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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.98065)
Duration: 52:41
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:09Refutation of the first alternative concerning non-existence.
0:09–0:13Let the first alternative be accepted, then.
0:13–0:19One must ask, is this the negation of the very nature of the object's absence,
0:19–0:26or is the nature of its absence explained through negation of the object's existence?
0:26–0:32If the first, the object whose absence is negated becomes eternal.
0:32–0:38If the second, the negation or absence of the object itself becomes eternal.
0:38–0:43Refutation of the third explanation of the necessity of destruction.
0:44–0:52Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction be identified with its being an effect of its counter positive.
0:52–0:53No.
0:54–1:00If being an effect means being an effect of this as well, it contradicts necessity.
1:00–1:06If it means being the effect of this alone, it is unestablished.
1:06–1:14Can the statement mean that whatever an object produces immediately upon arising is its destruction?
1:14–1:21Then it would mean only that an effect depends on nothing apart from its aggregate of causes
1:21–1:25and necessary occurrence would mean only this.
1:25–1:28Who denies such a statement?
1:28–1:34But what is the basis for calling the effect itself the destruction of its cause?
1:34–1:42Is it because the effect differs from the cause, or because the effect is non-different from the absence of the cause?
1:42–1:46Refutation of the two latter alternatives.
1:46–1:50The first alternative is certainly untenable.
1:50–2:00Auxiliary causes also differ from the principal cause, then they too would have to be regarded as the destruction of the principal cause.
2:00–2:09Further, if absence of the cause is merely an unreal absence, how could a real effect possess it as a quality?
2:09–2:17And if absence of the cause is non-different from the effect, how can the effect be said to possess that absence?
2:17–2:22The nature of absence cannot even be defined here.
2:22–2:26The second alternative is also untenable.
2:26–2:36It could stand only if, when the effect arose, the cause were not seen although it would have been seen had it remained present
2:36–2:43or if there were a customary usage that the absence of the cause is non-different from its effect
2:43–2:50or if there were some proof eliminating the difference between the effect and the causes destruction.
2:50–2:54Refutation of the first and second alternatives.
2:54–3:00Of the three alternatives stated above, the first is untenable.
3:00–3:09When the effect, such as cloth, is produced, auxiliary causes such as the loom are still seen to be present.
3:09–3:17Can it be said that this loom and the rest differ from the loom that existed before the cloth was produced?
3:17–3:21No. What proves such a difference?
3:21–3:26The opponent may ask, what proves their non-difference?
3:26–3:38Suppose there is no proof, even then, the mere arising of doubt destroys the basis of the argument that the cause is not seen at the time of the effect.
3:38–3:42The second alternative is also untenable.
3:42–3:46When one says the cloth has been produced,
3:46–3:51no one understands this to mean the threads have been destroyed.
3:51–3:54Is it because part and whole are non-different?
3:54–3:57So that thread and cloth are not distinct
3:57–4:01and cloth is merely thread in a particular arrangement
4:01–4:05that people do not say the threads have been destroyed
4:05–4:07when cloth is produced?
4:08–4:12If so, usage 2 does not support the proposed view.
4:13–4:19Can it be that when cloth is torn and threads or pieces of yarn are again produced,
4:19–4:25people do not say the cause has been destroyed because a series of effects wholly different
4:25–4:28from the causal series has arisen?
4:28–4:30No, that is not so.
4:31–4:34Objection to the preceding view and its answer.
4:35–4:41If the unravelled threads are themselves the destruction of the cloth, how can they inherit
4:41–4:47in the cloth according to Nya Vayika, or be non-different from the cloth according to
4:47–4:48Buddhist?
4:48–4:55The cloth was regarded as the destruction of the threads because it was their effect,
4:55–5:00and the threads produced when the cloth is destroyed were regarded as the destruction
5:00–5:02of the cloth.
5:02–5:10Then the cloth and its destruction would both be one and the same thing an inconsistency.
5:10–5:15Can it be replied that the later threads differ from the earlier ones?
5:15–5:16No.
5:16–5:23No generic difference is known between them and individual difference remains to be proved
5:23–5:28because it depends on the unestablished doctrine of momentariness.
5:28–5:34If the later threads are regarded as different only from the earlier threads and are called
5:34–5:40non-different from the destruction of the cloth, that difference itself would be explained
5:40–5:46through the non-difference of the later threads and the destruction of the cloth, circularity
5:46–5:48would result.
5:48–5:53Nevertheless, why not regard the later threads as the destruction of the earlier
5:53–5:55threads?
5:55–6:01The only defects in this view are that it has no valid basis and does not accord with
6:01–6:03ordinary usage.
6:03–6:10Further, if cloth were destroyed as a result of the destruction of the threads that are
6:10–6:15its material cause, no threads could remain after the cloth.
6:15–6:23In this context, usage of the word destruction is determined by other destructive causes.
6:23–6:30Therefore, the threads cannot be regarded as non-different from the destruction of the cloth.
6:30–6:32The reply continued.
6:32–6:41Destruction regarded as non-different from thread either generically excludes or opposes other threads, or it does not.
6:41–6:48If it does, how can it remain a thread while opposing other members of its own kind?
6:48–6:58The generic nature of a blue object opposes what is non blue, but it is not itself an instance of another non blue object.
6:58–7:07If thread does not generically oppose other threads, how can it be the destruction or opponent of the earlier thread?
7:07–7:13One blue object is not generically opposed to another blue object.
7:13–7:23Can opposition be accepted only at the level of individual threads and not in their capacity as representatives of a kind?
7:23–7:29Then we ask, is thread, generically, neither opposed nor unopposed to anything,
7:29–7:37so that by virtue of being thread it is neither opposed nor unopposed to thread or to anything else?
7:37–7:42If so, generic opposition among threads has been denied,
7:42–7:46although it was one of the views advanced above.
7:46–7:54The doctrine that an effect is the destruction of its cause therefore cannot be rationally maintained.
7:54–8:02It may be objected if universals are imaginary, what work could generic opposition perform?
8:02–8:13The answer is that if there is no opposition, the hope of establishing difference through the coexistence of mutually incompatible generic properties disappears
8:13–8:18because that difference is based precisely on such coexistence.
8:18–8:26Another objection and reply concerning the relation between destruction and its counter-positive.
8:26–8:28Could it not be as follows?
8:28–8:36According to the opponent, destruction or absence is regarded as different from its counter-positive,
8:36–8:44Nevertheless, one cloth, though devoid of another cloth, retains the nature of cloth, or an absence
8:44–8:50opposed to one pot may coexist with another pot, and the members of these pairs are not
8:50–8:53mutually opposed.
8:53–8:59In the same way, destruction non-different from an effect might retain the same nature
8:59–9:02as the cause and yet be its destruction.
9:02–9:04No.
9:04–9:11We do not accept non-difference, coexistence, or identity of generic nature between absence
9:11–9:14or destruction and its counter-positive.
9:14–9:21If these were accepted, the counter-positive would become non-different from its destruction
9:21–9:27and cease to be a counter-positive, destruction would not be non-contemporaneous with it,
9:27–9:32and there would be no general incompatibility between their natures.
9:32–9:40But what defect is there in relating destruction to an object that is not its counter positive?
9:40–9:47Difference of individuals, difference of universals, and contemporaneity are not opposed to relation,
9:47–9:54what opposes relation is identity and incompatibility, and we accept neither here.
9:54–10:00Nor is there any proof opposed to accepting that an object and its destruction are
10:00–10:02different.
10:02–10:09Another objection and its answer. If absence is different from its counter positive, it
10:09–10:16may be asked whether a pot is present together with its prior and posterior absences in its
10:16–10:24two halves. These absences are accepted as present in the halves, therefore, if absence
10:24–10:30is different from its counter positive, the pot to may coexist with them. If the
10:30–10:37The pot is present there, it will exist in the very halves in which its absence occurs.
10:37–10:43If the pot is not present in the substrate of absence, an infinite regress follows, the
10:43–10:50pot is absent from the absence in which the pot's absence resides, therefore a second
10:50–10:58absence must exist within the first, a third within the second, and so on without end.
10:58–11:04If the usage concerning absence of the pot within the absence of the pot can be explained
11:04–11:11without positing a second absence, then usage concerning absence of a pot in any other thing
11:11–11:18can likewise be explained without positing an independent absence distinct from the pot.
