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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 23:19
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0:02–0:32परसव्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्
0:32–0:38I knew this shell is silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing
0:38–0:43the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as
0:43–0:47its object, and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that
0:47–0:52object. Reflexive awareness is veridical cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise
0:52–0:56even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be required.
0:56–1:02nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is
1:02–1:06non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition.
1:07–1:11Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended,
1:11–1:14reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises.
1:15–1:19One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time
1:19–1:23difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established
1:23–1:29by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell is silver,
1:29–1:33it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of
1:33–1:38the non-relation of the qualifier silverness, therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of
1:38–1:42invalid qualified cognition the shell is silver can arise at all.
1:43–1:47The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver.
1:48–1:53The instrumental expression, as silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver,
1:53–1:55qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualificant.
1:56–2:00Veridical qualify cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:00–2:04therefore invalid qualify cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object.
2:05–2:10In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present, and qualify cognition
2:10–2:14necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore the Naya Yaka
2:14–2:18theory of misapprehension is not the sotranthika Buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or
2:18–2:22apprehension of the unreal.
2:22–2:27Explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions
2:27–2:31Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and
2:31–2:35sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain
2:35–2:37fixed.
2:37–2:39This objection is unsound.
2:39–2:42A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator.
2:42–2:47For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective and sound
2:47–2:52sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen.
2:52–2:56When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously
2:56–3:00arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise
3:00–3:02at all.
3:02–3:07The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are
3:07–3:09mutually independent.
3:09–3:13If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the
3:13–3:19earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition not yet produced
3:19–3:25sublate in earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet
3:25–3:31arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component
3:31–3:36of illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore
3:36–3:41cannot be sublated. The qualitative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as
3:41–3:47quality can cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred,
3:47–3:52future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated.
3:52–3:57Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid
3:57–4:03cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition.
4:03–4:06Confidence in cognitive validity
4:06–4:10Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika admit
4:10–4:15some cognitions to be invalid. This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity
4:15–4:20has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhupāda Kāra view too,
4:20–4:24how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the
4:24–4:28non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things
4:28–4:33are observed in many cases. It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of
4:33–4:36the non-relation of an existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this
4:36–4:41an existent thing, is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the
4:41–4:46basis of cognition of an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises,
4:46–4:51a sublating cognition removes it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a
4:51–4:56general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence
4:56–5:00in validity can be explained merely from absence of a sublating cognition.
5:01–5:05The men's arc cannot explain confidence in validity without another cognition of an
5:05–5:10an existent object. The method by which distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference
5:10–5:15has already been explained. Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on
5:15–5:18the Nayayika view.
5:18–5:25A third view concerning confidence in validity. Some others say that in silver directly seen,
5:25–5:29absence of the remembered incapable contrary shellhood itself becomes the substrate or
5:29–5:35cognition of it. This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive
5:35–5:41validity is established. When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell,
5:41–5:45an incapable contrary substrate, confidence in validity becomes possible through another
5:45–5:51cognition of difference. This proposal is unsound. On both MMA with
5:51–5:56Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through
5:56–6:01another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student.
6:01–6:05In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference,
6:05–6:10cognition explicitly presents identity. How then will the memsake establish the state of
6:10–6:12cognition of an existent object?
6:13–6:16A defect causes illusion.
6:17–6:21Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition.
6:21–6:25This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its
6:25–6:28produced result, invalid cognition.
6:29–6:33It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell
6:33–6:36both shell and silver are real and existent.
6:36–6:41Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is
6:41–6:47additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist.
6:47–6:52If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows.
6:52–6:57The superimposed relation need not be unreal here.
6:57–7:01The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent
7:01–7:05shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that
7:05–7:10places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object
7:10–7:14had opposed to the qualifier. This defect is clear in such cognition.
7:16–7:20The earlier Neyayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal.
7:22–7:26The earlier Nyayaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become objects
7:26–7:31of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending
7:31–7:36the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal
7:36–7:41entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. There is no reason to
7:41–7:46admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent qualifier and
7:46–7:51qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object
7:51–7:57equally afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and Naya does not arise. The complete causal
7:57–8:01aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability
8:01–8:06therefore applies only to the Memsaka view. Bhakaspati Mishra likewise says,
8:06–8:10a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the object exists in another is
8:10–8:16unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object. Thus ends the theory of misapprehension
8:16–8:20in the perception section of the Tatva Sintmaya of Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
8:20–8:30The theory of the definition of perception. Four kinds of valid cognition.
