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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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asr-draft
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No
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not-reviewed
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small
Detected language
en (0.993033)
Duration
20:14
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Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

  1. 0:02–0:13इन्व्रिंष अगड, कम्प्लिट मइथिली च्रन्श्छन, इन्व्रिंष अगड, तदवसिंट मैज्वि,
  2. 0:13–0:191. Thus, after inference has been explained, God, the Creator of the world and supreme among
  3. 0:19–0:24persons is established through inference. God is established by the inference, earth
  4. 0:24–0:29and the other things have an agent, because they are effects, like a jar.
  5. 0:29–0:33Objection, earth and the other things are not the subject.
  6. 0:33–0:382. The following objection may now be raised, earth and the other entities cannot separately
  7. 0:38–0:41be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as earth cannot be
  8. 0:41–0:46denoted merely by the word, earth, and so forth. Nor can earth and the others collectively
  9. 0:46–0:51be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary
  10. 0:51–0:55delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute
  11. 0:55–0:58in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference
  12. 0:58–1:03either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form,
  13. 1:03–1:08their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's
  14. 1:08–1:12existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence.
  15. 1:14–1:16The problem of mutual dependence
  16. 1:18–1:203. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and
  17. 1:20–1:25opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a
  18. 1:25–1:29neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt
  19. 1:29–1:33would arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent,
  20. 1:33–1:36while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question.
  21. 1:36–1:41Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar.
  22. 1:41–1:46Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject,
  23. 1:46–1:50the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects.
  24. 1:50–1:56Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject.
  25. 1:56–2:03For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body,
  26. 2:03–2:06or whatever has not been produced by a body.
  27. 2:06–2:13Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing,
  28. 2:13–2:18the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing,
  29. 2:18–2:20would not be included in the subject.
  30. 2:20–2:26Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too may,
  31. 2:26–2:30through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities.
  32. 2:30–2:36Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort, or
  33. 2:36–2:41a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent.
  34. 2:41–2:45Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen
  35. 2:45–2:47merit or demerit.
  36. 2:47–2:52Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit,
  37. 2:52–2:57nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject.
  38. 2:57–3:02God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced
  39. 3:02–3:07by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities.
  40. 3:07–3:12Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established,
  41. 3:12–3:17because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form.
  42. 3:17–3:21Earth alone is not the subject.
  43. 3:21–3:25Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning
  44. 3:25–3:32deviation of the reason and a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness.
  45. 3:32–3:36Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt
  46. 3:36–3:40about the reason in a certain counter instance.
  47. 3:40–3:44Near doubt about occurrence of the reason and a counter instance possessing the absence
  48. 3:44–3:47of the probandom is a defect of the reason.
  49. 3:47–3:51Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt
  50. 3:51–3:56about the reasons presence and a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom,
  51. 3:56–4:01or through doubt about the absence of the probandum and a locus possessing the reason.
  52. 4:01–4:05Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing
  53. 4:05–4:10the probandum. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference
  54. 4:10–4:15and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject.
  55. 4:15–4:21Influence of God, Tat the Sintmai. A Sprout cannot be the subject.
  56. 4:21–4:276. It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason effect hood is doubtful,
  57. 4:27–4:32therefore effect hood becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effect
  58. 4:32–4:35hood in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in
  59. 4:35–4:39that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because
  60. 4:39–4:43all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject
  61. 4:43–4:48earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises
  62. 4:48–4:50in that very sprout.
  63. 4:50–4:53This argument, however, is not sound.
  64. 4:53–4:58The sprout is not the subject, so effected is not a property of the subject there, consequently
  65. 4:58–5:01the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement.
  66. 5:01–5:05Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement
  67. 5:05–5:07would become a second thesis.
  68. 5:07–5:11If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an
  69. 5:11–5:15inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would
  70. 5:15–5:17arise because of mutual dependence.
  71. 5:17–5:23Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and the other things as subjects.
  72. 5:23–5:30Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises.
  73. 5:30–5:37By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established.
  74. 5:37–5:45Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent.