11:18–11:21No, this reasoning is improper.
11:21–11:28The positive substrate of a negation has a positive nature and therefore is not opposed
11:28–11:31to the nature of a positive object.
11:31–11:38If it were opposed to a positive object, it would itself cease to be positive.
11:38–11:45But if a substrate is treated as an absence merely because it differs from the counter-positive,
11:45–11:51then even while a pot is present in its substrate, the absence of the pot would also have
11:51–11:58to be regarded as present there. To explain the cognition that one absence occurs within
11:58–12:06another, there is no need to imagine a second absence. The natural incompatibility between
12:06–12:14existence and absence is sufficient to explain this cognition. There is neither experience
12:14–12:21nor negative reasoning in favor of accepting an infinite series of absences situated
12:21–12:27within one another. Objection to the preceding answer and the reply.
12:27–12:33If absence is regarded as different from its counter positive, should a pot not continue
12:33–12:40to exist even while its destruction is present, since the two are different and the existence
12:40–12:46of one should not prevent the existence of the other? Is this not the defect in
12:46–12:53the view. If the pot continues to exist means only that its pot nature continues, we accept
12:53–13:01this. We do not hold that when the absence or destruction of a pot arises, the pot ceases
13:01–13:09to be a pot. That the pot exists means that its destruction has not yet arisen, for the
13:09–13:16destruction or absence of a pot is by nature non contemporaneous with the pot.
13:16–13:22Then because destruction has no material cause, let it be regarded as costless and therefore
13:22–13:28necessary since every productive cause is a material cause.
13:28–13:29No.
13:29–13:36The valid cognition the pot has now been destroyed which proves the reality of destruction
13:36–13:39also proves that it is produced.
13:39–13:45In the inference destruction is not produced because it has no material cause, the invariable
13:45–13:51concomitance between reason and probandom is initiated by a condition.
13:51–13:55The condition here is having a positive nature.
13:55–14:02Every unproduced entity has a positive nature, whereas an absence without a material cause
14:02–14:05does not have a positive nature.
14:05–14:11This refutation also defeats the inference of the necessity of destruction based on the
14:11–14:16reason being itself no objects material cause.
14:16–14:22Once the distinction between a quality and the substance that is its substrate is established,
14:22–14:28the reason being no objects material cause will also be shown to deviate, because although
14:28–14:35no quality is the material cause of anything, qualities are produced.
14:35–14:42of the final explanation of necessity. The preceding refutation also defeats the possible
14:42–14:49objection that if destruction requires causes other than its counter positive, the production
14:49–14:55or assemblage of those causes may be obstructed, so that destruction might never arise and
14:55–15:03an object might never be destroyed. If such a possibility exists, then when a pot is
15:03–15:10destroyed its pot shards to might fail to arise. The casualty of destruction must be understood
15:10–15:17in the same manner as the casualty of the pot shards. Then let the last of the preceding
15:17–15:25alternatives be accepted. The inference establishing the necessity of destruction would be, destruction
15:25–15:31is not produced because it is an absence, like the prior absence of an object.
15:31–15:39Or if destruction is produced, it too is destroyed, because it is produced like a pot.
15:39–15:43No, these inferences are not valid.
15:43–15:50Contrary inferences may be formulated, prior absence is produced because it is an absence,
15:50–15:56or because it is capable of being destroyed, like destruction and a pot.
15:56–16:04Alternatively, if prior absence is unproduced, it is not destroyed because it is unproduced,
16:04–16:07like space or a hare's horn.
16:07–16:15Just as these counter inferences are invalid, so are the original inferences.
16:15–16:21Statement and rational confirmation of the defects in the Buddhist inferences.
16:21–16:28What is defective in the inferences advanced above by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist?
16:28–16:34In the first inference the reason is inconclusive with respect to the probandum because its
16:34–16:41invariable concomitance with the probandum is determined by the condition positivity.
16:41–16:47Every known example of the probandum, unproduced, is a positive object since only positive
16:47–16:54objects are placed in the class of the Unproduced, therefore possessing the Universal of Existence
16:54–17:01is a condition of this Probandom. Absence does not possess the Universal of Existence.
17:02–17:09Moreover, the perceptual cognitions that attest the reality of prior and posterior absence
17:09–17:15oppose this inference. There is also contrary reasoning through negative concomitance,
17:15–17:23If prior absence itself were produced, an effect could arise before the production of its prior absence.
17:23–17:33If posterior absence were capable of destruction, a destroyed object could arise again after its posterior absence was destroyed.
17:33–17:40What defect is there if an object arises again under such circumstances?
17:40–17:47If so, the temporal interruption experienced in an object's existence before its production
17:47–17:50and after its destruction would be neither true nor false.
17:51–17:59If it were false, then just as the displacement of the moon is false in the illusion of two moons,
17:59–18:03the temporal break in the object's existence would be false here.
18:03–18:09Consequently, the object could coexist with its prior and posterior absences
18:09–18:13and the mutual opposition among them would disappear.
18:13–18:20If the experience were true, the two absences would have to be regarded as mutually different
18:20–18:27and the view that the object might arise again before or after the production of these absences
18:27–18:29could not be maintained.
18:29–18:35The same reasoning refutes the possible inference, if the pot does not exist while
18:35–18:43prior absence exists, then posterior absence, which opposes the pot, must exist at that time,
18:43–18:50and if the pot does not exist while posterior absence exists, then prior absence, which opposes
18:50–18:59the pot, must exist at that time. For just as prior and posterior absence both oppose
18:59–19:06the pot, so the pot and posterior absence both oppose prior absence, while the pot and
19:06–19:11prior absence both oppose posterior absence.
19:11–19:15Positive proof of the persistence of objects.
19:15–19:19How is the persistence of objects established?
19:19–19:26On the basis of recognition and the impossibility that universals are momentary.
19:26–19:32It may be objected that the definition of recognition also applies to recognition of cognitions
19:32–19:39that change at every moment, such recognition of cognition is false, and therefore recognition
19:39–19:45concerning the persistence of other objects is also invalid.
19:45–19:46No.
19:46–19:52The definition of a valid special kind of recognition does not deviate.
19:52–19:59This definition is the cognition whose object is devoid of mutually incompatible marks and
19:59–20:05this mark has already been established in recognition of enduring objects.
20:05–20:10Can recognition possessing this mark also be false?
20:10–20:11No.
20:11–20:17If recognition of the identity of an object devoid of incompatible qualities were false,
20:17–20:21no identity would remain in any object.
20:21–20:27Consequently, there would be no difference among objects either, because difference is
20:27–20:35merely exclusion of identity and nothing but emptiness would remain in Buddhist hands.
20:35–20:43Thus if objects are known as different, mutually incompatible qualities must coexist in them.
20:43–20:48If no such coexistence occurs, there is no difference.
20:48–20:54This is the rule governing practices of identity and difference.
20:54–20:58Objection to the preceding proof and the answer.
20:58–21:05In a steady yet spreading lamp flame carefully observed, no coexistence of incompatible qualities
21:05–21:12appears yet is not mere difference, opposed to recognition, a property of the flame.
21:12–21:19Yes, but on what valid basis is it concluded that the flame is not one object?
21:19–21:26The basis is knowledge of the rule that exhaustion of fuel causes a flame to be extinguished.
21:26–21:34Oil is seen to burn at every moment, and wick and oil are seen to diminish at every moment.
21:34–21:43The proper conclusion is therefore that the earlier WIC and oil are continuously being replaced by later WIC and oil.
21:43–21:48But this is precisely the coexistence of incompatible qualities.
21:49–22:00Destruction of the earlier part and production of the later or changing efficient casualty cannot be properties of one and the same flame.
22:00–22:04Objection to the answer and its resolution.
22:04–22:15What can be said of the person who refuses to pay a hundred coins for fear that his head will be cut off, yet readily pays five groups of 20 each?
22:15–22:25Could there not also be in so-called valid recognition a coexistence of incompatible properties that is not readily visible?
22:25–22:39If this is admitted as possible, we ask, in the recognition this is that same crystal, do we doubt the incompatibility of properties whose mutual relation has already been validly established?
22:39–22:47Or do we doubt the coexistence of properties whose incompatibility has already been validly
22:47–22:55established? Or do we doubt the incompatibility or coexistence of properties whose nature,
22:55–23:00incompatibility and relation have none of them been established?
