MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part12_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.995811)
Duration: 22:28
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:05Konjunction come inherences the cause.
0:05–0:12Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherence in an object conjoined with the sense.
0:12–0:16Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object,
0:16–0:21because inherence in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like.
0:21–0:26It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again.
0:26–0:31Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances
0:31–0:36such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception of other
0:36–0:39substances such as whole objects.
0:39–0:43Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent
0:43–0:47in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone.
0:47–0:51A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor,
0:51–0:55conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception
0:55–0:56of odor.
0:56–1:00Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might be perceived
1:00–1:03without inheritance in the substrate of odor.
1:03–1:07A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with
1:07–1:09the sense, which is unacceptable.
1:09–1:14Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance
1:14–1:18of the odor is present as a qualifier.
1:18–1:22If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with the substrate
1:22–1:27the odor's substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would produce perception
1:27–1:33of the odor of cloth. Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause.
1:36–1:40Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause perception
1:40–1:44of odor, while inheritance merely delimits causality. This view is equivalent to the
1:44–1:48view that inheritance in a conjoined object is the cause and conjunction the delimiter,
1:48–1:52like the two edges of one cloth. Nor is the argument sound that
1:52–1:57that Inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction nor Inherence nor both.
1:57–2:02On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a combination of conjunction and Inherence.
2:02–2:07Inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to Oda.
2:07–2:10There is no contradiction in calling this relation conjunction come Inherence,
2:10–2:14nor does calling it something more conflict with Nayya.
2:14–2:25The Neayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inheritance and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction-come-inherence.
2:25–2:33This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like.
2:33–2:42Conjunction-come-inherence in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal.
2:42–2:45The objection that colorness and the like are not perceived without the
2:45–2:49adherence residing in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound.
2:50–2:54Though adherence in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color,
2:54–2:58taste, and the like is apprehended through adherence of those qualities in the conjoined object.
3:00–3:05Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances.
3:06–3:10Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable,
3:10–3:15Therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect relation.
3:16–3:21Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ.
3:22–3:29Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odourness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by recurrent
3:29–3:35cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove
3:35–3:41the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye,
3:41–3:46because that would overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the
3:46–3:54like is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense
3:54–4:01faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and
4:01–4:07yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances
4:07–4:12composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance,
4:12–4:16hence the consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible.
4:18–4:23It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance
4:23–4:29but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty. If differences among qualities are perceived
4:29–4:34through mutually opposed universal such as color-ness, one must infer differences among
4:34–4:39the senses that apprehend those qualities, mutual dependence would then follow. Nor is
4:39–4:43it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument.
4:45–4:50Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste,
4:50–4:55or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense.
4:55–5:00Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color
5:00–5:04and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness.
5:04–5:10Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness, because it overextends to yellowness.
5:10–5:14Further objection that individual colors are one.
5:14–5:19Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one, because, although difference
5:19–5:25appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color.
5:25–5:30It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would
5:30–5:32become a universal.
5:32–5:38A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in
5:38–5:40the whole substance.
5:40–5:44The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal
5:44–5:48is not appropriate to individual blueness.
5:48–5:53Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but
5:53–5:59from difference between two colors. In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises,
5:59–6:05this is not illusion. Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition
6:05–6:11of their production and destruction. Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour
6:11–6:16tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one, and comparative cognition such as this is
6:16–6:23sweeter would be impossible. Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the
6:23–6:31cause. Sound inheres an auditory space. If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound,
6:31–6:37all sounds would be continuously apprehended. It cannot be said that only sound delimited
6:37–6:42by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended, because there is no difference between the ear
6:42–6:47cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there. Therefore only sound fit for
6:47–6:52a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended.
6:52–6:59Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent.
6:59–7:05Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational.
7:05–7:14Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality.
7:14–7:20A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating
7:20–7:25cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception.
7:25–7:29Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality.
7:29–7:34Establishing Inherence as the Cause
7:34–7:41The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception
7:41–7:43must arise through contact in the form of Inherence.
7:43–7:50It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended.
7:50–7:56The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year cavity.
7:56–8:01Conjunction with the year cavity specify substrate hood described by inheritance.
8:01–8:07The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere.
8:07–8:13Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year is apprehended.
8:13–8:16Sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not.
8:16–8:23Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not by its absence.
8:23–8:28Therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited by hand conjunction.
8:28–8:35Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere.
