MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode10_radio_video.mp4

Collection

Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.96201)

Duration

56:36

Source

Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:04–0:08रेविताषन अबजेक्षन्ज अगेंस्ट अठोम्स.
2. 0:08–0:15दूस, मेर्ली भाई अस्टबलिषिझ दाध वान आटम कन भी कझोंगड वित मैने अदर अठोम्स,
3. 0:15–0:24All objections based on the alleged impossibility of one atom being conjoined with six atoms situated in the six directions,
4. 0:24–0:34the necessity of assigning different places to atoms, the casting of shadows upon atoms, and so forth are refuted.
5. 0:34–0:37Continuation of the refutation
6. 0:37–0:49The other reasons offered to establish the non-atomicity of atoms are refuted by whichever proof establishes either the reality or the non-establishment of atoms.
7. 0:49–0:53Another minor objection and its refutation.
8. 0:53–0:59It is wholly impossible for space to enter the interior of an atom.
9. 0:59–1:04General refutation of all the foregoing objections.
10. 1:04–1:11The two terms occurring in the subject statements of all these inferences are mutually contradictory.
11. 1:11–1:21For example, in the subject statement the atom possesses parts, the word atom itself means a partless entity.
12. 1:21–1:31Moreover, since the probandom is absent from the subject, the inference also suffers from the defect of a subject devoid of the probandom.
13. 1:31–1:39Reduxio arguments such as if an atom were partless, it would have no determinate size and could
14. 1:39–1:47not be conjoint with 6 distinct atoms are wisheted by an unestablished subject and an unestablished
15. 1:47–1:54concomitance because if atoms do not exist there can be no example exhibiting the concomitance.
16. 1:54–2:04Further, the undesirable consequence of an infinite series of subordinate parts arises against the divisibility of atoms.
17. 2:04–2:10Along with it comes the contrary consequence that if atoms were not partless,
18. 2:10–2:15a minute whole composed of three atoms would become immeasurably vast.
19. 2:15–2:20Both points support the partlessness of atoms.
20. 2:20–2:24Objection to the refutation and its refutation.
21. 2:24–2:28Let atoms then be regarded as destructible.
22. 2:28–2:30No.
23. 2:30–2:34No proof establishes their destructibility.
24. 2:34–2:38Every reason offered to establish that atom's poses parts
25. 2:38–2:43generates the defect of an infinite series of parts.
26. 2:43–2:46Thus the atom is a curious entity,
27. 2:46–2:49like the demon named Raktaabja,
28. 2:49–2:55Two tiers open the belly of the demoness of logic and emerges again in the form of an
29. 2:55–2:57atom.
30. 2:57–3:05The point is that the reasons offered to refute atoms ultimately establish those very atoms.
31. 3:05–3:09Defense of the first objection and its refutation.
32. 3:09–3:16Can a reduction not proceed on the basis of an imagined subject and an imagined concomitance?
33. 3:16–3:18No.
34. 3:18–3:25If affirmation, negation, and the like are based only on imagined notions, the very meaning
35. 3:25–3:30of real affirmation and negation disappears.
36. 3:30–3:36And if customary practice is to be followed in this matter, the original statement that
37. 3:36–3:42a whole cannot inherit in its parts, being opposed to ordinary practice, cannot be accepted
38. 3:42–3:44at all.
39. 3:44–3:49This point has already been clarified repeatedly.
40. 3:49–3:51Continuation of the refutation.
41. 3:51–3:59Otherwise, that is, if even non-standard and defective arguments are regarded as acceptable,
42. 3:59–4:05all the foregoing arguments against atoms will apply to cognition as well.
43. 4:05–4:11Cognition too may be established as possessing parts on the ground that it can be related
44. 4:11–4:14to six objects at once.
45. 4:14–4:21But how will cognition's conjunction, determinate size and so forth be established?
46. 4:21–4:23By inference alone.
47. 4:23–4:30For example, cognition is simultaneously conjoined with six objects and possesses a determinate
48. 4:30–4:38size because it is real and is treated in practice like the objects known by it.
49. 4:38–4:41But will this inference not be groundless?
50. 4:41–4:47Once the proof establishing the reality of cognition establishes the opposite conclusion,
51. 4:47–4:53very well if the inference is abandoned on that ground, the same consideration must be
52. 4:53–4:57given priority in the case of atoms.
53. 4:57–5:02The related questions should be resolved in the same way.
54. 5:02–5:05Consideration of the Madhyamaka view.
55. 5:05–5:11Another disputant, the Madhyamika, closes his eyes to escape danger and says, then consciousness
56. 5:11–5:14to must disappear.
57. 5:14–5:20When even the mention of reason, probandom, subject, and the rest has been abandoned,
58. 5:20–5:23what can be said about this assertion?
59. 5:23–5:28Can there not be an illusory mention of them?
60. 5:28–5:35can provided at least the full reality of illusion or illusory cognition is accepted.
61. 5:35–5:43Otherwise, just as there will be neither a real object nor an illusory object, illusion
62. 5:43–5:47itself may be illusory regarded as real.
63. 5:47–5:54Yes, but if this second illusion is also unreal, nothing new has been stated by the foregoing
64. 5:54–5:56assertion.
65. 5:56–6:03And if the second illusion is admitted as holy real, it is itself consciousness, whose reality
66. 6:03–6:06cannot be denied.
67. 6:06–6:13Can this illusory cognition be real, sublated, and therefore only illusorily real?
68. 6:13–6:14No.
69. 6:14–6:18If it is definitely real, what could sublate it?
70. 6:18–6:24And if it is sublated, how can the object it apprehends be real?
71. 6:24–6:32of the Madhyamaka view. Experience establishes that whatever is not clearly sublated is regarded
72. 6:32–6:40as real. It must therefore be admitted that what is accompanied by the property of reality
73. 6:40–6:47or what is real cannot be sublated. Why then, should the reality of what is accompanied
74. 6:47–6:55by sublation, or what is sublated, not be denied. If that can be done, the reality of
75. 6:55–7:03sublation itself can also be denied. Very well, let both reality and sublation be regarded
76. 7:03–7:12as unavoidable. Yes, that is precisely the fact, what must be denied is their coexistence,
77. 7:12–7:15which would generate contradiction.
78. 7:15–7:22The coexistence of mutually opposed things, or the mutual opposition of things that coexist,
79. 7:22–7:27can be maintained only within one's private doctrine, in debate it is improper merely
80. 7:27–7:31to assert one's private belief.
81. 7:31–7:36Consequently, the more the Buddhists try to extinguish consciousness, the brighter its
82. 7:36–7:39light becomes.
83. 7:39–7:43Even the negation of consciousness must be known.
84. 7:43–7:51Thus the Buddhist is trying to create darkness, by extinguishing one lamp with another lamp.
85. 7:51–7:54Refutation of another objection.
86. 7:54–7:59This answer also refutes the assertion, that nothing is real because the cause-effect
87. 7:59–8:03relation cannot be established.
88. 8:03–8:09Whether the Buddhist attempt to refute the cause-effect relation succeeds or fails, that
89. 8:09–8:12relation cannot be denied.
90. 8:12–8:18If the attempt succeeds, a cause-effect relation between the attempt and the established conclusion
91. 8:18–8:24must be accepted, if it fails, the relation remains unsublated.
92. 8:24–8:30If, by denying the relation, the Buddhist wishes to refute the doctrine that the effect
93. 8:30–8:37already exists in the cause, that is acceptable. But if he wishes to refute the doctrine that
94. 8:37–8:43an effect is newly produced, the view is unacceptable because it contradicts perception.
95. 8:44–8:51Moreover, if the assertion that points out a defect in the doctrine of newly arising effects
96. 8:51–8:58already exists, there is no need to produce it again. If it did not already exist,
97. 8:58–9:02The Buddhist utterance produces it anew.
98. 9:02–9:10Consequently, the reason in the inference whatever is unreal is not produced is shown to be deviant.
99. 9:10–9:14Objection to the refutation and its refutation.
100. 9:14–9:18Let the objection then be this.
101. 9:18–9:23Although all the foregoing criticisms of the whole have proved fruitless,
102. 9:23–9:28non-cognition of the whole may still constitute a powerful objection.
103. 9:28–9:37In the place where a hole is supposed to exist, I perceive no entity different from the collection of atoms.
104. 9:37–9:43But this is merely the resentful outcry of one who has been defeated.
105. 9:43–9:49The reality of gross holes is a matter of universal experience.
106. 9:49–9:54Refutation of the objection that cognition of grossness is false.
107. 9:54–10:02Can it not be said that the cognition, the whole is one object is conceptual and therefore falls?
108. 10:02–10:09No. This cognition apprehends its object with extreme clarity.
109. 10:09–10:15Should it be said that the clarity of this cognition depends only upon a condition?
110. 10:15–10:23No. If a non-conceptual cognition having the same object is the basis of this conceptual cognition
111. 10:23–10:28and the clarity of the first cognition is superimposed upon the second,
112. 10:28–10:32the truth of the conceptual cognition is established by itself.
113. 10:33–10:39If a non-conceptual cognition having a different object is regarded as its basis,
114. 10:39–10:46the clarity of non-conceptual cognition of blue, yellow, and the light must likewise be regarded
115. 10:46–10:51as conditional, with the result that no cognition remains wholly clear.
116. 10:51–11:00Only that which is apprehended in both non-conceptual and conceptual cognition can be regarded as
117. 11:00–11:03the object of veridical perception.
