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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:34ताथ विशिश्विशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिश
0:34–0:38first considered the view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the
0:38–0:42prima facie position. They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with
0:42–0:47the desire to complete the work. The direct result of the invocation is therefore the
0:47–0:50completion of the work, that is, the desired completion.
0:51–0:56Gangesha Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions.
0:57–1:01He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication,
1:01–1:05as in the case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work
1:05–1:09remains unfinished even after a complete invocation has been performed.
1:11–1:15If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work,
1:15–1:19and completion follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort,
1:19–1:23then according to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of
1:23–1:28the invocation that assists in bringing the work to completion. According to Gangesa's Nyaya
1:28–1:33doctrine, the principle and immediate result of an auspicious invocation is the destruction
1:33–1:37of obstacles, Vignadvasa.
1:37–1:41He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book, rather,
1:41–1:47it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition.
1:47–1:51Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary
1:51–1:54human effort.
1:54–1:58This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question.
1:58–2:03If an auspicious invocation destroys obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive
2:03–2:08authors, who do not perform such an invocation, sometimes completed?
2:08–2:12According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without obstruction in such a
2:12–2:16case, despite the absence of an invocation?
2:16–2:21This is a highly important question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously
2:21–2:24logical manner.
2:24–2:28According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed
2:28–2:32without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of
2:32–2:35obstacles, Vignabhava.
2:35–2:40Gangeset explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles
2:40–2:43carried over from a previous birth.
2:43–2:49At times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all.
2:49–2:54Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles,
2:54–2:59No invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset.
2:59–3:04In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring
3:04–3:08the work to completion without obstruction.
3:08–3:102.
3:10–3:16The doctrine of validity, Pramayadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known?
3:16–3:20We shall now consider the doctrine of validity.
3:20–3:25The central dispute in this doctrine is between the Msaakas and the Neayakas concerning how
3:25–3:30the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended.
3:30–3:36The Msaakas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha.
3:36–3:40In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of the
3:40–3:46very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically.
3:46–3:53The Neayakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, parattapramayavda.
3:53–3:57They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its
3:57–4:02own causal complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or
4:02–4:05a subsequently successful activity.
4:05–4:10The Neayakas put a very practical question to themsakas on this point.
4:10–4:15Logically, if themsaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically
4:15–4:20certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its validity,
4:20–4:25such as hesitation or doubt, would become wholly impossible in a condition of unfamiliarity,
4:25–4:29when a new cognition occurs for the first time?
4:29–4:33If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising,
4:33–4:38a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in
4:38–4:40a state of unfamiliarity.
4:40–4:44Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life.
4:44–4:49On this basis, the Nayayakas refute the Msaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish
4:49–4:54that a cognition's validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or
4:54–4:57through successful activity.
4:57–5:03The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha.
5:03–5:07When a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question
5:07–5:12from the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata,
5:12–5:14is...
5:14–5:18What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell
5:18–5:24lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous activity?
5:24–5:29The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present
5:29–5:34before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory.
5:34–5:38According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of
5:38–5:42silver, two distinct cognitions are actually present.
5:42–5:48First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell.
5:48–5:53Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory.
5:53–5:58The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions.
5:58–6:03In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, bedagraha, difference plus
6:03–6:05non-apprehension.
6:05–6:09Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds
6:09–6:13to pick up the supposed silver.
6:13–6:18The Nayayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension, Anyathakiyati, do not agree that the error
6:18–6:22consists merely in ignorance of the difference.
6:22–6:26In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier
6:26–6:30that does not in fact belong to it.
6:30–6:34The Nayayakas hold that in error the person does not merely overlook the difference
6:34–6:37between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain.
6:37–6:42Rather, he positively apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in
6:42–6:45the shell but belongs to silver.
6:45–6:50For this reason, the error is called anyothakiyati, apprehending one thing as another, and is
6:50–6:54treated as a qualified cognition.
6:54–6:58The doctrine of validity, with respect to apprehension and production, whether the
6:58–7:03validity of a cognition is intrinsically produced and known through its own causal complex,
7:03–7:09themsakas hold, or extrinsically through some other means, as the Neayakas maintain.
7:09–7:14The fundamental dispute between themsakas and Neayakas in this discussion is how it is known
7:14–7:19that a cognition is veritical or valid its apprehension and how that validity is produced
7:19–7:21its production.
7:21–7:25The Msakas uphold intrinsic validity.
7:25–7:29According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically through the same complete
7:29–7:35causal complex from which the cognition itself arises. If another means or cognition were
7:35–7:40needed to know its validity, a third would be required to establish the validity of the second,
7:40–7:47producing the defect of infinite regress, and a vasta. The Neayakas, on the contrary,
7:47–7:53support extrinsic validity. They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically
7:53–7:58through some further means, such as inference or successful activity.
7:58–8:03In this context the Nayayakas raise a highly practical question.
8:03–8:08When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a person
8:08–8:12often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not.
8:12–8:17If the msaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes intrinsically
8:17–8:21certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then according
8:21–8:26According to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt,
8:26–8:30would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition?
8:30–8:34What is that particular property called?
8:34–8:363.
8:36–8:41The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of apprehension,
8:41–8:45whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as silver, is
8:45–8:50the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference,
8:50–8:57or the Nayaka doctrine of misapprehension, anyathakiyati, namely a qualified cognition.
8:57–9:02The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell, Sukti, takes it to be silver,
9:02–9:04rajatha, and is prompted to pick it up.
9:04–9:08What is the actual cause of that activity?
9:08–9:11Two principal views are offered.
9:11–9:16The Prabhakramsaka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition
9:16–9:18arises here.
9:18–9:22There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition this concerning the
9:22–9:28shell present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory.
9:28–9:32According to the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between these two
9:32–9:38cognitions, this is called non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, or Akiyati.
9:38–9:43The Nayayaka theory of misapprehension, the Nayayakas maintain that the error is
9:43–9:46not merely ignorance of a difference.
