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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.997164)
Duration: 23:26
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:14Objection. How can a universal such as cowhood or sweetness serve as a reason in an inference of mutual difference, since cognitions, this is a cow and this is cowwood, are not separate?
0:14–0:20Reply, an individual cow delimited by cowwood through inheritance itself serves as the reason.
0:20–0:28The experienced cowwood is present in all individual cows and differs from non-cows, does not generate infinite regress.
0:28–0:32Therefore a universal or intermediate property can serve as a reason.
0:33–0:37With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
0:39–0:42Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection,
0:42–0:46cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause.
0:48–0:5214. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view,
0:52–0:57a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises,
0:57–1:01Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by fire
1:01–1:06and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form's smoke or light is a property of the mountain.
1:07–1:11On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
1:12–1:17In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject
1:17–1:21propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless,
1:21–1:27Gaegia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary
1:27–1:30cause of inference.
1:30–1:32Otherness from that is not the reason.
1:32–1:3315.
1:33–1:38It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason.
1:38–1:42But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary
1:42–1:45breadth and the possibility of deviation.
1:45–1:50Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood.
1:50–1:53from that is not pervaded by fire.
1:53–1:5916. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire.
1:59–2:03In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire.
2:03–2:07Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless.
2:07–2:19The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smoke hood or light hood.
2:19–2:24Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual.
2:24–2:31Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference.
2:31–2:43Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of pervasion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition's smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
2:43–2:51Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualifical relation are decisive.
2:51–2:57Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception.
2:57–3:08It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire.
3:08–3:14But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light
3:14–3:18contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and
3:18–3:23negative concomitance it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire.
3:23–3:27Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, the cause of the inference,
3:27–3:30there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke
3:30–3:34or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject.
3:34–3:38In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition's smoke or light
3:38–3:43is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection,
3:43–3:49therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference.
3:49–3:54Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire.
3:54–3:5519.
3:55–3:59It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself
3:59–4:03the delimiter of the smoke hood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by
4:03–4:08fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated
4:08–4:11in all smokes.
4:11–4:14But there is no evidence for this view.
4:14–4:19A general perversion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual
4:19–4:24or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke
4:24–4:26is apprehended.
4:26–4:31Without cognition of these individual pervasions, subsumptive reflection concerning general
4:31–4:33pervasion is impossible.
4:33–4:37Therefore, when smokehood and pervasion are jointly apprehended in the smoke
4:37–4:42on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause
4:42–4:44of inference.
4:44–4:50Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity.
4:50–4:5220.
4:52–4:56Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce
4:56–4:59needless complexity into inference.
4:59–5:04Its causality is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition.
5:04–5:10are not an effect arises, a substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself a... even
5:10–5:14with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified substantive reflection with
5:14–5:20the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of pervasion. Just as, concerning
5:20–5:25the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends pervasion with the assistance of cognition
5:25–5:29obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so substantive reflection concerning the mountain
5:29–5:34smoking smokes pervasion by fire as possible.
5:34–5:39Application is not a separate means of knowledge.
5:39–5:44Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association
5:44–5:48generated by thought, like poetic imagination, subsumptive reflection is possible on the
5:48–5:54basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of pervasion.
5:54–5:59Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
5:59–6:05The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent.
6:05–6:1022. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through
6:10–6:14the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular
6:14–6:18mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke.
6:18–6:22For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself
6:22–6:27arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive reflection
6:27–6:31would become obscure.
6:31–6:35of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as
6:35–6:41a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex.
6:41–6:45Viridical perception of fire is impossible.
6:45–6:4623.
6:46–6:51In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual
6:51–6:55through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta.
6:55–7:00But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier,
7:00–7:06Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression.
7:06–7:11In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known,
7:11–7:16hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance
7:16–7:18of an impression.
7:18–7:22But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property
7:22–7:27of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by
7:27–7:30an impression alone.
7:30–7:34is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom.
7:34–7:40Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke
7:40–7:44through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain
7:44–7:47fire is not directly perceived.
7:47–7:53Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both
7:53–7:55reason and probandom.
7:55–7:59The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the pervasion by fire
7:59–8:03and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through
8:03–8:05substantive reflection based on recollection.
8:07–8:15Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation
8:15–8:21between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand,
8:21–8:25and sense contact are all causes of veritical qualificand perception.
8:25–8:30In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire
8:30–8:35pervasion and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The smoke of fire
8:35–8:39pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular
8:39–8:44smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by
8:44–8:49fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense
8:49–8:53Therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire.
8:53–8:59Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood.
8:59–9:0626. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through
9:06–9:11an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded by fire is
9:11–9:18recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
9:18–9:25In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood.
9:25–9:28The mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire.
9:29–9:34The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes.
9:35–9:39But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark,
9:39–9:47the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary.
9:47–9:56In practice, even one who does not understand perversion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke.