118. 11:03–11:10If the object of conceptual cognition is not real, the object of non-conceptual cognition
119. 11:10–11:13too will cease to be real.
120. 11:13–11:17Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation.
121. 11:17–11:20Can atoms themselves not be gross?
122. 11:20–11:24No, then they would cease to be atoms.
123. 11:24–11:27Can a collection of atoms be gross?
124. 11:27–11:29No.
125. 11:29–11:35The Buddhist does not admit a unitary aggregate entity based upon the collected things.
126. 11:35–11:42If such an entity is accepted, what defect is there in accepting a whole?
127. 11:42–11:48Can atoms in their collected state themselves appear as a gross object?
128. 11:48–11:53No, because none of them individually is gross.
129. 11:53–11:57Does grossness mean occupying different places?
130. 11:57–12:03No, a single atom does not occupy even one place with extension.
131. 12:03–12:12Can many atoms, appearing densely as one and occupying many places, be regarded as gross on that account?
132. 12:12–12:17No, a gross object is always experienced as one.
133. 12:17–12:23Another defense of cognition of unity among atoms and its refutation.
134. 12:23–12:33Can cognition of the unity of a gross object not be explained by the superimposition of unity upon the atoms constituting its parts?
135. 12:33–12:41That is, if its several parts each appear as one, the whole two will appear as one.
136. 12:41–12:44No, this is impossible.
137. 12:44–12:56No one superimposes unity upon the countless atoms constituting the different limbs of the body, the hands, feet, chin, nose, and so forth.
138. 12:56–13:04Although these limbs appear mutually distinct, cognition of the unity of the entire body is not absent.
139. 13:04–13:12Conversely, unity may be superimposed upon the parts even while they continue to appear distinct.
140. 13:12–13:15Continuation of the refutation.
141. 13:15–13:19Moreover, if there is in reality no single hole,
142. 13:19–13:32one must hold that the millions of atoms constituting the hole or its parts appear as one only because the unity of a single atom is superimposed upon them.
143. 13:32–13:40In that case the object of superimposition would appear only as atoms, not as a gross object.
144. 13:40–13:48Can the appearance of grossness be explained by the inference that the atoms are spread over many places?
145. 13:48–13:49No.
146. 13:49–13:53This explanation is self-contradictory.
147. 13:53–14:00If atoms spread over different places are known in the form of those distinct places,
148. 14:00–14:06neither unity nor residence in many places can be superimposed upon them.
149. 14:06–14:16If the entities situated in different places are not known, what object will there be that occupies those distinct places?
150. 14:16–14:23And if both unity and residence in distinct places are superimposed upon the atoms,
151. 14:23–14:28no other object remains to occupy those different places.
152. 14:28–14:33Here the atoms would appear neither as many nor as places,
153. 14:33–14:37and no occupant of the places would be known.
154. 14:37–14:45Therefore, if unity is superimposed, only the atoms will be known, not their grossness.
155. 14:45–14:48A brief question and its answer.
156. 14:48–14:55If this is so, how can the ordinary cognition of grossness and unity in a collection of objects
157. 14:55–14:59from which no single hole has risen be explained.
158. 14:59–15:10The answer is that the nature of a substance occupying a space equal to the dimensions of the collection is superimposed upon that collection,
159. 15:10–15:16because such a substance occupies a spatial extent equal to that of the collection.
160. 15:16–15:26But this is impossible on your view, because veridical cognition of the grossness to be superimposed is available nowhere else.
161. 15:26–15:31Are non-existent unity and grossness themselves known here?
162. 15:31–15:32No.
163. 15:32–15:38All the arguments against unity and grossness have already been refuted.
164. 15:38–15:43Indirect refutation of a possible contrary view.
165. 15:43–15:57The foregoing refutation of the arguments against the whole also refutes the view that the grossness appearing in an object is only the object of conceptual cognition and is therefore unreal.
166. 15:57–16:08Such grossness must be one of three kinds, an utterly unreal entity, an imagination constructed by cognition, or a real thing.
167. 16:08–16:13refutation of the claim that invisible atoms cannot become perceptible.
168. 16:13–16:19When every atom is invisible, how can their collection be visible?
169. 16:19–16:25A mere aggregation of invisible things does not make them visible.
170. 16:25–16:38Should it be said that the object produced at each moment from invisible atoms and destroyed the next moment is of a special kind and is therefore apprehensible by the senses?
171. 16:38–16:50No. You might as well suppose that in a dream you are stretching out your hand and begging, for the doctrine of momentariness has already been refuted.
172. 16:50–16:57Continuation of the refutation. Or let momentary causation be accepted.
173. 16:57–17:05Even so, we have already rejected the reality of the special property called immediate efficacy
174. 17:05–17:11in momentary things, because accepting such a property produces the defect of Universal's
175. 17:11–17:14overlapping one another.
176. 17:14–17:21Therefore, if atoms possess no such special property, there will be no determination of
177. 17:21–17:28which atoms possessing the common property of atomhood are invisible and which visible.
178. 17:28–17:35Upon rational examination no difference can be determined among the atoms.
179. 17:35–17:41Further development of the refutation that grossness determines perceptibility. Suppose
180. 17:41–17:48that special property exists. Even then, the property determining perceptibility by
181. 17:48–17:56the senses must be grossness alone. Otherwise, an atom that is not gross but possesses the
182. 17:56–18:02special property of immediate efficacy would become visible. The necessary visibility of
183. 18:02–18:10whatever is distinct from the non-gross establishes only the visibility of the gross. Here the
184. 18:10–18:16cause-effect relation is known from the positive and negative concomitance between grossness
185. 18:16–18:24and visibility. Nor is grossness present in a collection of atoms. Objection to the foregoing
186. 18:24–18:35refutation. Can multiplicity itself not be grossness and its absence-minuteness? No. On that view,
187. 18:35–18:42many atoms scattered over a vast tract of land would also become visible. If it is further
188. 18:42–18:49required for grossness that there be no interval between two atoms, even this condition will
189. 18:49–18:56not be fulfilled in the present case, because according to the Buddhist view, atoms of qualities,
190. 18:56–19:02such as taste intervene among the atoms of color in the constitution of an object.
191. 19:02–19:09Nor can the absence of intervals be regarded as superimposed, because circularity would
192. 19:09–19:16result, cognition of grossness arises when the absence of intervals is superimposed and
193. 19:16–19:24that superimposition is made only after grossness has been cognized. Therefore, for an object
194. 19:24–19:31to be apprehensible by the senses it must be gross. Otherwise, even atoms spread far
195. 19:31–19:41apart would be visible. Atoms must therefore be regarded as invisible. If no hole is accepted,
196. 19:41–19:45none of its qualities or properties can be known.
197. 19:45–19:52Another objection to the reality of a hole and its refutation. Let a gross object lasting
198. 19:52–20:01only one moment then be admitted. No, this is impossible. On the doctrine of momentariness,
199. 20:01–20:05parts and hole cannot be perceived at the same time.
200. 20:06–20:09Since the parts are the material cause of the hole,
201. 20:09–20:13they must exist one moment before it, consequently,
202. 20:13–20:19as soon as the hole arises, the parts will have ceased to exist.
203. 20:19–20:23Moreover, objects such as pots and cloths,
204. 20:23–20:27produced and then destroyed in the next moment,
205. 20:27–20:30arise from their causes, pot shards, threads,
206. 20:30–20:37and the like, yet the successive pot sherds and threads that arise at each moment and perish the
207. 20:37–20:43next are also held to be the causes producing the subsequent series of pot sherds and threads.
208. 20:44–20:51Consequently, the material causes of the pot and cloth, the pot sherds and threads,
209. 20:51–20:56would simultaneously produce to distinct entities serving as material effects.
210. 20:56–21:06This contradicts the rule that the production of one material effect from a material cause prevents the production of another such effect.
211. 21:06–21:23Logical conclusion. Thus the proof establishing the grossness of a whole also refutes momentariness, just as a proof of one thesis may simultaneously establish another thesis already presupposed by it.
212. 21:23–21:31That is, grossness necessarily entails the non-momentariness of a gross object.
213. 21:31–21:35A minor objection and its resolution.
214. 21:35–21:41This conclusion also disposes of the following inference intended to establish that a whole
215. 21:41–21:48is partless, whatever is real is partless, like cognition, disputed objects such as
216. 21:48–21:50pots are real.
217. 21:50–21:56The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom is not established because the
218. 21:56–22:02denial of the proposed universal rule is not sublated.
219. 22:02–22:09Against it, one may offer the following CRVK like inference, whatever is real has parts,
220. 22:09–22:12like a pot, cognition is real.
221. 22:12–22:18If this inference is defective, its opposite is equally defective.
222. 22:18–22:22The same answer applies in both cases.
223. 22:22–22:25Continuation of the resolution.
224. 22:25–22:31But consciousness is by nature partless and self-aware, whereas whether parts and the
225. 22:31–22:35like-poses parts is presently under dispute.
226. 22:35–22:42How then, can the inference-establishing possession of parts be valid, and how can both inferences
227. 22:42–22:46be rejected by the same answer?
228. 22:46–22:47No.
229. 22:47–22:54This reasoning can be directed against consciousness as well, an objection may equally be raised
230. 22:54–22:57against its partlessness.
231. 22:57–23:04In ordinary experience no one knows a part devoid of its neck, rim, sides, belly, and
232. 23:04–23:05so forth.