9:46–9:51It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively apprehends
9:51–9:56silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him.
9:56–10:00In other words, one thing is apprehended as another.
10:00–10:05Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Sakha standpoint.
10:05–10:10If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely,
10:10–10:14according to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person
10:14–10:18person fail to understand at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming
10:18–10:21impelled to act.
10:21–10:25According to the Prabhakram Sakha theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to apprehend
10:25–10:29the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver being
10:29–10:31recalled.
10:31–10:36When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind.
10:36–10:43According to the Prabhakras, this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions.
10:43–10:49cognition, this is something the general perception of the shell in which owing to a defect or
10:49–10:55distance, its shellhood is not apprehended. Memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously
10:55–11:01seen silver evoked by the shell's luster. The person cannot distinguish between this
11:01–11:06perception of the shell before him and the memory of previously seen silver. Because
11:06–11:11of this non apprehension of difference, Vedagraha, he takes the two to be one and proceeds
11:11–11:14to pick up the supposed silver.
11:14–11:20Now consider the Neyayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account.
11:20–11:25According to the Neyayakas, who uphold Aniyathakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail to
11:25–11:30distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell
11:30–11:34before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as
11:34–11:36another.
11:36–11:41What distinctive property is Silverhood, Rajatattva?
11:41–11:46According to the Nayayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present
11:46–11:51before him as the Qualificand, or Substrate, and superimposes Silverhood upon it as the
11:51–11:53Qualifier or Mode.
11:53–11:57This differs from the Prabhuprādhā theory of non-apprehension because the person is
11:57–12:02not merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell a property,
12:02–12:05Silverhood, that is not there at all.
12:05–12:10Because of this specific superimposition, the Neayakas call the error Anniyathakiyati,
12:10–12:15the apprehension of one thing is another, and a qualified cognition.
12:15–12:20Tatvasintmai, inference section.
12:20–12:23Influential cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition
12:23–12:27and the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions
12:27–12:32of pervasion and the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or
12:32–12:36an unconditional relation, together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account.
12:38–12:42In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyo's Tatvasant Mai, the study of inferential cognition
12:42–12:46and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy.
12:47–12:51It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various
12:51–12:55prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions and those attributed to
12:55–13:00see how and Viagra and Gangesa's decisive definition.
13:00–13:05Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail.
13:05–13:10The nature of inferential cognition, anumitai.
13:10–13:15In Nyaya philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent and
13:15–13:20valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony.
13:20–13:26Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason
13:26–13:30is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation of
13:30–13:34invariable concomitance.
13:34–13:38In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and
13:38–13:42one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition
13:42–13:45of fire arises in that subject.
13:45–13:50This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary cause is subsumptive
13:50–13:54reflection, paramarsa.
13:54–13:59The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions.
13:59–14:03Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition.
14:03–14:06It is not sufficient merely to characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason
14:06–14:10from the probandom, many prima facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate
14:10–14:13its philosophical definition.
14:13–14:17Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions
14:17–14:19of pervasion.
14:19–14:22The five definitions of perversion.
14:22–14:26Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify perversion.
14:26–14:31Gangesa takes them up as prima facie views and subjects them to examination.
14:31–14:40The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur.
14:40–14:45This is called absence of occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandom.
14:45–14:58The reasons non-occurrence and a locus of the absence of the probandum that is distinct from the locus of the probandum, in places other than the probandum's own locus where the probandum is absent, the reason must not occur.
14:58–15:07Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence whose counter-positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum.
15:07–15:14The state of being the counter-positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the absence of the probandum.
15:14–15:19The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum.
15:19–15:35Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative inference, in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandum, as in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandum in such a case.
15:35–15:41b. Definitions of perversion attributed to Seahut and Viagra
15:41–15:48Certain logicians referred to as SIHA and Viagra proposed two further marks of pervasion.
15:48–15:54The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandums collocation.
15:54–16:00The reasons non-occurrence and a place distinct from the locus of the probandum.
16:00–16:07Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain special cases.
16:07–16:11Gangesa therefore rejects them as well.
16:11–16:16In addition, Gangesa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions,
16:16–16:21including the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different locus,
16:21–16:27possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation.
16:27–16:32Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion.
16:32–16:37After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical examination,
16:37–16:40Ganjisa Ubudyoja presents his definitive characterization of perversion.
16:42–16:42Definition.
16:44–16:47Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom,
16:47–16:52but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness whose
16:52–16:56counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but
16:56–17:01but is not co-located with its own counter-positive.
17:01–17:03In simple terms,
17:03–17:09pervasion is the concomitance or co-location of the reason with the probandum.
17:09–17:14This concomitance, however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive
17:14–17:18and a different or incongruent locus, an absence that occurs in the locus of the reason
17:18–17:22but not in the locus of its actual counter-positive.
17:22–17:27Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the defect of a reason burdened
17:27–17:33by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of perversion.
17:33–17:38The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Upadi its nature, the basis of its vitiating force,
17:38–17:43and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference.
17:43–17:48Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadiya is Tattvasintmai, the doctrine of the extraneous
17:48–17:53condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Nyaya philosophy.
17:54–17:59And Yupiti plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the pro-bandom
17:59–18:05and an inference. Let us examine and detail the nature of a Yupiti, the basis of its vitiating
18:05–18:09force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain Yupiti upon inference.
18:11–18:18The nature of a Yupiti. In Nyaya philosophy, a Yupiti is a property that does not pervade
18:18–18:23the property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom.
18:24–18:30In simple terms, an upity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the probandom
18:30–18:34and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore does not
18:34–18:41pervade the reason. Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire. In this inference,
18:41–18:47fire is the reason and smoke is the probandom. The conjunction of damp fuel is the upity,
18:47–18:52It does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in dry wood or cow dung cakes without moisture,
18:52–18:56but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without moisture or damp fuel.
18:58–19:01The basis of the Eupades Vitiating Force
19:03–19:08How is an Eupade regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference?
