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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 52:27
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0:04–0:14Art 2. Examination of the Doctrine Denying External Reality. Introduction to the Subject of Debate.
0:14–0:23When the Vijnabdin maintains that nothing exists outside consciousness, what room remains for the existence of the self?
0:23–0:44Very well, let the Vijnavdine be asked whether his meaning is that the two components of a cognitive state, the knowable object and the knowing consciousness, are ultimately real but mutually non-different, or that both belong to one generic kind, or that the knowable component is imaginary.
0:44–0:49Statement of the defects in the Vijnavdine's inference
0:49–0:56Whatever reason is advanced to prove the probandom of the first of the three inferences necessary
0:56–1:04co-appearance, cognition hood, humanosity or anything else is plainly defective.
1:04–1:06Explanation of the defect.
1:06–1:11The admission in the preceding inference that cognitions having mutually incompatible
1:11–1:18forms such as blue and white arise gives birth to a monster that destroys those very
1:18–1:26cognitions. Further explanation of the defect. If the stated cognitions apprehend mutually
1:26–1:32incompatible objects, how can one cognition, while remaining one, be not different from
1:32–1:40many objects? If it does not apprehend them, how does it possess their forms? Self-aware
1:40–1:46cognition cannot remain unconscious of the form of its own object.
1:46–1:50Ratnakritya's answer and its refutation.
1:50–1:57It may be objected that difficulty arises only when mutually incompatible properties appear
1:57–2:04together in external objects, if, despite such appearance, external objects were regarded
2:04–2:10as non-different, the successful activities arising from them and the movements toward
2:10–2:18them would intermingle and no distinction among external objects would remain. Consciousness,
2:18–2:27however, faces no such difficulty. The existence of consciousness does not depend upon producing
2:27–2:35any successful activity but only upon luminosity. A person desiring an object does not go in
2:35–2:43search of consciousness. The activity of consciousness is nothing beyond the natural flow of self-luminous
2:43–2:50moments of consciousness. The person desiring these activities is likewise neither different
2:50–2:58from nor outside this flow. Non-difference is the ultimate and final nature of consciousness
2:58–3:01because all consciousness is self-aware.
3:01–3:05A satirical reply to the preceding answer.
3:05–3:07Dear brother,
3:07–3:11Does this mean that just as creatures that are natural enemies,
3:11–3:20such as snake and mongoose, abandon their innate hostility when they approach the hermitage of a peaceful sage,
3:20–3:29So mutually opposed objects such as blue and white abandon their natural opposition when apprehended by cognition.
3:29–3:38Or do they retain their opposition but abandon its consequence, mutual difference, refutation of the two alternatives.
3:38–3:42The first alternative is untenable.
3:42–3:56If objects whose presence and absence are respectively pervaded by the absence and presence of the other are not regarded as mutually opposed, all opposition would disappear from the world.
3:56–4:01The answer, nothing is wrong, let it be so, is improper.
4:01–4:11The opposed nature of objects cannot be abolished in this way, because mutual exclusion is the very nature of opposition.
4:11–4:16Establishing this exclusion is establishing difference itself.
4:16–4:20Therefore the second alternative cannot stand either.
4:20–4:24Objection to the refutation and the answer.
4:24–4:33It may be said that the distinct successful activities of external objects were presented as the basis of their opposition.
4:33–4:40This rule applies only to external objects, not to cognition or consciousness.
4:40–4:46Therefore cognition need not be different even when its objects differ.
4:46–4:50But this reasoning is not rational.
4:50–4:57If apparent coexistence of incompatible properties is taken as the ground for difference among objects,
4:57–5:04what benefit is gained by mentioning the individual limitation of successful activities?
5:04–5:07If none, why mention it?
5:07–5:19The individual limits of successful activities themselves remain only if the activities differ because incompatible properties visibly coexist in them.
5:19–5:23Objection to the refutation and its refutation.
5:23–5:29Where is the rule that different objects cannot appear in one cognition?
5:29–5:34Different objects certainly can appear in one cognition.
5:34–5:41No, our meaning in saying that the appearances of different objects do not overlap is not this.
5:42–5:50We mean only that blue itself does not appear as yellow, and yellow itself does not appear as blue.
5:51–5:54This is the basis of all opposition.
5:55–5:57Justification of the refutation.
5:57–6:04If this were not so, knowledge and ignorance too would not remain mutually opposed.