233. 23:05–23:12Or, from the very reason because it is real, it may be inferred that consciousness does
234. 23:12–23:18not in here in another thing, or that a part in his in its parts as an entity distinct
235. 23:18–23:26from them. Just as these inferences established nothing, so to the preceding inference intended
236. 23:26–23:33to establish the partlessness of consciousness is fruitless. Further development of the
237. 23:33–23:39resolution. Moreover, is the foregoing proof establishing the partlessness of a gross
238. 23:39–23:45object a positive inference or a conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence.
239. 23:46–23:54The first alternative is impossible. If the words pot and the like in the inference signify
240. 23:54–24:01qualities such as color or entities such as atoms and those are made the subject,
241. 24:01–24:05the defect of establishing what is already established arises.
242. 24:05–24:15If a unitary grows object is accepted and made the subject, there is the defect that the probandom is absent from the subject.
243. 24:15–24:22And if no such object is accepted, the subject itself is unestablished.
244. 24:22–24:31It may be said that the defect of absence of the probandum occurs only if a unitary gross object is accepted,
245. 24:31–24:42whereas the defect of an unestablished subject occurs only if it is not accepted, so the same inference does not contain both defects.
246. 24:42–24:59But if the inference is defended in this manner, the subject of an inference establishing fragrance in a sky flower would also have to be accepted as valid, and the defect of an unestablished subject would disappear altogether.
247. 24:59–25:03Let such reasoning therefore end here.
248. 25:03–25:07Objection to the resolution and its answer.
249. 25:07–25:15Can the pots and the like known in ordinary experience not be made the subject of an inference of partlessness,
250. 25:15–25:24just as a mountain is made the subject of an inference of fire without first determining whether fire exists there?
251. 25:24–25:34Otherwise, since it remains unknown whether the mountain is a real transformation of Brahman or merely an illusory appearance,
252. 25:34–25:39Even the inference of fire on the mountain would be impossible.
253. 25:39–25:42No, this is not so.
254. 25:42–25:48Under both Vedantic alternatives there is no incoherence in the inference.
255. 25:48–25:53Even if the world is established as a transformation of Brahman,
256. 25:53–25:59the subject, such as the mountain, does not change its nature.
257. 25:59–26:04For example, in a dream, if an inference occurs,
258. 26:04–26:09dream fire is inferred on a dream mountain from dream smoke.
259. 26:09–26:13Even in practice said to arise from ignorance,
260. 26:13–26:17there is a distinction between relative truth and falsehood
261. 26:17–26:22and practical activity must depend upon that distinction.
262. 26:22–26:25But in the foregoing inference, the words,
263. 26:25–26:29Pot and the like make grows objects the subject.
264. 26:29–26:34Therefore contradiction between the subject in the form of grossness
265. 26:34–26:39and the partlessness to be established in it is unavoidable.
266. 26:39–26:43Another objection to the resolution and its refutation.
267. 26:43–26:49If the atoms are called the pot and made the subject in the foregoing inference,
268. 26:49–26:55How can the defect of re-establishing what is already established be avoided?
269. 26:55–27:02Does this defect not disappear for a person who doubts the partlessness of atoms?
270. 27:02–27:03No.
271. 27:03–27:07No one doubts the partlessness of atoms.
272. 27:07–27:15Could the inference not be useful for removing the ordinary person's error that pots and the like poses parts?
273. 27:15–27:22Perhaps, but if the very gross object apprehended by ordinary people is made the subject, contradiction
274. 27:22–27:27between subject and probandom is unavoidable.
275. 27:27–27:33If some other entity is the subject, the defect of re-establishing what is already established
276. 27:33–27:35is certain.
277. 27:35–27:40Should it then be said that the gross object is not one?
278. 27:40–27:46If so, proof of that very statement must first be supplied.
279. 27:46–27:52In the inference of partlessness, the reason called reality is as fruitless as the milkless
280. 27:52–27:55teat on a goat's neck.
281. 27:55–28:01Nor can reality be the reason in an inference establishing grossness, because if cognition
282. 28:01–28:08of grossness is regarded as false, this reason becomes incompatible with the subject.
283. 28:08–28:15The conclusion, therefore, is that a thing becomes the subject of an inference only in
284. 28:15–28:20the form in which it is not opposed to the desired probandom and in which the presence
285. 28:20–28:29of the probandom is not already established or undisputed, not in any other form.
286. 28:29–28:34Refutation of the second alternative above, the conditional reduction in the form of reversal
287. 28:34–28:36of the consequence.
288. 28:36–28:42The foregoing thesis cannot be a reductio or conditional inference either, because its
289. 28:42–28:49conclusion does not terminate in a form opposed to the statement initially accepted.
290. 28:49–28:56For example, if the pot were real, it would be partless, but it is not partless, therefore
291. 28:56–28:58it is not real.
292. 28:58–29:04In this argument, the Buddhist does not accept that the pot possesses parts.
293. 29:04–29:11Therefore, the Buddhist cannot establish the pots on reality on the ground that it possesses
294. 29:11–29:15parts, the subject would be unestablished.
295. 29:15–29:20If the same reason is used in an attempt to establish that cognition of possession of
296. 29:20–29:28parts is false, the defect of mutual contradiction also arises, because cognition itself is
297. 29:28–29:29a real entity.
298. 29:29–29:43Moreover, the reason suffers from being excessively narrow, because according to the Buddhist neither the unreal hairs horn nor consciousness, atoms, and the like possess parts.
299. 29:43–29:59It is not enough to say that the Buddhist can argue on the basis of the opponent's acceptance of composite objects, because to derive a negative conclusion through a conditional inference the Buddhist must himself accept the reality of the reason.
300. 29:59–30:05Demand for inferential proof of a whole and its refutation.
301. 30:05–30:09But what is the inferential proof of a whole?
302. 30:09–30:16When asking this question, do you intend to say that inference is superior to perception?
303. 30:16–30:23If so, what is the inferential proof of the self-awareness of cognition that you accept?
304. 30:23–30:26The demand is therefore groundless.
305. 30:26–30:33Nevertheless, the following inference with an essential nature as its reason may be offered,
306. 30:33–30:40whatever does not exhibit the coexistence of mutually opposed properties must be regarded
307. 30:40–30:47as one entity, like cognition, and what is known as a unitary gross object is clearly
308. 30:47–30:49of this kind.
309. 30:49–30:55Practical usage concerning unity depends solely upon the absence of the apparent coexistence
310. 30:55–31:03of a post properties. This usage can neither be costless nor arise from some other cause,
311. 31:03–31:10otherwise water, earth, air, and fire too would have to be regarded as a single thing.
312. 31:10–31:18A general objection to the reality of external objects and its refutation. Let there then
313. 31:18–31:24always be doubt concerning the reality of external objects, because it is impossible
314. 31:24–31:31to distinguish truth from falsehood? No. This impossibility cannot arise from everything
315. 31:31–31:38being true because the answer to the question now to be asked refutes that assumption. The
316. 31:38–31:45question is, is the ordinary cognition I understood this object incorrectly technically called
317. 31:45–31:52erroneous cognition true or not? Whatever answer is given, it cannot establish that
318. 31:52–31:55Everything is true.
319. 31:55–31:58Objection to the foregoing refutation.
320. 31:58–32:04Could calling the statement I understood this incorrectly, an erroneous cognition be nothing
321. 32:04–32:08more than uttering a meaningless cluster of words?
322. 32:08–32:09No.
323. 32:09–32:15If no cognition lay behind this statement, there would be no disagreement concerning the
324. 32:15–32:19nature of erroneous cognition.
325. 32:19–32:23And people do not dispute merely about words.
326. 32:23–32:29Nor is it the case that no dispute or disagreement occurs among scholars.
327. 32:29–32:34Is the dispute about the meaning of words such as erroneous cognition?
328. 32:34–32:41If so, what is unknown cannot be denied, and since the purpose of debate is to deny
329. 32:41–32:47the opponent's view, it cannot be said that the disputants have no cognition of what
330. 32:47–32:48they deny.
331. 32:48–32:54support for the possibility of conceptual erroneous cognition.
332. 32:54–33:00Cognition of one object cannot impel a person toward another object, otherwise the object
333. 33:00–33:05of cognition and the object of activity would be different.
334. 33:05–33:12That is, unless one thing is understood as another, activity toward the first cannot
335. 33:12–33:13arise.
336. 33:13–33:29Nor can it be said that cognition of one thing produces activity toward the first thing merely because it occurs immediately beside cognition of another thing, for then any cognition could produce any activity.
337. 33:29–33:39Nor can it be said that ignorance of the difference between the two cognitions, together with their proximity, causes the activity.
338. 33:39–33:56If in ignorance of difference ignorance is primary and difference secondary, the same cognition will produce withdrawal as well as pursuit, because at that moment ignorance of difference from the undesired object is also present.
339. 33:56–34:07Just as failure to know difference from the desired object produces pursuit, failure to know difference from the undesired object will produce withdrawal.
340. 34:07–34:14Can it not be said that the cause of withdrawal is not ignorance but knowledge of difference
341. 34:14–34:23from the desired object? No. On that view withdrawal from an object mistaken for silver would be
342. 34:23–34:29impossible because at that time there is no conceptual cognition, this is different from
343. 34:29–34:36silver. And if such cognition of difference is accepted, the reality of erroneous cognition
344. 34:36–34:44has been accepted, because a non-different object is being cognized as different. Therefore,
345. 34:44–34:50those who deny the possibility of erroneous cognition must regard ignorance of difference
346. 34:50–34:56as the cause of both pursuit and withdrawal, the undesirable consequence of simultaneous
347. 34:56–35:04pursuit and withdrawal thus remains. Alternative explanation of ignorance of difference, and
348. 35:04–35:12its resolution. If it is said that in ignorance of difference, difference is primary and ignorance
349. 35:12–35:18secondary. Cognition of real silver could not impel a person towards silver because
350. 35:18–35:24the presented object and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not mutually
351. 35:24–35:32different. The other consequences of this view may be considered in the same way.