19:10–19:14By means of its own absence, the Eupade establishes the absence of the probandom and
19:14–19:18thereby produces deviation of the reason from the probandum.
19:19–19:24When an inference contains a reason accompanied by an eupody, the natural pervasion or invariable
19:24–19:30relation between that reason and the probandum is destroyed. The eupody establishes that the
19:30–19:35apparent association between them is not intrinsic but depends upon the concealed condition.
19:36–19:40For this reason, the eupody is the principal basis of the inference's defectiveness.
19:40–19:48The effect of a certain and a doubtful Upadi upon inference.
19:48–19:54In the Tatvasint Mai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes.
19:54–19:57A. Certain Upadi.
19:57–20:02Nature, an Upadi that is certainly pervasive of the probandum and non-pervasive of the
20:02–20:07reason, and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the probandum, is
20:07–20:10called a certain Upadi.
20:10–20:15Based upon inference, the presence of a certain Eupade completely defeats an inference.
20:15–20:20It wholly destroys the provision between the reason and the probandom, so that no inferential
20:20–20:23cognition of the probandom can arise.
20:23–20:28For example, in the inference, the lake is smoked because it has fire, the possession
20:28–20:31of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain Eupade.
20:31–20:34b. doubtful Eupade.
20:34–20:39Nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails to pervade the
20:39–20:44probandum or that the condition pervades the probandum, and only doubt remains, the condition
20:44–20:48is a doubtful eupody.
20:48–20:52Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful
20:52–20:57eupody gives rise to doubt about deviation between the probandum and the reason.
20:57–21:02This doubt weakens the proponents cognition and obstructs the production of a determinate
21:02–21:04inferential cognition.
21:04–21:09For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra,
21:09–21:13being produced by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful yuppati relative to the probandum
21:13–21:15of blackness.
21:15–21:19Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of yuppati in the inference section of the
21:19–21:25Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true,
21:25–21:29the reason must be free from an yuppati.
21:29–21:33Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection, the definition of subjecthood in terms of the
21:33–21:38desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and
21:38–21:43dispute between Mshakas and Nayayakas over whether subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary
21:43–21:45cause of inference.
21:45–21:50In the inference section of Dhanjisa Upadyas Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive
21:50–21:55reflection are highly important and original doctrines of Nyaya philosophy.
21:55–21:59The discussion explains the definition of the inferential subject in terms of the desire
21:59–22:04to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and examines the
22:04–22:09extensive controversy between msakas and neayakas concerning subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary
22:09–22:13cause of inference.
22:13–22:17Let us examine all these matters in detail.
22:17–22:23The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference.
22:23–22:27To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject, such
22:27–22:30as the mountain in which fire is to be established.
22:30–22:35In the Prima Facei view, several teachers treated doubt about the probandam, or merely the absence
22:35–22:39of evidence either establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood.
22:39–22:43Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts.
22:43–22:48The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood.
22:48–22:52A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together
22:52–22:58with the absence of a desire to establish the probandam.
22:58–23:05In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors.
23:05–23:09Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is
23:09–23:15already available to establish the probandom, for example fire, in that locus.
23:15–23:20The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish, subjecthood is determined by
23:20–23:24the particular configuration of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence
23:24–23:28evidence that would already establish it.
23:28–23:33Where the probandom has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood, and therefore
23:33–23:37no need for a fresh inference.
23:37–23:42The controversy between msakkas and neayakkas over subsumptive reflection as the direct
23:42–23:45cause of inference.
23:45–23:49There is a serious philosophical dispute between the neayakkas and msakkas over whether
23:49–23:54subsumptive reflection, the cognition that a property serving is a reason and pervaded
23:54–23:58by the probandum occurs in the subject, as in and the mountain possesses smoke pervaded
23:58–24:03by fire, is the extraordinary cause that produces inferential cognition.
24:03–24:09Themsaka view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct cause.
24:09–24:14Themsaka's maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection is
24:14–24:16required.
24:16–24:20They argue that recollection of pervasion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, together
24:20–24:25with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain,
24:25–24:28directly produces the inference.
24:28–24:33From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third cognition called subsumptive reflection
24:33–24:39in addition to these two cognitions introduces needless theoretical complexity.
24:39–24:45The Neyayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection alone is the extraordinary cause of inference.
24:45–24:51Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayayakas firmly refute the msaka position.
24:51–24:56They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from separate cognitions of
24:56–25:00perversion and of the reason's occurrence and the subject.
25:00–25:04Until the specific cognition arises that the reason qualified by that perversion
25:04–25:09is present in the subject, subsumptive reflection, no determinant conclusion or inferential
25:09–25:12cognition can be obtained.
25:12–25:17Reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential cognition, and
25:17–25:21inference cannot be accomplished without this process.
25:21–25:26Types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative
25:26–25:31and purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom.
25:31–25:35Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyas Tathasintmai, the establishment
25:35–25:39of purely affirmative and purely negative inference, and the detailed explanation of
25:39–25:44how the probandom is proved in each, are highly important topics in Nyaya philosophy.
25:45–25:48Let us examine both types of inference in detail.
25:50–25:53Purely affirmative inference, Kevalyn Vein.
25:55–25:58Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance,
25:58–26:02no locus where the probandom is absent, is called purely affirmative.
26:03–26:08It contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because
26:08–26:14no locus of the probandum's absence is available. Example, the pot is nameable because it is
26:14–26:19knowable. Explanation, here knowability is the reason
26:19–26:25and nameability is the probandum. Both properties are found in every object in the world.
26:25–26:29There is no object that is neither knowable nor capable of being named. Where the probandum
26:29–26:34has no negative instance, purely affirmative pervasion is established.
26:34–26:38Gangisa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an unestablished
26:38–26:43probandom in subjects such as, ether, or, the nameable, an inference becomes purely affirmative
26:43–26:48when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence is not present in the subject.
26:48–26:54In this type of inference, the probandom is established solely through positive pervasion.
