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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:11Gajia concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither
0:11–0:15makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition
0:15–0:20or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition
0:20–0:24is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition,
0:24–0:29is the qualifiquant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because
0:29–0:35its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifiers JAHOD and the like
0:35–0:41are cognized, a doubt such as, is JAHOD the object of this cognition or not, is possible.
0:41–0:45Consequently the NAYAYIKA doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is
0:45–0:49reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reasoned smoke and all individuals
0:49–0:53of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means cognizing
0:53–0:58that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire.
0:58–1:05The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded.
1:05–1:147. The theory of the extraneous condition.
1:14–1:18Upadhibita.
1:18–1:19Introduction.
1:19–1:261. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandom,
1:26–1:32therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be ascertained.
1:32–1:38For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter.
1:38–1:47of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that pervades the property intended
1:47–1:54as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason. But cognition that
1:54–1:58the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition that the reason
1:58–2:04is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defect of mutual dependence arises in the
2:04–2:09form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of pervasion,
2:09–2:13cognition of perversion causes cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition.
2:15–2:18An alternative definition of an extraneous condition.
2:20–2:243. Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows.
2:24–2:28Its perversion of the probandum is the state in which it is not the counter positive of an
2:28–2:33absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the probandum, and its non-pervasion
2:33–2:38of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive of an absolute absence of the
2:38–2:43probandum occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other words, an extraneous condition
2:43–2:48is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, but
2:48–2:54not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandum.
2:54–3:00But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous condition
3:00–3:05that pervades a probandum delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades
3:05–3:12a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being
3:12–3:18produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected
3:18–3:23that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited
3:23–3:28by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which
3:28–3:33pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason property being Mitra's son,
3:33–3:38not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include them.
3:38–3:43For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation
3:43–3:46from the probandom.
3:46–3:50In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
3:50–3:54possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is dark because it is
3:54–4:00mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic as extraneous
4:00–4:04conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates from the
4:04–4:08probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness.
4:08–4:12If possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded as
4:12–4:18extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine.
4:18–4:23Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended.
4:23–4:27In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property
4:27–4:32of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition,
4:32–4:37yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension
4:37–4:45and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous
4:45–4:47condition.
4:47–4:515. It may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because
4:51–4:56it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies
4:56–5:00the reason. That is, the reason is stated as being distinct from what is other than
5:00–5:05the subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished.
5:05–5:10But, mountain is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs on
5:10–5:15the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative inference.
5:16–5:21This objection is untenable. In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced,
5:21–5:25subject otherness occurring in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat,
5:25–5:29the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an
5:29–5:32extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom.
5:34–5:39It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result.
5:39–5:44For generic subject otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom
5:44–5:50cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject mountain. Therefore the expression
5:50–5:55the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on the mountain must be regarded as an
5:55–6:03extraneous condition. An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition.
6:05–6:106. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject,
6:10–6:15occurring in the subject and actually pervading the probandom, is an extraneous condition.
6:16–6:21Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous
6:21–6:25condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the
6:25–6:30probandum is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the
6:30–6:32probandum.
6:32–6:37Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness.
6:37–6:42If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates
6:42–6:46doubt about the probandum and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions
6:46–6:50in general would disappear.
6:50–6:55refutation of the view that, lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter-instance, should be added.
6:58–7:087. It may also be proposed that, the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition.
7:09–7:20Consequently subject-otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced.
7:20–7:24But this proposal is untenable.
7:24–7:29Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the pro-bandom
7:29–7:33and the counter-instance, because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the
7:33–7:36subject and in counter-instances.
7:36–7:41Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous
7:41–7:48conditionhood, contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished.
7:48–7:52subject-otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the
7:52–7:57reason. When these properties are removed from subject-otherness, denial of the probandom
7:57–8:03and the subject becomes possible. Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates
8:03–8:08from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily
8:08–8:15present. For this reason subject-otherness itself is an extraneous condition. The
8:15–8:19The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of
8:19–8:23the probandom and the counter instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous
8:23–8:26condition.
8:26–8:31Refutation of the objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
8:31–8:338.
