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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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asr-draft

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en (0.995446)

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28:39

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1. 0:02–0:06the established doctrine of defeat
2. 0:06–0:11the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum is the defect
3. 0:11–0:1980. the established doctrine is that certainty of the absence of the probandum in the subject arises from certainty of the validity of cognition of that absence
4. 0:19–0:27otherwise validity would be pointless, because if mere cognition of an object produced certainty of that object, erroneous cognition would yield the same result
5. 0:27–0:37Therefore, certainty of deviation or of an inhibitor arises only when the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition.
6. 0:37–0:45Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason.
7. 0:45–0:51Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference.
8. 0:51–0:5881. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject
9. 0:58–1:02did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion
10. 1:02–1:06and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom
11. 1:06–1:10and establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain.
12. 1:12–1:16But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been
13. 1:16–1:23apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason.
14. 1:23–1:28Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is
15. 1:28–1:33known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise.
16. 1:33–1:38The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of
17. 1:38–1:42the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason.
18. 1:42–1:48Here veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not the defect.
19. 1:48–1:4982.
20. 1:49–1:50Objection.
21. 1:50–1:51Veridical cognition.
22. 1:51–1:56Here the reason is present and the probandom absent, that is, cognition of deviation,
23. 1:56–2:00should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect.
24. 2:00–2:04Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition
25. 2:04–2:07of validity would fail to inhibit inference.
26. 2:07–2:11It may again be said that the cognition, there is veridical cognition of the absence
27. 2:11–2:16of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its
28. 2:16–2:21own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom.
29. 2:21–2:24Answer, this is not sound.
30. 2:24–2:27Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the
31. 2:27–2:32absence of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat.
32. 2:32–2:35The same rule is observed in verbal cognition.
33. 2:35–2:38Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly
34. 2:38–2:43related to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason.
35. 2:43–2:48In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation.
36. 2:48–2:51Defeat is a distinct defect.
37. 2:51–2:5283.
38. 2:52–2:56It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom
39. 2:56–3:00absent produces only the defect of deviation.
40. 3:00–3:04Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty
41. 3:04–3:10of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition
42. 3:10–3:15of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct
43. 3:15–3:16defect.
44. 3:16–3:21Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence
45. 3:21–3:25of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate
46. 3:25–3:27defeater is needed.
47. 3:27–3:32Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom
48. 3:32–3:38could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom
49. 3:38–3:44is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence.
50. 3:45–3:48Thus defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason.
51. 3:50–3:53The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted.
52. 3:54–3:5984. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject,
53. 3:59–4:03Therefore, if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no
54. 4:03–4:09cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doulat from cowwood, odor from
55. 4:09–4:14earthwood, and qualities from substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties
56. 4:14–4:20deviate from one another. The counter-positive of an absence and the like, because of their
57. 4:20–4:27delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious
58. 4:27–4:31reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly
59. 4:31–4:36establish either established or unestablished probanda.
60. 4:36–4:40Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason.
61. 4:40–4:4185.
62. 4:41–4:48Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandum is not deviation.
63. 4:48–4:51Otherwise inferences of odor from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would
64. 4:51–4:56fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction.
65. 4:57–5:02In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom
66. 5:02–5:08is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence
67. 5:08–5:15in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary.
68. 5:17–5:20Defeat is foundational. 86.
69. 5:20–5:25Objection, if the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom,
70. 5:25–5:27there is the defect of establishing what is already established.
71. 5:28–5:32If the delimiter of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established.
72. 5:33–5:37And a subject qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated.
73. 5:39–5:44Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject,
74. 5:44–5:47therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time.
75. 5:47–5:54Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists.
76. 5:54–6:00Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference.
77. 6:00–6:05Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect.
78. 6:05–6:12Eighty-seven, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason.
79. 6:12–6:17reason. Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference.
80. 6:17–6:21Cognition that the probandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent
81. 6:21–6:25renewed cognition of the probandom, successive cognitions are possible.