26:54–26:59Purely negative inference, Kevalati-Otterikan.
26:59–27:03Definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom
27:03–27:07is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative
27:07–27:14inference. Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses
27:14–27:20smell. Explanation, in this inference, the probandum is that Earth differs from the
27:20–27:24other substances, water, air, ether, and so forth, and possession of smell is the
27:24–27:29reason. No substance in the world other than Earth possesses the quality called
27:29–27:34smell. Consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which both smell and earthhood
27:34–27:39are found. In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative
27:39–27:43concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference from the other substances is absent, that
27:43–27:49is, wherever the thing is not distinct in the way earth is, smell is also absent. Thus,
27:49–27:53when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom earth is
27:53–27:59different from the other substances is conclusively established through negative pervasion.
27:59–28:03Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai,
28:03–28:08Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient
28:08–28:12to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative
28:12–28:15inference are both indispensable where appropriate.
28:15–28:19The doctrine of presumption, Artha Patti the dispute between the Mtsaka view that
28:19–28:24presumption is a separate means of knowledge and the Nayaka view that it falls under purely
28:24–28:27negative inference.
28:27–28:31The dispute between Sakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in the inference
28:31–28:36section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattva Sintma is a highly philosophical and logical issue
28:36–28:38within Nyaya.
28:38–28:43Let us examine this dispute in detail.
28:43–28:48The Msaaka view, presumption as a separate means of knowledge.
28:48–28:53From Sakas regard presumption as an independent means of knowledge distinct from perception,
28:53–28:58inference, and verbal testimony, the sixth type of prama.
28:58–29:02Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible, and an unseen or
29:02–29:07absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them, the resulting cognition
29:07–29:10is called presumption.
29:10–29:14The famous example is Devdutta, who is alive but is not seen at home during the
29:14–29:16day.
29:16–29:21Here there are two facts, that he is alive and that he is absent from home.
29:21–29:25Once his absence from home is certain, his continuing life is possible only if he is gone
29:25–29:28somewhere outside.
29:28–29:32His being outside is thus postulated through presumption.
29:32–29:37Themsaka argument, Themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference, because
29:37–29:41no determinant reason and provision are directly operative.
29:41–29:48An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent contradiction.
29:48–29:54The Nayayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference.
29:54–30:00The Nayayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption
30:00–30:03is an independent means of knowledge.
30:03–30:09The Nayayaka argument, no separate Prama called presumption need be postulated.
30:09–30:16The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative inference.
30:16–30:22The inferential form, Dev Dutta's being outside the house is known through the following inference.
30:22–30:27Living Dev Dutta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the continuous
30:27–30:31absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it.
30:31–30:36Economy, the Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an ordinary
30:36–30:41purely negative inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called presumption
30:41–30:47introduces needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted as an independent
30:47–30:52means of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between msakkas and neyayakkas.
30:53–31:00The neyayakas include it within inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas
31:00–31:05Tapasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive reflection, and purely negative
31:05–31:09inference are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical topics in Nyaya.
31:10–31:14All three occupy a central place in the process of inferential cognition.
31:15–31:18Let us discuss these three topics in detail.
31:20–31:23The extraneous condition, Yupati the source of a fallacy.
31:25–31:29According to Nyaya, and Yupati is a property that pervades the probandum,
31:29–31:33the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the proof rests.
31:33–31:39In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the reason.
31:39–31:44The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective?
31:44–31:53When a reason accompanied by a nupity is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural pervasion or invariable relation between the reason and the probandom.
31:53–32:00The nupity shows that their apparent association is not genuine but depends upon some other concealed condition.
32:00–32:08Example, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. Here fire is the reason and
32:08–32:15smoke the probandom. Yet fire alone does not produce smoke. Conjunction with damp fuel
32:15–32:20is the upity, although it does not pervade fire, it does pervade smoke. The inference
32:20–32:25is defective because of this upity.
32:25–32:33reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition. In the Neyayaka view, subsumptive reflection
32:33–32:38is the extraordinary or direct cause that produces inferential cognition, the cognition
32:38–32:43of the conclusion. Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific
32:43–32:47cognition expressed in the formula, the property occurring in the subject and qualified
32:47–32:53by pervasion is subsumptive reflection. That is, the subject, such as the mountain,
32:53–32:59is a reason, such as smoke, that is pervaded by the probandum, fire.
32:59–33:03Its distinction from recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reason in the subject,
33:03–33:07merely remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that
33:07–33:12there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection.
33:12–33:16It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded
33:16–33:19by fire.
33:19–33:23The Msaaka and Aayaka dispute, the Msaaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection
33:23–33:27need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reasons
33:27–33:31presence and the subject together suffice.
33:31–33:36Gangesa Upadyaya and the Aayakas, however, establish that no determinant inferential
33:36–33:43cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of subsumptive reflection occurs.
33:43–33:48Purely negative inference, Kevaladi-Aterican.
33:48–33:53Nyaia recognizes three forms of inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative,
33:53–33:55and purely negative.
33:55–34:00Nature, an inference that employs only negative perversion because no directly observable
34:00–34:05positive similar instance is available is called purely negative.
34:05–34:12It proceeds by the rule, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason is also absent.
34:12–34:17Classical example, Earth differs from the other substances because it possesses smell.
34:17–34:22In analysis, the inference seeks to establish that earth differs from the other eight substances,
34:22–34:24such as water, ether, and air.
34:24–34:28Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the reason, no positive similar
34:28–34:32instance is available in which both smell and difference from the other substances can
34:32–34:34be directly observed.
34:34–34:39In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different
34:39–34:43in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not
34:43–34:45possess smell.
34:45–34:51By the force of this negative provision, Earth's difference from the other substances is established.
34:51–34:56In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great subtlety
34:56–35:01to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self, the validity
35:01–35:03of cognition, and the distinctness of Earth.