8:30–8:37Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition.
8:37–8:47Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly four perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means.
8:47–8:53Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures.
8:53–8:57This will be explained further below.
8:57–9:03Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception.
9:03–9:09The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as non-deviant, that is,
9:09–9:13veridical cognition produced by contact between sense-faculty and object.
9:13–9:18Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition,
9:18–9:22cognition, because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and
9:22–9:27the self as object. It under extends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced
9:27–9:32by any relation. Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot
9:32–9:37be generalized. If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called
9:37–9:42contact, distinguishing it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness.
9:42–9:46The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense
9:46–9:50faculty or the object would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by
9:50–9:54either one of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced
9:54–10:00by either the mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition,
10:00–10:04including the sense faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence.
10:04–10:09Nor can perception be defined as veritical experience not produced by a previously known
10:09–10:15specific instrument. Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce
10:15–10:22If an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to inferential cognition.
10:22–10:32Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under extends to qualify perception produced from cognition of a qualifier.
10:32–10:38Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular manifestor.
10:38–10:50If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness.
10:50–10:55Directness is the definition of perception.
10:55–10:59The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition.
10:59–11:04In perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present,
11:04–11:10reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness.
11:10–11:13Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise
11:13–11:18the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense
11:18–11:21faculty itself would become super sensible.
11:21–11:27The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifesto is unsound.
11:27–11:31Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the universal
11:31–11:35directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad.
11:35–11:39A recurrent manifesto is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestos
11:39–11:45are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain.
11:45–11:49Conversely, presence of a regular manifesto may itself obstruct establishing a universal,
11:49–11:54manifesto can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception,
11:54–11:59the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing cognition of its substrate.
12:01–12:04Produced directness is the definition of produced perception.
12:06–12:11The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced
12:11–12:15from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinant cognition
12:15–12:20concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation,
12:20–12:25and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects.
12:25–12:29Such cognition is produced direct cognition.
12:29–12:33Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through universal
12:33–12:37characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related to an
12:37–12:40object generated by a sense faculty.
12:40–12:43Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as
12:43–12:45its own object.
12:45–12:49inference, verbal cognition, and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as
12:49–12:54qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only
12:54–13:00as in hearing cause. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a
13:00–13:07sense faculty. A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood,
13:07–13:11therefore the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity.
13:11–13:20The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood, otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions.
13:20–13:29Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition whose cause is cognition.
13:29–13:36Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but not memory.
13:36–13:42memory. Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of
13:42–13:48mind of which they are substrates produces memory. Alternatively, sense facultyhood is
13:48–13:52being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces cognition but is not the substrate
13:52–13:57of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound.
13:57–14:01The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another
14:01–14:08cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument
14:08–14:14because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception
14:14–14:19concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of
14:19–14:26qualified perception, because there is no proof for this. In recognition, this is that very
14:26–14:30thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the instrument through the
14:30–14:36operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony, the condition
14:36–14:42produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental impression causes memory
14:42–14:51alone. The Prabhupāda view, direct cognition is perception. The Prabhupāda says that perceptual
14:51–14:56cognition is direct cognition. Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular
14:56–15:02a manifestor. Nor is cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because
15:02–15:08it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition. A cognition that,
15:08–15:12concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning
15:12–15:18that object. In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual,
15:18–15:23because it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning
15:23–15:27a universal is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and
15:27–15:32individual. Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity
15:32–15:36and the like, qualified cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without
15:36–15:41cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception
15:41–15:46of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object.
15:46–15:49Inference and recognition are indirect in the probandom and atness components, but
15:49–15:54both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components.
15:54–16:00Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view.
16:00–16:04A partial msaka says that recognition, I know that this is that manifests thatness only
16:04–16:10as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness,
16:10–16:13therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component.
16:13–16:18But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the
16:18–16:22the probandum as cognition of the mark.
16:22–16:26Recutation of the Prabhācāra view.
16:26–16:31The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component,
16:31–16:35it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent.
16:35–16:41If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause,
16:41–16:45recognition in the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated.
16:45–16:51It is needlessly complex to hold that sense-production independent of cognition of that-ness regulates
16:51–16:56the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the this-ness component,
16:56–17:00because it arises from a sense-faculty together with another cognition.