82. 6:26–6:29Even after the probandom has been established by perception,
83. 6:29–6:33inference may arise if someone desires to know that probandom threw inference.
84. 6:34–6:38A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard.
85. 6:38–6:45A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred,
86. 6:45–6:50but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference.
87. 6:50–6:57Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired
88. 6:57–7:03result, not a direct defect of inference. A post cognition is an inhibitor.
89. 7:03–7:11It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general.
90. 7:11–7:214. Certainty of Silverhood and this is Silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not Silver.
91. 7:21–7:33Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veritical cognition of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow.
92. 7:33–7:37This argument, however, is not sound.
93. 7:37–7:44Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception.
94. 7:44–7:50Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness and a
95. 7:50–7:56conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom
96. 7:56–8:01inhibits inference of the probandom. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the
97. 8:01–8:06absence of the probandum is present, inference of the presence of the probandum cannot arise.
98. 8:08–8:0910 types of defeated reason
99. 8:11–8:19Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception,
100. 8:19–8:26for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference,
101. 8:26–8:34for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal
102. 8:34–8:39testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain.
103. 8:41–8:46A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter positive of the pro-bandom, for example,
104. 8:46–8:54fire is not hot because it is produced. A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter
105. 8:54–8:59positive of the pro-bandom, for example, sound is inaudible because it is a quality.
106. 9:01–9:06A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahut is not the ground for using the
107. 9:06–9:14the word Gavaia, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing
108. 9:14–9:19the probandom, for example, the skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a
109. 9:19–9:26conch, it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends
110. 9:26–9:31the reason, for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch,
111. 9:31–9:38like fire. A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the
112. 9:38–9:42The mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent
113. 9:42–9:46cause of cognition.
114. 9:46–9:51A reason defeated by verbal testimony and joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma
115. 9:51–9:57should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni-Alma
116. 9:57–9:59sacrifice.
117. 9:59–10:03Fallacious reasons establish incapacity to prove.
118. 10:03–10:0490.
119. 10:04–10:07Fallacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the
120. 10:07–10:12The five kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the probandom.
121. 10:12–10:16By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity
122. 10:16–10:20of the proponent's reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are
123. 10:20–10:22improper replies.
124. 10:22–10:26An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stopped merely by cognition
125. 10:26–10:29of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reason's
126. 10:29–10:32incapacity through fallaciousness.
127. 10:32–10:36The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the
128. 10:36–10:41proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice.
129. 10:41–10:45Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes.
130. 10:45–10:53First, to stop inference for another, second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponent's reason.
131. 10:53–11:03The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason.
132. 11:03–11:07Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing
133. 11:07–11:12that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions, obstructing
134. 11:12–11:16inference and establishing incapacity.
135. 11:16–11:20Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible.
136. 11:20–11:24It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaya statement
137. 11:24–11:29would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would
138. 11:29–11:33not be fully established as incapable.
139. 11:33–11:38This objection is not sound. Debate proceeds on the accepted pervasion that every fallacious
140. 11:38–11:43reason is incapable. It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect
141. 11:43–11:48in this particular reason. Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to
142. 11:48–11:52explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason.
143. 11:52–11:56It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced,
144. 11:56–12:00The pervasion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent
145. 12:00–12:04and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the pervasion of producedness by incapacity
146. 12:04–12:07to establish impermanence.
147. 12:07–12:10This argument too is not sound.
148. 12:10–12:14During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable
149. 12:14–12:17matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become
150. 12:17–12:20disputable.
151. 12:20–12:23Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere.
152. 12:23–12:2992, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence
153. 12:29–12:33of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness
154. 12:33–12:37by impermanence. Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who
155. 12:37–12:42initially does not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity.
156. 12:42–12:46Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition,
157. 12:46–12:50merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere,
158. 12:50–12:53use of all five members is necessary.
159. 12:53–13:00But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable.
160. 13:00–13:03Definition of incapacity to prove.
161. 13:03–13:0593.