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ताथ विशिश्विशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिशिश first considered the view of the masakas and certain ancient teachers, presented as the prima facie position. They argue that every author performs an auspicious indication with the desire to complete the work. The direct result of the invocation is therefore the completion of the work, that is, the desired completion. Gangesha Upadyaya, however, refutes this view by pointing out exceptions. He argues that a work is sometimes completed without an auspicious indication, as in the case of the inattentive Udayan's composition, while on other occasions a work remains unfinished even after a complete invocation has been performed. If the direct result of an auspicious invocation is not that completion of the work, and completion follows from the work's own causes, such as the author's effort, then according to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine what is the principle and immediate result of the invocation that assists in bringing the work to completion. According to Gangesa's Nyaya doctrine, the principle and immediate result of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles, Vignadvasa. He explains that an auspicious invocation does not directly complete a book, rather, it removes whatever impediment or obstacle might arise during its composition. Once the obstacle has been removed, the author completes the task through ordinary human effort. This doctrine, however, raises another interesting question. If an auspicious invocation destroys obstacles, how are the works of atheists or inattentive authors, who do not perform such an invocation, sometimes completed? According to Gangesa, how can their work be completed without obstruction in such a case, despite the absence of an invocation? This is a highly important question, and Gangesa explains the exception in a rigorously logical manner. According to his doctrine, an atheist's or inattentive person's work may be completed without an auspicious invocation because in some cases there is already an absence of obstacles, Vignabhava. Gangeset explains that this may be possible because of an enduring absence of obstacles carried over from a previous birth. At times, by the very nature of the circumstances, no obstacle arises at all. Since the principal function of an auspicious invocation is the destruction of obstacles, No invocation is required to remove an impediment when none is present from the outset. In such a situation, ordinary causes, such as the author's knowledge and effort, bring the work to completion without obstruction. 2. The doctrine of validity, Pramayadha how is the truth of a cognition produced and known? We shall now consider the doctrine of validity. The central dispute in this doctrine is between the Msaakas and the Neayakas concerning how the validity, Pramaya, of a cognition is produced and apprehended. The Msaakas accept the doctrine of intrinsic validity, Svata Pramayadha. In their view, when a cognition arises, it is intrinsically veridical by virtue of the very causal complex that produces it, and its validity is likewise known intrinsically. The Neayakas, by contrast, defend the doctrine of extrinsic validity, parattapramayavda. They argue that the validity of a cognition is neither produced nor known through its own causal complex, but extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or a subsequently successful activity. The Neayakas put a very practical question to themsakas on this point. Logically, if themsaka claim is accepted that the truth of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain as soon as the cognition arises, what natural mental state concerning its validity, such as hesitation or doubt, would become wholly impossible in a condition of unfamiliarity, when a new cognition occurs for the first time? If the truth of a cognition were intrinsically determined at the very moment of its arising, a person could never experience doubt or hesitation concerning a new cognition in a state of unfamiliarity. Yet people do experience doubt in everyday life. On this basis, the Nayayakas refute the Msaka doctrine of intrinsic validity and establish that a cognition's validity is known extrinsically, that is, later through some other means or through successful activity. The famous example here is that of mistaking a shell, Sukti, for silver, Rajattha. When a person takes the shell to be silver and proceeds to pick it up, the question from the standpoint of the Prabhakram Saka theory of non-apprehension, Akiyatibhata, is... What precisely did the person fail to understand or apprehend at that moment about the shell lying before him and the silver retained in memory, thereby prompting the erroneous activity? The person failed to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell, Sukti, present before him and the silver, Rajattha, recalled from memory. According to the Prabhakram Sakas, when the luster of the shell evokes the memory of silver, two distinct cognitions are actually present. First, this is something, the general perceptual cognition of the shell. Second, silver, a cognition arising from memory. The person, however, fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions. In philosophy this is called non-apprehension of difference, bedagraha, difference plus non-apprehension. Because the separation is not known, the person takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. The Nayayakas, who uphold the theory of misapprehension, Anyathakiyati, do not agree that the error consists merely in ignorance of the difference. In their view, the person superimposes upon the shell a particular property or qualifier that does not in fact belong to it. The Nayayakas hold that in error the person does not merely overlook the difference between the shell and silver, as the Prabhakras maintain. Rather, he positively apprehends in the shell before him a property that is not really in the shell but belongs to silver. For this reason, the error is called anyothakiyati, apprehending one thing as another, and is treated as a qualified cognition. The doctrine of validity, with respect to apprehension and production, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsically produced and known through its own causal complex, themsakas hold, or extrinsically through some other means, as the Neayakas maintain. The fundamental dispute between themsakas and Neayakas in this discussion is how it is known that a cognition is veritical or valid its apprehension and how that validity is produced its production. The Msakas uphold intrinsic validity. According to them, the validity of a cognition is known intrinsically through the same complete causal complex from which the cognition itself arises. If another means or cognition were needed to know its validity, a third would be required to establish the validity of the second, producing the defect of infinite regress, and a vasta. The Neayakas, on the contrary, support extrinsic validity. They argue that the validity of a cognition is known extrinsically through some further means, such as inference or successful activity. In this context the Nayayakas raise a highly practical question. When a new cognition occurs for the first time, in a condition of unfamiliarity, a person often doubts whether that cognition is valid or not. If the msaka claim is accepted that the truth or validity of a cognition becomes intrinsically certain through its own causal complex as soon as the cognition arises, then according According to the Neayakas what natural mental state concerning validity, such as doubt, would become wholly impossible at the moment of cognition? What is that particular property called? 