17:00–17:05It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within
17:05–17:08one recognition.
17:08–17:11It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct
17:11–17:14components this-ness and that-ness.
17:14–17:18Both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced
17:18–17:20by the sense faculty.
17:20–17:23Inferential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer
17:23–17:27components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes
17:27–17:29only direct cognition.
17:29–17:33If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the
17:33–17:36probandom component too must be mind-generated.
17:36–17:41Making, the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate, regulate perceptuality
17:41–17:43is excessively complex.
17:43–17:48in general is not cognitionhood, because cognitionhood is unproduced, and no single combined causal
17:48–17:52aggregate for all cognition is established.
17:52–17:57Refutation of the Prima-Facey definition.
17:57–18:01Cognition has no parts, therefore only its components are objects of cognition, not
18:01–18:06constituents. Another determinate cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition,
18:06–18:09otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and
18:09–18:15thatness objects because those objects are not produced from another determinate cognition.
18:15–18:18It may be said that in recognition cognition of thatness taking thatness as object is a
18:18–18:23cause, in inference cognition of the probandom taking the probandom as object is a cause,
18:23–18:27but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning
18:27–18:31cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate, while the complete causal aggregate of cognition
18:31–18:33is the cause.
18:33–18:35This proposal is unsound.
18:35–18:39Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes,
18:39–18:43another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition.
18:43–18:47This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the
18:47–18:52staff as qualifier causes qualifier cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognition
18:52–18:58hood is not an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the probandom.
18:58–19:02Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing
19:02–19:06in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes
19:06–19:11qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition of recurrence
19:11–19:16would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the prima facie definition
19:16–19:20of perception as that for which another cognition is not an instrument is impossible.
19:22–19:29Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view was refuted, perceptual cognition
19:29–19:34is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is
19:34–19:39only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an
19:39–19:46impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive.
19:46–19:50This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff-bearer, because perception concerning
19:50–19:55the staff-bearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff.
19:55–20:00Nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified
20:00–20:06experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression
20:06–20:12produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory.
20:14–20:17Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition.
20:20–20:24Via the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation.
20:26–20:30A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception.
20:30–20:36perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense faculty and object.
20:36–20:40Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color
20:40–20:43and action arises through conjunction come inheritance.
20:43–20:46Since universals such as colorness in here in color and the like in hearing in the
20:46–20:50conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come inheritance in the
20:50–20:52inherent.
20:52–20:55Sound is perceived through its inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through
20:55–20:58its inheritance in sound in hearing in that sense.
20:58–21:02of sound is perceived through qualitative or intrinsic relation.
21:02–21:06Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through qualitative relation
21:06–21:09in a substrate conjoined with the sense.
21:09–21:12Perception arises only from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation
21:12–21:16to an imperceptible object is never a cause.
21:16–21:23Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause.
21:23–21:26Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited
21:26–21:31by minit atomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of
21:31–21:36the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause. In perception
21:36–21:41of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the cause.
21:41–21:45The argument that, conjunction with the apprehensible object, is more economical than, conjunction
21:45–21:50with the parts, and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause, is unsound. Conjunction
21:50–21:54with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the
21:54–21:58object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also
21:58–22:04refuted. Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through
22:04–22:08conjunction delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be
22:08–22:13established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction
22:13–22:18would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the
22:18–22:21minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable.
22:21–22:29Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause.
22:29–22:31This view is unsound.
22:31–22:34Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in
22:34–22:39general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the self, thus particles
22:39–22:42dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles.
22:42–22:46Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular
22:46–22:49substances such as pots.
22:49–22:53of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible
22:53–22:57object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction
22:57–23:00of the sense with its own apprehensible object.
23:00–23:04If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction
23:04–23:10with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating cause.
23:10–23:15Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible
23:15–23:16by that sense.

