MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part5_RadioPlay.mp3

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.994481)
Duration: 20:42
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:32नाटक आप्रहेंचवाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्व
0:32–0:37Even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because
0:37–0:41validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition
0:41–0:44of validity as its object.
0:44–0:47After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative
0:47–0:49inference of the same kind.
0:49–0:53Example, this cognition of a body is valid, because it is cognition of a body with
0:53–0:57respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own
0:57–0:58body.
0:58–1:01The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and
1:01–1:07feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body.
1:07–1:14Refutation of Objections to the Reason and the Inference Concerning Cognition of a Body
1:14–1:16This answer also refutes the following objection.
1:16–1:19In the inference that this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with
1:19–1:23respect to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot
1:23–1:27be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring
1:27–1:28exclusion.
1:28–1:33Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition
1:33–1:38making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant.
1:38–1:41Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this
1:41–1:43is a body.
1:43–1:47If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that
1:47–1:50is the object of cognition, the reason, being body cognition that takes as object
1:50–1:54a substrate of hands and feet, will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in
1:54–1:58fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object.
1:58–2:02Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid
2:02–2:05of hands and feet, be attached to the reason.
2:05–2:09If the locative phrase, in an object devoid of hands and feet, means objecthood, the qualified
2:09–2:13reason will mean, being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid
2:13–2:17of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object
2:17–2:22bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar.
2:22–2:25Nor will the qualifier, not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object
2:25–2:29avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be object
2:29–2:34hood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier
2:34–2:36is available.
2:36–2:40Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate
2:40–2:45of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished
2:45–2:49with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And
2:49–2:53if object hood delimits both mode hood and qualifcant hood, the reason will
2:53–2:57be stated thus, being body-cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of
2:57–3:02bodyhood residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness
3:02–3:07of objecthood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition.
3:07–3:13Recutation of the Prabhupācāra objection of infinite regress
3:13–3:17The Prabhupākāra or Guru-Pāti may say, a cognition whose validity has already been
3:17–3:20determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity
3:20–3:25of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition
3:25–3:29whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its
3:29–3:33validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let
3:33–3:37only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of
3:37–3:41another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine
3:41–3:45its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through
3:45–3:49another cognition in order to determine its object.
3:49–3:53The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore
3:53–3:57its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate.
3:57–4:01It may be objected that the first inference of validity too is sometimes found invalid,
4:01–4:04how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition?
4:04–4:09Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the
4:09–4:11validity of the first cognition.
4:11–4:15In cognition of an object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt
4:15–4:20about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty
4:20–4:25of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about
4:25–4:30a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning
4:30–4:34it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has
4:34–4:38been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore
4:38–4:42inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended
4:42–4:46determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting in doubt
4:46–4:51about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of
4:51–4:56validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity.
4:56–5:00Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the
5:00–5:04validity of the object cognition.
5:04–5:08Avoidance of infinite regress
5:08–5:10There is no infinite regress in this way.
5:10–5:14Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final
5:14–5:19cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some
5:19–5:22distinct object has already been obtained.
5:22–5:26On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the Bhavu, because cognition's validity
5:26–5:29is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition.
5:29–5:33In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither
5:33–5:37in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it
5:37–5:41cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be
5:41–5:45apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means, and the validity of that
5:45–5:50means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress.
5:50–5:54Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the
5:54–5:58first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so
5:58–6:02there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt
6:02–6:06about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful,
6:06–6:11Once validity has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains.
6:11–6:16Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition,
6:16–6:21the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress.
6:21–6:23But this view is not correct.
6:23–6:27If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because
6:27–6:31the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty
6:31–6:35about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about
6:35–6:40the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart
6:40–6:45from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt
6:45–6:49about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object already determined,
6:49–6:54one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions
6:54–6:59validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object
6:59–7:02of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt
7:02–7:04concerning the object.
7:04–7:11Saka objection and Naya yaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference.
7:11–7:24Some masakas object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished.
7:24–7:31The Nayaika may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects,
7:31–7:38otherwise all inference would disappear since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes.
7:38–7:44But this answer is not sound because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason,
7:44–7:51and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative.
7:51–8:00The Naya Yaka replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object.
8:00–8:05When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object.
8:05–8:13Some Naya Yaka say that even the Memsako admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not.
8:13–8:18The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri... it may be objected
8:18–8:22that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination
8:22–8:26of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an
8:26–8:28inference determining its validity?