3. The cause of erroneous cognition and consequent activity, in the theories of apprehension, whether the fundamental cause of acting upon an error such as this shell as silver, is the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension, akhyati, namely non-apprehension of difference, or the Nayaka doctrine of misapprehension, anyathakiyati, namely a qualified cognition. The fundamental question is this, when a person sees a shell, Sukti, takes it to be silver, rajatha, and is prompted to pick it up. What is the actual cause of that activity? Two principal views are offered. The Prabhakramsaka theory of non-apprehension, according to this view, no new invalid cognition arises here. There are in fact two separate cognitions, the general cognition this concerning the shell present before one, and the cognition of silver arising from memory. According to the Prabhakras, the person fails to apprehend the difference between these two cognitions, this is called non-apprehension of difference, Bidagraha, or Akiyati. The Nayayaka theory of misapprehension, the Nayayakas maintain that the error is not merely ignorance of a difference. It is instead a qualified but illusory cognition, pramsa, in which the person positively apprehends silverhood as a qualifier or mode in the shell presently before him. In other words, one thing is apprehended as another. Let us first consider the matter from the Prabhakram Sakha standpoint. If a person sees a shell, takes it to be silver, and goes to pick it up, what precisely, according to the Prabhakara doctrine of non-apprehension of difference, did the person person fail to understand at that very moment about the shell and the silver, thereby becoming impelled to act. According to the Prabhakram Sakha theory of non-apprehension, the person fails to apprehend the difference or separation between the shell present before him and the silver being recalled. When the person sees the luster of the shell, it calls silver to mind. According to the Prabhakras, this is not a single cognition but two distinct cognitions. cognition, this is something the general perception of the shell in which owing to a defect or distance, its shellhood is not apprehended. Memory cognition, silver, the memory of previously seen silver evoked by the shell's luster. The person cannot distinguish between this perception of the shell before him and the memory of previously seen silver. Because of this non apprehension of difference, Vedagraha, he takes the two to be one and proceeds to pick up the supposed silver. Now consider the Neyayaka position, which rejects the Prabhakara account. According to the Neyayakas, who uphold Aniyathakiyati, in error the person does not merely fail to distinguish the shell from silver, rather, he positively superimposes upon the shell before him a distinctive property belonging to silver, thus apprehending one thing as another. What distinctive property is Silverhood, Rajatattva? According to the Nayayakas, in an erroneous cognition the person takes the shell present before him as the Qualificand, or Substrate, and superimposes Silverhood upon it as the Qualifier or Mode. This differs from the Prabhuprādhā theory of non-apprehension because the person is not merely overlooking a distinction, he is positively seeing in the shell a property, Silverhood, that is not there at all. Because of this specific superimposition, the Neayakas call the error Anniyathakiyati, the apprehension of one thing is another, and a qualified cognition. Tatvasintmai, inference section. Influential cognition and the examination of pervasion, the nature of inferential cognition and the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions of pervasion and the definitions attributed to Sihar and Viagra, as non-deviation or an unconditional relation, together with an examination of Gangesa's definitive account. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyo's Tatvasant Mai, the study of inferential cognition and pervasion is among the most subtle and important topics in Naya philosophy. It contains a detailed examination of the nature of inferential cognition, the various prima facie definitions of pervasion, such as the five definitions and those attributed to see how and Viagra and Gangesa's decisive definition. Let us examine these philosophical questions in detail. The nature of inferential cognition, anumitai. In Nyaya philosophy, inference or inferential cognition is accepted as an independent and valid means of knowledge after perception, comparison, and verbal testimony. Definition, inferential cognition is the cognition produced by the apprehension that the reason is present as a property in the subject and is qualified by perversion, the relation of invariable concomitance. In simple terms, when smoke is the reason is seen on a subject such as a mountain, and one already knows the perversion that wherever there is smoke there is fire, the cognition of fire arises in that subject. This cognition is called inferential cognition, and its extraordinary cause is subsumptive reflection, paramarsa. The examination of pervasion and the prima facie definitions. Pervasion is the principal ground of inferential cognition. It is not sufficient merely to characterize pervasion as the non-deviation of the reason from the probandom, many prima facie positions were proposed in the attempt to formulate its philosophical definition. Gangesa Upadyoya examines and successively refutes the celebrated preliminary definitions of pervasion. The five definitions of perversion. Ancient teachers offered five definitions to clarify perversion. Gangesa takes them up as prima facie views and subjects them to examination. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the probandom, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason must not occur. This is called absence of occurrence in a locus of the absence of the probandom. The reasons non-occurrence and a locus of the absence of the probandum that is distinct from the locus of the probandum, in places other than the probandum's own locus where the probandum is absent, the reason must not occur. Possession of a locus distinct from the locus of that mutual absence whose counter-positive has as its locus the locus of the probandum. The state of being the counter-positive of an absence occurring in every locus of the absence of the probandum. The reasons non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum. Defect, Gangesa shows that none of these five definitions applies to a purely affirmative inference, in which there is no counter instance or locus of absence of the probandum, as in, it is nameable because it is knowable, since there is no absence of the probandum in such a case. b. Definitions of perversion attributed to Seahut and Viagra Certain logicians referred to as SIHA and Viagra proposed two further marks of pervasion. The reasons non-occurrence and the locus of the absence of the reasons and probandums collocation. The reasons non-occurrence and a place distinct from the locus of the probandum. Defect, neither definition applies correctly to purely affirmative reasons or to certain special cases. Gangesa therefore rejects them as well. In addition, Gangesa points out defects in several other preliminary assumptions, including the absence of a counter-positiveness delimited by a property occurring in a different locus, possession of a locus, collocation with the probandom, and a natural relation. Gangesa's definitive definition of perversion. After exposing the defects of the prima facie definitions and subjecting them to logical examination, Ganjisa Ubudyoja presents his definitive characterization of perversion. Definition. Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of a counter-positiveness whose counter-positiveness is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but but is not co-located with its own counter-positive. In simple terms, pervasion is the concomitance or co-location of the reason with the probandum. This concomitance, however, must not be delimited by an absence involving a counter-positive and a different or incongruent locus, an absence that occurs in the locus of the reason but not in the locus of its actual counter-positive. Through this refined definition, Gangesa excludes deviation and the defect of a reason burdened by an extraneous condition, thereby establishing the nature of perversion. The doctrine of the extraneous condition, Upadi its nature, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of doubtful or certain conditions upon inference. Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadiya is Tattvasintmai, the doctrine of the extraneous condition is an exceptionally important and complex topic of Nyaya philosophy. And Yupiti plays a major role in vitiating the relation between the reason and the pro-bandom and an inference. Let us examine and detail the nature of a Yupiti, the basis of its vitiating force, and the effect of a doubtful or certain Yupiti upon inference. The nature of a Yupiti. In Nyaya philosophy, a Yupiti is a property that does not pervade the property taken to be the reason but does pervade the property taken to be the probandom. In simple terms, an upity is a condition or property that invariably accompanies the probandom and thus pervades it, but does not invariably accompany the reason and therefore does not pervade the reason. Example, the mountain has smoke because it has fire. In this inference, fire is the reason and smoke is the probandom. The conjunction of damp fuel is the upity, It does not pervade fire, since fire may also occur in dry wood or cow dung cakes without moisture, but it does pervade smoke, since smoke cannot arise without moisture or damp fuel. The basis of the Eupades Vitiating Force How is an Eupade regarded as capable of producing a defect or fallacious reason in an inference? By means of its own absence, the Eupade establishes the absence of the probandom and thereby produces deviation of the reason from the probandum. When an inference contains a reason accompanied by an eupody, the natural pervasion or invariable relation between that reason and the probandum is destroyed. The eupody establishes that the apparent association between them is not intrinsic but depends upon the concealed condition. For this reason, the eupody is the principal basis of the inference's defectiveness. The effect of a certain and a doubtful Upadi upon inference. In the Tatvasint Mai, Gangesa Upadyaya principally divides Upadis into two classes. A. Certain Upadi. Nature, an Upadi that is certainly pervasive of the probandum and non-pervasive of the reason, and that fully establishes the reason's deviation from the probandum, is called a certain Upadi. Based upon inference, the presence of a certain Eupade completely defeats an inference. It wholly destroys the provision between the reason and the probandom, so that no inferential cognition of the probandom can arise. For example, in the inference, the lake is smoked because it has fire, the possession of fire produced by damp fuel is a certain Eupade. b. doubtful Eupade. Nature, where it is not conclusively established that the reason fails to pervade the probandum or that the condition pervades the probandum, and only doubt remains, the condition is a doubtful eupody. Effect upon inference, like an inconclusive or deviating fallacious reason, a doubtful eupody gives rise to doubt about deviation between the probandum and the reason. This doubt weakens the proponents cognition and obstructs the production of a determinate inferential cognition. For example, in the inference, the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra, being produced by the cooking of vegetables is a doubtful yuppati relative to the probandum of blackness. Thus, through his subtle logical analysis of yuppati in the inference section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that, for an inferential cognition to be true, the reason must be free from an yuppati. Subjecthood and subsumptive reflection, the definition of subjecthood in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and dispute between Mshakas and Nayayakas over whether subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary cause of inference. In the inference section of Dhanjisa Upadyas Tattvasintmai, subjecthood and subsumptive reflection are highly important and original doctrines of Nyaya philosophy. The discussion explains the definition of the inferential subject in terms of the desire to establish the probandum and the absence of an establishing proof, and examines the extensive controversy between msakas and neayakas concerning subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Let us examine all these matters in detail. The definition of subjecthood, packet, the substantive ground for inference. To perform an inference, it is essential to understand the status of the subject, such as the mountain in which fire is to be established. In the Prima Facei view, several teachers treated doubt about the probandam, or merely the absence of evidence either establishing or defeating it, a subjecthood. Gangesa Upadyoja rejects all these accounts. The definitive position, the true definition of subjecthood. A thing is an inferential subject when there is an absence of establishing evidence together with the absence of a desire to establish the probandam. In other words, subjecthood consists in the combined condition of the following two factors. Absence of establishing evidence, no direct means of knowledge, such as perception, is already available to establish the probandom, for example fire, in that locus. The absence or relevant presence of the desire to establish, subjecthood is determined by the particular configuration of the desire to establish the probandom and the absence evidence that would already establish it. Where the probandom has already been completely established, there is no subjecthood, and therefore no need for a fresh inference. The controversy between msakkas and neayakkas over subsumptive reflection as the direct cause of inference. There is a serious philosophical dispute between the neayakkas and msakkas over whether subsumptive reflection, the cognition that a property serving is a reason and pervaded by the probandum occurs in the subject, as in and the mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the extraordinary cause that produces inferential cognition. Themsaka view, subsumptive reflection is not a distinct cause. Themsaka's maintain that no independent cognition separately called subsumptive reflection is required. They argue that recollection of pervasion, wherever there is smoke, there is fire, together with the cognition that the reason occurs in the subject, there is smoke on the mountain, directly produces the inference. From the standpoint of economy, to postulate a third cognition called subsumptive reflection in addition to these two cognitions introduces needless theoretical complexity. The Neyayaka doctrine, subsumptive reflection alone is the extraordinary cause of inference. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Nayayakas firmly refute the msaka position. They maintain that inferential cognition cannot arise merely from separate cognitions of perversion and of the reason's occurrence and the subject. Until the specific cognition arises that the reason qualified by that perversion is present in the subject, subsumptive reflection, no determinant conclusion or inferential cognition can be obtained. Reflection is therefore the extraordinary or direct cause of inferential cognition, and inference cannot be accomplished without this process. Types of inference, a detailed examination of the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference and the proof of the pro-bandom. Within the inference section of Gangesa Upadyas Tathasintmai, the establishment of purely affirmative and purely negative inference, and the detailed explanation of how the probandom is proved in each, are highly important topics in Nyaya philosophy. Let us examine both types of inference in detail. Purely affirmative inference, Kevalyn Vein. Definition, an inference in which there is no negative instance, no locus where the probandom is absent, is called purely affirmative. It contains only positive concomitance, negative concomitance is impossible because no locus of the probandum's absence is available. Example, the pot is nameable because it is knowable. Explanation, here knowability is the reason and nameability is the probandum. Both properties are found in every object in the world. There is no object that is neither knowable nor capable of being named. Where the probandum