6:04–6:18For example, that which is said to be not known is known, since we can say, this known horse and so forth is not known, ignorance would thereby become manifest.
6:18–6:25Do knowledge and ignorance not appear respectively in the forms of ignorance and knowledge?
6:25–6:32Yes, but when distinct objects such as blue and yellow are cognized together, is blue
6:32–6:39cognized as yellow in that cognition, so that opposition among the objects would disappear.
6:39–6:46Therefore, opposition at the level of objects and opposition at the level of cognition should
6:46–6:52be regarded as alike, and each should be understood as possessing an equal capacity
6:52–7:00to remove identity with its own object. To regard one as superior to the other is mere
7:00–7:07partiality, like the well-known proverb about the beggar and the housewife.
7:07–7:13Refutation of an earlier view. The foregoing refutation also disposes of the Buddhist's
7:13–7:20earlier assertion that there is no differentiation within cognition. The cognition of distinct
7:20–7:27forms as distinct forms is precisely the differentiation of cognition.
7:27–7:30Another refutation of the objection.
7:30–7:36If all externally real things are momentary, then by the time a person who cognizes to
7:36–7:43external objects such as blue and yellow together tries to know their mutual difference,
7:43–7:46both will already have perished.
7:46–7:53How then can that same person know the objects and their difference successively?
7:53–7:59There is no certainty that another person cognizes this difference, and if there is doubt about
7:59–8:06the cognition of difference, there will be doubt about the difference itself as well.
8:06–8:12But if neither an object nor its cognition can be known by anything different from it,
8:12–8:14how can doubt arise?
8:14–8:20The Buddhist seeks to establish the identity of the noble and cognition on the ground that
8:20–8:24no distinction is apprehended within cognition.
8:24–8:31If that very non-distinction is in turn established on the ground of their identity, the fault
8:31–8:33of circularity follows.
8:33–8:39Therefore, presenting identity as the reason is pointless.
8:39–8:47of the objection that pure cognition is undifferentiated. Then cognition's uniform luminosity may
8:47–8:53remove its multiplicity or differentiation, while the manifest coexistence within it
8:53–9:01of incompatible properties may remove its unity. But what effect can these negations
9:01–9:07have upon the purely luminous nature of the cognition of blue, yellow, and the like,
9:07–9:12which is supposedly devoid of both unity and multiplicity?
9:12–9:13None.
9:13–9:18This reply resembles the weeding of a field by barbarians.
9:18–9:23When told to remove the weeds, they uprooted the crop as well.
9:23–9:30To be one means to possess a determinate form, while to be many means to possess indeterminate
9:30–9:33or mutually distinct forms.
9:33–9:40If cognition has neither unity nor multiplicity, it can assume neither the form of blue nor
9:40–9:43the combined forms of blue and yellow.
9:43–9:47Consequently, no form whatever remains in it.
9:47–9:53Refutation of the objection that the appearance of incompatible properties in cognition is
9:53–9:55illusory.
9:55–10:00The argument for the non-differentiation of cognition would then be this, only the
10:00–10:08The real coexistence of incompatible properties appearing in something determines its differentiation,
10:08–10:12whereas here their appearance is merely illusory.
10:12–10:14Very well.
10:14–10:21If so, it has been established by your own admission that cognition is pure and formless
10:21–10:27like crystal, and that the distinct forms appearing in it are not its own.
10:27–10:36Therefore, whether those forms are real or unreal, the inference of identity between cognition and its object from their
10:36–10:42Coappearance is initiated by the defect of an example lacking the Probandom.
10:42–10:52Objection that difference is unreal and reply is not the mere unreal difference that appears in conceptual cognition but not in
10:52–10:58non-conceptual cognition sufficient for the practical usage of difference?
10:58–10:59No.
10:59–11:06Such difference cannot remain immune from the objections concerning its reality or unreality
11:06–11:11and its appearance or non-appearance in cognition.
11:11–11:15Defense of the objection and its refutation.
11:15–11:21Is it only a non-existent or unreal and unknown difference that is apprehended?
11:21–11:27Yes, but the meaning of the word apprehension must be clarified.
11:27–11:33Does it mean being the cause of practical activity concerning the apprehended object?
11:33–11:34No.
11:34–11:41If practical activity is something different from cognition, then being itself unreal because
11:41–11:47it is different from cognition, how can it generate a distinction?
