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Episode3_Part10_RadioPlay.mp3

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Collection
Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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asr-draft
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No
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not-reviewed
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small
Detected language
en (0.997909)
Duration
21:27
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Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

  1. 0:02–0:04यद मेथिली नाटक आप्विमर्शक रेक।
  2. 0:04–0:06यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
  3. 0:06–0:08यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
  4. 0:08–0:10यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
  5. 0:10–0:12यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
  6. 0:12–0:14यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
  7. 0:14–0:19the probandom, neither ascertainment of its absence nor hypothetical reasoning can arise.
  8. 0:20–0:25The proponent of the established conclusion replies, once the self has been established as the
  9. 0:25–0:29substratum of desire and the eight substances such as earth have been established as not being
  10. 0:29–0:34substratum of desire, the inference the self differs from the eight substances is established
  11. 0:34–0:41on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum
  12. 0:41–0:46of desire or the occurrence of desire has been established in the substance that is the self
  13. 0:46–0:52does negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the
  14. 0:52–0:58reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance
  15. 0:58–1:03distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance. Once an example
  16. 1:03–1:10is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply negative inference is possible in the
  17. 1:10–1:12absence of recollection of affirmative
  18. 1:12–1:15perversion, even though negative perversion is remembered.
  19. 1:15–1:20The reasons uncommonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason,
  20. 1:20–1:24and the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish
  21. 1:24–1:25the absence of the probandom.
  22. 1:27–1:30For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is luminous,
  23. 1:30–1:33or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood,
  24. 1:33–1:37uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally.
  25. 1:37–1:45negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection, once the absence of desire in the
  26. 1:45–1:50eight substances has been established, desires residence in the self will be affirmatively
  27. 1:50–1:55established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary.
  28. 1:55–2:02Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides
  29. 2:02–2:06in the self, the specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances
  30. 2:06–2:08is not established without negative perversion.
  31. 2:10–2:14If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject,
  32. 2:14–2:18the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only
  33. 2:18–2:22through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive
  34. 2:22–2:28property. Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established separately.
  35. 2:30–2:35Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur in the self,
  36. 2:35–2:38Therefore the self differs from the eight substances.
  37. 2:39–2:42But how is the substratum that is the self directly known?
  38. 2:44–2:48The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire
  39. 2:48–2:53may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other
  40. 2:53–2:55eight substances arises through negative inference.
  41. 2:57–3:02In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably
  42. 3:02–3:07known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially
  43. 3:07–3:12the difference of the substratum that is the self.
  44. 3:12–3:19Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. 50. Some scholars say that even
  45. 3:19–3:22those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with
  46. 3:22–3:27earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire
  47. 3:27–3:31cognition of difference through the negative inference, the substratum of desire differs
  48. 3:31–3:36from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because
  49. 3:36–3:42it possesses a counter reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative
  50. 3:42–3:50inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that
  51. 3:50–3:56mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual
  52. 3:56–4:02Mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference.
  53. 4:02–4:07Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water,
  54. 4:07–4:12therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth.
  55. 4:12–4:16In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is
  56. 4:16–4:20already directly known.
  57. 4:20–4:25Selfhood can be established in a living body.
  58. 4:25–4:29In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects
  59. 4:29–4:37such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire.
  60. 4:37–4:41Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire,
  61. 4:41–4:45the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example.
  62. 4:45–4:5152. The absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example.
  63. 4:51–4:55But a living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence,
  64. 4:55–4:59desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum
  65. 4:59–5:04of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded
  66. 5:04–5:09as pervading inirtness, inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous
  67. 5:09–5:14absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness
  68. 5:14–5:17in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the
  69. 5:17–5:21absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence
  70. 5:21–5:24of desire.
  71. 5:24–5:30Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus.
  72. 5:30–5:3153.
  73. 5:31–5:35In this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition
  74. 5:35–5:40does not produce successful activity in a competent person.
  75. 5:40–5:44In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent
  76. 5:44–5:49person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property.
  77. 5:49–5:55Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly
  78. 5:55–6:01perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent.
  79. 6:01–6:06This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity
  80. 6:06–6:08of cognition.
  81. 6:08–6:12It may be objected that if the pro-bandom is not previously established, how can cognition
  82. 6:12–6:16qualified by the pro-bandom arise merely from cognition of the reason?
  83. 6:16–6:18This objection is untenable.
  84. 6:18–6:22When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present,
  85. 6:22–6:27a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier,
  86. 6:27–6:31just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant
  87. 6:31–6:33and the ground the qualifier.
