly conjoint with one atom, it cannot be conjoint with another. A thing wholly located in only one place cannot at the same time be located in another place as well. refutation of the objection. No, this objection is improper. The conjunction of atoms is exactly analogous to the relation of cognition to its objects. One may ask, does a cognition that apprehends real or unreal objects or assumes their forms, do so in its entirety or through some of its parts. The first alternative is impossible. If cognition wholly apprehended one object, the same cognition could not assume the forms of both blue and yellow. A cognition wholly absorbed in the blue object or blue form cannot also be absorbed in the yellow object or yellow form. The second alternative too is impossible because cognition has no parts. What then prevents us from regarding cognition as formless and objectless? We accept this. Very well, but does this mean that the known object is false or that nothing is known? The first alternative will not work. Even if blue, yellow and the like are regarded as non-existent, the question remains how they are cognized. The whole cognition cannot apprehend blue because then yellow and the rest would remain unknown and no part of cognition can apprehend it because cognition has been admitted to be partless. The second alternative is also impossible. If nothing appears, nothing exists, how then could the very question arise whether an object is wholly or partially present? Defense of the objection and its refutation. Let the answer then be this. Whole means everything without leaving anything over, while part means a portion of some complete thing or collection. Cognition is not an aggregate but a unitary entity. How then can the question of partial or total apprehension by cognition be raised? And how can the assertion that cognition neither apprehends an object nor assumes its form be maintained? If it is said that no other mode of apprehension can be conceived, the answer is that cognition apprehends its object through its own nature. Excellent. This clever member of the fraternity of logicians has at last stated the truth. Out of mere envy of us he had concealed the correct answer for so long and the same answer applies equally to atoms. Refutation of an earlier objection to the reality of a whole. This answer also refutes the alleged contradiction of being and not being in the same place. For example, it may be held that a perception having the form of blue excludes the forms of yellow and the rest, because the presence of the yellow form is connected with the absence of the blue form, which is held to be denied by cognition. The question will then arise, how can the same cognition simultaneously possess the many forms of blue, yellow, and the rest? This question is analogous to the question concerning the alleged coexistence of existence and non-existence in the same place in the case of a whole. The Buddhist may answer this question as follows, the difficulty would arise only if being blue-formed were invariably connected with not being yellow-formed. But it is not. A cognition bearing both blue and yellow forms is known as a single cognition. If each cognition were necessarily confined to only one form, collective cognition of many objects would never arise. The same result applies to atoms and holes. It is not the case that one atom conjoined with many other atoms or one hole inhering in many parts is not known as one entity. If it were so, cognition of the relation of one thing to many things could never arise. Thus the consequence is the same in both cases. The fact that the state of cognition differs from that of an atom or a hole produces no useful result here.

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