9:56–10:01Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark.
10:01–10:07Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, if this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire,
10:07–10:13is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark and is the cause of inference.
10:13–10:18Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is subsumptive reflection.
10:18–10:19Another view.
10:19–10:2828. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is cognition that the probandom pervades the property of the subject.
10:28–10:35The probandom's pervadingness means not being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason,
10:35–10:39and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom.
10:39–10:50According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandoms pervadingness are not required.
10:50–10:57In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandoms pervadingness.
10:57–11:11But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandum.
11:11–11:14Definition of pervadingness
11:14–11:2029. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause
11:20–11:24of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection, since the
11:24–11:28collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain
11:28–11:30to be inferred.
11:30–11:35Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation
11:35–11:39to the collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs
11:39–11:41in the subject.
11:41–11:48If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness.
11:48–11:52In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence
11:52–11:57of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke.
11:57–12:01Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire.
12:01–12:06The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the
12:06–12:10subject, only the relation of pervasion is known.
12:10–12:13A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable.
12:13–12:19When fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental.
12:19–12:23The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and
12:23–12:26negative concomitance.
12:26–12:29Rule concerning the subject as qualifacand.
12:29–12:3030.
12:30–12:34It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate
12:34–12:39or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot
12:39–12:43become the principal qualificant in the inferential cognition, there is fire on the mountain because
12:43–12:47there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the
12:47–12:51principal qualificant in the resulting cognition.
12:51–12:55It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualifican
12:55–12:59in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificans
12:59–13:03of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ.
13:03–13:08For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the
13:08–13:13man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the
13:13–13:18substantive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the
13:18–13:22qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand.
13:22–13:27There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain
13:27–13:32the qualificand of the resulting cognition. Therefore substantive reflection
13:32–13:36concerning the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which
13:36–13:40the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificand.
13:42–13:48Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference.
13:50–13:53Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference.
13:53–13:57The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause.
13:59–14:03Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion, but subsumptive reflection
14:03–14:08including the reason's pervasion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause.
14:08–14:13Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent
14:13–14:14causality.
14:14–14:19If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense
14:19–14:23contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause.
14:23–14:28The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition
14:28–14:32of smoke but from the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the
14:32–14:38mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire
14:38–14:43qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of
14:43–14:49subsumptive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the
14:49–14:53extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate operation
14:53–14:58follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would
14:58–15:03not be the extraordinary cause. The proponent of the established conclusion replies that
15:03–15:08extraordinary causality belongs precisely to substantive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause.
15:09–15:15The inferential mark is not the cause of inference. 32. The proponent of the established
15:15–15:20conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even when past and future individual
15:20–15:25smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual smoke itself is not the extraordinary
15:25–15:31cause of inference. The prior presence or operation of smoke is not always required.
15:32–15:37If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or
15:37–15:42past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason and
15:42–15:47subsumptive reflection of perversion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive.
15:49–15:52Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark.
15:52–15:5933. The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past
15:59–16:04smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an
16:04–16:10individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be
16:10–16:16doubtful. In the inference there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is
16:16–16:21not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time.
16:21–16:25Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke as the reason incurs the defect of a
16:25–16:28pointless qualifier.
16:28–16:33The general cause of inference is not smoke but subsumptive reflection concerning smoke's
16:33–16:34pervasion.
16:34–16:39The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity
16:39–16:42of the particular subsumptive reflection.
16:42–16:47Reflection in general is the cause of inference in general.
16:47–16:51Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference.
16:51–16:57Proposal, the validity of substantive reflection is connected with the actual presence of
16:57–17:03a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
17:03–17:10Reply, substantive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke.
17:10–17:14For the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause.
17:14–17:19From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the subsumptive
17:19–17:24reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises, this subsumptive
17:24–17:28reflection alone is the cause of inference.
17:28–17:32Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its
17:32–17:36operation.
17:36–17:40Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it
17:40–17:45has no separate operation. Cognition of pervasion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive
17:45–17:49reflection is its operation.
17:49–17:53But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of pervasion arises
17:53–17:58as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter.
17:58–18:03Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference.
18:03–18:07The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an
18:07–18:13effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection.
18:13–18:19With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
18:19–18:23Purely Affirmative Inference.
18:23–18:27Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference.
18:27–18:33Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative.
18:33–18:39An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative.
18:39–18:44Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable.
18:44–18:49Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus
18:49–18:53of the absence of nameability is impossible.
18:53–18:55Objection to the definition.
18:55–19:00Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter
19:00–19:04instance of nameability is possible.
19:04–19:08When the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would
19:08–19:11not remain purely affirmative.
19:11–19:17Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely
19:17–19:22affirmative and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom
19:22–19:24will be indeterminate.
19:24–19:30Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative.
19:30–19:34An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is
19:34–19:37not present in the subject.
19:37–19:42Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative.