Plain text

परसव्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष् I knew this shell is silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object, and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object. Reflexive awareness is veridical cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be required. nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition. Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended, reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises. One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell is silver, it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness, therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid qualified cognition the shell is silver can arise at all. The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver. The instrumental expression, as silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver, qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualificant. Veridical qualify cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore invalid qualify cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object. In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present, and qualify cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore the Naya Yaka theory of misapprehension is not the sotranthika Buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal. Explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain fixed. This objection is unsound. A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator. For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective and sound sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen. When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise at all. The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate in earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated. The qualitative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as quality can cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred, future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated. Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition. Confidence in cognitive validity Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika admit some cognitions to be invalid. This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhupāda Kāra view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things are observed in many cases. It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this an existent thing, is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arc cannot explain confidence in validity without another cognition of an an existent object. The method by which distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference has already been explained. Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the Nayayika view. A third view concerning confidence in validity. Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it. This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive validity is established. When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell, an incapable contrary substrate, confidence in validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference. This proposal is unsound. On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student. In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference, cognition explicitly presents identity. How then will the memsake establish the state of cognition of an existent object? A defect causes illusion. Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition. This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its produced result, invalid cognition. It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell both shell and silver are real and existent. Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist. If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows. The superimposed relation need not be unreal here. The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object had opposed to the qualifier. This defect is clear in such cognition. The earlier Neyayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal. The earlier Nyayaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and Naya does not arise. The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the Memsaka view. Bhakaspati Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object. Thus ends the theory of misapprehension in the perception section of the Tatva Sintmaya of Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of the definition of perception. Four kinds of valid cognition. Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition. Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly four perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means. Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures. This will be explained further below. Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception. The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as non-deviant, that is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense-faculty and object. Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition, cognition, because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as object. It under extends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced by any relation. Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized. If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness. The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty or the object would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced by either the mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence. Nor can perception be defined as veritical experience not produced by a previously known specific instrument. Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce If an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to inferential cognition. Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under extends to qualify perception produced from cognition of a qualifier. Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular manifestor. If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness. Directness is the definition of perception. The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition. In perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness. Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible. The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifesto is unsound. Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad. A recurrent manifesto is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestos are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain. Conversely, presence of a regular manifesto may itself obstruct establishing a universal, manifesto can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing cognition of its substrate. Produced directness is the definition of produced perception. The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinant cognition concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation, and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects. Such cognition is produced direct cognition. Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related to an object generated by a sense faculty. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its own object. inference, verbal cognition, and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only as in hearing cause. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty. A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity. The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood, otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions. Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition whose cause is cognition. Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but not memory. memory. Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind of which they are substrates produces memory. Alternatively, sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound. The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this. In recognition, this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental impression causes memory alone. The Prabhupāda view, direct cognition is perception. The Prabhupāda says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition. Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular a manifestor. Nor is cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition. A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning that object. In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual, because it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual. Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object. Inference and recognition are indirect in the probandom and atness components, but both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components. Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view. A partial msaka says that recognition, I know that this is that manifests thatness only as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness, therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component. But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the the probandum as cognition of the mark. Recutation of the Prabhācāra view. The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component, it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent. If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause, recognition in the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated. It is needlessly complex to hold that sense-production independent of cognition of that-ness regulates the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the this-ness component, because it arises from a sense-faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition. It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct components this-ness and that-ness. Both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced by the sense faculty. Inferential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes only direct cognition. If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the probandom component too must be mind-generated. Making, the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate, regulate perceptuality is excessively complex. in general is not cognitionhood, because cognitionhood is unproduced, and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established. Refutation of the Prima-Facey definition. Cognition has no parts, therefore only its components are objects of cognition, not constituents. Another determinate cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and thatness objects because those objects are not produced from another determinate cognition. It may be said that in recognition cognition of thatness taking thatness as object is a cause, in inference cognition of the probandom taking the probandom as object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate, while the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause. This proposal is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff as qualifier causes qualifier cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognition hood is not an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the probandom. Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which another cognition is not an instrument is impossible. Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view was refuted, perceptual cognition is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff-bearer, because perception concerning the staff-bearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff. Nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory. Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition. Via the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation. A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception. perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense faculty and object. Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color and action arises through conjunction come inheritance. Since universals such as colorness in here in color and the like in hearing in the conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come inheritance in the inherent. Sound is perceived through its inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through its inheritance in sound in hearing in that sense. of sound is perceived through qualitative or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through qualitative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object is never a cause. Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause. Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minit atomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause. In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the cause. The argument that, conjunction with the apprehensible object, is more economical than, conjunction with the parts, and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause, is unsound. Conjunction with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also refuted. Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable. Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause. This view is unsound. Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the self, thus particles dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles. Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular substances such as pots. of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object. If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating cause. Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense.

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