23:00–23:07Refutation of the possible forms of doubt. Of the alternatives stated above, the first
23:07–23:13is untenable. It has already been refuted in the refutation of the view that capacity
23:13–23:22and incapacity and the like cannot coexist. The second alternative is also untenable because
23:22–23:29directly perceived properties known together are not known to be mutually incompatible.
23:29–23:35The possibility of such imperceptible properties is also denied by the fact that wherever
23:35–23:43absence of an effect is observed, absence of the corresponding cause is also observed,
23:43–23:48coexistence of a cause and the absence of its effect is never seen.
23:48–23:52The third alternative is also untenable.
23:52–23:59Doubt concerning the coexistence or non coexistence of properties whose nature, incompatibility
23:59–24:05and relation are wholly unknown would be possible in every recognition.
24:05–24:11Consequently, identity would everywhere be deprived of being the object of recognition.
24:11–24:18It has thus been established that invalid recognition there is no coexistence of
24:18–24:21incompatible properties within the recognized object.
24:22–24:29Now, if the determining property is abstracted from the definition of recognition and
24:29–24:35established in real objects, their persistence is proved by inference.
24:35–24:41The inference is, the object under dispute does not become different when the time of
24:41–24:47its occurrence changes, because despite difference of time it is not endowed with incompatible
24:47–24:49properties.
24:49–24:55Whatever is not endowed with incompatible properties, when something related to it
24:55–25:01changes does not itself change, as an atom does not itself change even when it becomes
25:01–25:09conjoined with different atoms. The object under dispute is like the atom, therefore
25:09–25:14it does not become different even when its time changes.
25:14–25:20Justification of the preceding inference. No one can doubt the validity of the invariable
25:20–25:26concomitance between reason and probandum in this inference.
25:26–25:32The reason in the subject namely, absence of the coexistence of incompatible properties
25:32–25:37in real objects has already been established.
25:37–25:42That real objects cannot be momentary, is established by the fact that knowledge
25:42–25:50of similarity and the practices based on it cannot be explained through momentary objects.
25:50–25:58Or verbal cognition, reason or inferential cognition, and conceptual cognition cannot produce even
25:58–26:05an effect as slight as bending a blade of grass without taking some common form of objects
26:05–26:07as their subject.
26:07–26:10This is undisputed.
26:10–26:15Cognition itself cannot be treated as the common form in place of accepting generic
26:15–26:22properties, but discussion of momentariness or persistence is meaningful only when the
26:22–26:27reality of external objects is admitted.
26:27–26:31Examination of the nature of the common form of objects.
26:31–26:35There are three views concerning the common form of objects.
26:35–26:43It is an imagined entity, it is a common generic form, or it is an eternal entity.
26:43–26:46The first view is unacceptable.
26:46–26:53It cannot be maintained on the basis of experience because no experience apprehends an object's
26:53–26:55imagined character.
26:55–27:01If it did, the action prompted by that experience would be contradicted.
27:01–27:06Action is directed toward a real object, not an imagined one.
27:06–27:15No person desiring an important result pursues an object once it is understood to be unreal.
27:15–27:20Can it be said that in conceptual cognition of an object only the exclusion of things
27:20–27:26different from it appears as the object, while the imagined character of the exclusion
27:26–27:31does not appear in cognition, thereby removing the difficulty?
27:31–27:33No.
27:33–27:39In conceptual cognition only the positive form of the object appears.
27:39–27:45A word and the reason in an inference do not produce the negative cognition there is no
27:45–27:51non-fire on this mountain peak, they produce the positive cognition there is fire on this
27:51–27:54mountain peak.
27:54–27:59Objection in favor of cognition of exclusion and its refutation.
27:59–28:06It may be objected that although there is no reflexive cognition, I know exclusion, cognition
28:06–28:12of the excluding object itself is cognition of exclusion.
28:12–28:18Cognition of a qualified object is impossible without cognition of the qualifier.
28:18–28:25Just as in the Nya-Vaika view, although there is no reflexive cognition, I know
28:25–28:31So the generic property, when an object is known, the common form appears in cognition
28:31–28:37and conceptual cognition is therefore called cognition of a generic property, so cognition
28:37–28:43of the excluding thing necessarily entails cognition of exclusion.
28:43–28:46This reasoning is improper.
28:46–28:52In ordinary cognition of an object, only the generic property becomes an object
28:52–29:00its being a generic property does not. In cognition of a cow, an object excluding non-cows
29:00–29:08does not become the object in such a way that exclusion itself becomes an object of cognition.
29:08–29:15The reply continued. Conceptual cognition of a cow is not in the form this object is
29:15–29:23exclusion of non-caus, but this is a cow. If, even without the reflexive cognition, I apprehend
29:23–29:29the exclusion of things different from a cow, conceptual cognition nevertheless apprehends
29:29–29:37exclusion, no one can deny that it is cognition of exclusion. Otherwise, a cognition that
29:37–29:43does not apprehend, an object could still be called cognition of that object, then
29:43–29:47cognition having the form of a cow could be about a horse.
29:47–29:54Mere cognition of exclusion also does not produce action toward an object.
29:54–30:01A person desiring a pot does not move toward it merely on knowing there is no non-pot here.
30:01–30:06He acts only after knowing there is a pot here.
30:06–30:09Another objection and its reply.
30:09–30:16If only exclusion of non-cows is regarded as the object in common cognition of a cow,
30:16–30:23the preceding defect will be removed, otherwise, because one cow differs from another cow,
30:23–30:28it would count as a non-cow and would also be negated by exclusion.
30:28–30:29No.
30:29–30:36If exclusion or negation of a pot is not negated by the stated exclusion, the necessity
30:36–30:44implicit in the expression non-pot will not remain. If non-pot is negated, no positive
30:44–30:51generic nature remains beyond this negation, exclusion of the exclusion of a pot itself
30:51–30:57would become the positive generic nature. If exclusion of another thing is not the
30:57–31:03object in common cognition, will a person ordered to tie the cow also tie a horse because
31:03–31:10the word cow does not convey exclusion of the horse. Yes, that would happen if the horse
31:10–31:18were itself a cow, but a horse is a horse and a cow is a cow. Otherwise, how could correct
31:18–31:26cognition depend even upon exclusion? If one exclusion requires another exclusion to
31:26–31:32distinguish it from other exclusions, those other exclusions must be distinguished by
31:32–31:37by still further exclusions and an infinite regress results.
31:37–31:44If exclusion is not distinguished from its substrate and counter positive, any word may
31:44–31:52prompt action toward any object because exclusion of non-pot would not differ from exclusion
31:52–31:54of non-cloth.
31:54–32:01If every exclusion is regarded as unique in its own kind and cognition of one exclusion
32:01–32:07is prevented from extending to another, the natures of positive objects may equally be
32:07–32:13regarded as unique in their respective kinds, and the rule by which cognition determines
32:13–32:17action will remain intact.
32:17–32:22Refutation of the view that a universal is exclusion of others.
32:22–32:28Is exclusion itself the universal, distinct from other exclusions, while the positive
32:28–32:37object is the counter positive of the exclusion that constitutes its nature? No. If a universal
32:37–32:44is imaginary, how can it constitute the nature of a real positive object? If it is the nature of a
32:44–32:52real object, it cannot be imaginary. Further, if the universal as exclusion is non-different from
32:52–32:58a positive real object, it will itself be real. How? Then, could it become the object
32:58–33:06of false conceptual cognition? A person ordered to tie the cow, does not go to tie a horse,
33:06–33:13because the cognition produced by those words is not about a horse. Even after seeing the
33:13–33:19horse and being inclined to approach it, the commanded person turns away on knowing,
33:19–33:21This is not a cow.
33:21–33:25What is inconsistent in this?
33:25–33:33Examination and refutation of generous, give that exclusion is a secondary object of cognition.
33:33–33:36Then let this argument be presented.
33:36–33:40No doctrine can disregard the evidence of experience.
33:40–33:46Who would dare deny that a positive real object appears in cognition?
33:46–33:53But while the positive object appears, negative exclusion also appears in cognition as its
33:53–33:55secondary component.
33:55–34:02If this were not so, a positive property could not determine or qualify.