19:42–19:46Defect in the alternative definition
19:46–19:51It cannot be said that being the counter-positive of an absolute absence and being excluded
19:51–19:56are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type.
19:56–20:00Both are knowable in a generalized form.
20:00–20:05Only the perversion of a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present
20:05–20:08in the subject becomes purely affirmative.
20:08–20:12Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter positive of their
20:12–20:17own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative.
20:17–20:22The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative.
20:22–20:27For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying equality, produced by destruction
20:27–20:32of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere.
20:32–20:37In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying
20:37–20:41the quality cannot coexist.
20:41–20:45Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality,
20:45–20:51after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer exists.
20:51–20:57Or the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative.
20:57–21:03The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative.
21:03–21:07Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative.
21:07–21:12If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter
21:12–21:18positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether.
21:18–21:22Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence
21:22–21:28of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative
21:28–21:34merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely
21:34–21:41affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion.
21:43–21:48Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated
21:48–21:54absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute
21:54–21:59absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not
21:59–22:05the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether
22:05–22:11can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is
22:11–22:16nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the
22:16–22:20counter-positives of instantiated absolute absences.
22:20–22:24No ability is purely affirmative.
22:24–22:31Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized.
22:31–22:37Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge,
22:37–22:41objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability
22:41–22:45applies to many individuals and can be generalized.
22:45–22:50A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual.
22:50–22:55In cognition of an individual, the relation of the universal is quickly known through pervasive
22:55–22:58cognition such as inheritance.
22:58–23:02At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property
23:02–23:07delimiting the individual must also be admitted.
23:07–23:12Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word.
23:12–23:17Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual,
23:17–23:21therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

Plain text

Objection. How can a universal such as cowhood or sweetness serve as a reason in an inference of mutual difference, since cognitions, this is a cow and this is cowwood, are not separate? Reply, an individual cow delimited by cowwood through inheritance itself serves as the reason. The experienced cowwood is present in all individual cows and differs from non-cows, does not generate infinite regress. Therefore a universal or intermediate property can serve as a reason. With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause. 14. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by fire and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form's smoke or light is a property of the mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, Gaegia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Otherness from that is not the reason. 15. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood. from that is not pervaded by fire. 16. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire. Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smoke hood or light hood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual. Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference. Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of pervasion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition's smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualifical relation are decisive. Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception. It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitance it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire. Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, the cause of the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition's smoke or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference. Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire. 19. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter of the smoke hood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes. But there is no evidence for this view. A general perversion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervasions, subsumptive reflection concerning general pervasion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and pervasion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition. are not an effect arises, a substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself a... even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified substantive reflection with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of pervasion. Just as, concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends pervasion with the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so substantive reflection concerning the mountain smoking smokes pervasion by fire as possible. Application is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination, subsumptive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of pervasion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent. 22. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure. of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex. Viridical perception of fire is impossible. 23. In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta. But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone. is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom. Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through substantive reflection based on recollection. Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand, and sense contact are all causes of veritical qualificand perception. In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense Therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire. Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood. 26. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood. The mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand perversion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark. Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, if this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark and is the cause of inference. Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is subsumptive reflection. Another view. 28. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is cognition that the probandom pervades the property of the subject. The probandom's pervadingness means not being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandoms pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandoms pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandum. Definition of pervadingness 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection, since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred. Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject. If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness. In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the subject, only the relation of pervasion is known. A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable. When fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. Rule concerning the subject as qualifacand. 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualificant in the inferential cognition, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the principal qualificant in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualifican in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificans of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the substantive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand. There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificand of the resulting cognition. Therefore substantive reflection concerning the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificand. Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference. Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause. Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion, but subsumptive reflection including the reason's pervasion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause. Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent causality. If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke but from the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of subsumptive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause. The proponent of the established conclusion replies that extraordinary causality belongs precisely to substantive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause. The inferential mark is not the cause of inference. 32. The proponent of the established conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even when past and future individual smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual smoke itself is not the extraordinary cause of inference. The prior presence or operation of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of perversion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark. 33. The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke as the reason incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke but subsumptive reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity of the particular subsumptive reflection. Reflection in general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference. Proposal, the validity of substantive reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. Reply, substantive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. For the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause. From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises, this subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation. Cognition of pervasion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of pervasion arises as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter. Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference. The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection. With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Purely Affirmative Inference. Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference. Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative. An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative. Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable. Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus of the absence of nameability is impossible. Objection to the definition. Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible. When the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative. Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative. An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative. Defect in the alternative definition It cannot be said that being the counter-positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the perversion of a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative. The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative. For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying equality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer exists. Or the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative. Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether. Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter-positives of instantiated absolute absences. No ability is purely affirmative. Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized. Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized. A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual. In cognition of an individual, the relation of the universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance. At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted. Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word. Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

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