  75. 5:45–5:52Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort.
  76. 5:52–6:00Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person,
  77. 6:00–6:08because if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises.
  78. 6:08–6:14Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with
  79. 6:14–6:18direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort.
  80. 6:18–6:22If concerning the material cause means merely having some material cause or other as its
  81. 6:22–6:26object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the
  82. 6:26–6:27like.
  83. 6:27–6:33Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like.
  84. 6:33–6:39Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth.
  85. 6:39–6:43It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of
  86. 6:43–6:50a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status.
  87. 6:50–6:54This argument, however, is not sound.
  88. 6:54–6:58Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth are held
  89. 6:58–7:02to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the like and by
  90. 7:02–7:06means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already
  91. 7:06–7:09been established.
  92. 7:09–7:13possession of an agent is not being produced by effort.
  93. 7:13–7:149.
  94. 7:14–7:18Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort.
  95. 7:18–7:22It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through
  96. 7:22–7:26effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment
  97. 7:26–7:28immediately after the productive effort.
  98. 7:28–7:32If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of
  99. 7:32–7:33the jar.
  100. 7:33–7:38The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise.
  101. 7:38–7:42Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action
  102. 7:42–7:45there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar.
  103. 7:45–7:51Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition.
  104. 7:51–7:56Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause.
  105. 7:56–8:00Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and
  106. 8:00–8:04the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such
  107. 8:04–8:08a property is unestablished.
  108. 8:08–8:13Or should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and, when connected
  109. 8:13–8:17with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific
  110. 8:17–8:23material cause just as in kaitra is devoted to his own mother, like mithra?
  111. 8:23–8:28Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition.
  112. 8:28–8:31Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor
  113. 8:31–8:34opponent is trustworthy.
  114. 8:34–8:38In inference, however, a pervasive perbandom is established generally only when the general
  115. 8:38–8:42pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandum
  116. 8:42–8:47is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional
  117. 8:47–8:49distinct object be established.
  118. 8:49–8:531. Influence of God, Tatva Sintmai
  119. 8:53–8:58Pervasion by the probandum cannot be apprehended.
  120. 8:58–9:0311. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is,
  121. 9:03–9:07the status of the probandum as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by
  122. 9:07–9:12cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere
  123. 9:12–9:16known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of
  124. 9:16–9:22God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning
  125. 9:22–9:27the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to
  126. 9:27–9:33persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes,
  127. 9:33–9:38and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact,
  128. 9:38–9:42or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect.
  129. 9:43–9:48Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment
  130. 9:48–9:52immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is
  131. 9:52–9:59present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly
  132. 9:59–10:04produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted.
  133. 10:06–10:13The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the
  134. 10:13–10:17inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct
  135. 10:17–10:23cognition, desire to act, an effort concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through
  136. 10:23–10:28generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through
  137. 10:28–10:31effort generated by yogic merit.
  138. 10:31–10:36Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed
  139. 10:36–10:41with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being
  140. 10:41–10:46produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated
  141. 10:46–10:49by yogic merit.
  142. 10:49–10:53Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with
  143. 10:53–10:57direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced
  144. 10:57–11:02through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not
  145. 11:02–11:08being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced
  146. 11:08–11:12through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future.
  147. 11:12–11:17It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and
  148. 11:17–11:21effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other
  149. 11:21–11:23entities.
  150. 11:23–11:28Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended.
  151. 11:28–11:34Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment
  152. 11:34–11:39of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises.
  153. 11:39–11:44Refutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom.
  154. 11:44–11:4813. No, this proposal is not sound.
  155. 11:48–11:52Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the
  156. 11:52–11:57future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently,
  157. 11:57–12:01direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either.
  158. 12:02–12:06Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the
  159. 12:06–12:11opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the
  160. 12:11–12:15opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference.