34:02–34:08What does not distinguish the Qualific and from things different from it is no qualifier,
34:08–34:15distinguishing a thing from others is precisely what determines or qualifies it.
34:15–34:21Just as the words blue lotus and white lotus respectively produce verbal cognitions of a
34:21–34:28lotus endowed with blueness and whiteness, the place of those qualities is secondary
34:28–34:34relative to the lotus substance, yet exclusion of non blue and non white lotuses remains
34:34–34:40embedded within that cognition like an embryo within an embryo.
34:40–34:45The same may be accepted in all other cases.
34:45–34:47Very well, let it be so.
34:47–34:53But now no disagreement remains between us concerning the appearance of a positive object
34:53–34:55in cognition.
34:55–35:01If the appearance of the positive object is denied, that is, if qualifier and qualificant
35:01–35:08do not appear, the qualified character of the qualificant will also not be known.
35:08–35:15For example, if buneous and lotus-ness do not appear in cognition of a blue lotus, its
35:15–35:21difference from what is non-blue and non-lotus can never be known.
35:21–35:25Objection to the preceding view and its answer.
35:25–35:31Can cognition apprehend exclusion without apprehending the excluded object?
35:31–35:37Cognition of exclusion depends upon cognition of what is excluded.
35:37–35:44It may be replied, let exclusion of buffaloes and the like by cowness be the qualificant
35:44–35:50and let the exclusion residing in the cow be the qualifier, then no positive object
35:50–35:53will enter conceptual cognition.
35:53–35:58No, this cannot be accepted, because circularity results.
35:58–36:04Cognition of the cow depends upon cognition of exclusion of non-cows, while cognition
36:04–36:12of exclusion of non-Kaus again depends upon cognition of the cow. Cognition of a purely
36:12–36:19positive object is not tainted by such circularity. In order to know a cow as a cow, it is not
36:19–36:26always necessary to know it in the form of negation of a non-Ka. In this way the opponent
36:26–36:31exposed circularity in the Buddhist theory of conceptual cognition.
36:31–36:38Jinnar, however, misunderstood this objection as concerning the conventional meaning of
36:38–36:45a word and attempted to answer that the word cow conveys a cow, not a buffalo or another
36:45–36:50animal, because there are other words for those.
36:50–36:55This is like the cheap magic displayed by an ordinary conjurer.
36:55–37:01Only an uncultivated person can be deceived by such slate of hand.
37:01–37:05Another objection and its answer.
37:05–37:11Then let an unreal positive object be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition.
37:11–37:15No, this view is self-contradictory.
37:15–37:22A positive object is something, while an unreal object is nothing, how can that be
37:22–37:23one?
37:23–37:30If unreality is attributed to a positive object because it excludes other objects, then a real
37:30–37:38momentary particular would also become unreal, because it excludes things different from itself.
37:38–37:44Universals exclude all other things and may therefore be regarded as unreal, but then
37:44–37:47how can they remain positive?
37:47–37:52Another objection to the preceding answer and its resolution.
37:52–37:58This positive or real discourse applied to unreal universals because their difference from
37:58–38:02real particulars is not known.
38:02–38:03No.
38:03–38:09This would be possible only if a particular sometimes appeared stripped of its positive
38:09–38:16real nature or if an unreal object appeared freed from its negative nature.
38:16–38:18Neither occurs.
38:18–38:24If both real and unreal were wholly devoid of their distinctive marks, they could appear
38:24–38:31in some form or nature different from themselves, and no form of theirs would remain that did
38:31–38:34not appear in cognition.
38:34–38:41The view that an imagined form is inferred in a real object has already been cut off
38:41–38:46at the root, for superimposition depends upon ignorance of the difference between
38:46–38:53the superimposed property and its substrate, whereas the possibility of such ignorance is
38:53–39:02excluded here. Justification for the appearance of a real common form in conceptual cognition.
39:02–39:09The object of conceptual cognition is a form common to many things. An unreal object cannot
39:09–39:17be such. Being mere absence, an unreal object cannot by nature be present in one and the
39:17–39:25same form at different times and places. The stated commonality cannot be imaginary either,
39:25–39:32because imagination is momentary and cannot last beyond a moment or exist in different
39:32–39:39places. Nor can commonality be superimposed, because the similarity required for superimposed
39:39–39:46is not actually present elsewhere in a real form that could be superimposed upon real objects.
39:46–39:52The view that cognition of similarity is explained by ignorance of difference.
39:52–40:00Could it be that the different unreal objects of conceptual cognition are not apprehended as mutually different,
40:00–40:07so that there is not spatiotemporal similarity among them but merely cognition of non-difference,
40:07–40:12non-difference and that this accounts for cognition of similarity?
40:12–40:14No.
40:14–40:18Unreal objects possess no real difference.
40:18–40:23If they possessed real difference, they would cease to be unreal, because real difference
40:23–40:27is a property only of real objects.
40:27–40:31Is their difference actually absent?
40:31–40:38If so, the real non-difference of the objects of conceptual cognition would be established.
40:38–40:45Thus cognition of similarity arise from ignorance of a difference superimposed upon the objects.
40:45–40:50No, a superimposed object cannot remain unknown.
40:50–40:57Further, if difference is superimposed upon the objects, there is no occasion to superimpose
40:57–40:59non-difference.
40:59–41:06Is there ignorance of that difference whose absence is superimposed upon these objects?
41:06–41:07No.
41:07–41:15If only the absence of difference is superimposed, difference itself is established as real.
41:15–41:21If difference is none of these four kinds but indescribable, ignorance of it as the cause
41:21–41:26of false superimposition of non-difference would be available everywhere.
41:26–41:33Being the direct meaning of the phrase a property common to both existence and non-existence,
41:33–41:35what is this property?
41:35–41:44It cannot be having the nature of both, because existence and non-existence are mutually incompatible.
41:44–41:51Nor is it being a property of both positive and negative entities, for we do not regard
41:51–41:56a universal such as Kaunas as a negative property.
41:56–42:03Nor is it possessing both positive and negative properties, because an individual real object
42:03–42:09endowed with positive and negative properties is not regarded as wholly negative, hence
42:09–42:17this reason deviates in an inference intended to establish the negative nature of universals.
42:17–42:23Nor can the property be similarity to both positive and negative.
42:23–42:27Such similarity is impossible in a universal.
42:27–42:34If a universal, a positive object, and a negative absence are all said to be similar because
42:34–42:41each excludes things different from itself, exclusion is not identical with the probandom
42:41–42:48of the inference until the universal has first been established as exclusion, consequently,
42:48–42:51the similarity cannot be accepted.
42:51–42:58Or can this property be being the object of both positive and negative cognition, this
42:58–43:03involves both contradiction and an inconclusive reason.
43:03–43:09What is the object of affirmative cognition in the form, is not also the object of negative
43:09–43:13cognition in the form, is not.
43:13–43:19Can one and the same thing be the object of affirmation in one respect and of negation
43:19–43:25in another, or be present in one place and absent in another?
43:25–43:26Yes.
43:26–43:33But then a universal to may be regarded as an object of affirmation or as positive in precisely
43:33–43:38this way, without being treated as exclusion.
43:38–43:45If the positive and negative natures of objects are not established as mutually incompatible,
43:45–43:51The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom in the preceding inference will
43:51–43:54not be established.
43:54–44:00The question may now be raised if a universal is positive and an object of affirmation,
44:00–44:05what further does an affirmative word convey about it?
44:05–44:11The counter question is if a universal has a negative nature, what further does negation
44:11–44:18remove or deny from it? Should a universal for this reason be regarded as having a nature
44:18–44:26common to both positive and negative? No. Such an imagined common nature cannot be both
44:26–44:33positive and negative at once, nor can it be the exclusion of both, because positive
44:33–44:42and negative are mutually incompatible. Review of the entire discussion. Affirmative and negative
44:42–44:49verbs used with a subject in a sentence respectively state the presence and absence in that subject
44:49–44:56of some property other than the universal, or if that presence or absence has already
44:56–45:01Being stated by another means, they indicate its necessity.
45:01–45:06Both kinds of verb are therefore meaningful.
45:06–45:12Even when a universal is accepted as a purely positive object, these two functions of the
45:12–45:14verb remain.
45:14–45:20But if the universal is imaginary, no property can be attributed to it.
