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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996014)
Duration: 21:12
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33दोक्ट्रन विलिदिदि लिए प्रदूस्त भाषावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावा
0:33–0:38present, a defect corresponding to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and
0:38–0:43the light produces invalid cognition. Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from
0:43–0:47perception of the distinguishing feature and absence of jaundice and the light,
0:47–0:51but not from mere absence of defects. An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of
0:51–0:56valid cognition, why then should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically
0:56–1:02by an additional cause? Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity,
1:02–1:06because of deviation, overextension, and similar defects,
1:06–1:09regularity is not based on relations between individuals.
1:10–1:15Consequently the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive
1:15–1:21to production of the effect and recurrent. Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent
1:21–1:26cause excluding irregular effects must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
1:26–1:33Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous
1:33–1:36to the clay that causes a pot.
1:36–1:41Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental.
1:41–1:46An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and
1:46–1:50this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to
1:50–1:54pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation.
1:54–1:59Before the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous
1:59–2:05to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition,
2:05–2:07like a pot.
2:07–2:12Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid
2:12–2:17cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because,
2:17–2:21like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition does not suffer from proving
2:21–2:24what is already established.
2:24–2:29This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect.
2:29–2:34The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must
2:34–2:38also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
2:38–2:43The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and
2:43–2:48is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot.
2:48–2:54To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted.
2:54–2:59An effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this
2:59–3:03contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition,
3:03–3:07so there is no deviation in the causal relation.
3:07–3:11Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to
3:11–3:16the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid
3:16–3:21cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition.
3:21–3:25Nor does the following inference prove what is already established, valid cognition is
3:25–3:30produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition,
3:30–3:32it is a produced cognition.
3:32–3:37The reason is that the Neyayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid
3:37–3:41cognition in general.
3:41–3:45Examples and justification of other inferences.
3:45–3:50Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effect hood, because, like invalidity, it
3:50–3:54is a property residing in all effects without obstruction.
3:54–3:59But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood, because it is
3:59–4:05nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood.
4:05–4:09There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties
4:09–4:12as delimiters of effect hood.
4:12–4:17that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is
4:17–4:22also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general.
4:22–4:27Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production
4:27–4:30of non-eternal valid cognition.
4:30–4:34Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines
4:34–4:39a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal
4:39–4:44cognition hood because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood.
4:45–4:48This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect.
4:50–4:54It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining
4:54–5:00a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition
5:00–5:05because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pot hood.
5:05–5:12Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause.
5:12–5:29Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from visual illusion, like pot hood.
5:29–5:35Again, being a non-eternal veritical cognition of silver delimits an effect hood determining
5:35–5:39a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid
5:39–5:44cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent
5:44–5:47from an illusion of silver, like pothood.
5:47–5:52Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver
5:52–5:56makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent
5:56–5:58from silver its mode.
5:58–6:03Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced
6:03–6:08extrinsically by a distinct cause.
6:08–6:12Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes
6:12–6:16of validity and invalidity.
6:16–6:20The men-saka objects that in the inference whose pro-bandam is, being produced by a cause
6:20–6:24different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid
6:24–6:26cognition is an extraneous condition.
6:26–6:30It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition,
6:30–6:35Nayaikas regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that
6:35–6:39which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative
6:39–6:44instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but because of complexity, a property excluding
6:44–6:49the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition
6:49–6:54merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is
6:54–6:59the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there. This objection
6:59–7:04is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility,
7:04–7:08the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition
7:08–7:11cannot pervade the probandom or make the reason deviant.
7:12–7:17The Msaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition,
7:17–7:22thus validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone.
7:23–7:27A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but
7:27–7:32merely distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like staff would delimiting causality.
7:33–7:39This reasoning is unsound. When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a
7:39–7:45crystal does not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because
7:45–7:51absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition.
7:51–8:03answer valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits including complete sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature invalid cognition arises in their absence
8:03–8:13what prevents us then from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition
8:13–8:17absence of merit is not a cause
8:17–8:23Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be
8:23–8:27conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent.
8:27–8:31Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object,
8:31–8:36absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition.
8:36–8:40It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a nonexistent
8:40–8:44object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes
8:44–8:48only existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only nonexistent
8:48–8:53objects. Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no
8:53–8:59proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition
8:59–9:04of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object. Answer, then
9:04–9:08simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition of an
9:08–9:13existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent object.
9:13–9:18Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and the
9:18–9:23same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot
9:23–9:25reside in the same substrate.