11:47–11:53If practical activity is cognition itself, why should its cognitive relation, without
11:53–11:59any regulator, be fixed upon one particular object rather than another?
11:59–12:05Is the relation of distinct practical activities to distinct differences determined by the causal
12:05–12:08capacities of those activities?
12:08–12:10No.
12:10–12:12This is a Buddhist oddity.
12:12–12:18They are prepared to maintain that practical activity is a kind of cognition, that its
12:18–12:25object is an unreal difference and that, even in the absence of any other regulator, the
12:25–12:31capacities of the causes of practical activity determine their relation, yet they are unwilling
12:31–12:38to admit a cognitive relation between non-conceptual cognition and its real object.
12:38–12:45This resembles a man afflicted with a digestive disorder who abandons pure milk and longs
12:45–12:48for rice water.
12:48–12:50Objection to the refutation
12:50–12:55Are the differences among external objects not themselves non-different from the form
12:55–13:02of the cognition that apprehends them, just as the external objects themselves are held
13:02–13:04to be cognitive in nature?
13:04–13:11If difference is definitely unreal, how can it be the form of a real cognition?
13:11–13:17And if difference is non-different from the form of cognition, how can it be unreal?
13:17–13:21Let the Buddhist attend to this dilemma.
13:21–13:23Suppose difference is real.
13:23–13:29If cognition does not apprehend the substrate and the counter-positive of the difference,
13:29–13:32how can the difference be known?
13:32–13:38And if it apprehends both along with the difference, how can a single cognition be non-different
13:38–13:40from all of them?
13:40–13:44Should cognition be regarded as having a variegated form?
13:44–13:46No.
13:46–13:52The very consideration of the alternatives, whether the variegated form is one or many
13:52–13:55eliminates this possibility.
13:55–14:01If the forms are many, how can they be non-different from one cognition?
14:01–14:07If cognition to becomes many in accordance with the differences among the form, what,
14:07–14:13after all, is the defect in an object different from cognition being known by cognition?
14:13–14:15There is none.
14:15–14:22But on this view the knowable, knower relation between two different things, object and cognition
14:22–14:29cannot be determined by a process initiated by either one, because no such regular process
14:29–14:30exists.
14:30–14:36Nor can the relation be determined by generic similarity, otherwise the cognitive relation
14:36–14:43would not remain confined to a particular object, and any object could become the object
14:43–14:45of any cognition.
14:45–14:52A known cow possessing cowness does not become a non-cow in relation to some other thing.
14:52–15:00If so, the same defect also applies to the view that cognition and its object are identical.
15:00–15:07The usage cognition knows itself cannot be grounded in a process since an action of a thing upon
15:07–15:10itself is impossible.
15:10–15:16Nor can it be grounded in generic similarity otherwise cognition would take all things as
15:16–15:18its object.
15:18–15:25No rule has been observed according to which a cow is generically a cow only in relation
15:25–15:29to itself and not in relation to other things.
15:29–15:35Nor does cognitions being self-revealing make it revealing of other cognitions, otherwise
15:35–15:41every cognition would take every other cognition as its object.
15:41–15:45Objection to the reply and rejoinder.
15:45–15:51Should we, on the basis of the object's illuminated nature, merely deny the difference between
15:51–15:56cognition and its object without affirming their identity?
15:56–15:57No.
15:57–16:04The negation of difference is itself the positive affirmation of identity.
16:04–16:10Objection that variegated cognition is neither different nor non-different and reply.
16:10–16:16Then let variegated cognition be devoid of both difference and non-difference.
16:16–16:22If its form is different from cognition, cognition cannot illuminate it.
16:22–16:29If it is non-different, then, because cognition is one, its form too will be one, there will
16:29–16:37then be no variegation in a cognition that apprehends blue, yellow, and the like together.
16:37–16:40This position is untenable.
16:40–16:46Just as the simultaneous affirmation of mutually opposed properties in a single substrate is
16:46–16:51incoherent, so too is their simultaneous negation.
16:51–16:58If it is said, let us accept even this negation, the Buddhist will have to follow in the footsteps
16:58–17:05of the Jant teacher by accepting every undesirable possibility, becoming shameless like a Dighambara
17:05–17:06adherent.
17:06–17:13Refutation of the objection that variegatedness transcends all determination.