45:20–45:26How can a new property be attributed to an imaginary thing, or the necessity of an already
45:26–45:30attributed property be stated?
45:30–45:35This special defect initiates the view that universals are imaginary.
45:35–45:42The word cow conveys only an individual object endowed with cow-ness.
45:42–45:48But such an individual may exist in a distant place or at another time, and therefore
45:48–45:56the word cow alone does not satisfy the inquiry of a person desiring an important result or action.
45:57–46:04The person wishes to know a definite fact concerning the cow. That desire is satisfied
46:04–46:09by the information. In the cow shed there is a beautiful cow with black eyes,
46:09–46:16an udder like a pitcher, and a large bell around her neck. These qualifiers are generally
46:16–46:24affirmed of the cow or if already affirmed their necessity is indicated. Thus the view
46:24–46:30that a word conveys a positive universal is free from defect.
46:30–46:37Thus the word cow itself produce cognition of a real or unreal animal endowed with cowness
46:37–46:43so that use of the verb is in the sentence a cow exists is unnecessary for conveying
46:43–46:51the individual? No. Is converse existence, which the word cow does not, it is therefore
46:51–47:00necessary to communicate this additional meaning? Objection to generous inference and the reply.
47:00–47:07Jannar, who calls himself an expert, presents an inference in which cognition of a universal
47:07–47:13is the subject, if a cognition appears as related to both the existence and non-existence of
47:13–47:21an object, it is not a cognition of that object, just as cognition of a cow is not cognition
47:21–47:30of a horse. This inference is initiated by confusion of reason and probandom. For example,
47:30–47:36if cowness being related to both the existence and non-existence of something like a horse,
47:36–47:44is the same as not taking the horse as its object, then being related to both the existence
47:44–47:51and non-existence of a cow will likewise be the same as not taking the cow as its object.
47:51–47:56Thus reason and probandom merge into each other.
47:56–48:00Refutation of the third definition of the reason
48:00–48:07If the reason is producing a desire concerning the existence or non-existence of the object,
48:07–48:13it becomes excessively narrow and confined to the subject alone.
48:13–48:19The cognition of a cow used as the example produces no desire concerning the existence
48:19–48:25or non-existence of a horse, therefore, if for this reason it is not cognition
48:25–48:30of a horse, it would not be cognition of a cow either.
48:30–48:37If the desire produced is treated as a particular kind and restricted to the existence or non-existence
48:37–48:44of the object at a definite place or time, the reason becomes contrary to the probandom.
48:44–48:50A cognition that does not take an object as its subject does not produce a desire to
48:50–48:56determine that object's particular existence or non-existence.
48:56–49:03If it did, cognition of a cow would produce a desire to determine the existence of a horse.
49:03–49:08Refutation of the fourth definition of the reason.
49:08–49:13Is the reason non-apprehension of the object's existence and non-existence?
49:13–49:14No.
49:14–49:21If the object's existence and non-existence are non-different from the object itself,
49:21–49:24cognition cannot fail to apprehend the object.
49:24–49:32The Nya-Vaika position does not accept that cognition of a cow fails to apprehend the cow,
49:32–49:36and in the Buddhist position this has not yet been established.
49:36–49:43If existence and non-existence differ from the object, the reason deviates.
49:43–49:48There is no rule that a cognition failing to apprehend a property in herring in but
49:48–49:54different from an object also fails to apprehend the object.
49:54–50:02to the preceding refutation and the answer. The objection is that such a rule does exist.
50:02–50:08A cognition that does not apprehend the qualities inherent in an object does not apprehend the
50:08–50:14object either. For example, cognition of a cow and the word
50:14–50:21cow neither apprehend nor denote the qualities of a horse and therefore neither apprehend
50:21–50:28nor denote the horse. Cognition of a cow and the word cow stand in the same relation to
50:28–50:36qualities such as buneus in a cow, they neither apprehend nor denote the cow's buneus. Thus,
50:36–50:42when the pervading member of the invariable concomitance is absent, the pervaded member
50:42–50:49cognition of the object is also absent. The Buddhist says that when an object itself
50:49–50:56is known, knowledge of some of its qualities and ignorance of others are possible only if
50:56–51:02cognitions receive different impressions and if difference of impressions results from
51:02–51:06differences in the capacities of their causes.
51:06–51:13But this explanation leads to infinite regress, because to explain difference of capacity
51:13–51:18one must posit a further difference of capacity within capacity.
51:18–51:26If capacities are not different, their effects or products will not be different either, consequently,
51:26–51:33an object will be known together with all its qualities or not known at all.
51:33–51:41These are the only two possibilities, therefore the stated invariable concomitance is established.
51:41–51:43All this is mistaken.
51:43–51:50If a quality and the object that is its substrate are mutually different, cognition of one and
51:50–51:56ignorance of the other can be explained by the non-simultaneous presence of the respective
51:56–52:00causal complexes that produce their cognitions.
52:00–52:06Cognition of qualities and cognition of the qualified object arise from their own
52:06–52:12causal complexes because the two cognitions differ by nature, and this natural difference
52:12–52:20results from difference of their causes. difference of causes is established by the positive and
52:20–52:26negative concomitance between causes and their respective effects, while that concomitance
52:26–52:33is established through the occurrence of the effects consisting in cognition and non-cognition
52:33–52:35of the object and its qualities.

Plain text

Refutation of the first alternative concerning non-existence. Let the first alternative be accepted, then. One must ask, is this the negation of the very nature of the object's absence, or is the nature of its absence explained through negation of the object's existence? If the first, the object whose absence is negated becomes eternal. If the second, the negation or absence of the object itself becomes eternal. Refutation of the third explanation of the necessity of destruction. Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction be identified with its being an effect of its counter positive. No. If being an effect means being an effect of this as well, it contradicts necessity. If it means being the effect of this alone, it is unestablished. Can the statement mean that whatever an object produces immediately upon arising is its destruction? Then it would mean only that an effect depends on nothing apart from its aggregate of causes and necessary occurrence would mean only this. Who denies such a statement? But what is the basis for calling the effect itself the destruction of its cause? Is it because the effect differs from the cause, or because the effect is non-different from the absence of the cause? Refutation of the two latter alternatives. The first alternative is certainly untenable. Auxiliary causes also differ from the principal cause, then they too would have to be regarded as the destruction of the principal cause. Further, if absence of the cause is merely an unreal absence, how could a real effect possess it as a quality? And if absence of the cause is non-different from the effect, how can the effect be said to possess that absence? The nature of absence cannot even be defined here. The second alternative is also untenable. It could stand only if, when the effect arose, the cause were not seen although it would have been seen had it remained present or if there were a customary usage that the absence of the cause is non-different from its effect or if there were some proof eliminating the difference between the effect and the causes destruction. Refutation of the first and second alternatives. Of the three alternatives stated above, the first is untenable. When the effect, such as cloth, is produced, auxiliary causes such as the loom are still seen to be present. Can it be said that this loom and the rest differ from the loom that existed before the cloth was produced? No. What proves such a difference? The opponent may ask, what proves their non-difference? Suppose there is no proof, even then, the mere arising of doubt destroys the basis of the argument that the cause is not seen at the time of the effect. The second alternative is also untenable. When one says the cloth has been produced, no one understands this to mean the threads have been destroyed. Is it because part and whole are non-different? So that thread and cloth are not distinct and cloth is merely thread in a particular arrangement that people do not say the threads have been destroyed when cloth is produced? If so, usage 2 does not support the proposed view. Can it be that when cloth is torn and threads or pieces of yarn are again produced, people do not say the cause has been destroyed because a series of effects wholly different from the causal series has arisen? No, that is not so. Objection to the preceding view and its answer. If the unravelled threads are themselves the destruction of the cloth, how can they inherit in the cloth according to Nya Vayika, or be non-different from the cloth according to Buddhist? The cloth was regarded as the destruction of the threads because it was their effect, and the threads produced when the cloth is destroyed were regarded as the destruction of the cloth. Then the cloth and its destruction would both be one and the same thing an inconsistency. Can it be replied that the later threads differ from the earlier ones? No. No generic difference is known between them and individual difference remains to be proved because it depends on the unestablished doctrine of momentariness. If the later threads are regarded as different only from the earlier threads and are called non-different from the destruction of the cloth, that difference itself would be explained through the non-difference of the later threads and the destruction of the cloth, circularity would result. Nevertheless, why not regard the later threads as the destruction of the earlier threads? The only defects in this view are that it has no valid basis and does not accord with ordinary usage. Further, if cloth were destroyed as a result of the destruction of the threads that are its material cause, no threads could remain after the cloth. In this context, usage of the word destruction is determined by other destructive causes. Therefore, the threads cannot be regarded as non-different from the destruction of the cloth. The reply continued. Destruction regarded as non-different from thread either generically excludes or opposes other threads, or it does not. If it does, how can it remain a thread while opposing other members of its own kind? The generic nature of a blue object opposes what