8:33–8:37The objection that subject otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition
8:37–8:41because it destroys an infant with a doubtful probandom and thereby occasions the self-defeating
8:41–8:44rejoinder known as a jati is rejected.
8:44–8:48subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
8:48–8:54therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect.
8:54–8:58This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness
8:58–9:02from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must
9:02–9:05be regarded as the extraneous condition.
9:05–9:08Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable
9:08–9:12of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it
9:12–9:17certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition.
9:17–9:23The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation.
9:23–9:28It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom
9:28–9:33through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
9:33–9:37therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation.
9:37–9:41But the absence of subject-otherness is not a means of establishing the absence
9:41–9:47of the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance.
9:47–9:52Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation
9:52–9:57after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
9:57–10:03Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground
10:03–10:08that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established
10:08–10:12as pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition
10:12–10:18that pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both reason and
10:18–10:23extraneous condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes only one side.
10:25–10:30For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason pervaded by the
10:30–10:34probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous condition that
10:34–10:39that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum.
10:39–10:44Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in
10:44–10:47establishing the probandum and its absence.
10:47–10:51Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the
10:51–10:56probandum and is the seed of vitiation.
10:56–11:02An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason.
11:02–11:07It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting
11:07–11:14an equally strong counter reason. This objection is untenable. If an extraneous condition meant
11:14–11:19an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous
11:19–11:22condition in an inference already possessing an equally strong counter reason, just as
11:22–11:26it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter reason against an inference
11:26–11:31already possessing one. Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded
11:31–11:36as an equally strong counter reason, the defect of subject otherness arising as a
11:36–11:40cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference fire is not hot because it is produced
11:40–11:45would not qualify as an extraneous condition either because denial of the probandom through
11:45–11:49subject otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence of the probandom.
11:51–11:55Objection to treating subject otherness as an extraneous condition.
11:57–12:0111. It may be said that the rule concerning subject otherness as an extraneous condition
12:01–12:04does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject.
12:04–12:09For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke,
12:09–12:13subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
12:13–12:17Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom
12:17–12:19is absent.
12:19–12:24In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, non-fireiness and
12:24–12:28the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness does
12:28–12:31not apply directly.
12:31–12:34But this objection does not stand.
12:34–12:38If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no
12:38–12:42property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject fire element
12:42–12:45hood, can serve as an extraneous condition.
12:45–12:50Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases.
12:50–12:56Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition.
12:56–13:0112, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs
13:01–13:05in a part of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain,
13:05–13:09being the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from
13:09–13:13both lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there is
13:13–13:18fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke.
13:18–13:22In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon suitor reason cannot
13:22–13:27persist, and an equally strong counter reason also arises from the counter positive of the
13:27–13:32absence of subject otherness occurring in the subject mountain.
13:32–13:36The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong
13:36–13:42counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason
13:42–13:44and becomes a defect.
13:44–13:49Both the relation between reason and probandom and that between probandom and extraneous condition
13:49–13:53oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment of
13:53–13:57perversion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the
13:57–14:00probandom.
14:00–14:04In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason
14:04–14:07deviates from the probandom.
14:07–14:11Such defect is fully present in subject-otherness as well.
14:11–14:16Udaya Nicaria also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about
14:16–14:19deviation.
14:19–14:23One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that
14:23–14:27all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that
14:27–14:32the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject
14:32–14:36otherness as well.
14:36–14:41Udayanakkari is definition of an extraneous condition.
14:41–14:4213.
14:42–14:46To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition,
14:46–14:51the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is
14:51–14:53unsuitable.
14:53–14:57Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies
14:57–15:02as an extraneous condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an
15:02–15:05equally strong counter reason.
15:05–15:10The qualifier co-extensive with the pro-bandom in the definition is entirely pointless, because
15:10–15:15it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an extraneous condition, that
15:15–15:20is, its causation of cognition of deviation.
15:20–15:27An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, first proposal.
15:27–15:3114, it may be proposed that the property which prompts both the affirmative and negative
15:31–15:35concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition.
15:35–15:39A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the probandom's
15:39–15:43affirmative and negative concomitance, because the probandom may remain in the absence of
15:43–15:47that property and the absence of the probandom may remain in its presence.
15:47–15:52Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition.