8:28–8:33Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven,
8:33–8:37has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition
8:37–8:40having the same sacrifice as its object.
8:40–8:45Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition,
8:45–8:49a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity.
8:49–8:53Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing
8:53–8:57doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity.
8:57–9:03Nayaaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness
9:03–9:05is not.
9:05–9:09Some Nayaayakas, including the Kasperty, say that the validity of an inference
9:09–9:13free from any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from
9:13–9:17its own causal aggregate. This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as
9:17–9:21cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire
9:21–9:26is invariably connected with validity. Because a perception of a distinguishing feature,
9:26–9:31no doubt about invalidity arises in inference. Thus, because the validity of inference
9:31–9:35is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the
9:35–9:41object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be
9:41–9:45extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of
9:45–9:50activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no
9:50–9:56doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences,
9:56–10:00I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of
10:00–10:06awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth. Even in illusion, reflex of awareness
10:06–10:10states silverness and the like is modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness
10:10–10:16is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated
10:16–10:21reflex of awareness such as this is my body, extremely effective on wavering activity
10:21–10:27is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflex of awareness is intrinsically determined,
10:27–10:32whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically.
10:32–10:34This view is unsound.
10:34–10:39Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of
10:39–10:44an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination
10:44–10:48must occur extrinsically through another means.
10:48–10:52Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition
10:52–10:57and the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from
10:57–11:02doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity.
11:02–11:06Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause
11:06–11:08of activity.
11:08–11:12The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence
11:12–11:16of the first cognition's own causal aggregate.
11:16–11:20A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy,
11:20–11:25The water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known.
11:25–11:29Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section
11:29–11:34of the tat the sintma composed by the illustrious Gangesopadia.
11:34–11:39The theory of the production of validity.
11:39–11:45The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically.
11:45–11:49The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is
11:49–11:54not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone.
11:54–11:59Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate,
11:59–12:01would become valid.
12:01–12:06And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid.
12:06–12:10If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the
12:10–12:15cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition,
12:15–12:21be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate.
12:21–12:25Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be
12:25–12:30a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate.
12:30–12:34A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit
12:34–12:39and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one
12:39–12:43and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity
12:43–12:45and invalidity should arise.
12:45–12:49Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity
12:49–12:52and invalidity, is no separate effect.
12:52–12:56The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific
12:56–12:58cognitions, valid and invalid.
12:58–13:04No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition.
13:04–13:09Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear.
13:09–13:15The Memsaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly
13:15–13:19The Memsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates
13:19–13:23of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two
13:23–13:28pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other.
13:28–13:32It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent,
13:32–13:35a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent
13:35–13:39effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes.
13:39–13:42property is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of
13:42–13:48effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects, is likewise deviant in such specific
13:48–13:51properties as bluepot hood and pot cognition hood.
13:51–13:56The author of the Kusumunjeli may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive
13:56–14:01cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition,
14:01–14:08it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included
14:08–14:13in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general,
14:13–14:17thus the probandom is absent from the subject and contradiction results.
14:18–14:22If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in
14:22–14:27general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the
14:27–14:34example in valid cognition. Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is
14:34–14:37not established either.
14:37–14:41If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some
14:41–14:48one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established.
14:48–14:53Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition
14:53–14:57in general, be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established
14:57–15:00and contradiction arise.
15:00–15:03It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition
15:03–15:09have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition.
15:10–15:15Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects.
15:17–15:21This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause
15:21–15:27distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject,
15:27–15:31the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established,
15:31–15:37and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished.
15:39–15:41Refutation of other inferences
15:43–15:47Nor is the following probandom admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose
15:47–15:52causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality
15:52–15:58delimited by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal
15:58–16:02entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood.
16:02–16:06Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends
16:06–16:10on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property.
16:10–16:15The qualifier, unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides
16:15–16:18in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause.
16:18–16:23Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting
16:23–16:27effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon
16:27–16:32a cause, cognitionhood is not such a property. If the probandom is restricted to the validity
16:32–16:36of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like make the
16:36–16:40inference prove what is already established, since each sense faculty is not an individual
16:40–16:45cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type.
16:45–16:49This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which
16:49–16:54is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity,
16:54–16:58It is a property directly pervaded by cognitionhood.
16:58–17:04Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effecthood.
17:04–17:08The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognitionhood
17:08–17:15of non-eternal entities delimits effecthood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties.