162. 13:05–13:11Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject.
163. 13:11–13:15A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the
164. 13:15–13:17probandom in the subject.
165. 13:17–13:22Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandom
166. 13:22–13:25because the necessary causes are incomplete.
167. 13:26–13:30It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject
168. 13:30–13:33qualified by the probandom at the time the fallacious reason is known.
169. 13:34–13:38For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandom
170. 13:38–13:42arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the
171. 13:42–13:44probandom arises from a valid reason.
172. 13:45–13:48This view, however, is not sound.
173. 13:48–13:54A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter reason,
174. 13:54–13:59may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject qualified
175. 13:59–14:01by the probandom.
176. 14:01–14:06Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason.
177. 14:06–14:11Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandom.
178. 14:11–14:1794, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom.
179. 14:17–14:22A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandum when its defeated
180. 14:22–14:26or contradictory status is unknown.
181. 14:26–14:29But this view too is not sound.
182. 14:29–14:33A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion
183. 14:33–14:38of the probandum when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status
184. 14:38–14:43is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion.
185. 14:43–14:47Nor is incapacity the absence of either pervasion or subject propertyhood in a reason,
186. 14:47–14:52valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence.
187. 14:53–14:57At a particular time a valid reason too may assume a defective form.
188. 14:58–15:03Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the
189. 15:03–15:08probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again.
190. 15:10–15:14Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons.
191. 15:14–15:18In conclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof,
192. 15:18–15:23in conclusiveness concerning the context specific probandom would remain unestablished,
193. 15:23–15:28and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be
194. 15:28–15:34established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom.
195. 15:36–15:41One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom.
196. 15:41–15:4995. Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the
197. 15:49–15:54context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to
198. 15:54–15:59produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject.
199. 16:01–16:06It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established,
200. 16:06–16:09because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness.
201. 16:09–16:17But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced,
202. 16:17–16:21it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom,
203. 16:21–16:28consequently a two would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of
204. 16:28–16:34the subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection
205. 16:34–16:38arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the
206. 16:38–16:41reflection sometimes remains uncertain.
207. 16:42–16:44Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason
208. 16:44–16:46that produces veridical cognition
209. 16:46–16:48of the absence of the pro-bandom.
210. 16:48–16:50Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason
211. 16:50–16:52itself inhibits inference.
212. 16:53–16:56Alternative view, incapacity is being the object
213. 16:56–16:59of veridical cognition that inhibits inference.
214. 17:01–17:0496, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists
215. 17:04–17:06in being the object of veridical cognition
216. 17:06–17:08that inhibits inferential cognition.
217. 17:08–17:13An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced
218. 17:13–17:17by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical
219. 17:17–17:21cognition of an equally strong counter- reason inhibits inference.
220. 17:21–17:24This view, however, is not sound.
221. 17:24–17:29An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced or contradictory reason
222. 17:29–17:31does not inhibit inference.
223. 17:31–17:36And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to
224. 17:36–17:40be treated as an inhibitor, which is unacceptable.
225. 17:40–17:46Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandum is an inhibitor.
226. 17:46–17:5197. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the
227. 17:51–17:56probandum, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and
228. 17:56–18:01that this cognition alone is veritical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason
229. 18:01–18:05itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor.
230. 18:05–18:10Cognition that it produces the absence of the probandum is not itself the inhibitor,
231. 18:10–18:14because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment.
232. 18:14–18:19Nor can mere veritical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced
233. 18:19–18:23reason, provision or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence
234. 18:23–18:28of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons.
235. 18:28–18:33Or should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and
236. 18:33–18:36a non-reason is the defect?
237. 18:36–18:41When such a general property is known to deviate from the pro-bandom, it would entail destruction
238. 18:41–18:44of inference of the pro-bandom in general.
239. 18:44–18:49In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter-reason, which depends
240. 18:49–18:54on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them,
241. 18:54–18:56inhibits inference.
242. 18:56–19:00Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under non-establishment
243. 19:00–19:03of pervasion.