  88. 6:33–6:38Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment
  89. 6:38–6:41of the probandom and negative inference.
  90. 6:41–6:45This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandom
  91. 6:45–6:50is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence
  92. 6:50–6:56pervading the absence of the probandum. Cognition of possessing the counter positive
  93. 6:56–7:02of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary.
  94. 7:02–7:0654, may be objected that recollection of the probandum, Earth's difference from the
  95. 7:06–7:11other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor
  96. 7:11–7:14can it be said that, for cognizing the probandum, it is enough that the subject
  97. 7:14–7:18Earth possesses the reason Earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading
  98. 7:18–7:22the absence of the Probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference
  99. 7:22–7:24would be impossible.
  100. 7:24–7:26This objection is untenable.
  101. 7:26–7:31In Earth, the absence pervading the Probandom, difference from other substances, is established
  102. 7:31–7:33by the absence of the absence of Earthhood.
  103. 7:33–7:38Here Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the Probandom
  104. 7:38–7:40difference from others.
  105. 7:40–7:43Therefore only a reason that follows the Probandom and does not deviate from its
  106. 7:43–7:47absence is indicative for establishing the probandom.
  107. 7:47–7:53This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others,
  108. 7:53–7:57when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to
  109. 7:57–8:01the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference
  110. 8:01–8:07for others is impossible by this specified method. With this, the established conclusion
  111. 8:07–8:12concerning purely negative inference comes to an end.
  112. 8:12–8:16The theory of presumption.
  113. 8:16–8:17Objection.
  114. 8:17–8:21Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge.
  115. 8:21–8:221.
  116. 8:22–8:26Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no
  117. 8:26–8:31need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge.
  118. 8:31–8:35Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge
  119. 8:35–8:40can be achieved through purely negative inference itself.
  120. 8:40–8:44The M'saka view of presumption based on doubt.
  121. 8:44–8:452.
  122. 8:45–8:50be admitted, nevertheless, the msaka view is as follows.
  123. 8:50–8:54That devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another
  124. 8:54–8:56scientifically accepted cause.
  125. 8:56–9:01Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that devdatta, who lives for a hundred
  126. 9:01–9:04years, stays only inside the house.
  127. 9:04–9:09When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living devdatta, is not found in the
  128. 9:09–9:13house, his absence within the house is ascertained.
  129. 9:13–9:18This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house.
  130. 9:18–9:23His external presence conveys that Devdutta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdutta
  131. 9:23–9:25alive or not?
  132. 9:25–9:30According to the Memsaka, Devdutta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning
  133. 9:30–9:32his being alive.
  134. 9:32–9:36From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdutta's being alive and his necessary
  135. 9:36–9:38presence.
  136. 9:38–9:41Without supposing Devdutta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these
  137. 9:41–9:46These two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta is outside the house, rises
  138. 9:46–9:50only after the entire specified causal complex.
  139. 9:50–9:53Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through
  140. 9:53–9:57affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being
  141. 9:57–10:02alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary
  142. 10:02–10:04cause of the presumption of external presence.
  143. 10:04–10:08Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as
  144. 10:08–10:13cause of presumption because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation.
  145. 10:14–10:19Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive
  146. 10:19–10:24and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption.
  147. 10:25–10:31On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta is
  148. 10:31–10:37outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains
  149. 10:37–10:41doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this
  150. 10:41–10:48Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
  151. 10:48–10:52Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection.
  152. 10:52–10:543.
  153. 10:54–10:58It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument,
  154. 10:58–11:02then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative
  155. 11:02–11:04would also become inevitable.
  156. 11:04–11:08Or is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition?
  157. 11:08–11:13If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and if
  158. 11:13–11:18being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference.
  159. 11:18–11:22If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises
  160. 11:22–11:26on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as
  161. 11:26–11:28necessary.
  162. 11:28–11:31Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because
  163. 11:31–11:36of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence.
  164. 11:36–11:39But this argument is untenable.
  165. 11:39–11:44Doubt about dead-dut does being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause
  166. 11:44–11:46of presumption.
  167. 11:46–11:50For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce
  168. 11:50–11:55that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's
  169. 11:55–11:57presence outside.
  170. 11:57–12:01The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter-positive,
  171. 12:01–12:06The living devdatta is not itself doubt about devdattas being alive.
  172. 12:06–12:11Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent.
  173. 12:11–12:15For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devdattas
  174. 12:15–12:19being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then
  175. 12:19–12:22is supposition of external presence possible?
  176. 12:22–12:26No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed.