15:52–15:55But this proposal is untenable.
15:55–15:57A property prompting the affirmative and negative
15:57–16:00concomitance of the probandum means a property
16:00–16:02that produces the defect consisting in cognition
16:02–16:05that the reason deviates from the probandum.
16:05–16:09This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum
16:09–16:11while not pervading the reason.
16:11–16:14Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum
16:14–16:16serves no purpose in producing the defect
16:16–16:20and is therefore pointless.
16:20–16:22An asymmetrically pervaded property
16:22–16:24is not an extraneous condition.
16:24–16:27Second proposal.
16:27–16:3115. Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is reflected
16:31–16:37upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness
16:37–16:41in a crystal because the hibiscus' redness is reflected upon the crystal. Similarly,
16:41–16:45the probandum pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous
16:45–16:50condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is
16:50–16:54the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there
16:54–16:59is fire. The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely
16:59–17:04because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore
17:04–17:09concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition.
17:11–17:18Use of the word extraneous condition 16. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically
17:18–17:23pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous condition because it does not produce a defect.
17:23–17:31or although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent.
17:31–17:39The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom.
17:39–17:47The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another.
17:47–17:52another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain,
17:52–17:56the word, condition, is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result.
17:57–18:02In a treatise, the etymology of the word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to
18:02–18:05establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate.
18:06–18:09The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandom while not
18:09–18:14pervading the reason. In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense.
18:14–18:21An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of another
18:21–18:28decisive criterion. 17. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that
18:28–18:32whose absence opposes the reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an
18:32–18:36object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from
18:36–18:40the probandom, because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object.
18:40–18:46For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, no ability pervades
18:46–18:51non-eternality but not the reason quality hood, rather, quality hood is pervaded by no ability.
18:52–18:57There is no pervasion between non-eternality and quality hood, that is, the reason quality hood
18:57–19:02deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive with
19:02–19:06the pro-bandom is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom.
19:06–19:13The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the probandum does not deviate from the probandum.
19:13–19:20In the case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition.
19:20–19:27Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandum but does not pervade the reason.
19:27–19:31Refutation of the other scholar's view.
19:31–19:3518. This view also fails.
19:35–19:40It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as
19:40–19:46the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion
19:46–19:52too is untenable, because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule.
19:52–19:56Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion
19:56–19:59of non-deviation.
19:59–20:03Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the
20:03–20:07reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to
20:07–20:11be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded
20:11–20:16by the probandom, leading to infinite regress.
20:16–20:20In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the state
20:20–20:25of pervading the probandom, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition
20:25–20:29that pervades the probandom while not pervading the reason.
20:29–20:34of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition of perversion,
20:34–20:39nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition from arising
20:39–20:43in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of cognition of
20:43–20:45deviation.
20:45–20:49But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely
20:49–20:53for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons
20:53–20:58causing cognition of deviation.
20:58–21:03of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition.
21:03–21:0819. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property
21:08–21:13of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood,
21:13–21:18because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited
21:18–21:21by a property of the reason.
21:21–21:26Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility
21:26–21:32would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition. Non-audibility pervades the probandum
21:32–21:37name ability delimited by qualityhood, because the property of sound is absent from color and the
21:37–21:44like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade the reason no ability. Therefore non-audibility
21:44–21:48would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence.
21:50–21:55This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel
21:55–21:59in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction
21:59–22:03with what fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of
22:03–22:05the reason occurring in the subject.