9:25–9:29Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes absence of defect
9:29–9:32because of valid cognition.
9:32–9:36The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim,
9:36–9:40some merits cause some valid cognitions.
9:40–9:44It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily
9:44–9:46arise from absence of merit.
9:46–9:51Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily
9:51–9:53arise from defects.
9:53–9:58If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of
9:58–10:04merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either.
10:04–10:09Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause
10:09–10:18A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition.
10:18–10:23Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid cognition.
10:23–10:32Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition.
10:32–10:36Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once jaundice
10:36–10:41is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises.
10:41–10:45A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property.
10:45–10:49If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion
10:49–10:53in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being
10:53–10:57the counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual
10:57–11:02dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself.
11:02–11:06If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even considering
11:06–11:10a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would consequently be
11:10–11:12invalid rather than valid.
11:12–11:16If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies
11:16–11:19equally to merits.
11:19–11:25Saka objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition.
11:25–11:30The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither
11:30–11:33valid nor invalid cognition.
11:33–11:38Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that
11:38–11:44bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises.
11:44–11:49Here absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should
11:49–11:54be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well.
11:54–11:58Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because
11:58–12:04As the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch.
12:04–12:08It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I
12:08–12:13am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a
12:13–12:14merit.
12:14–12:18Answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception
12:18–12:22of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity
12:22–12:25error does not arise.
12:25–12:29It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition
12:29–12:34of that hair arises when there is ocular contact nearly with other hair of the same class, and
12:34–12:36not in its absence.
12:36–12:41Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise
12:41–12:45be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere.
12:45–12:50Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair
12:50–12:55located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other
12:55–12:57hair of the same class.
12:57–13:02Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because
13:02–13:08if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid.
13:08–13:12It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature
13:12–13:18causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence,
13:18–13:24of the distinction, will cause valid cognition. Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature
13:24–13:29causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit
13:29–13:39or positive operation. The M'saka view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality.
13:39–13:43Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are
13:43–13:49necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect. It should
13:49–13:54not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must be generalized
13:54–13:59as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony, mere non-perception
13:59–14:04of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition. It is possible to generalize
14:04–14:09jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid cognition, otherwise
14:09–14:14their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce invalid cognition.
14:14–14:20Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect
14:20–14:25relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total absence of
14:25–14:31all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing
14:31–14:35feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent,
14:35–14:41lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity
14:41–14:46of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition
14:46–14:51of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one
14:51–14:55distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a
14:55–15:00distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid
15:00–15:04cognition, it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause
15:04–15:08of valid cognition of itself, infinite regress follows.
15:08–15:13A further objection in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object
15:13–15:18contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent,
15:18–15:21therefore a defect causes invalid cognition.
15:21–15:25If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow
15:25–15:29that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid.
15:29–15:34Invalid cognition, being produced by contact, would also acquire perceptuality.
15:34–15:38Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither
15:38–15:43by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty.
15:43–15:47When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished.
15:47–15:52If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both overextension
15:52–15:56to invalid inference and lack of recurrence.
15:56–16:00Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition
16:00–16:05and incognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present
16:05–16:08in invalid cognition.
16:08–16:12Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional
16:12–16:17recurrent merit is unnecessary.
16:17–16:22The Nyayaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent.
16:22–16:27The Nyayaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid
16:27–16:28cognitions.
16:28–16:32Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of pavasion belonging
16:32–16:37to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception,
16:37–16:41inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is established by positive
16:41–16:46and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects
16:46–16:50of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is
16:50–16:55a specific merit of perception. The men's arc a proposes that only the cause
16:55–16:58of perception of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception,
16:58–17:04absence of valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception
17:04–17:09of the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception
17:09–17:12of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then,
17:12–17:17if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in
17:17–17:22human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing
17:22–17:27hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Nayaika will ask how perception
17:27–17:32of the pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception
17:32–17:37of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error.
17:37–17:41On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition
17:41–17:44of an individual arising after doubt or error.
17:44–17:51But this proposal too is unsound. Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing
17:51–17:55features of each person, the causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore
17:55–17:59cannot cause all valid cognitions of individuals arising after doubt or error.
18:00–18:05Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises from a
18:05–18:12specific cause, namely perception of the distinction. Conclusion, merit is a cause,
18:12–18:15and the nature of merit in inference and the other means of knowledge.
18:18–18:22Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and not
18:22–18:26perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception.