8:35–8:40The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not arise.
8:40–8:47Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inherent, but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualitative status.
8:47–8:53Even if inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places.
8:53–8:59Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense.
8:59–9:06Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited
9:06–9:11by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the
9:11–9:13ear cavity.
9:13–9:18Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron,
9:18–9:22one would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear.
9:22–9:26Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters
9:26–9:31produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of sound locations,
9:31–9:36the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments such
9:36–9:40as the VA with macron as substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity to treat only
9:40–9:45space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely many directions.
9:47–9:51The reply that nearby and distant persons experienced differences of loud and soft sound,
9:51–9:56thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound.
9:57–10:02One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed.
10:03–10:07When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced,
10:07–10:13uncovering the ear opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the ear
10:13–10:20opening is covered. The Neayaka reply, spaced delimited by the ear is the auditory sense.
10:20–10:28The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the
10:28–10:33ear opening, because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense.
10:33–10:40Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception.
10:40–10:45Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body as a sense faculty. The experience,
10:45–10:50I hear the sound of the via with Macron through the ear proves ear delimited space to be
10:50–10:56the auditory sense. VA with Macron delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception.
10:57–11:03VA with Macron s are infinitely many, not all pervasive, and are not common causes of sound
11:03–11:08perception. VA with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a
11:08–11:12sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the VA with Macron.
11:12–11:19How then arises the cognition sound is in the VA with Macron.
11:19–11:24It is unnecessary to apprehend the VA with Macron as the substrate of every sound.
11:24–11:29The VA with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists the
11:29–11:34production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the inhering
11:34–11:39cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate.
11:39–11:46of simultaneous perception of many sounds. Objection, if idelimited space is the auditory
11:46–11:50sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be
11:50–11:55apprehended simultaneously. The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor
11:55–11:59of perception of one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not
11:59–12:04experienced as inhibitory. Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension
12:04–12:10of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension
12:10–12:16of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity.
12:18–12:22If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same
12:22–12:27class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition such as, I recited this section
12:27–12:32after Mitra, and I heard the same song before. A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds
12:32–12:37produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from
12:37–12:42a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through
12:42–12:45a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted.
12:47–12:54The manner of sound production. One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic
12:54–12:59region, otherwise sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person.
13:00–13:05The initial sound, can join with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent
13:05–13:11sound in every direction. An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal
13:11–13:16conjunction, thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a
13:16–13:22wider region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place.
13:23–13:29Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first,
13:29–13:35apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air.
13:35–13:46On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadambosphere, produces 10 sounds in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds.
13:46–13:51Support for the cadambosphere model.
13:51–13:56Objection. How can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions?
13:56–14:04Answer. Through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences, many sounds are produced like a cadambosphere.
14:04–14:08It should not be said that when all causes accept prior absence or alike,
14:08–14:11near-difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects.
14:11–14:15Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates,
14:15–14:19and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate.
14:19–14:25Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same.
14:25–14:33Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of prior absence and destruction of previous color.
14:33–14:40There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere.
14:40–14:53Prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the taste of water.
14:53–14:59Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant.
14:59–15:08are irrelevant. Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes.
15:08–15:13Alternatively, though prior absence is alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors
15:13–15:18such as fragrance and stencherize at different times from special conjunctions with fire.
15:18–15:22Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would
15:22–15:28be deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior
15:28–15:33absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general.
15:33–15:37The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because
15:37–15:41cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound.
15:41–15:45Without cooperating cause is the effect does not arise, but when the other cooperators
15:45–15:49are present and already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a
15:49–15:51general cause.
15:51–15:55It is not true that one cause will aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production
15:55–15:59of an effect results from absence of its aggregate.
15:59–16:03The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly
16:03–16:06complex.
16:06–16:09Coexistence of non-production of the effect with an Inherent Cause qualified by destruction
16:09–16:15establishes only the existent Inherent Cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate
16:15–16:17causality.
16:17–16:21Even without accepting inheritance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness,
16:21–16:26The universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals
16:26–16:28such as colorness.
16:28–16:32Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and
16:32–16:40the perception section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
16:40–16:41The theory of Inherence
16:41–16:47Inherence is an apprehensive relation.
16:47–16:48Prima-facie view
16:48–16:52Inherence is not an apprehensive relation.