is non blue, but it is not itself an instance of another non blue object. If thread does not generically oppose other threads, how can it be the destruction or opponent of the earlier thread? One blue object is not generically opposed to another blue object. Can opposition be accepted only at the level of individual threads and not in their capacity as representatives of a kind? Then we ask, is thread, generically, neither opposed nor unopposed to anything, so that by virtue of being thread it is neither opposed nor unopposed to thread or to anything else? If so, generic opposition among threads has been denied, although it was one of the views advanced above. The doctrine that an effect is the destruction of its cause therefore cannot be rationally maintained. It may be objected if universals are imaginary, what work could generic opposition perform? The answer is that if there is no opposition, the hope of establishing difference through the coexistence of mutually incompatible generic properties disappears because that difference is based precisely on such coexistence. Another objection and reply concerning the relation between destruction and its counter-positive. Could it not be as follows? According to the opponent, destruction or absence is regarded as different from its counter-positive, Nevertheless, one cloth, though devoid of another cloth, retains the nature of cloth, or an absence opposed to one pot may coexist with another pot, and the members of these pairs are not mutually opposed. In the same way, destruction non-different from an effect might retain the same nature as the cause and yet be its destruction. No. We do not accept non-difference, coexistence, or identity of generic nature between absence or destruction and its counter-positive. If these were accepted, the counter-positive would become non-different from its destruction and cease to be a counter-positive, destruction would not be non-contemporaneous with it, and there would be no general incompatibility between their natures. But what defect is there in relating destruction to an object that is not its counter positive? Difference of individuals, difference of universals, and contemporaneity are not opposed to relation, what opposes relation is identity and incompatibility, and we accept neither here. Nor is there any proof opposed to accepting that an object and its destruction are different. Another objection and its answer. If absence is different from its counter positive, it may be asked whether a pot is present together with its prior and posterior absences in its two halves. These absences are accepted as present in the halves, therefore, if absence is different from its counter positive, the pot to may coexist with them. If the The pot is present there, it will exist in the very halves in which its absence occurs. If the pot is not present in the substrate of absence, an infinite regress follows, the pot is absent from the absence in which the pot's absence resides, therefore a second absence must exist within the first, a third within the second, and so on without end. If the usage concerning absence of the pot within the absence of the pot can be explained without positing a second absence, then usage concerning absence of a pot in any other thing can likewise be explained without positing an independent absence distinct from the pot. No, this reasoning is improper. The positive substrate of a negation has a positive nature and therefore is not opposed to the nature of a positive object. If it were opposed to a positive object, it would itself cease to be positive. But if a substrate is treated as an absence merely because it differs from the counter-positive, then even while a pot is present in its substrate, the absence of the pot would also have to be regarded as present there. To explain the cognition that one absence occurs within another, there is no need to imagine a second absence. The natural incompatibility between existence and absence is sufficient to explain this cognition. There is neither experience nor negative reasoning in favor of accepting an infinite series of absences situated within one another. Objection to the preceding answer and the reply. If absence is regarded as different from its counter positive, should a pot not continue to exist even while its destruction is present, since the two are different and the existence of one should not prevent the existence of the other? Is this not the defect in the view. If the pot continues to exist means only that its pot nature continues, we accept this. We do not hold that when the absence or destruction of a pot arises, the pot ceases to be a pot. That the pot exists means that its destruction has not yet arisen, for the destruction or absence of a pot is by nature non contemporaneous with the pot. Then because destruction has no material cause, let it be regarded as costless and therefore necessary since every productive cause is a material cause. No. The valid cognition the pot has now been destroyed which proves the reality of destruction also proves that it is produced. In the inference destruction is not produced because it has no material cause, the invariable concomitance between reason and probandom is initiated by a condition. The condition here is having a positive nature. Every unproduced entity has a positive nature, whereas an absence without a material cause does not have a positive nature. This refutation also defeats the inference of the necessity of destruction based on the reason being itself no objects material cause. Once the distinction between a quality and the substance that is its substrate is established, the reason being no objects material cause will also be shown to deviate, because although no quality is the material cause of anything, qualities are produced. of the final explanation of necessity. The preceding refutation also defeats the possible objection that if destruction requires causes other than its counter positive, the production or assemblage of those causes may be obstructed, so that destruction might never arise and an object might never be destroyed. If such a possibility exists, then when a pot is destroyed its pot shards to might fail to arise. The casualty of destruction must be understood in the same manner as the casualty of the pot shards. Then let the last of the preceding alternatives be accepted. The inference establishing the necessity of destruction would be, destruction is not produced because it is an absence, like the prior absence of an object. Or if destruction is produced, it too is destroyed, because it is produced like a pot. No, these inferences are not valid. Contrary inferences may be formulated, prior absence is produced because it is an absence, or because it is capable of being destroyed, like destruction and a pot. Alternatively, if prior absence is unproduced, it is not destroyed because it is unproduced, like space or a hare's horn. Just as these counter inferences are invalid, so are the original inferences. Statement and rational confirmation of the defects in the Buddhist inferences. What is defective in the inferences advanced above by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist? In the first inference the reason is inconclusive with respect to the probandum because its invariable concomitance with the probandum is determined by the condition positivity. Every known example of the probandum, unproduced, is a positive object since only positive objects are placed in the class of the Unproduced, therefore possessing the Universal of Existence is a condition of this Probandom. Absence does not possess the Universal of Existence. Moreover, the perceptual cognitions that attest the reality of prior and posterior absence oppose this inference. There is also contrary reasoning through negative concomitance, If prior absence itself were produced, an effect could arise before the production of its prior absence. If posterior absence were capable of destruction, a destroyed object could arise again after its posterior absence was destroyed. What defect is there if an object arises again under such circumstances? If so, the temporal interruption experienced in an object's existence before its production and after its destruction would be neither true nor false. If it were false, then just as the displacement of the moon is false in the illusion of two moons, the temporal break in the object's existence would be false here. Consequently, the object could coexist with its prior and posterior absences and the mutual opposition among them would disappear. If the experience were true, the two absences would have to be regarded as mutually different and the view that the object might arise again before or after the production of these absences could not be maintained. The same reasoning refutes the possible inference, if the pot does not exist while prior absence exists, then posterior absence, which opposes the pot, must exist at that time, and if the pot does not exist while posterior absence exists, then prior absence, which opposes the pot, must exist at that time. For just as prior and posterior absence both oppose the pot, so the pot and posterior absence both oppose prior absence, while the pot and prior absence both oppose posterior absence. Positive proof of the persistence of objects. How is the persistence of objects established? On the basis of recognition and the impossibility that universals are momentary. It may be objected that the definition of recognition also applies to recognition of cognitions that change at every moment, such recognition of cognition is false, and therefore recognition concerning the persistence of other objects is also invalid. No. The definition of a valid special kind of recognition does not deviate. This definition is the cognition whose object is devoid of mutually incompatible marks and this mark has already been established in recognition of enduring objects. Can recognition possessing this mark also be false? No. If recognition of the identity of an object devoid of incompatible qualities were false, no identity would remain in any object. Consequently, there would be no difference among objects either, because difference is merely exclusion of identity and nothing but emptiness would remain in Buddhist hands. Thus if objects are known as different, mutually incompatible qualities must coexist in them. If no such coexistence occurs, there is no difference. This is the rule governing practices of identity and difference. Objection to the preceding proof and the answer. In a steady yet spreading lamp flame carefully observed, no coexistence of incompatible qualities appears yet is not mere difference, opposed to recognition, a property of the flame. Yes, but on what valid basis is it concluded that the flame is not one object? The basis is knowledge of the rule that exhaustion of fuel causes a flame to be extinguished. Oil is seen to burn at every moment, and wick and oil are seen to diminish at every moment. The proper conclusion is therefore that the earlier WIC and oil are continuously being replaced by later WIC and oil. But this is precisely the coexistence of incompatible qualities. Destruction of the earlier part and production of the later or changing efficient casualty cannot be properties of one and the same flame. Objection to the answer and its