244. 19:03–19:08Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition.
245. 19:08–19:1098.
246. 19:10–19:14The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular
247. 19:14–19:19probandom, subject, person, and time is not incapacity.
248. 19:19–19:24For example, this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at
249. 19:24–19:28this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is
250. 19:28–19:34cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness.
251. 19:34–19:39Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason,
252. 19:39–19:43but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at
253. 19:43–19:46the same time, cannot arise later.
254. 19:46–19:53Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity.
255. 19:53–19:59is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandum and subject.
256. 19:59–20:0599. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the
257. 20:05–20:10subject and probandum. The radical cognition of a true probandum may sometimes arise even
258. 20:10–20:16from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that
259. 20:16–20:21actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of
260. 20:21–20:26fire may arise, this cognition concerning fire is veritical even though the reason employed is
261. 20:26–20:33defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One and the same
262. 20:33–20:39fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible.
263. 20:40–20:45Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor
264. 20:45–20:49is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke.
265. 20:49–20:55Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical.
266. 20:55–21:01Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition.
267. 21:01–21:05Presence and absence do not both occur in one lock as, nevertheless,
268. 21:05–21:08the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence.
269. 21:08–21:15Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may
270. 21:15–21:22arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier.
271. 21:22–21:26Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor.
272. 21:26–21:33100. The decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom.
273. 21:33–21:37If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines
274. 21:37–21:43inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily
275. 21:43–21:45present there.
276. 21:45–21:50Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently
277. 21:50–21:54identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in
278. 21:54–21:56numerous reasons.
279. 21:56–22:00Then inference of fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid.
280. 22:00–22:02Answer, not so.
281. 22:02–22:07Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms
282. 22:07–22:11of the absence of incapacity are possible.
283. 22:11–22:16with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore
284. 22:16–22:19the stated overextension does not arise.
285. 22:19–22:23The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition.
286. 22:23–22:28101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition,
287. 22:28–22:32because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object
288. 22:32–22:36of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference,
289. 22:36–22:39like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself.
290. 22:39–22:44A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the
291. 22:44–22:49other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier.
292. 22:49–22:54Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus
293. 22:54–22:58is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke.
294. 22:58–23:02Cessation of inferential cognition is possible.
295. 23:02–23:08Objection, once the pervasion of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity
296. 23:08–23:13for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate.
297. 23:13–23:17Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the
298. 23:17–23:21object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless
299. 23:21–23:26prolixity. Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other
300. 23:26–23:31than the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference. The causal
301. 23:31–23:34complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should
302. 23:34–23:37therefore necessarily produce its result.
303. 23:37–23:41Answer, this objection is not sound.
304. 23:41–23:44Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow
305. 23:44–23:49of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible.
306. 23:49–23:51Validity of inferential cognition
307. 23:51–23:57103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side
308. 23:57–24:01of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the
309. 24:01–24:04reason possess incapacity?
310. 24:04–24:06Let incapacity be admitted.
311. 24:06–24:10If smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side
312. 24:10–24:11of smoke?
313. 24:11–24:15Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel and not other fire be held
314. 24:15–24:18to pervade smoke?
315. 24:18–24:22It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire
316. 24:22–24:25produced by conjunction with moist fuel.
317. 24:25–24:29Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known, but since
318. 24:29–24:35smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid.
319. 24:35–24:39smoke is said to be accidentally present there.
320. 24:39–24:44In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire.
321. 24:44–24:49Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, the
322. 24:49–24:54probandum fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually
323. 24:54–24:59present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true.
324. 24:59–25:04According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference of
325. 25:04–25:07the probandum fire will be true.
326. 25:07–25:12Incapacity, the Decisive View
327. 25:12–25:15104, here we present our Decisive View.
328. 25:15–25:20The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not
329. 25:20–25:24produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing
330. 25:24–25:27or proving the probandum and the subject.