16:52–16:53Prima-facie view
16:53–16:56Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot be the apprehensive
16:56–17:01relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like.
17:01–17:05Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between
17:05–17:10qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of inheritance as an apprehensive
17:10–17:12relation.
17:12–17:17The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced
17:17–17:21as mutually related by inheritance, such qualifier cognition and corresponding usage
17:21–17:25are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of inheritance
17:25–17:30must be accepted. The prima facie objecta, however, says that from the experience of
17:30–17:35related things Inherence itself does not appear as a qualifier, because Inherence has not previously
17:35–17:40been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the
17:40–17:45way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does Inherence
17:45–17:49appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form, I know Inherence.
17:49–17:55The argument that a qualified cognition such as the pot is blue takes as its object the
17:55–17:59qualify a qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound.
17:59–18:03In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises,
18:03–18:08as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible.
18:08–18:12If merely not contradicted is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject
18:12–18:14becomes pointless.
18:14–18:17Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the
18:17–18:22opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results.
18:23–18:26A cognition allegedly of Inherence is not a means of proving Inherence,
18:26–18:30because it has not been established that such cognition has Inherence as its object,
18:30–18:34otherwise the cognition of Inherence and Inherence itself would become mutually dependent.
18:35–18:39Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as,
18:39–18:43the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented.
18:43–18:49yet this cognition is erroneous because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective reality of that relation.
18:49–18:56Prima-facy-objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, were false,
18:56–19:01even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized,
19:01–19:09although it is often cognized. Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot.
19:09–19:18The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance.
19:18–19:26A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not been established here as a possible relation.
19:26–19:31Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general.
19:31–19:38If this means, the capacity to make known and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established.
19:38–19:46Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can't
19:46–19:54nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition.
19:54–20:06In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inheritance.
20:06–20:14Nor can the qualification, conforming to the pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it.
20:14–20:19Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example.
20:19–20:26The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected.
20:26–20:31In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason,
20:31–20:35improving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without
20:35–20:39a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence.
20:39–20:43Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through
20:43–20:47a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists
20:47–20:51either in a distinct qualifier hood or is fixed by modehood and the like.
20:51–20:55But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation
20:55–20:58as a part of the objecthood of cognition.
20:58–21:01Objection, some of what you say may be true.
21:01–21:06Nevertheless, the following argument proves the existence of inheritance.
21:06–21:10Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a hole in its parts, a quality in the qualified
21:10–21:15thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in,
21:15–21:18the cloth is in the threads, the white color is in the cloth, motion is in this
21:18–21:23object, and clothhood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation
21:23–21:25between container and contained.
21:25–21:30Reason, these are both truth-conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this.
21:30–21:35Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves the existence
21:35–21:38of the relation of conjunction.
21:38–21:40Prima-facy objecta, no.
21:40–21:44Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there is
21:44–21:46absence of a pot.
21:46–21:50Do not again at the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof, for that device
21:50–21:52has already been rejected.
21:52–21:56In brief, your argument is invalid because the relations mentioned by you can be accounted
21:56–22:00for without accepting any ontologically distinct container-contained relation over and above
22:00–22:02the relata.
22:02–22:07In the context of production, as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance,
22:07–22:10as in the cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context
22:10–22:14of cognition, as in a pot assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient
22:14–22:18to say that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence.
22:18–22:21This dependence is a self-linking relation.