352. 35:32–35:41to the foregoing resolution and its refutation. It may be asked, just as, in the case of activity,
353. 35:41–35:47ignorance of difference from both desired and undesired objects is present, so before
354. 35:47–35:54illusion arises both kinds of ignorance are present, why, then, do cognition of difference
355. 35:54–36:02and cognition of identity not arise at once? The answer is that ignorance alone is
356. 36:02–36:09not sufficient to produce such cognitions. Each requires a specific causal complex,
357. 36:09–36:16some defect for the superimposition of identity and the absence of defect and so forth for
358. 36:16–36:25cognition of difference. But once difference is cognized, identity cannot be superimposed.
359. 36:25–36:31The rule is that a defect conjoined with ignorance of difference produces an illusion
360. 36:31–36:37or superimposition of difference, the same should be understood concerning an illusion
361. 36:37–36:45or superimposition of identity. Yet nowhere are difference and identity both true together
362. 36:45–36:52such that cognitions of both might arise simultaneously. The problem should be resolved
363. 36:52–37:00in this manner. Refutation of the second alternative that all cognition is false.
364. 37:00–37:07True is the distinction between truth and falsehood impossible because all cognition is false.
365. 37:07–37:15If the cognition such and such cognition is false is true, then not all cognition is false.
366. 37:15–37:22If this cognition is not true, its object the cognition said to be false, will not in
367. 37:22–37:29fact be false, consequently, at least one true cognition must be admitted.
368. 37:29–37:34Under both alternatives the answer is therefore self-contradictory.
369. 37:34–37:42The actual situation is that some cognitions are veridical and others non-veridical.
370. 37:42–37:47Practical usage concerning this distinction between veridical and non-veridical cognition
371. 37:47–37:53would be impossible unless the distinction were experienced.
372. 37:53–38:00of how the veridicality of cognition is known and defense of extrinsic validity. It will
373. 38:00–38:06now be clarified whether the veridicality of cognition is known by that cognition itself
374. 38:06–38:13or by an instrument different from it. Under the first alternative, the veridicality
375. 38:13–38:19of a cognition would be known either by that same cognition or by a second cognition
376. 38:19–38:27that knows it. Of these, the first sub-alternative is impossible, cognition does not even know
377. 38:27–38:35itself, so how can it know its own veridicality? Being ominous in nature cannot serve as a possible
378. 38:35–38:42reason because it is not a common property of light and cognition. An inference cannot
379. 38:42–38:49proceed from mere similarity in the usage of the word light. Can perception prove this
380. 38:49–38:58point? No. Since there is doubt whether the knowing cognition is identical with or different
381. 38:58–39:05from the known cognition, the testimony of perception is not useful here. It may,
382. 39:05–39:11however, be objected that if cognition does not know itself, it cannot know its object
383. 39:11–39:19either and if one cognition is known by another, an infinite regress follows. Moreover, just
384. 39:19–39:26as one act of cutting cannot be the object of another act of cutting of the same kind,
385. 39:26–39:31cognition to cannot be the object of another cognition, therefore the foregoing doubt
386. 39:31–39:34does not arise at all.
387. 39:34–39:38First Objection to the Doctrine of Self Validity
388. 39:38–39:45In the original quotation, does the word indicating arising mean birth or the awareness of cognition
389. 39:45–39:50which is expressed elsewhere by the word knowledge?
390. 39:50–39:56If it means birth, the assertion would mean that cognition of an object arises only
391. 39:56–39:59when cognition of that cognition arises.
392. 39:59–40:06Consequently, every cognition would have to know a cognition that has already arisen
393. 40:06–40:11after its own arising and is therefore no longer present.
394. 40:11–40:17This follows from the explanation that what is not known does not arise.
395. 40:17–40:23But how will this cognition of the object cognition itself arise?
396. 40:23–40:27It too would have to be known by another cognition.
397. 40:27–40:32Thus the doctrine of cognition's self-awareness ultimately establishes the total absence
398. 40:32–40:35of cognition.
399. 40:35–40:42objection to the doctrine of self-validity. If the second meaning of the word, knowledge,
400. 40:42–40:48is accepted, the defect of re-establishing what is already established arises, what is
401. 40:48–40:56not known is not known, this is obvious. But then, if cognition itself is not known,
402. 40:56–41:03will its object not remain unknown as well? No. The cognition that knows the object
403. 41:03–41:11is not a cognition of cognition, it is itself cognition of the object. It may be asked if
404. 41:11–41:18cognition is not known, how can there be the practical usage cognition has occurred? The
405. 41:18–41:26answer is, what need is there for such usage? The mere absence of practical usage concerning
406. 41:26–41:33a thing's existence does not abolish the thing's existence. Nor can practical usage
407. 41:33–41:39concerning an object based upon cognition of that object be abandoned.
408. 41:39–41:43Does this dependence not produce an infinite regress?
409. 41:43–41:50No, we do not regard it as necessary that every cognition be known.
410. 41:50–41:56It is like determinate cognition, whose further determinate cognition is not necessary.
411. 41:56–42:05Otherwise, a determinate cognition not itself determinately known could not determinately know its object either.
412. 42:05–42:11Yet a determinate cognition is not its own determinate cognition.
413. 42:11–42:25Therefore, this defense of the self-awareness of cognition resembles the plight of a housewife who tried to please her husband with her mouth full of lentils but could not conceal the foul smell of her breath.
414. 42:25–42:29Continuation of the refutation
415. 42:29–42:35The example of cutting that has been offered cannot by itself satisfies.
416. 42:35–42:41The inference, one cognition is not the object of another cognition,
417. 42:41–42:45because it is an action of the same class as the other cognition,
418. 42:45–42:51no action of one class is the object of another action of the same class,
419. 42:51–42:58Just as one act of cutting is not the object of another act of cutting is defective.
420. 42:58–43:09If it seeks to establish that cognition, like an act of cutting, is wholly different from the object of another cognition of its own class,
421. 43:09–43:19the probandom is absent from the subject, because one person's cognition is known by another person's cognition and a person's own cognition
422. 43:19–43:27is known through memory. If it seeks to establish cognition's self-objecthood, the example,
423. 43:27–43:33an act of cutting is devoid of the probandom because an act of cutting is not its own
424. 43:33–43:40object, consequently, the reason being an action is incompatible with the probandom.
425. 43:40–43:46Refutation of the view that veridicality is known through reflective cognition. The
426. 43:46–43:53The veridicality of cognition is not known through reflective cognition or through an inference
427. 43:53–44:01based upon the known object because this means cannot distinguish veridicality from non-veridicality.
428. 44:01–44:07It is not the case that only veridical cognition is known as veridical, erroneous cognition
429. 44:07–44:11too is understood as veridical.
430. 44:11–44:19If erroneous cognition were not known in this way, it would not impel one to any action.
431. 44:19–44:22Continuation of the refutation.
432. 44:22–44:28Suppose that a second cognition taking the first cognition as its object happens to manifest
433. 44:28–44:30its veridicality.
434. 44:30–44:36Even so, because there is no certainty about such manifestation, it cannot produce the
435. 44:36–44:43The firm conviction that the first cognition is not different from veridicality.
436. 44:43–44:49We require precisely such firm conviction, because it is a necessary condition for actions
437. 44:49–44:52performed for otherworldly results.
438. 44:52–44:58Could doubt about veridicality somehow be removed, so that no obstacle remains to knowledge
439. 44:58–45:01of veridicality?
440. 45:01–45:05Perhaps, but how is the doubt itself removed?
441. 45:05–45:12If it is removed by some other veridical cognition or proof, it will be asked whether that cognition
442. 45:12–45:14produces firm certainty.
443. 45:14–45:21If not, the doubt is not removed, because removal of doubt is the result of determinate
444. 45:21–45:22cognition.
445. 45:22–45:29If it does produce firm certainty, the required certainty of veridicality is obtained not
446. 45:29–45:35from reflective cognition and the like, but from that other cognition.
447. 45:35–45:40Objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer.
448. 45:40–45:46Let cognition of cognition and the like merely produce an appearance of veridicality without
449. 45:46–45:48confirming it.
450. 45:48–45:54But if it cannot guide action with certainty, what use is such appearance?
451. 45:54–46:01In fact, cognition of cognition cannot even produce an appearance of veridicality.
452. 46:01–46:07If the property whose presence in the known object determines the veridicality of cognition
453. 46:07–46:12is not known, cognition cannot be known as veridical.
454. 46:12–46:20The mere apprehension of an object by cognition is not its veridicality, an object is apprehended
455. 46:20–46:23in illusion as well.
456. 46:23–46:30property is in fact apprehending the object as it really is. From the fact that cognition
457. 46:30–46:36apprehends an object it does not follow that it also apprehends the object's reality
458. 46:36–46:41because such cognition does not apprehend the property of the object that removes
459. 46:41–46:48its illusory character. In some cognitions this property too is apprehended as in
460. 46:48–46:54And this is indeed a pot but not in a cognition that merely takes another cognition as its
461. 46:54–46:55object.