resolution. What can be said of the person who refuses to pay a hundred coins for fear that his head will be cut off, yet readily pays five groups of 20 each? Could there not also be in so-called valid recognition a coexistence of incompatible properties that is not readily visible? If this is admitted as possible, we ask, in the recognition this is that same crystal, do we doubt the incompatibility of properties whose mutual relation has already been validly established? Or do we doubt the coexistence of properties whose incompatibility has already been validly established? Or do we doubt the incompatibility or coexistence of properties whose nature, incompatibility and relation have none of them been established? Refutation of the possible forms of doubt. Of the alternatives stated above, the first is untenable. It has already been refuted in the refutation of the view that capacity and incapacity and the like cannot coexist. The second alternative is also untenable because directly perceived properties known together are not known to be mutually incompatible. The possibility of such imperceptible properties is also denied by the fact that wherever absence of an effect is observed, absence of the corresponding cause is also observed, coexistence of a cause and the absence of its effect is never seen. The third alternative is also untenable. Doubt concerning the coexistence or non coexistence of properties whose nature, incompatibility and relation are wholly unknown would be possible in every recognition. Consequently, identity would everywhere be deprived of being the object of recognition. It has thus been established that invalid recognition there is no coexistence of incompatible properties within the recognized object. Now, if the determining property is abstracted from the definition of recognition and established in real objects, their persistence is proved by inference. The inference is, the object under dispute does not become different when the time of its occurrence changes, because despite difference of time it is not endowed with incompatible properties. Whatever is not endowed with incompatible properties, when something related to it changes does not itself change, as an atom does not itself change even when it becomes conjoined with different atoms. The object under dispute is like the atom, therefore it does not become different even when its time changes. Justification of the preceding inference. No one can doubt the validity of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandum in this inference. The reason in the subject namely, absence of the coexistence of incompatible properties in real objects has already been established. That real objects cannot be momentary, is established by the fact that knowledge of similarity and the practices based on it cannot be explained through momentary objects. Or verbal cognition, reason or inferential cognition, and conceptual cognition cannot produce even an effect as slight as bending a blade of grass without taking some common form of objects as their subject. This is undisputed. Cognition itself cannot be treated as the common form in place of accepting generic properties, but discussion of momentariness or persistence is meaningful only when the reality of external objects is admitted. Examination of the nature of the common form of objects. There are three views concerning the common form of objects. It is an imagined entity, it is a common generic form, or it is an eternal entity. The first view is unacceptable. It cannot be maintained on the basis of experience because no experience apprehends an object's imagined character. If it did, the action prompted by that experience would be contradicted. Action is directed toward a real object, not an imagined one. No person desiring an important result pursues an object once it is understood to be unreal. Can it be said that in conceptual cognition of an object only the exclusion of things different from it appears as the object, while the imagined character of the exclusion does not appear in cognition, thereby removing the difficulty? No. In conceptual cognition only the positive form of the object appears. A word and the reason in an inference do not produce the negative cognition there is no non-fire on this mountain peak, they produce the positive cognition there is fire on this mountain peak. Objection in favor of cognition of exclusion and its refutation. It may be objected that although there is no reflexive cognition, I know exclusion, cognition of the excluding object itself is cognition of exclusion. Cognition of a qualified object is impossible without cognition of the qualifier. Just as in the Nya-Vaika view, although there is no reflexive cognition, I know So the generic property, when an object is known, the common form appears in cognition and conceptual cognition is therefore called cognition of a generic property, so cognition of the excluding thing necessarily entails cognition of exclusion. This reasoning is improper. In ordinary cognition of an object, only the generic property becomes an object its being a generic property does not. In cognition of a cow, an object excluding non-cows does not become the object in such a way that exclusion itself becomes an object of cognition. The reply continued. Conceptual cognition of a cow is not in the form this object is exclusion of non-caus, but this is a cow. If, even without the reflexive cognition, I apprehend the exclusion of things different from a cow, conceptual cognition nevertheless apprehends exclusion, no one can deny that it is cognition of exclusion. Otherwise, a cognition that does not apprehend, an object could still be called cognition of that object, then cognition having the form of a cow could be about a horse. Mere cognition of exclusion also does not produce action toward an object. A person desiring a pot does not move toward it merely on knowing there is no non-pot here. He acts only after knowing there is a pot here. Another objection and its reply. If only exclusion of non-cows is regarded as the object in common cognition of a cow, the preceding defect will be removed, otherwise, because one cow differs from another cow, it would count as a non-cow and would also be negated by exclusion. No. If exclusion or negation of a pot is not negated by the stated exclusion, the necessity implicit in the expression non-pot will not remain. If non-pot is negated, no positive generic nature remains beyond this negation, exclusion of the exclusion of a pot itself would become the positive generic nature. If exclusion of another thing is not the object in common cognition, will a person ordered to tie the cow also tie a horse because the word cow does not convey exclusion of the horse. Yes, that would happen if the horse were itself a cow, but a horse is a horse and a cow is a cow. Otherwise, how could correct cognition depend even upon exclusion? If one exclusion requires another exclusion to distinguish it from other exclusions, those other exclusions must be distinguished by by still further exclusions and an infinite regress results. If exclusion is not distinguished from its substrate and counter positive, any word may prompt action toward any object because exclusion of non-pot would not differ from exclusion of non-cloth. If every exclusion is regarded as unique in its own kind and cognition of one exclusion is prevented from extending to another, the natures of positive objects may equally be regarded as unique in their respective kinds, and the rule by which cognition determines action will remain intact. Refutation of the view that a universal is exclusion of others. Is exclusion itself the universal, distinct from other exclusions, while the positive object is the counter positive of the exclusion that constitutes its nature? No. If a universal is imaginary, how can it constitute the nature of a real positive object? If it is the nature of a real object, it cannot be imaginary. Further, if the universal as exclusion is non-different from a positive real object, it will itself be real. How? Then, could it become the object of false conceptual cognition? A person ordered to tie the cow, does not go to tie a horse, because the cognition produced by those words is not about a horse. Even after seeing the horse and being inclined to approach it, the commanded person turns away on knowing, This is not a cow. What is inconsistent in this? Examination and refutation of generous, give that exclusion is a secondary object of cognition. Then let this argument be presented. No doctrine can disregard the evidence of experience. Who would dare deny that a positive real object appears in cognition? But while the positive object appears, negative exclusion also appears in cognition as its secondary component. If this were not so, a positive property could not determine or qualify. What does not distinguish the Qualific and from things different from it is no qualifier, distinguishing a thing from others is precisely what determines or qualifies it. Just as the words blue lotus and white lotus respectively produce verbal cognitions of a lotus endowed with blueness and whiteness, the place of those qualities is secondary relative to the lotus substance, yet exclusion of non blue and non white lotuses remains embedded within that cognition like an embryo within an embryo. The same may be accepted in all other cases. Very well, let it be so. But now no disagreement remains between us concerning the appearance of a positive object in cognition. If the appearance of the positive object is denied, that is, if qualifier and qualificant do not appear, the qualified character of the qualificant will also not be known. For example, if buneous and lotus-ness do not appear in cognition of a blue lotus, its difference from what is non-blue and non-lotus can never be known. Objection to the preceding view and its answer. Can cognition apprehend exclusion without apprehending the excluded object? Cognition of exclusion depends upon cognition of what is excluded. It may be replied, let exclusion of buffaloes and the like by cowness be the qualificant and let the exclusion residing in the cow be the qualifier, then no positive object will enter conceptual cognition. No, this cannot be accepted, because circularity results. Cognition of the cow depends upon cognition of exclusion of non-cows, while cognition of exclusion of non-Kaus again depends upon cognition of the cow. Cognition of a purely positive object is not tainted by such circularity. In order to know a cow as a cow, it is not always necessary to know it in the form of negation of a non-Ka. In this way the opponent exposed circularity in the Buddhist theory of conceptual cognition. Jinnar, however, misunderstood this objection as concerning the conventional meaning of a word and attempted to answer that the word cow conveys a cow, not a buffalo or another animal, because there are other words for those. This is like the cheap magic displayed by an ordinary conjurer. Only an uncultivated person can be deceived by such slate of hand. Another objection and its answer. Then let an unreal positive object be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition. No, this view is self-contradictory. A positive object is something, while an unreal object is nothing, how can that be one? If unreality is attributed to a