  177. 12:26–12:30If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose devdattas death
  178. 12:30–12:34and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external
  179. 12:34–12:39presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal.
  180. 12:41–12:46Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view.
  181. 12:48–12:52Five, when one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker,
  182. 12:52–12:57the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or
  183. 12:57–13:02dead does not arise. Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when
  184. 13:02–13:07is being alive and his absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur
  185. 13:07–13:12in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence
  186. 13:12–13:16outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference,
  187. 13:16–13:20living Devdatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence
  188. 13:20–13:25instantiated inside the house. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of
  189. 13:25–13:29external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning
  190. 13:29–13:31being alive.
  191. 13:31–13:35Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both
  192. 13:35–13:39cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external
  193. 13:39–13:43presence because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause
  194. 13:43–13:46ascertainment of that same object.
  195. 13:46–13:49Mutual Confrediction of the Two Acertainments
  196. 13:49–13:516.
  197. 13:51–13:54This position is unacceptable.
  198. 13:54–13:59A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex
  199. 13:59–14:00reasons as follows.
  200. 14:00–14:05The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension
  201. 14:05–14:10of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta in the house.
  202. 14:10–14:14Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments
  203. 14:14–14:19– devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must be
  204. 14:19–14:25sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid.
  205. 14:25–14:30Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death,
  206. 14:30–14:36or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence.
  207. 14:36–14:40In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the
  208. 14:40–14:45house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta
  209. 14:45–14:49lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in
  210. 14:49–14:55the house, are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment
  211. 14:55–15:01Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated.
  212. 15:01–15:05Doubt produces the supposition of external presence.
  213. 15:05–15:117. Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period,
  214. 15:11–15:18long period as in Devdutta is alive today and Devdutta will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal
  215. 15:18–15:23divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated.
  216. 15:24–15:29Compared with these numerous provisions, the provision of Devdutta's presence inside the house,
  217. 15:29–15:33which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive.
  218. 15:34–15:38Devdutta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more
  219. 15:38–15:43economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being
  220. 15:43–15:48merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction
  221. 15:48–15:53with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive
  222. 15:53–15:57in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves
  223. 15:57–16:04being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's external
  224. 16:04–16:07Hypothetical presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as
  225. 16:07–16:10supposed by presumption.
  226. 16:10–16:15Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical
  227. 16:15–16:23reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes dev-dupt as external presence.
  228. 16:23–16:26Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
  229. 16:26–16:278.
  230. 16:27–16:31It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more
  231. 16:31–16:36economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical
  232. 16:36–16:41meaning an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Dev Dutta's external
  233. 16:41–16:47presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does
  234. 16:47–16:51not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is
  235. 16:51–16:57a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates
  236. 16:57–17:03with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate
  237. 17:03–17:08in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish
  238. 17:08–17:13dev-dut-tas external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause
  239. 17:13–17:19of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt.
  240. 17:21–17:269. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning,
  241. 17:26–17:31produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and
  242. 17:31–17:35the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which
  243. 17:35–17:40Devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable.
  244. 17:41–17:46A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory
  245. 17:46–17:51illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its
  246. 17:51–17:55epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external
  247. 17:55–17:58presence. It may be said that cognition resembling
  248. 17:58–18:02supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial
  249. 18:02–18:08cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing
  250. 18:08–18:12the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous,
  251. 18:12–18:15the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest.
  252. 18:17–18:20Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the
  253. 18:20–18:24capacity to produce veridical cognition of devodata's presence outside the house.
  254. 18:25–18:30With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end.
  255. 18:30–18:36Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt
  256. 18:36–18:4110. The Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Based on Doubt is now stated.
  257. 18:41–18:47The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings,
  258. 18:47–18:51therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning,
  259. 18:51–18:58sublates Devdutta's necessary presence inside the house and ascertains Devdutta's being alive as a qualifier of the reason.
  260. 18:58–19:04In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house.
  261. 19:05–19:07This may be explained as follows.
  262. 19:08–19:12If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated,
  263. 19:12–19:18Devdutta's death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house.
  264. 19:18–19:24Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years,
  265. 19:24–19:28and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated.
  266. 19:30–19:35When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's
  267. 19:35–19:40being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined
  268. 19:40–19:44with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the
  269. 19:44–19:50The inference of external presence sublates cognition of presence inside the house.
  270. 19:50–19:54The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does
  271. 19:54–19:59not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external
  272. 19:59–20:01presence.
  273. 20:01–20:06Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference
  274. 20:06–20:10from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the
  275. 20:10–20:15reason is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of devdatta's
  276. 20:15–20:21external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption
  277. 20:21–20:23is required.