462. 46:55–47:05Were this not so, doubt concerning the veridicality of an unfamiliar cognition would never arise.
463. 47:05–47:11In the case of a familiar cognition, veridical apprehension of the object arises from recollection
464. 47:11–47:16of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandom.
465. 47:16–47:22This recollection is born from the latent impression left by the first cognition of concomitance
466. 47:22–47:28and is therefore included in another inferentially veridical cognition.
467. 47:28–47:35Consequently, only the doctrine of extrinsic validity remains tenable.
468. 47:35–47:39Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation.
469. 47:39–47:45But will the inferential determination of a cognition's veridicality not also generate
470. 47:45–47:53an infinite regress. No. The earlier cognition on the basis of whose similarity the veredicality
471. 47:53–48:00of a new cognition is determined is already known as veredical, its veredicality need
472. 48:00–48:08not be established again, so no infinite regress arises on that account. Admittedly, if the
473. 48:08–48:14veredicality of the very inference establishing veredicality is questioned, the possibility
474. 48:14–48:23of regress may arise, but an inference need not determine its own veridicality every time.
475. 48:23–48:30An inference is like cognition of an object, which need not first establish its own veridicality
476. 48:30–48:38in order to apprehend its object. Very well, then an infinite regress will arise because
477. 48:38–48:44of the cognition of the subject and reason in the inference, since inference does not
478. 48:44–48:50occur unless subject and reason are correctly known, and their correct knowledge cannot arise
479. 48:50–48:56without knowledge of the veridicality of the inference in which they are employed.
480. 48:56–48:58No.
481. 48:58–49:04In an inference establishing the veridicality of cognition, the duality of veridicality
482. 49:04–49:11and non-veridicality is not present. In this inference cognition is the subject and
483. 49:11–49:17veridicality the probandom, therefore doubt about veridicality does not enter into the
484. 49:17–49:25inference itself. Wherever cognition of the subject or reason allows both truth and falsehood
485. 49:25–49:32that is, wherever the cognition is doubtful, the reason remains afflicted by doubt concerning
486. 49:32–49:39its defectiveness and is therefore invalid. But where cognition of the subject or reason
487. 49:39–49:47is related only to veridicality, their veridicality is determined merely by the absence of cognition
488. 49:47–49:54of non-veridicality. A cognition that apprehends only one qualifier of its substantive is a
489. 49:54–50:01determinate cognition. It is established that a cognition apprehending an entity together
490. 50:01–50:07with its property does not contain the duality of truth and falsehood.
491. 50:07–50:13Yet if the veridicality of this cognition to must be determined, it will be determined
492. 50:13–50:18through an external means, namely inference.
493. 50:18–50:21This is the view current in Nya.
494. 50:21–50:27Because of this special character of inferential cognition, Kasperi, the great author of
495. 50:27–50:34the Takparyak, has said that the veridicality of inference is known by itself, that is,
496. 50:34–50:40ordinarily no doubt of non-veridicality arises concerning an inference. Why the duality
497. 50:40–50:49of truth and falsehood does not occur in reflective cognition, question and answer? It may be
498. 50:49–50:55asked, how is it itself determined that the reflective cognition concerning a cognition's
499. 50:55–51:02VARIDICALITY apprehends only VARIDICALITY and not NON-VARIDICALITY as the qualifier of its
500. 51:02–51:09substantive. If this is not determined, an infinite regress follows.
501. 51:09–51:15The answer is that when the VARIDICALITY of the entire class of reflective cognitions
502. 51:15–51:22has been known, and the invariable concomitance between being a reflective cognition and VARIDICALITY
503. 51:22–51:29has been determined, the reflective cognitions of the subject, reason, and so forth are
504. 51:29–51:35known as possessing the same nature because they possess that same class property, and
505. 51:35–51:41are therefore regarded as veridical. Once it has been generally determined that every
506. 51:41–51:48reflective cognition is veridical, there is no room for duality concerning any particular
507. 51:48–51:56instance falling under that class property. For example, in the sentence, a word conveys
508. 51:56–52:02meaning, the word word employed in the sentence does not explicitly state its own capacity
509. 52:02–52:09to convey meaning, because it has no such separate power within the sentence. Nevertheless,
510. 52:09–52:16the wordhood on the basis of which all words are said to convey meaning is also present
511. 52:16–52:23in the word word in that sentence. Therefore, no one doubts whether the word word conveys
512. 52:23–52:31meaning nor does understanding the meaningfulness of the word produce an infinite rigorous.
513. 52:31–52:39Further elaboration of the answer. The foregoing concomitances are also supported by reductio
514. 52:39–52:47arguments in the form of reversal of the consequence. For example, if cognition of the subject or
515. 52:47–52:53substantive were false, it would either be objectless or have a false object, but this
516. 52:53–53:00is unacceptable. If reflective cognition were non-veredical, it would not even apprehend
517. 53:00–53:05the objecthood of the cognition that is its object, because nothing different from
518. 53:05–53:13cognition becomes an object directly. If a cognition such as the cognition of the pervader's
519. 53:13–53:20presence wherever the pervaded is present were established as non-veredical, no locus or basis
520. 53:20–53:26would remain for the absence of invariable concomitance because absence of concomitance
521. 53:26–53:34is itself a kind of false apprehension. Its negation is possible only after reality
522. 53:34–53:40has been admitted since the negation depends upon that very reality.
523. 53:40–53:45Logical Conclusion Once the distinction between true and false
524. 53:45–53:52cognition has thus been established, the assertion that there is no difference between
525. 53:52–53:57the states of consciousness in dream and waking comes to an end.
526. 53:57–54:03The doctrine of the appearance of non-existent objects and the doctrine of pure objectless
527. 54:03–54:11consciousness have already been refuted. Moreover, a theory of erroneous cognition cannot operate
528. 54:11–54:19without admitting the possibility of cognition of real objects. Therefore, if no real cognition
529. 54:19–54:26occurs even in the waking state, such cognition will occur nowhere. Explanation of the difference
530. 54:26–54:35between waking and dream. Even so, it may be asked how these two states are to be distinguished.
531. 54:35–54:42The answer is, in the manner in which they are distinguished in ordinary practice. If
532. 54:42–54:48it is further asked what their definitions are, the answer is this.
533. 54:48–54:54Dream is the state in which some accidental coherence appears among internal events,
534. 54:54–55:02but no continuity is maintained among the agents, actions, instruments, places, and times that
535. 55:02–55:10appear there. Waking is the state in which only some of its objects are subsequently sublated
536. 55:10–55:17and an accidental continuity among different objects is maintained. On this basis, green
537. 55:17–55:23and waking may alternatively be defined as follows. Green is the state in which the
538. 55:23–55:27The continuity of objects is liable to sublation.
539. 55:27–55:33Waking is the state that begins with the sublation of the former continuity and ends in that state
540. 55:33–55:38called dream in which all continuity is sublated.
541. 55:38–55:42Their difference should be understood in this way.
542. 55:42–55:44Final conclusion.
543. 55:44–55:48Therefore, the world is certainly real.
544. 55:48–55:56It seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically neglected the world's reality because reflection
545. 55:56–56:01upon the world appears to be of no special use to them.
546. 56:01–56:07If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality?
547. 56:07–56:13The answer is that if the world is abruptly denied without understanding its relevance
548. 56:13–56:19to liberation, defective reasoning may produce profound confusion concerning all the sources
549. 56:19–56:27of knowledge. Consequently, even a subtle-minded and logically inclined person, acting with such
550. 56:27–56:30haste, may fail to reach the truth.