has no negative instance, purely affirmative pervasion is established. Gangisa rejects the objection and explains that, even when there is doubt about an unestablished probandom in subjects such as, ether, or, the nameable, an inference becomes purely affirmative when the counter positive of the relevant absolute absence is not present in the subject. In this type of inference, the probandom is established solely through positive pervasion. Purely negative inference, Kevalati-Otterikan. Definition, an inference in which no positive similar instance is available and the probandom is established solely through knowledge of negative pervasion is called a purely negative inference. Example, Earth is different from the other eight substances because it possesses smell. Explanation, in this inference, the probandum is that Earth differs from the other substances, water, air, ether, and so forth, and possession of smell is the reason. No substance in the world other than Earth possesses the quality called smell. Consequently, there is no positive similar instance in which both smell and earthhood are found. In such a case the Neayakas rely upon negative concomitance, wherever the probandom of difference from the other substances is absent, that is, wherever the thing is not distinct in the way earth is, smell is also absent. Thus, when the absence of smell is observed in things other than earth, the probandom earth is different from the other substances is conclusively established through negative pervasion. Through his subtle logical analysis of both forms of inference in the Tattvasant Mai, Gangesa Upadyaya establishes that perception or affirmative inference alone is not sufficient to prove every object and philosophical truth, purely affirmative and purely negative inference are both indispensable where appropriate. The doctrine of presumption, Artha Patti the dispute between the Mtsaka view that presumption is a separate means of knowledge and the Nayaka view that it falls under purely negative inference. The dispute between Sakas and Nayakas over the doctrine of presumption in the inference section of Gangesa Upadyaya's Tattva Sintma is a highly philosophical and logical issue within Nyaya. Let us examine this dispute in detail. The Msaaka view, presumption as a separate means of knowledge. From Sakas regard presumption as an independent means of knowledge distinct from perception, inference, and verbal testimony, the sixth type of prama. Definition and example, when two observed facts appear incompatible, and an unseen or absent fact must be postulated in order to reconcile them, the resulting cognition is called presumption. The famous example is Devdutta, who is alive but is not seen at home during the day. Here there are two facts, that he is alive and that he is absent from home. Once his absence from home is certain, his continuing life is possible only if he is gone somewhere outside. His being outside is thus postulated through presumption. Themsaka argument, Themsaka say that this cognition is not an ordinary inference, because no determinant reason and provision are directly operative. An independent means of knowledge called presumption is required to resolve the apparent contradiction. The Nayayaka view, presumption is merely a purely negative inference. The Nayayakas, especially Gangesa Upadyaya, reject the Mtsaka view and deny that presumption is an independent means of knowledge. The Nayayaka argument, no separate Prama called presumption need be postulated. The cognition can be fully accommodated under the Nyaya category of purely negative inference. The inferential form, Dev Dutta's being outside the house is known through the following inference. Living Dev Dutta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of the continuous absence occurring inside the house, that is, he is absent from it. Economy, the Nayayakas argue that when the matter can be established through an ordinary purely negative inference, postulating a new and additional means of knowledge called presumption introduces needless complexity. Thus, whether presumption should be accepted as an independent means of knowledge remained a major subject of controversy between msakkas and neyayakkas. The neyayakas include it within inference. In the inference section of Gangesa Upadyayas Tapasintmai, the extraneous condition, subsumptive reflection, and purely negative inference are exceptionally original and subtle philosophical topics in Nyaya. All three occupy a central place in the process of inferential cognition. Let us discuss these three topics in detail. The extraneous condition, Yupati the source of a fallacy. According to Nyaya, and Yupati is a property that pervades the probandum, the matter to be established, but does not pervade the reason on which the proof rests. In simple terms, it is a condition that invariably accompanies the probandom but not the reason. The basis of its vitiating force, why is it defective? When a reason accompanied by a nupity is employed in an inference, it destroys the natural pervasion or invariable relation between the reason and the probandom. The nupity shows that their apparent association is not genuine but depends upon some other concealed condition. Example, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. Here fire is the reason and smoke the probandom. Yet fire alone does not produce smoke. Conjunction with damp fuel is the upity, although it does not pervade fire, it does pervade smoke. The inference is defective because of this upity. reflection, paramarsa, or syllogistic cognition. In the Neyayaka view, subsumptive reflection is the extraordinary or direct cause that produces inferential cognition, the cognition of the conclusion. Nature, subsumptive reflection is the specific cognition expressed in the formula, the property occurring in the subject and qualified by pervasion is subsumptive reflection. That is, the subject, such as the mountain, is a reason, such as smoke, that is pervaded by the probandum, fire. Its distinction from recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reason in the subject, merely remembering that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and merely seeing that there is smoke on the mountain, are not yet subsumptive reflection. It arises when the mature cognition occurs that this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. The Msaaka and Aayaka dispute, the Msaaka's deny that a separate subsumptive reflection need be admitted, claiming that recollection of perversion and cognition of the reasons presence and the subject together suffice. Gangesa Upadyaya and the Aayakas, however, establish that no determinant inferential cognition can arise until this distinct mental operation of subsumptive reflection occurs. Purely negative inference, Kevaladi-Aterican. Nyaia recognizes three forms of inference, purely affirmative, both affirmative and negative, and purely negative. Nature, an inference that employs only negative perversion because no directly observable positive similar instance is available is called purely negative. It proceeds by the rule, wherever the probandom is absent, the reason is also absent. Classical example, Earth differs from the other substances because it possesses smell. In analysis, the inference seeks to establish that earth differs from the other eight substances, such as water, ether, and air. Since no object other than earth possesses smell as the reason, no positive similar instance is available in which both smell and difference from the other substances can be directly observed. In such a situation, the Neayakas follow the negative route, whatever is not different in the manner of earth, that is, whatever belongs to the other substances, does not possess smell. By the force of this negative provision, Earth's difference from the other substances is established. In the inference section, Gangesa Upadyaya uses this form of inference with great subtlety to establish profound philosophical truths such as the existence of the self, the validity of cognition, and the distinctness of Earth.

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