17:15–17:19It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect
17:19–17:23arising from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition,
17:23–17:29invalid cognition. This is unsound. Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid
17:29–17:34cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example,
17:34–17:39invalid cognition. If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition.
17:40–17:44The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning
17:44–17:48a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes.
17:50–17:52Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:53–17:58It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is delimited
17:58–18:03by a property up-sent from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous
18:03–18:05to invalid cognition.
18:05–18:08If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is
18:08–18:13determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition.
18:13–18:17But this inference suffers from proving what is already established.
18:17–18:20Sense-object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property up-sent
18:20–18:24from invalid cognition and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact
18:24–18:29as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties.
18:29–18:33The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates
18:33–18:37identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless.
18:37–18:42It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking
18:42–18:46either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid
18:46–18:47or invalid.
18:47–18:52Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception,
18:52–18:58because, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition.
18:58–19:01But these inferences too prove what is already established.
19:01–19:05The uncommon, individual sense-object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit
19:05–19:11invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce a lucary perception.
19:11–19:15This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its
19:15–19:21contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition.
19:22–19:26When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's
19:26–19:31limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to
19:31–19:37produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice
19:37–19:42and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific
19:42–19:47Six sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition
19:47–19:52and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established
19:52–19:53recurs.
19:53–19:58Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the
19:58–20:03causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition.
20:03–20:07Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions
20:07–20:10such as valid perceptions.
20:10–20:14such as sense-object contact do not form a recurrent class.
20:14–20:17Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal
20:17–20:18of causeness.
20:18–20:23Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the property
20:23–20:28of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only
20:28–20:31invalid cognition is unfamiliar.
20:31–20:34Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity
20:34–20:38in the perception section of the Tat Vassant Mai composed by Sri Gangesopadhaya.

Plain text

नाटक आप्रहेंचवाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्व Even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid, because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with respect to a body. Refutation of Objections to the Reason and the Inference Concerning Cognition of a Body This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference that this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion. Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body. If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is the object of cognition, the reason, being body cognition that takes as object a substrate of hands and feet, will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet, be attached to the reason. If the locative phrase, in an object devoid of hands and feet, means objecthood, the qualified reason will mean, being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar. Nor will the qualifier, not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be object hood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available. Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes body hit its mode and a substrate of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if object hood delimits both mode hood and qualifcant hood, the reason will be stated thus, being body-cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an object devoid of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition. Recutation of the Prabhupācāra objection of infinite regress The Prabhupākāra or Guru-Pāti may say, a cognition whose validity has already been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. Nor can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object. The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected that the first inference of validity too is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an object clear as an amalaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition. Avoidance of infinite regress There is no infinite regress in this way. Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some distinct object has already been obtained. On the contrary, infinite regress arises in the Bhavu, because cognition's validity is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition. In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another means, and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress. Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, Once validity has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt about the first cognitions validity again raises doubt about an object already determined, one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognitions validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object. Saka objection and Naya yaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference. Some masakas object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished. The Nayaika may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would disappear since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative. The Naya Yaka replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object. Some Naya Yaka say that even the Memsako admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacri... it may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference determining its validity? Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity. Nayaaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not. Some Nayaayakas, including the Kasperty, say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate. This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity. Because a perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference. Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it as cloth. Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like is modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body, extremely effective on wavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflex of awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically through another means. Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition and the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity. The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy, The water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section of the tat the sintma composed by the illustrious Gangesopadia. The theory of the production of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate. A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise. Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity, is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Memsaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly The Memsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other. It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. property is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects, is likewise deviant in such specific properties as bluepot hood and pot cognition hood. The author of the Kusumunjeli may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition. Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established. Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general, be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished. Refutation of other inferences Nor is the following probandom admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect hood different from the causality delimited by effect hood delimited by cognition hood. Cognition hood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effect hood. Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause delimits effect hood, cognition hood is such a property. The qualifier, unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause. Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognitionhood is not such a property. If the probandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like make the inference prove what is already established, since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, It is a property directly pervaded by cognitionhood. Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effecthood. The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognitionhood of non-eternal entities delimits effecthood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties. It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect arising from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, invalid cognition. This is unsound. Jaunders and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a part is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is delimited by a property up-sent from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established. Sense-object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property up-sent from invalid cognition and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception, because, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense-object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce a lucary perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific Six sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition. Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid perceptions. such as sense-object contact do not form a recurrent class. Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal of causeness. Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the Tat Vassant Mai composed by Sri Gangesopadhaya.

← Transcript index