Plain text

रेविताषन अबजेक्षन्ज अगेंस्ट अठोम्स. दूस, मेर्ली भाई अस्टबलिषिझ दाध वान आटम कन भी कझोंगड वित मैने अदर अठोम्स, All objections based on the alleged impossibility of one atom being conjoined with six atoms situated in the six directions, the necessity of assigning different places to atoms, the casting of shadows upon atoms, and so forth are refuted. Continuation of the refutation The other reasons offered to establish the non-atomicity of atoms are refuted by whichever proof establishes either the reality or the non-establishment of atoms. Another minor objection and its refutation. It is wholly impossible for space to enter the interior of an atom. General refutation of all the foregoing objections. The two terms occurring in the subject statements of all these inferences are mutually contradictory. For example, in the subject statement the atom possesses parts, the word atom itself means a partless entity. Moreover, since the probandom is absent from the subject, the inference also suffers from the defect of a subject devoid of the probandom. Reduxio arguments such as if an atom were partless, it would have no determinate size and could not be conjoint with 6 distinct atoms are wisheted by an unestablished subject and an unestablished concomitance because if atoms do not exist there can be no example exhibiting the concomitance. Further, the undesirable consequence of an infinite series of subordinate parts arises against the divisibility of atoms. Along with it comes the contrary consequence that if atoms were not partless, a minute whole composed of three atoms would become immeasurably vast. Both points support the partlessness of atoms. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Let atoms then be regarded as destructible. No. No proof establishes their destructibility. Every reason offered to establish that atom's poses parts generates the defect of an infinite series of parts. Thus the atom is a curious entity, like the demon named Raktaabja, Two tiers open the belly of the demoness of logic and emerges again in the form of an atom. The point is that the reasons offered to refute atoms ultimately establish those very atoms. Defense of the first objection and its refutation. Can a reduction not proceed on the basis of an imagined subject and an imagined concomitance? No. If affirmation, negation, and the like are based only on imagined notions, the very meaning of real affirmation and negation disappears. And if customary practice is to be followed in this matter, the original statement that a whole cannot inherit in its parts, being opposed to ordinary practice, cannot be accepted at all. This point has already been clarified repeatedly. Continuation of the refutation. Otherwise, that is, if even non-standard and defective arguments are regarded as acceptable, all the foregoing arguments against atoms will apply to cognition as well. Cognition too may be established as possessing parts on the ground that it can be related to six objects at once. But how will cognition's conjunction, determinate size and so forth be established? By inference alone. For example, cognition is simultaneously conjoined with six objects and possesses a determinate size because it is real and is treated in practice like the objects known by it. But will this inference not be groundless? Once the proof establishing the reality of cognition establishes the opposite conclusion, very well if the inference is abandoned on that ground, the same consideration must be given priority in the case of atoms. The related questions should be resolved in the same way. Consideration of the Madhyamaka view. Another disputant, the Madhyamika, closes his eyes to escape danger and says, then consciousness to must disappear. When even the mention of reason, probandom, subject, and the rest has been abandoned, what can be said about this assertion? Can there not be an illusory mention of them? can provided at least the full reality of illusion or illusory cognition is accepted. Otherwise, just as there will be neither a real object nor an illusory object, illusion itself may be illusory regarded as real. Yes, but if this second illusion is also unreal, nothing new has been stated by the foregoing assertion. And if the second illusion is admitted as holy real, it is itself consciousness, whose reality cannot be denied. Can this illusory cognition be real, sublated, and therefore only illusorily real? No. If it is definitely real, what could sublate it? And if it is sublated, how can the object it apprehends be real? of the Madhyamaka view. Experience establishes that whatever is not clearly sublated is regarded as real. It must therefore be admitted that what is accompanied by the property of reality or what is real cannot be sublated. Why then, should the reality of what is accompanied by sublation, or what is sublated, not be denied. If that can be done, the reality of sublation itself can also be denied. Very well, let both reality and sublation be regarded as unavoidable. Yes, that is precisely the fact, what must be denied is their coexistence, which would generate contradiction. The coexistence of mutually opposed things, or the mutual opposition of things that coexist, can be maintained only within one's private doctrine, in debate it is improper merely to assert one's private belief. Consequently, the more the Buddhists try to extinguish consciousness, the brighter its light becomes. Even the negation of consciousness must be known. Thus the Buddhist is trying to create darkness, by extinguishing one lamp with another lamp. Refutation of another objection. This answer also refutes the assertion, that nothing is real because the cause-effect relation cannot be established. Whether the Buddhist attempt to refute the cause-effect relation succeeds or fails, that relation cannot be denied. If the attempt succeeds, a cause-effect relation between the attempt and the established conclusion must be accepted, if it fails, the relation remains unsublated. If, by denying the relation, the Buddhist wishes to refute the doctrine that the effect already exists in the cause, that is acceptable. But if he wishes to refute the doctrine that an effect is newly produced, the view is unacceptable because it contradicts perception. Moreover, if the assertion that points out a defect in the doctrine of newly arising effects already exists, there is no need to produce it again. If it did not already exist, The Buddhist utterance produces it anew. Consequently, the reason in the inference whatever is unreal is not produced is shown to be deviant. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Let the objection then be this. Although all the foregoing criticisms of the whole have proved fruitless, non-cognition of the whole may still constitute a powerful objection. In the place where a hole is supposed to exist, I perceive no entity different from the collection of atoms. But this is merely the resentful outcry of one who has been defeated. The reality of gross holes is a matter of universal experience. Refutation of the objection that cognition of grossness is false. Can it not be said that the cognition, the whole is one object is conceptual and therefore falls? No. This cognition apprehends its object with extreme clarity. Should it be said that the clarity of this cognition depends only upon a condition? No. If a non-conceptual cognition having the same object is the basis of this conceptual cognition and the clarity of the first cognition is superimposed upon the second, the truth of the conceptual cognition is established by itself. If a non-conceptual cognition having a different object is regarded as its basis, the clarity of non-conceptual cognition of blue, yellow, and the light must likewise be regarded as conditional, with the result that no cognition remains wholly clear. Only that which is apprehended in both non-conceptual and conceptual cognition can be regarded as the object of veridical perception. If the object of conceptual cognition is not real, the object of non-conceptual cognition too will cease to be real. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation. Can atoms themselves not be gross? No, then they would cease to be atoms. Can a collection of atoms be gross? No. The Buddhist does not admit a unitary aggregate entity based upon the collected things. If such an entity is accepted, what defect is there in accepting a whole? Can atoms in their collected state themselves appear as a gross object? No, because none of them individually is gross. Does grossness mean occupying different places? No, a single atom does not occupy even one place with extension. Can many atoms, appearing densely as one and occupying many places, be regarded as gross on that account? No, a gross object is always experienced as one. Another defense of cognition of unity among atoms and its refutation. Can cognition of the unity of a gross object not be explained by the superimposition of unity upon the atoms constituting its parts? That is, if its several parts each appear as one, the whole two will appear as one. No, this is impossible. No one superimposes unity upon the countless atoms constituting the different limbs of the body, the hands, feet, chin, nose, and so forth. Although these limbs appear mutually distinct, cognition of the unity of the entire body is not absent. Conversely, unity may be superimposed upon the parts even while they continue to appear distinct. Continuation of the refutation. Moreover, if there is in reality no single hole, one must hold that the millions of atoms constituting the hole or its parts appear as one only because the unity of a single atom is superimposed upon them. In that case the object of superimposition would appear only as atoms, not as a gross object. Can the appearance of grossness be explained by the inference that the atoms are spread over many places? No. This explanation is self-contradictory. If atoms spread over different places are known in the form of those distinct places, neither unity nor residence in many places can be superimposed upon them. If the entities situated in different places are not known, what object will there be that occupies those distinct places? And if both unity and residence in distinct places are superimposed upon the atoms, no other object remains to occupy those different places. Here the atoms would appear neither as many nor as places, and no occupant of the places would be known. Therefore, if unity is superimposed, only the atoms will be known, not their grossness. A brief question and its answer. If this is so, how can the ordinary cognition of grossness and unity in a collection of objects from which no single hole has risen be explained. The answer is that the nature of a substance occupying a space equal to the dimensions of the collection is superimposed upon that collection, because such a substance occupies a spatial extent equal to that of the collection. But this is impossible on your view, because veridical cognition of the grossness to be superimposed is available nowhere else. Are non-existent unity and grossness themselves known here? No. All the arguments against unity and grossness have already been refuted. Indirect refutation of a possible contrary view. The foregoing refutation of the arguments against the whole also refutes the view that the grossness appearing in an object is only the object of conceptual cognition and is therefore unreal. Such grossness must be one of three kinds, an utterly unreal entity, an imagination constructed by cognition, or a real thing. refutation of the claim that invisible atoms cannot become perceptible. When every atom is invisible, how can their collection be visible? A mere aggregation of invisible things does not make them visible. Should it be said that the object produced at each moment from invisible atoms and destroyed the next moment is of a special kind and is therefore apprehensible by the senses? No. You might as well suppose that in a dream you are stretching out your hand and begging, for the doctrine of momentariness has already been refuted. Continuation of the refutation. Or let momentary causation be accepted. Even so, we have already rejected the reality of the special property called immediate efficacy in momentary things, because accepting such a property produces the defect of Universal's overlapping one another. Therefore, if atoms possess no such special property, there will be no determination of which atoms possessing the common property of atomhood are invisible and which visible. Upon rational examination no difference can be determined among the atoms. Further development of the refutation that grossness determines perceptibility. Suppose that special property exists. Even then, the property determining perceptibility by the senses must be grossness alone. Otherwise, an atom that is not gross but possesses the special property of immediate efficacy would become visible. The necessary visibility of whatever is distinct from the non-gross establishes only the visibility of the gross. Here the cause-effect relation is known from the positive and negative concomitance between grossness and visibility. Nor is grossness present in a collection of atoms. Objection to the foregoing refutation. Can multiplicity itself not be grossness and its absence-minuteness? No. On that view, many atoms scattered over a vast tract of land would also become visible. If it is further required for grossness that there be no interval between two atoms, even this condition will not be fulfilled in the present case, because according to the Buddhist view, atoms of qualities, such as taste intervene among the atoms of color in the constitution of an object. Nor can the absence of intervals be regarded as superimposed, because circularity would result, cognition of grossness arises when the absence of intervals is superimposed and that superimposition is made only after grossness