Plain text

Gajia concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition, is the qualifiquant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifiers JAHOD and the like are cognized, a doubt such as, is JAHOD the object of this cognition or not, is possible. Consequently the NAYAYIKA doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reasoned smoke and all individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smokes pervasion by fire means cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire. The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded. 7. The theory of the extraneous condition. Upadhibita. Introduction. 1. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reasons deviation from the probandom, therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be ascertained. For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter. of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason. But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defect of mutual dependence arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of pervasion, cognition of perversion causes cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of an extraneous condition. 3. Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows. Its perversion of the probandum is the state in which it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the probandum, and its non-pervasion of the reason is the state in which it is the counter positive of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other words, an extraneous condition is the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, but not the counter positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandum. But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandum delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandom darkness delimited by the reason property being Mitra's son, not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference, the crow is dark because it is mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are regarded in logic as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness. If possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine. Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended. In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition, yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition. 5. It may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies the reason. That is, the reason is stated as being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished. But, mountain is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs on the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative inference. This objection is untenable. In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced, subject otherness occurring in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom. It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result. For generic subject otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject mountain. Therefore the expression the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition. 6. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject, occurring in the subject and actually pervading the probandom, is an extraneous condition. Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the probandum is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandum. Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness. If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates doubt about the probandum and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions in general would disappear. refutation of the view that, lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter-instance, should be added. 7. It may also be proposed that, the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition. Consequently subject-otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced. But this proposal is untenable. Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the pro-bandom and the counter-instance, because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances. Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood, contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished. subject-otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the reason. When these properties are removed from subject-otherness, denial of the probandom and the subject becomes possible. Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present. For this reason subject-otherness itself is an extraneous condition. The The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous condition. Refutation of the objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 8. The objection that subject otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition because it destroys an infant with a doubtful probandom and thereby occasions the self-defeating rejoinder known as a jati is rejected. subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect. This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded as the extraneous condition. Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition. The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation. It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandom through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation. But the absence of subject-otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance. Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established as pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both reason and extraneous condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes only one side. For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason pervaded by the probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous condition that that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum. Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in establishing the probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seed of vitiation. An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason. It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting an equally strong counter reason. This objection is untenable. If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter reason against an inference already possessing one. Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter reason, the defect of subject otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference fire is not hot because it is produced would not qualify as an extraneous condition either because denial of the probandom through subject otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence of the probandom. Objection to treating subject otherness as an extraneous condition. 11. It may be said that the rule concerning subject otherness as an extraneous condition does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, non-fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness does not apply directly. But this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject fire element hood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases. Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition. 12, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs in a part of the mountain, substancehood distinct from what occurs on the mountain, being the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both lake and mountain, qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as, there is fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke. In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon suitor reason cannot persist, and an equally strong counter reason also arises from the counter positive of the absence of subject otherness occurring in the subject mountain. The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason and becomes a defect. Both the relation between reason and probandom and that between probandom and extraneous condition oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment of perversion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the probandom. In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom. Such defect is fully present in subject-otherness as well. Udaya Nicaria also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about deviation. One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject otherness as well. Udayanakkari is definition of an extraneous condition. 13. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition, the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is unsuitable. Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong counter reason. The qualifier co-extensive with the pro-bandom in the definition is entirely pointless, because it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an extraneous condition, that is, its causation of cognition of deviation. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, first proposal. 14, it may be proposed that the property which prompts both the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition. A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the probandom's affirmative and negative concomitance, because the probandom may remain in the absence of that property and the absence of the probandom may remain in its presence. Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition. But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandum means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason. Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum serves no purpose in producing the defect and is therefore pointless. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition. Second proposal. 15. Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is reflected upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because the hibiscus' redness is reflected upon the crystal. Similarly, the probandum pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition. Use of the word extraneous condition 16. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous condition because it does not produce a defect. or although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent. The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom. The second is also untenable because the word extraneous condition is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another. another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain, the word, condition, is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate. The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the probandom while not pervading the reason. In the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of another decisive criterion. 17. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from the probandom, because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object. For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, no ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason quality hood, rather, quality hood is pervaded by no ability. There is no pervasion between non-eternality and quality hood, that is, the reason quality hood deviates from the pro-bandom non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive with the pro-bandom is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the pro-bandom. The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the probandum does not deviate from the probandum. In the case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition. Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the probandum but does not pervade the reason. Refutation of the other scholar's view. 18. This view also fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion too is untenable, because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule. Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion of non-deviation. Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded by the probandom, leading to infinite regress. In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the state of pervading the probandom, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition that pervades the probandom while not pervading the reason. of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition of perversion, nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition from arising in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of cognition of deviation. But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons causing cognition of deviation. of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition. 19. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood, because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition. Non-audibility pervades the probandum name ability delimited by qualityhood, because the property of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade the reason no ability. Therefore non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence. This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction with what fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of the reason occurring in the subject.

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