  278. 20:23–20:29Objection, presumption is necessary. 11. It may be objected that without cognition
  279. 20:29–20:33of devadatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment,
  280. 20:33–20:37devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of
  281. 20:37–20:43of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside
  282. 20:43–20:46the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that
  283. 20:46–20:52same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed
  284. 20:52–20:57evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence
  285. 20:57–20:59cannot arise.
  286. 20:59–21:03Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside
  287. 21:03–21:08the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence?
  288. 21:08–21:13Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces
  289. 21:13–21:18cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside
  290. 21:18–21:21the house.
  291. 21:21–21:22of the objection.

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यद मेथिली नाटक आप्विमर्शक रेक। यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक। यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक। यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक। यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक। यद मेथिली विचार-विमर्शक रेक। the probandom, neither ascertainment of its absence nor hypothetical reasoning can arise. The proponent of the established conclusion replies, once the self has been established as the substratum of desire and the eight substances such as earth have been established as not being substratum of desire, the inference the self differs from the eight substances is established on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum of desire or the occurrence of desire has been established in the substance that is the self does negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance. Once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative perversion, even though negative perversion is remembered. The reasons uncommonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason, and the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is luminous, or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, uncommonness is defective in special contexts, not universally. negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection, once the absence of desire in the eight substances has been established, desires residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self, the specific probandom, the self differs from the other eight substances is not established without negative perversion. If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property. Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur in the self, Therefore the self differs from the eight substances. But how is the substratum that is the self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference. 50. Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with earth and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference, the substratum of desire differs from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual Mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire. Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire, the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example. 52. The absence of desire in inert objects such as jars serves as the negative example. But a living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence, desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inirtness, inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53. In this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition. It may be objected that if the pro-bandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the pro-bandom arise merely from cognition of the reason? This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is the qualificant and the subject the qualifier, just as in the cognition, there is no jar on the ground, absence is the qualificant and the ground the qualifier. Here cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the probandom and negative inference. This cognition actually has the form that the absence of the absence of the probandom is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum. Cognition of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary. 54, may be objected that recollection of the probandum, Earth's difference from the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandum, it is enough that the subject Earth possesses the reason Earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the Probandom, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In Earth, the absence pervading the Probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of Earthhood. Here Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the Probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the Probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom. This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method. With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end. The theory of presumption. Objection. Presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. 1. Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through purely negative inference itself. The M'saka view of presumption based on doubt. 2. be admitted, nevertheless, the msaka view is as follows. That devdatta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another scientifically accepted cause. Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that devdatta, who lives for a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living devdatta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdutta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdutta alive or not? According to the Memsaka, Devdutta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devdutta's being alive and his necessary presence. Without supposing Devdutta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these These two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living devadatta is outside the house, rises only after the entire specified causal complex. Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as cause of presumption because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some saccas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption. On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection. 3. It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative would also become inevitable. Or is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition? If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would cease, and if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence. But this argument is untenable. Doubt about dead-dut does being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter-positive, The living devdatta is not itself doubt about devdattas being alive. Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent. For, it may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of devdattas being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong, how then is supposition of external presence possible? No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose devdattas death and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal. Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view. Five, when one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead does not arise. Therefore Devdatta's presence outside is supposed only when is being alive and his absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of Devdatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference, living Devdatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive. Nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause ascertainment of that same object. Mutual Confrediction of the Two Acertainments 6. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about devduttas being alive from the specified causal complex reasons as follows. The absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive, namely the living devdutta in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments – devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid. Therefore either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death, or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated. Doubt produces the supposition of external presence. 7. Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period, long period as in Devdutta is alive today and Devdutta will be alive tomorrow. If such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many provisions concerning time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous provisions, the provision of Devdutta's presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those provisions, is less extensive. Devdutta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devadatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical than external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's external Hypothetical presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption. Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes dev-dupt as external presence. Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. 8. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning an inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Dev Dutta's external presence. Only hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish dev-dut-tas external presence. Therefore hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt. 9. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning, produces veridical cognition of Devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which Devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling supersensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce veridical cognition of devodata's presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end. Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt 10. The Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Based on Doubt is now stated. The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning, sublates Devdutta's necessary presence inside the house and ascertains Devdutta's being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years, and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. When the evidence for Devdutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the The inference of external presence sublates cognition of presence inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of devdatta's external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required. Objection, presumption is necessary. 11. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise. Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house. of the objection.

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