has been cognized. Therefore, for an object to be apprehensible by the senses it must be gross. Otherwise, even atoms spread far apart would be visible. Atoms must therefore be regarded as invisible. If no hole is accepted, none of its qualities or properties can be known. Another objection to the reality of a hole and its refutation. Let a gross object lasting only one moment then be admitted. No, this is impossible. On the doctrine of momentariness, parts and hole cannot be perceived at the same time. Since the parts are the material cause of the hole, they must exist one moment before it, consequently, as soon as the hole arises, the parts will have ceased to exist. Moreover, objects such as pots and cloths, produced and then destroyed in the next moment, arise from their causes, pot shards, threads, and the like, yet the successive pot sherds and threads that arise at each moment and perish the next are also held to be the causes producing the subsequent series of pot sherds and threads. Consequently, the material causes of the pot and cloth, the pot sherds and threads, would simultaneously produce to distinct entities serving as material effects. This contradicts the rule that the production of one material effect from a material cause prevents the production of another such effect. Logical conclusion. Thus the proof establishing the grossness of a whole also refutes momentariness, just as a proof of one thesis may simultaneously establish another thesis already presupposed by it. That is, grossness necessarily entails the non-momentariness of a gross object. A minor objection and its resolution. This conclusion also disposes of the following inference intended to establish that a whole is partless, whatever is real is partless, like cognition, disputed objects such as pots are real. The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom is not established because the denial of the proposed universal rule is not sublated. Against it, one may offer the following CRVK like inference, whatever is real has parts, like a pot, cognition is real. If this inference is defective, its opposite is equally defective. The same answer applies in both cases. Continuation of the resolution. But consciousness is by nature partless and self-aware, whereas whether parts and the like-poses parts is presently under dispute. How then, can the inference-establishing possession of parts be valid, and how can both inferences be rejected by the same answer? No. This reasoning can be directed against consciousness as well, an objection may equally be raised against its partlessness. In ordinary experience no one knows a part devoid of its neck, rim, sides, belly, and so forth. Or, from the very reason because it is real, it may be inferred that consciousness does not in here in another thing, or that a part in his in its parts as an entity distinct from them. Just as these inferences established nothing, so to the preceding inference intended to establish the partlessness of consciousness is fruitless. Further development of the resolution. Moreover, is the foregoing proof establishing the partlessness of a gross object a positive inference or a conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence. The first alternative is impossible. If the words pot and the like in the inference signify qualities such as color or entities such as atoms and those are made the subject, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. If a unitary grows object is accepted and made the subject, there is the defect that the probandom is absent from the subject. And if no such object is accepted, the subject itself is unestablished. It may be said that the defect of absence of the probandum occurs only if a unitary gross object is accepted, whereas the defect of an unestablished subject occurs only if it is not accepted, so the same inference does not contain both defects. But if the inference is defended in this manner, the subject of an inference establishing fragrance in a sky flower would also have to be accepted as valid, and the defect of an unestablished subject would disappear altogether. Let such reasoning therefore end here. Objection to the resolution and its answer. Can the pots and the like known in ordinary experience not be made the subject of an inference of partlessness, just as a mountain is made the subject of an inference of fire without first determining whether fire exists there? Otherwise, since it remains unknown whether the mountain is a real transformation of Brahman or merely an illusory appearance, Even the inference of fire on the mountain would be impossible. No, this is not so. Under both Vedantic alternatives there is no incoherence in the inference. Even if the world is established as a transformation of Brahman, the subject, such as the mountain, does not change its nature. For example, in a dream, if an inference occurs, dream fire is inferred on a dream mountain from dream smoke. Even in practice said to arise from ignorance, there is a distinction between relative truth and falsehood and practical activity must depend upon that distinction. But in the foregoing inference, the words, Pot and the like make grows objects the subject. Therefore contradiction between the subject in the form of grossness and the partlessness to be established in it is unavoidable. Another objection to the resolution and its refutation. If the atoms are called the pot and made the subject in the foregoing inference, How can the defect of re-establishing what is already established be avoided? Does this defect not disappear for a person who doubts the partlessness of atoms? No. No one doubts the partlessness of atoms. Could the inference not be useful for removing the ordinary person's error that pots and the like poses parts? Perhaps, but if the very gross object apprehended by ordinary people is made the subject, contradiction between subject and probandom is unavoidable. If some other entity is the subject, the defect of re-establishing what is already established is certain. Should it then be said that the gross object is not one? If so, proof of that very statement must first be supplied. In the inference of partlessness, the reason called reality is as fruitless as the milkless teat on a goat's neck. Nor can reality be the reason in an inference establishing grossness, because if cognition of grossness is regarded as false, this reason becomes incompatible with the subject. The conclusion, therefore, is that a thing becomes the subject of an inference only in the form in which it is not opposed to the desired probandom and in which the presence of the probandom is not already established or undisputed, not in any other form. Refutation of the second alternative above, the conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence. The foregoing thesis cannot be a reductio or conditional inference either, because its conclusion does not terminate in a form opposed to the statement initially accepted. For example, if the pot were real, it would be partless, but it is not partless, therefore it is not real. In this argument, the Buddhist does not accept that the pot possesses parts. Therefore, the Buddhist cannot establish the pots on reality on the ground that it possesses parts, the subject would be unestablished. If the same reason is used in an attempt to establish that cognition of possession of parts is false, the defect of mutual contradiction also arises, because cognition itself is a real entity. Moreover, the reason suffers from being excessively narrow, because according to the Buddhist neither the unreal hairs horn nor consciousness, atoms, and the like possess parts. It is not enough to say that the Buddhist can argue on the basis of the opponent's acceptance of composite objects, because to derive a negative conclusion through a conditional inference the Buddhist must himself accept the reality of the reason. Demand for inferential proof of a whole and its refutation. But what is the inferential proof of a whole? When asking this question, do you intend to say that inference is superior to perception? If so, what is the inferential proof of the self-awareness of cognition that you accept? The demand is therefore groundless. Nevertheless, the following inference with an essential nature as its reason may be offered, whatever does not exhibit the coexistence of mutually opposed properties must be regarded as one entity, like cognition, and what is known as a unitary gross object is clearly of this kind. Practical usage concerning unity depends solely upon the absence of the apparent coexistence of a post properties. This usage can neither be costless nor arise from some other cause, otherwise water, earth, air, and fire too would have to be regarded as a single thing. A general objection to the reality of external objects and its refutation. Let there then always be doubt concerning the reality of external objects, because it is impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood? No. This impossibility cannot arise from everything being true because the answer to the question now to be asked refutes that assumption. The question is, is the ordinary cognition I understood this object incorrectly technically called erroneous cognition true or not? Whatever answer is given, it cannot establish that Everything is true. Objection to the foregoing refutation. Could calling the statement I understood this incorrectly, an erroneous cognition be nothing more than uttering a meaningless cluster of words? No. If no cognition lay behind this statement, there would be no disagreement concerning the nature of erroneous cognition. And people do not dispute merely about words. Nor is it the case that no dispute or disagreement occurs among scholars. Is the dispute about the meaning of words such as erroneous cognition? If so, what is unknown cannot be denied, and since the purpose of debate is to deny the opponent's view, it cannot be said that the disputants have no cognition of what they deny. support for the possibility of conceptual erroneous cognition. Cognition of one object cannot impel a person toward another object, otherwise the object of cognition and the object of activity would be different. That is, unless one thing is understood as another, activity toward the first cannot arise. Nor can it be said that cognition of one thing produces activity toward the first thing merely because it occurs immediately beside cognition of another thing, for then any cognition could produce any activity. Nor can it be said that ignorance of the difference between the two cognitions, together with their proximity, causes the activity. If in ignorance of difference ignorance is primary and difference secondary, the same cognition will produce withdrawal as well as pursuit, because at that moment ignorance of difference from the undesired object is also present. Just as failure to know difference from the desired object produces pursuit, failure to know difference from the undesired object will produce withdrawal. Can it not be said that the cause of withdrawal is not ignorance but knowledge of difference from the desired object? No. On that view withdrawal from an object mistaken for silver would be impossible because at that time there is no conceptual cognition, this is different from silver. And if such cognition of difference is accepted, the reality of erroneous cognition has been accepted, because a non-different object is being cognized as different. Therefore, those who deny the possibility of erroneous cognition must regard ignorance of difference as the cause of both pursuit and withdrawal, the undesirable consequence of simultaneous pursuit and withdrawal thus remains. Alternative explanation of ignorance of difference, and its resolution. If it is said that in ignorance of difference, difference is primary and ignorance secondary. Cognition of real silver could not impel a person towards silver because the presented object and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not mutually different. The other consequences of this view may be considered in the same way. to the foregoing resolution and its refutation. It may be asked, just as, in the case of activity, ignorance of difference from both desired and undesired objects is present, so before illusion arises both kinds of ignorance are present, why, then, do cognition of difference and cognition of identity not arise at once? The answer is that ignorance alone is not sufficient to produce such cognitions. Each requires a specific causal complex, some defect for the superimposition of identity and the absence of defect and so forth for cognition of difference. But once difference is cognized, identity cannot be superimposed. The rule is that a defect conjoined with ignorance of difference produces an illusion or superimposition of difference, the same should be understood concerning an illusion or superimposition of identity. Yet nowhere are difference and identity both true together such that cognitions of both might arise simultaneously. The problem should be resolved in this manner. Refutation of the second alternative that all cognition is false. True is the distinction between truth and falsehood impossible because all cognition is false. If the cognition such and such cognition is false is true, then not all cognition is false. If this cognition is not true, its object the cognition said to be false, will not in fact be false, consequently, at least one true cognition must be admitted. Under both alternatives the answer is therefore self-contradictory. The actual situation is that some cognitions are veridical and others non-veridical. Practical usage concerning this distinction between veridical and non-veridical cognition would be impossible unless the distinction were experienced. of how the veridicality of cognition is known and defense of extrinsic validity. It will now be clarified whether the veridicality of