positive object because it excludes other objects, then a real momentary particular would also become unreal, because it excludes things different from itself. Universals exclude all other things and may therefore be regarded as unreal, but then how can they remain positive? Another objection to the preceding answer and its resolution. This positive or real discourse applied to unreal universals because their difference from real particulars is not known. No. This would be possible only if a particular sometimes appeared stripped of its positive real nature or if an unreal object appeared freed from its negative nature. Neither occurs. If both real and unreal were wholly devoid of their distinctive marks, they could appear in some form or nature different from themselves, and no form of theirs would remain that did not appear in cognition. The view that an imagined form is inferred in a real object has already been cut off at the root, for superimposition depends upon ignorance of the difference between the superimposed property and its substrate, whereas the possibility of such ignorance is excluded here. Justification for the appearance of a real common form in conceptual cognition. The object of conceptual cognition is a form common to many things. An unreal object cannot be such. Being mere absence, an unreal object cannot by nature be present in one and the same form at different times and places. The stated commonality cannot be imaginary either, because imagination is momentary and cannot last beyond a moment or exist in different places. Nor can commonality be superimposed, because the similarity required for superimposed is not actually present elsewhere in a real form that could be superimposed upon real objects. The view that cognition of similarity is explained by ignorance of difference. Could it be that the different unreal objects of conceptual cognition are not apprehended as mutually different, so that there is not spatiotemporal similarity among them but merely cognition of non-difference, non-difference and that this accounts for cognition of similarity? No. Unreal objects possess no real difference. If they possessed real difference, they would cease to be unreal, because real difference is a property only of real objects. Is their difference actually absent? If so, the real non-difference of the objects of conceptual cognition would be established. Thus cognition of similarity arise from ignorance of a difference superimposed upon the objects. No, a superimposed object cannot remain unknown. Further, if difference is superimposed upon the objects, there is no occasion to superimpose non-difference. Is there ignorance of that difference whose absence is superimposed upon these objects? No. If only the absence of difference is superimposed, difference itself is established as real. If difference is none of these four kinds but indescribable, ignorance of it as the cause of false superimposition of non-difference would be available everywhere. Being the direct meaning of the phrase a property common to both existence and non-existence, what is this property? It cannot be having the nature of both, because existence and non-existence are mutually incompatible. Nor is it being a property of both positive and negative entities, for we do not regard a universal such as Kaunas as a negative property. Nor is it possessing both positive and negative properties, because an individual real object endowed with positive and negative properties is not regarded as wholly negative, hence this reason deviates in an inference intended to establish the negative nature of universals. Nor can the property be similarity to both positive and negative. Such similarity is impossible in a universal. If a universal, a positive object, and a negative absence are all said to be similar because each excludes things different from itself, exclusion is not identical with the probandom of the inference until the universal has first been established as exclusion, consequently, the similarity cannot be accepted. Or can this property be being the object of both positive and negative cognition, this involves both contradiction and an inconclusive reason. What is the object of affirmative cognition in the form, is not also the object of negative cognition in the form, is not. Can one and the same thing be the object of affirmation in one respect and of negation in another, or be present in one place and absent in another? Yes. But then a universal to may be regarded as an object of affirmation or as positive in precisely this way, without being treated as exclusion. If the positive and negative natures of objects are not established as mutually incompatible, The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom in the preceding inference will not be established. The question may now be raised if a universal is positive and an object of affirmation, what further does an affirmative word convey about it? The counter question is if a universal has a negative nature, what further does negation remove or deny from it? Should a universal for this reason be regarded as having a nature common to both positive and negative? No. Such an imagined common nature cannot be both positive and negative at once, nor can it be the exclusion of both, because positive and negative are mutually incompatible. Review of the entire discussion. Affirmative and negative verbs used with a subject in a sentence respectively state the presence and absence in that subject of some property other than the universal, or if that presence or absence has already Being stated by another means, they indicate its necessity. Both kinds of verb are therefore meaningful. Even when a universal is accepted as a purely positive object, these two functions of the verb remain. But if the universal is imaginary, no property can be attributed to it. How can a new property be attributed to an imaginary thing, or the necessity of an already attributed property be stated? This special defect initiates the view that universals are imaginary. The word cow conveys only an individual object endowed with cow-ness. But such an individual may exist in a distant place or at another time, and therefore the word cow alone does not satisfy the inquiry of a person desiring an important result or action. The person wishes to know a definite fact concerning the cow. That desire is satisfied by the information. In the cow shed there is a beautiful cow with black eyes, an udder like a pitcher, and a large bell around her neck. These qualifiers are generally affirmed of the cow or if already affirmed their necessity is indicated. Thus the view that a word conveys a positive universal is free from defect. Thus the word cow itself produce cognition of a real or unreal animal endowed with cowness so that use of the verb is in the sentence a cow exists is unnecessary for conveying the individual? No. Is converse existence, which the word cow does not, it is therefore necessary to communicate this additional meaning? Objection to generous inference and the reply. Jannar, who calls himself an expert, presents an inference in which cognition of a universal is the subject, if a cognition appears as related to both the existence and non-existence of an object, it is not a cognition of that object, just as cognition of a cow is not cognition of a horse. This inference is initiated by confusion of reason and probandom. For example, if cowness being related to both the existence and non-existence of something like a horse, is the same as not taking the horse as its object, then being related to both the existence and non-existence of a cow will likewise be the same as not taking the cow as its object. Thus reason and probandom merge into each other. Refutation of the third definition of the reason If the reason is producing a desire concerning the existence or non-existence of the object, it becomes excessively narrow and confined to the subject alone. The cognition of a cow used as the example produces no desire concerning the existence or non-existence of a horse, therefore, if for this reason it is not cognition of a horse, it would not be cognition of a cow either. If the desire produced is treated as a particular kind and restricted to the existence or non-existence of the object at a definite place or time, the reason becomes contrary to the probandom. A cognition that does not take an object as its subject does not produce a desire to determine that object's particular existence or non-existence. If it did, cognition of a cow would produce a desire to determine the existence of a horse. Refutation of the fourth definition of the reason. Is the reason non-apprehension of the object's existence and non-existence? No. If the object's existence and non-existence are non-different from the object itself, cognition cannot fail to apprehend the object. The Nya-Vaika position does not accept that cognition of a cow fails to apprehend the cow, and in the Buddhist position this has not yet been established. If existence and non-existence differ from the object, the reason deviates. There is no rule that a cognition failing to apprehend a property in herring in but different from an object also fails to apprehend the object. to the preceding refutation and the answer. The objection is that such a rule does exist. A cognition that does not apprehend the qualities inherent in an object does not apprehend the object either. For example, cognition of a cow and the word cow neither apprehend nor denote the qualities of a horse and therefore neither apprehend nor denote the horse. Cognition of a cow and the word cow stand in the same relation to qualities such as buneus in a cow, they neither apprehend nor denote the cow's buneus. Thus, when the pervading member of the invariable concomitance is absent, the pervaded member cognition of the object is also absent. The Buddhist says that when an object itself is known, knowledge of some of its qualities and ignorance of others are possible only if cognitions receive different impressions and if difference of impressions results from differences in the capacities of their causes. But this explanation leads to infinite regress, because to explain difference of capacity one must posit a further difference of capacity within capacity. If capacities are not different, their effects or products will not be different either, consequently, an object will be known together with all its qualities or not known at all. These are the only two possibilities, therefore the stated invariable concomitance is established. All this is mistaken. If a quality and the object that is its substrate are mutually different, cognition of one and ignorance of the other can be explained by the non-simultaneous presence of the respective causal complexes that produce their cognitions. Cognition of qualities and cognition of the qualified object arise from their own causal complexes because the two cognitions differ by nature, and this natural difference results from difference of their causes. difference of causes is established by the positive and negative concomitance between causes and their respective effects, while that concomitance is established through the occurrence of the effects consisting in cognition and non-cognition of the object and its qualities.

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