  161. 12:16–12:21Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce
  162. 12:21–12:26unseen merit or demerit, which in turn produces the element Earth. In this way, through the
  163. 12:26–12:31unseen, they can produce the element Earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established
  164. 12:31–12:37arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct
  165. 12:37–12:42cognition is intended in Earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the
  166. 12:42–12:48illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the
  167. 12:48–12:53the probandum becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars,
  168. 12:53–12:57consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinate cognition
  169. 12:57–13:05of provision produced in that way. The probandum would therefore be unestablished.
  170. 13:05–13:10Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise.
  171. 13:10–13:1714. It may now be argued that the probandum is established because of the reasons pervasion.
  172. 13:17–13:22The reason's perversion has the following specific form, wherever there is effecthood, there
  173. 13:22–13:26is being produced by a knower of that effect's material cause.
  174. 13:26–13:31Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material
  175. 13:31–13:32causes.
  176. 13:32–13:36Therefore, through this specific perversion, the reason effecthood establishes in earth
  177. 13:36–13:40and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material
  178. 13:40–13:45cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effecthood occurs.
  179. 13:45–13:50Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the
  180. 13:50–13:53inference of God.
  181. 13:53–13:57Refutation of the argument.
  182. 13:57–13:5815.
  183. 13:58–14:01This argument, however, is not sound.
  184. 14:01–14:05The question is, in what form does cognition of the provision of the reason-effect hood
  185. 14:05–14:10arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of
  186. 14:10–14:15the material cause of that particular jar, as being produced by a knower of the material
  187. 14:15–14:19cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general?
  188. 14:20–14:25Under the first alternative, the reason effect to a de-diates from the property of being produced
  189. 14:25–14:32by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition
  190. 14:32–14:38of the pro-bandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the
  191. 14:38–14:42like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such
  192. 14:42–14:49as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special
  193. 14:49–14:55words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defect
  194. 14:55–15:00of absence of perversion by the probandum. A statement about the nature of words has no use
  195. 15:00–15:06in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because,
  196. 15:06–15:09while alive, he is not inside the house.
  197. 15:10–15:14Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place,
  198. 15:14–15:19just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it.
  199. 15:20–15:23In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same
  200. 15:23–15:28relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration,
  201. 15:28–15:30there is only negative provision.
  202. 15:31–15:35Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established
  203. 15:35–15:37arises.
  204. 15:37–15:40Inference of God, Tat Vesant Mai.
  205. 15:40–15:46The form of the inference of God.
  206. 15:46–15:5116. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form.
  207. 15:51–16:03The conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect, like a jar.
  208. 16:03–16:09Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen,
  209. 16:09–16:14the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor.
  210. 16:14–16:17This proposal, however, is not sound.
  211. 16:17–16:22The production of dyads and the like in creation is not established for the opponent.
  212. 16:22–16:25Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by
  213. 16:25–16:29those very cognitions and the like is not established.
  214. 16:29–16:32Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not
  215. 16:32–16:36become instrumental in producing dyads.
  216. 16:36–16:41This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation
  217. 16:41–16:45is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is
  218. 16:45–16:47an effect.
  219. 16:47–16:52Merefforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does
  220. 16:52–16:59not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality.
  221. 16:59–17:04The nature of the reason cannot be determined.
  222. 17:04–17:08Further, the Prima-Facey opponent says that the reason-effect hood is not a property in
  223. 17:08–17:13the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property
  224. 17:13–17:17cannot be established for the opponent.
  225. 17:17–17:21Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing
  226. 17:21–17:26in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and
  227. 17:26–17:30the totality of pastime cannot be established.
  228. 17:30–17:34Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present
  229. 17:34–17:40from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property.
  230. 17:40–17:45Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because
  231. 17:45–17:50this property deviates in the condition of destruction.
  232. 17:50–17:54Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing
  233. 17:54–17:58existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent,
  234. 17:58–18:02while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction.
  235. 18:02–18:10alternative form of the inference of God. 18. Some scholars present an alternative form
  236. 18:10–18:14of the inference of God as follows. This jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the
  237. 18:14–18:19like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar,
  238. 18:19–18:27because it is an effect like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the
  239. 18:27–18:33absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental.