cognition is known by that cognition itself or by an instrument different from it. Under the first alternative, the veridicality of a cognition would be known either by that same cognition or by a second cognition that knows it. Of these, the first sub-alternative is impossible, cognition does not even know itself, so how can it know its own veridicality? Being ominous in nature cannot serve as a possible reason because it is not a common property of light and cognition. An inference cannot proceed from mere similarity in the usage of the word light. Can perception prove this point? No. Since there is doubt whether the knowing cognition is identical with or different from the known cognition, the testimony of perception is not useful here. It may, however, be objected that if cognition does not know itself, it cannot know its object either and if one cognition is known by another, an infinite regress follows. Moreover, just as one act of cutting cannot be the object of another act of cutting of the same kind, cognition to cannot be the object of another cognition, therefore the foregoing doubt does not arise at all. First Objection to the Doctrine of Self Validity In the original quotation, does the word indicating arising mean birth or the awareness of cognition which is expressed elsewhere by the word knowledge? If it means birth, the assertion would mean that cognition of an object arises only when cognition of that cognition arises. Consequently, every cognition would have to know a cognition that has already arisen after its own arising and is therefore no longer present. This follows from the explanation that what is not known does not arise. But how will this cognition of the object cognition itself arise? It too would have to be known by another cognition. Thus the doctrine of cognition's self-awareness ultimately establishes the total absence of cognition. objection to the doctrine of self-validity. If the second meaning of the word, knowledge, is accepted, the defect of re-establishing what is already established arises, what is not known is not known, this is obvious. But then, if cognition itself is not known, will its object not remain unknown as well? No. The cognition that knows the object is not a cognition of cognition, it is itself cognition of the object. It may be asked if cognition is not known, how can there be the practical usage cognition has occurred? The answer is, what need is there for such usage? The mere absence of practical usage concerning a thing's existence does not abolish the thing's existence. Nor can practical usage concerning an object based upon cognition of that object be abandoned. Does this dependence not produce an infinite regress? No, we do not regard it as necessary that every cognition be known. It is like determinate cognition, whose further determinate cognition is not necessary. Otherwise, a determinate cognition not itself determinately known could not determinately know its object either. Yet a determinate cognition is not its own determinate cognition. Therefore, this defense of the self-awareness of cognition resembles the plight of a housewife who tried to please her husband with her mouth full of lentils but could not conceal the foul smell of her breath. Continuation of the refutation The example of cutting that has been offered cannot by itself satisfies. The inference, one cognition is not the object of another cognition, because it is an action of the same class as the other cognition, no action of one class is the object of another action of the same class, Just as one act of cutting is not the object of another act of cutting is defective. If it seeks to establish that cognition, like an act of cutting, is wholly different from the object of another cognition of its own class, the probandom is absent from the subject, because one person's cognition is known by another person's cognition and a person's own cognition is known through memory. If it seeks to establish cognition's self-objecthood, the example, an act of cutting is devoid of the probandom because an act of cutting is not its own object, consequently, the reason being an action is incompatible with the probandom. Refutation of the view that veridicality is known through reflective cognition. The The veridicality of cognition is not known through reflective cognition or through an inference based upon the known object because this means cannot distinguish veridicality from non-veridicality. It is not the case that only veridical cognition is known as veridical, erroneous cognition too is understood as veridical. If erroneous cognition were not known in this way, it would not impel one to any action. Continuation of the refutation. Suppose that a second cognition taking the first cognition as its object happens to manifest its veridicality. Even so, because there is no certainty about such manifestation, it cannot produce the The firm conviction that the first cognition is not different from veridicality. We require precisely such firm conviction, because it is a necessary condition for actions performed for otherworldly results. Could doubt about veridicality somehow be removed, so that no obstacle remains to knowledge of veridicality? Perhaps, but how is the doubt itself removed? If it is removed by some other veridical cognition or proof, it will be asked whether that cognition produces firm certainty. If not, the doubt is not removed, because removal of doubt is the result of determinate cognition. If it does produce firm certainty, the required certainty of veridicality is obtained not from reflective cognition and the like, but from that other cognition. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer. Let cognition of cognition and the like merely produce an appearance of veridicality without confirming it. But if it cannot guide action with certainty, what use is such appearance? In fact, cognition of cognition cannot even produce an appearance of veridicality. If the property whose presence in the known object determines the veridicality of cognition is not known, cognition cannot be known as veridical. The mere apprehension of an object by cognition is not its veridicality, an object is apprehended in illusion as well. property is in fact apprehending the object as it really is. From the fact that cognition apprehends an object it does not follow that it also apprehends the object's reality because such cognition does not apprehend the property of the object that removes its illusory character. In some cognitions this property too is apprehended as in And this is indeed a pot but not in a cognition that merely takes another cognition as its object. Were this not so, doubt concerning the veridicality of an unfamiliar cognition would never arise. In the case of a familiar cognition, veridical apprehension of the object arises from recollection of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandom. This recollection is born from the latent impression left by the first cognition of concomitance and is therefore included in another inferentially veridical cognition. Consequently, only the doctrine of extrinsic validity remains tenable. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation. But will the inferential determination of a cognition's veridicality not also generate an infinite regress. No. The earlier cognition on the basis of whose similarity the veredicality of a new cognition is determined is already known as veredical, its veredicality need not be established again, so no infinite regress arises on that account. Admittedly, if the veredicality of the very inference establishing veredicality is questioned, the possibility of regress may arise, but an inference need not determine its own veridicality every time. An inference is like cognition of an object, which need not first establish its own veridicality in order to apprehend its object. Very well, then an infinite regress will arise because of the cognition of the subject and reason in the inference, since inference does not occur unless subject and reason are correctly known, and their correct knowledge cannot arise without knowledge of the veridicality of the inference in which they are employed. No. In an inference establishing the veridicality of cognition, the duality of veridicality and non-veridicality is not present. In this inference cognition is the subject and veridicality the probandom, therefore doubt about veridicality does not enter into the inference itself. Wherever cognition of the subject or reason allows both truth and falsehood that is, wherever the cognition is doubtful, the reason remains afflicted by doubt concerning its defectiveness and is therefore invalid. But where cognition of the subject or reason is related only to veridicality, their veridicality is determined merely by the absence of cognition of non-veridicality. A cognition that apprehends only one qualifier of its substantive is a determinate cognition. It is established that a cognition apprehending an entity together with its property does not contain the duality of truth and falsehood. Yet if the veridicality of this cognition to must be determined, it will be determined through an external means, namely inference. This is the view current in Nya. Because of this special character of inferential cognition, Kasperi, the great author of the Takparyak, has said that the veridicality of inference is known by itself, that is, ordinarily no doubt of non-veridicality arises concerning an inference. Why the duality of truth and falsehood does not occur in reflective cognition, question and answer? It may be asked, how is it itself determined that the reflective cognition concerning a cognition's VARIDICALITY apprehends only VARIDICALITY and not NON-VARIDICALITY as the qualifier of its substantive. If this is not determined, an infinite regress follows. The answer is that when the VARIDICALITY of the entire class of reflective cognitions has been known, and the invariable concomitance between being a reflective cognition and VARIDICALITY has been determined, the reflective cognitions of the subject, reason, and so forth are known as possessing the same nature because they possess that same class property, and are therefore regarded as veridical. Once it has been generally determined that every reflective cognition is veridical, there is no room for duality concerning any particular instance falling under that class property. For example, in the sentence, a word conveys meaning, the word word employed in the sentence does not explicitly state its own capacity to convey meaning, because it has no such separate power within the sentence. Nevertheless, the wordhood on the basis of which all words are said to convey meaning is also present in the word word in that sentence. Therefore, no one doubts whether the word word conveys meaning nor does understanding the meaningfulness of the word produce an infinite rigorous. Further elaboration of the answer. The foregoing concomitances are also supported by reductio arguments in the form of reversal of the consequence. For example, if cognition of the subject or substantive were false, it would either be objectless or have a false object, but this is unacceptable. If reflective cognition were non-veredical, it would not even apprehend the objecthood of the cognition that is its object, because nothing different from cognition becomes an object directly. If a cognition such as the cognition of the pervader's presence wherever the pervaded is present were established as non-veredical, no locus or basis would remain for the absence of invariable concomitance because absence of concomitance is itself a kind of false apprehension. Its negation is possible only after reality has been admitted since the negation depends upon that very reality. Logical Conclusion Once the distinction between true and false cognition has thus been established, the assertion that there is no difference between the states of consciousness in dream and waking comes to an end. The doctrine of the appearance of non-existent objects and the doctrine of pure objectless consciousness have already been refuted. Moreover, a theory of erroneous cognition cannot operate without admitting the possibility of cognition of real objects. Therefore, if no real cognition occurs even in the waking state, such cognition will occur nowhere. Explanation of the difference between waking and dream. Even so, it may be asked how these two states are to be distinguished. The answer is, in the manner in which they are distinguished in ordinary practice. If it is further asked what their definitions are, the answer is this. Dream is the state in which some accidental coherence appears among internal events, but no continuity is maintained among the agents, actions, instruments, places, and times that appear there. Waking is the state in which only some of its objects are subsequently sublated and an accidental continuity among different objects is maintained. On this basis, green and waking may alternatively be defined as follows. Green is the state in which the The continuity of objects is liable to sublation. Waking is the state that begins with the sublation of the former continuity and ends in that state called dream in which all continuity is sublated. Their difference should be understood in this way. Final conclusion. Therefore, the world is certainly real. It seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically neglected the world's reality because reflection upon the world appears to be of no special use to them. If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality? The answer is that if the world is abruptly denied without understanding its relevance to liberation, defective reasoning may produce profound confusion concerning all the sources of knowledge. Consequently, even a subtle-minded and logically inclined person, acting with such haste, may fail to reach the truth.

← Transcript index