22:21–22:24upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

Plain text

Konjunction come inherences the cause. Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherence in an object conjoined with the sense. Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object, because inherence in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like. It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again. Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception of other substances such as whole objects. Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone. A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor, conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception of odor. Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor. A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with the sense, which is unacceptable. Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance of the odor is present as a qualifier. If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with the substrate the odor's substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would produce perception of the odor of cloth. Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause. Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause perception of odor, while inheritance merely delimits causality. This view is equivalent to the view that inheritance in a conjoined object is the cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth. Nor is the argument sound that that Inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction nor Inherence nor both. On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a combination of conjunction and Inherence. Inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to Oda. There is no contradiction in calling this relation conjunction come Inherence, nor does calling it something more conflict with Nayya. The Neayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inheritance and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction-come-inherence. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like. Conjunction-come-inherence in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal. The objection that colorness and the like are not perceived without the adherence residing in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound. Though adherence in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color, taste, and the like is apprehended through adherence of those qualities in the conjoined object. Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances. Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable, Therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect relation. Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ. Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odourness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by recurrent cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye, because that would overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the like is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance, hence the consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible. It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty. If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universal such as color-ness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities, mutual dependence would then follow. Nor is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument. Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste, or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense. Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness. Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness, because it overextends to yellowness. Further objection that individual colors are one. Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one, because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color. It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would become a universal. A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance. The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to individual blueness. Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from difference between two colors. In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion. Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their production and destruction. Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one, and comparative cognition such as this is sweeter would be impossible. Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the cause. Sound inheres an auditory space. If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously apprehended. It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended, because there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there. Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended. Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational. Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality. Establishing Inherence as the Cause The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form of Inherence. It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended. The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year cavity. Conjunction with the year cavity specify substrate hood described by inheritance. The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere. Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year is apprehended. Sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not. Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not by its absence. Therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited by hand conjunction. Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere. The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not arise. Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inherent, but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualitative status. Even if inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places. Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear. Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of sound locations, the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments such as the VA with macron as substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely many directions. The reply that nearby and distant persons experienced differences of loud and soft sound, thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound. One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed. When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the ear opening is covered. The Neayaka reply, spaced delimited by the ear is the auditory sense. The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the ear opening, because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense. Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception. Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body as a sense faculty. The experience, I hear the sound of the via with Macron through the ear proves ear delimited space to be the auditory sense. VA with Macron delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception. VA with Macron s are infinitely many, not all pervasive, and are not common causes of sound perception. VA with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the VA with Macron. How then arises the cognition sound is in the VA with Macron. It is unnecessary to apprehend the VA with Macron as the substrate of every sound. The VA with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the inhering cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate. of simultaneous perception of many sounds. Objection, if idelimited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously. The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory. Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity. If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition such as, I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before. A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted. The manner of sound production. One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, otherwise sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person. The initial sound, can join with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction. An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction, thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place. Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first, apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadambosphere, produces 10 sounds in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds. Support for the cadambosphere model. Objection. How can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions? Answer. Through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences, many sounds are produced like a cadambosphere. It should not be said that when all causes accept prior absence or alike, near-difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects. Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates, and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate. Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same. Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of prior absence and destruction of previous color. There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere. Prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the taste of water. Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant. are irrelevant. Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes. Alternatively, though prior absence is alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors such as fragrance and stencherize at different times from special conjunctions with fire. Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound. Without cooperating cause is the effect does not arise, but when the other cooperators are present and already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general cause. It is not true that one cause will aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production of an effect results from absence of its aggregate. The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly complex. Coexistence of non-production of the effect with an Inherent Cause qualified by destruction establishes only the existent Inherent Cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality. Even without accepting inheritance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness, The universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as colorness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and the perception section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of Inherence Inherence is an apprehensive relation. Prima-facie view Inherence is not an apprehensive relation. Prima-facie view Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like. Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of inheritance as an apprehensive relation. The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually related by inheritance, such qualifier cognition and corresponding usage are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of inheritance must be accepted. The prima facie objecta, however, says that from the experience of related things Inherence itself does not appear as a qualifier, because Inherence has not previously been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does Inherence appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form, I know Inherence. The argument that a qualified cognition such as the pot is blue takes as its object the qualify a qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound. In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises, as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible. If merely not contradicted is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject becomes pointless. Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results. A cognition allegedly of Inherence is not a means of proving Inherence, because it has not been established that such cognition has Inherence as its object, otherwise the cognition of Inherence and Inherence itself would become mutually dependent. Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented. yet this cognition is erroneous because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective reality of that relation. Prima-facy-objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized. Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot. The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance. A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not been established here as a possible relation. Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general. If this means, the capacity to make known and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established. Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can't nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inheritance. Nor can the qualification, conforming to the pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it. Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example. The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected. In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason, improving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence. Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists either in a distinct qualifier hood or is fixed by modehood and the like. But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation as a part of the objecthood of cognition. Objection, some of what you say may be true. Nevertheless, the following argument proves the existence of inheritance. Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a hole in its parts, a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in, the cloth is in the threads, the white color is in the cloth, motion is in this object, and clothhood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between container and contained. Reason, these are both truth-conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this. Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction. Prima-facy objecta, no. Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there is absence of a pot. Do not again at the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof, for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production, as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition, as in a pot assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence. This dependence is a self-linking relation. upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

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