18:26–18:31answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate
18:31–18:36is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here. Thus
18:36–18:40cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while contrary
18:40–18:46cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator and sublated
18:46–18:53would be impossible. It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even in
18:53–18:57invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of
18:57–18:59a post.
18:59–19:04Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because
19:04–19:10a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated.
19:10–19:15Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the
19:15–19:19sublator, here only cognition produced by veridical perception of a distinguishing
19:19–19:22feature has been called the sublator.
19:22–19:26The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of the conch's
19:26–19:30whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived, and therefore perception of the
19:30–19:35distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound.
19:35–19:39Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition.
19:39–19:43Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes the illusion of a post,
19:43–19:47the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion, and in the identity
19:47–19:49era, I am fair.
19:49–19:53invalid cognition of a post-arising after doubt because a defect is present, no such perception
19:53–19:55of the distinction occurs.
19:55–20:01Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively
20:01–20:06of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting
20:06–20:11in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition
20:11–20:14of sentence meaning are established as causes.
20:14–20:18Thus valid cognition arises from merit.
20:18–20:22Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition
20:22–20:27of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is
20:27–20:30established.
20:30–20:34That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition.
20:34–20:38Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid
20:38–20:41perceptual cognition.
20:41–20:45But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction,
20:45–20:48So this is not its cause.
20:48–20:52Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects such
20:52–20:54as an illusory mark.
20:54–20:58True subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes.
20:58–21:04Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition
21:04–21:08of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of validated cognition as
21:08–21:09well.

Plain text

दोक्ट्रन विलिदिदि लिए प्रदूस्त भाषावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावावा present, a defect corresponding to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the light produces invalid cognition. Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature and absence of jaundice and the light, but not from mere absence of defects. An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause? Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension, and similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals. Consequently the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive to production of the effect and recurrent. Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to the clay that causes a pot. Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental. An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation. Before the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition does not suffer from proving what is already established. This recurrent cause must be conducive to producing the effect. The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot. To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted. An effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so there is no deviation in the causal relation. Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition. Nor does the following inference prove what is already established, valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. The reason is that the Neyayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid cognition in general. Examples and justification of other inferences. Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effect hood, because, like invalidity, it is a property residing in all effects without obstruction. But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood, because it is nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood. There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties as delimiters of effect hood. that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognition hood because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood. This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect. It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion like pot hood. Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from visual illusion, like pot hood. Again, being a non-eternal veritical cognition of silver delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from an illusion of silver, like pothood. Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent from silver its mode. Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes of validity and invalidity. The men-saka objects that in the inference whose pro-bandam is, being produced by a cause different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid cognition is an extraneous condition. It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition, Nayaikas regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there. This objection is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot pervade the probandom or make the reason deviant. The Msaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone. A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like staff would delimiting causality. This reasoning is unsound. When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition. answer valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits including complete sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature invalid cognition arises in their absence what prevents us then from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition absence of merit is not a cause Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is nonexistent. Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object, absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition. It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a nonexistent object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only nonexistent objects. Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object. Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent object. Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and the same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot reside in the same substrate. Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes absence of defect because of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions. It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either. Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition. Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises. A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property. If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself. If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid. If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies equally to merits. Saka objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition. The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither valid nor invalid cognition. Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises. Here absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well. Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because As the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch. It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a merit. Answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity error does not arise. It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition of that hair arises when there is ocular contact nearly with other hair of the same class, and not in its absence. Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere. Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other hair of the same class. Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid. It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence, of the distinction, will cause valid cognition. Answer, perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect, not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation. The M'saka view, absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality. Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect. It should not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony, mere non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition. It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition, it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect causes invalid cognition. If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. Invalid cognition, being produced by contact, would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both overextension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence. Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and incognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Nyayaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent. The Nyayaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of pavasion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is a specific merit of perception. The men's arc a proposes that only the cause of perception of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, absence of valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise why would mere perception of the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then, if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. Humanity in an object possessing hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Nayaika will ask how perception of the pervader is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. But this proposal too is unsound. Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions of individuals arising after doubt or error. Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction. Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other means of knowledge. Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception. answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here. Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator and sublated would be impossible. It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even in invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of a post. Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated. Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the sublator, here only cognition produced by veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived, and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features opposes the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion, and in the identity era, I am fair. invalid cognition of a post-arising after doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs. Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit. Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established. That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition. Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid perceptual cognition. But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction, So this is not its cause. Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects such as an illusory mark. True subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes. Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of validated cognition as well.

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