  240. 18:33–18:37Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal
  241. 18:37–18:41substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences.
  242. 18:41–18:45This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the
  243. 18:45–18:50impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth.
  244. 18:50–18:54And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure
  245. 18:54–18:59and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this.
  246. 18:59–19:04Direct cognition because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain.
  247. 19:04–19:09The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter-inference.
  248. 19:09–19:13This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent
  249. 19:13–19:20cognition and the like producing this jar because it possesses jarhood like another jar.
  250. 19:20–19:25A second alternative form of the inference.
  251. 19:25–19:2619.
  252. 19:26–19:28Some scholars propose as follows.
  253. 19:28–19:31Effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable to a person's directing the
  254. 19:31–19:36mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental
  255. 19:36–19:41action produces conjunction of self and mind, that conjunction produces cognition, and that
  256. 19:41–19:45cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced
  257. 19:45–19:50cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form,
  258. 19:50–19:54mental action does not occur in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of
  259. 19:54–19:59mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum
  260. 19:59–20:03of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular
  261. 20:03–20:04mental action.
  262. 20:04–20:09Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent,
  263. 20:09–20:11time that is the substratum of mental effort.

Plain text

इन्व्रिंष अगड, कम्प्लिट मइथिली च्रन्श्छन, इन्व्रिंष अगड, तदवसिंट मैज्वि, 1. Thus, after inference has been explained, God, the Creator of the world and supreme among persons is established through inference. God is established by the inference, earth and the other things have an agent, because they are effects, like a jar. Objection, earth and the other things are not the subject. 2. The following objection may now be raised, earth and the other entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, earth, and so forth. Nor can earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence. The problem of mutual dependence 3. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort, or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form. Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason and a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the reason and a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the reasons presence and a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom, or through doubt about the absence of the probandum and a locus possessing the reason. Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing the probandum. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject. Influence of God, Tat the Sintmai. A Sprout cannot be the subject. 6. It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason effect hood is doubtful, therefore effect hood becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effect hood in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that very sprout. This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effected is not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one probandom in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises. By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established. Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent. Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. If concerning the material cause means merely having some material cause or other as its object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth. It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status. This argument, however, is not sound. Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the like and by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already been established. possession of an agent is not being produced by effort. 9. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition. Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause. Possession of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished. Or should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause just as in kaitra is devoted to his own mother, like mithra? Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition. Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive perbandom is established generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandum is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established. 1. Influence of God, Tatva Sintmai Pervasion by the probandum cannot be apprehended. 11. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the probandum as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact, or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect. Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being produced through generic character contact, determinate cognition, or effort generated by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future. It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises. Refutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom. 13. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit, which in turn produces the element Earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element Earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is intended in Earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the the probandum becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinate cognition of provision produced in that way. The probandum would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14. It may now be argued that the probandum is established because of the reasons pervasion. The reason's perversion has the following specific form, wherever there is effecthood, there is being produced by a knower of that effect's material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific perversion, the reason effecthood establishes in earth and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effecthood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound. The question is, in what form does cognition of the provision of the reason-effect hood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of the material cause of that particular jar, as being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general? Under the first alternative, the reason effect to a de-diates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the pro-bandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defect of absence of perversion by the probandum. A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house. Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it. In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative provision. Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Inference of God, Tat Vesant Mai. The form of the inference of God. 16. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form. The conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect, like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor. This proposal, however, is not sound. The production of dyads and the like in creation is not established for the opponent. Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established. Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing dyads. This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect. Merefforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality. The nature of the reason cannot be determined. Further, the Prima-Facey opponent says that the reason-effect hood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established. Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property. Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because this property deviates in the condition of destruction. Nor can effected be the counter-positiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent, while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction. alternative form of the inference of God. 18. Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows. This jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is an effect like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences. This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth. And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this. Direct cognition because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain. The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter-inference. This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar because it possesses jarhood like another jar. A second alternative form of the inference. 19. Some scholars propose as follows. Effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, that conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action. Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

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