331. 25:27–25:31For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the
332. 25:31–25:36like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce
333. 25:36–25:43cognition of the probandom and the subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition
334. 25:43–25:47of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce
335. 25:47–25:52cognition of the probandom and the subject can be established on account of its capacity to
336. 25:52–25:58qualify the subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and
337. 25:58–26:02the like, cognition of the probandum and the subject may arise through an illusion of a
338. 26:02–26:08valid reason. Consequently, the defect of treating the probandum is unestablished or unproved
339. 26:08–26:13because the counter positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided.
340. 26:15–26:21Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition.
341. 26:21–26:28105. Alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the
342. 26:28–26:32object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing
343. 26:32–26:37or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason
344. 26:37–26:41possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition,
345. 26:41–26:45because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason.
346. 26:47–26:50It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits
347. 26:50–26:54Inferential cognition is in fact simply in conclusiveness and the like, in the mode of
348. 26:54–26:57being an object of cognition.
349. 26:57–27:01But identity with a pro-bandim in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object
350. 27:01–27:04of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous
351. 27:04–27:07condition becomes an object of inference.
352. 27:07–27:10For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property
353. 27:10–27:16delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as, water.
354. 27:16–27:19and capacity to prove conclusion.
355. 27:19–27:21106.
356. 27:21–27:23The view of other scholars is as follows.
357. 27:23–27:27In the case of inconclusive, defeated, and contradictory reasons, the condition of not
358. 27:27–27:31being pervaded, in the case of a reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition
359. 27:31–27:36of being inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in nature, a counterbalanced
360. 27:36–27:40reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition of being, at a specific time, the object
361. 27:40–27:46of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all these constitute the condition of not.
362. 27:46–27:49or proving the probandom in the subject.
363. 27:49–27:51It should not be objected that the collocation
364. 27:51–27:54and inconclusive reason does not prove the probandom
365. 27:54–27:56would be incoherent.
366. 27:56–27:59The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of,
367. 27:59–28:01does not prove the probandom.
368. 28:01–28:04It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks
369. 28:04–28:07a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone
370. 28:07–28:10has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition
371. 28:10–28:14inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious.
372. 28:14–28:20Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya,
373. 28:20–28:24the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the
374. 28:24–28:28probandum in capacity, ends.
375. 28:28–28:33The inference division ends, through the section on defeat.
376. 28:33–28:34Appendix 3
377. 28:34–28:36Thank you.

Plain text

the established doctrine of defeat the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandum is the defect 80. the established doctrine is that certainty of the absence of the probandum in the subject arises from certainty of the validity of cognition of that absence otherwise validity would be pointless, because if mere cognition of an object produced certainty of that object, erroneous cognition would yield the same result Therefore, certainty of deviation or of an inhibitor arises only when the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition. Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason. Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference. 81. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom and establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain. But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason. Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise. The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Here veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not the defect. 82. Objection. Veridical cognition. Here the reason is present and the probandom absent, that is, cognition of deviation, should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference. It may again be said that the cognition, there is veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat. The same rule is observed in verbal cognition. Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly related to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason. In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation. Defeat is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect. Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater is needed. Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence. Thus defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason. The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted. 84. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, Therefore, if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doulat from cowwood, odor from earthwood, and qualities from substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties deviate from one another. The counter-positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly establish either established or unestablished probanda. Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandum is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of odor from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction. In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary. Defeat is foundational. 86. Objection, if the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom, there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated. Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject, therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time. Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists. Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference. Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect. Eighty-seven, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason. reason. Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference. Cognition that the probandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent renewed cognition of the probandom, successive cognitions are possible. Even after the probandom has been established by perception, inference may arise if someone desires to know that probandom threw inference. A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard. A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred, but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference. Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct defect of inference. A post cognition is an inhibitor. It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general. 4. Certainty of Silverhood and this is Silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not Silver. Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veritical cognition of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow. This argument, however, is not sound. Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception. Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness and a conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom inhibits inference of the probandom. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum is present, inference of the presence of the probandum cannot arise. 10 types of defeated reason Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain. A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter positive of the pro-bandom, for example, fire is not hot because it is produced. A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter positive of the pro-bandom, for example, sound is inaudible because it is a quality. A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahut is not the ground for using the the word Gavaia, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the probandom, for example, the skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire. A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the The mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition. A reason defeated by verbal testimony and joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni-Alma sacrifice. Fallacious reasons establish incapacity to prove. 90. Fallacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the The five kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the probandom. By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity of the proponent's reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper replies. An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stopped merely by cognition of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reason's incapacity through fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice. Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes. First, to stop inference for another, second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponent's reason. The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason. Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions, obstructing inference and establishing incapacity. Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible. It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaya statement would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would not be fully established as incapable. This objection is not sound. Debate proceeds on the accepted pervasion that every fallacious reason is incapable. It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular reason. Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason. It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced, The pervasion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the pervasion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence. This argument too is not sound. During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become disputable. Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere. 92, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness by impermanence. Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity. Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition, merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere, use of all five members is necessary. But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable. Definition of incapacity to prove. 93. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject. A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the probandom in the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandom because the necessary causes are incomplete. It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandom arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom arises from a valid reason. This view, however, is not sound. A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter reason, may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom. Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason. Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandom. 94, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom. A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandum when its defeated or contradictory status is unknown. But this view too is not sound. A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion of the probandum when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion. Nor is incapacity the absence of either pervasion or subject propertyhood in a reason, valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason too may assume a defective form. Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again. Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons. In conclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof, in conclusiveness concerning the context specific probandom would remain unestablished, and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom. One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom. 95. Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject. It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established, because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness. But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced, it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom, consequently a two would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain. Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom. Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference. Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inference. 96, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inferential cognition. An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter- reason inhibits inference. This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference. And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor, which is unacceptable. Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandum is an inhibitor. 97. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the probandum, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and that this cognition alone is veritical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor. Cognition that it produces the absence of the probandum is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment. Nor can mere veritical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced reason, provision or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Or should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect? When such a general property is known to deviate from the pro-bandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the pro-bandom in general. In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter-reason, which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them, inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not incapacity. For example, this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness. Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason, but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity. is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandum and subject. 99. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the subject and probandum. The radical cognition of a true probandum may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of fire may arise, this cognition concerning fire is veritical even though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One and the same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical. Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition. Presence and absence do not both occur in one lock as, nevertheless, the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence. Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier. Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor. 100. The decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom. If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily present there. Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in numerous reasons. Then inference of fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid. Answer, not so. Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible. with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore the stated overextension does not arise. The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition. 101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition, because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference, like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself. A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier. Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke. Cessation of inferential cognition is possible. Objection, once the pervasion of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate. Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless prolixity. Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other than the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference. The causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should therefore necessarily produce its result. Answer, this objection is not sound. Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible. Validity of inferential cognition 103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the reason possess incapacity? Let incapacity be admitted. If smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke? Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel and not other fire be held to pervade smoke? It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel. Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known, but since smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid. smoke is said to be accidentally present there. In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire. Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, the probandum fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true. According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference of the probandum fire will be true. Incapacity, the Decisive View 104, here we present our Decisive View. The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject. For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce cognition of the probandom and the subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom and the subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like, cognition of the probandum and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason. Consequently, the defect of treating the probandum is unestablished or unproved because the counter positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided. Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition. 105. Alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason. It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits Inferential cognition is in fact simply in conclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an object of cognition. But identity with a pro-bandim in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous condition becomes an object of inference. For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as, water. and capacity to prove conclusion. 106. The view of other scholars is as follows. In the case of inconclusive, defeated, and contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded, in the case of a reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in nature, a counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition of being, at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all these constitute the condition of not. or proving the probandom in the subject. It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the probandom would be incoherent. The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the probandom. It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the probandum in capacity, ends. The inference division ends, through the section on defeat. Appendix 3 Thank you.

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