17:13–17:19Then variegated cognition would be devoid of all four mutually opposed properties, difference,
17:19–17:25identity, absence of difference and absence of identity.
17:25–17:31The variegated is indeed a wondrous entity, cognition is real although neither one nor
17:31–17:33many.
17:33–17:38Let us take this miracle to be the meaning of the word variegated.
17:38–17:45Very well if so, why not regard cognition as possessing all four properties?
17:45–17:50The ground for calling cognition miraculous is equal on both views.
17:50–17:57Moreover, the impossibility of each one of the four predications necessarily entails the
17:57–18:03opposite predication because the negation of an impossible predication is the affirmation
18:03–18:06of its contrary.
18:06–18:09Another refutation of the objection.
18:09–18:16If cognition is truly devoid of all four properties, that is merely another way of saying that
18:16–18:22these properties, though different from cognition, are either known or unknown.
18:22–18:29It is incorrect to call them unknown, for they are being known through these very words.
18:29–18:34If they are admitted to be known, they are known without possessing the defining
18:34–18:39property of nobility identity with cognition.
18:39–18:47One must then regard a single cognition as many, and a curious kind of non-dualism will result.
18:47–18:53But two strange assumptions are already present here, that an object lacking the defining mark
18:53–19:00of nobility is nevertheless known, and that its cognition is neither one nor many.
19:00–19:06It is therefore more rational to accept a duality of strange entities.
19:06–19:13On this admission, both the cognition of many distinct objects and the unity of that cognition
19:13–19:16are preserved.
19:16–19:23Examination of the view that an object is non-different from cognition because it is illuminated.
19:23–19:26The argument for identity would then be this.
19:26–19:32We admit that neither the internal agent in the form of cognition nor the external
19:32–19:39The object fulfills the definition of nobility, nevertheless, the illumination of blue, yellow,
19:39–19:45and the light cannot be denied, and this alone is what we assert.
19:45–19:46No.
19:46–19:52This view resembles an attempt to save a cow that has already been sold.
19:52–19:58What, after all, is this illumination that remains wholly unimpaired in the object
19:58–20:04even though the object does not satisfy the definition of norability.
20:04–20:10It is not a relation to illuminating cognition, for the Buddhists themselves have explained
20:10–20:17that a mere relation, in the absence of any process initiated by cognition or illumination,
20:17–20:22cannot determine which cognition knows which object.
20:22–20:28Nor is it identity with illumination, for then variegated cognition would become many
20:28–20:36by being identical with its several objects. Therefore, one who wishes to preserve the illumination
20:36–20:43of objects must explain their nobility or else deny their illumination. Otherwise,
20:43–20:50the Buddhist especially Jhana, who preserves the illumination of internal and external
20:50–20:56objects even though they utterly fail to satisfy the definition of nobility resembles
20:56–21:05a man who, holding a piece of gold in his hand, tries to tie a knot in the sky in order to keep it safe.
21:05–21:10Refutation of the second alternative stated at the beginning.
21:10–21:19The foregoing denial of the nobility of an external object also refutes the second of the initial alternatives.
21:19–21:27Nearly admitting generic similarity between an object and cognition does not satisfy the definition of nobility,
21:27–21:30because the undesirable consequence remains that,
21:30–21:34if cognition and object are generically similar,
21:34–21:38any object may become the object of any cognition.
21:39–21:43The cognition of a pot is generically similar to a tree as well.
21:44–21:47But if the external object is inert,
21:47–21:50How can it be illuminated or conscious?
21:50–21:57If it is illuminated, it must be admitted to be generically similar to cognition.
21:57–22:03This difficulty is the same for both the inert and the conscious.
22:03–22:08According to philosophers who do not regard cognition as self-aware,
22:08–22:12cognition illuminates another thing but not itself.
22:12–22:16According to those who accept self-aware cognition,
22:16–22:25Cognition illuminates itself but is inert with respect to another thing and therefore cannot know it.
22:25–22:32If one cognition can somehow know another cognition as well, it can also know an external object,
22:32–22:39the reason in the inference would then extend to the counter example and become inconclusive
22:39–22:45through deviation. Defense of Generic similarity between the object and cognition.
22:45–22:52If an external object is regarded as dissimilar to its cognition, does it never satisfy the
22:52–22:59definition of nobility, whereas if generic similarity is admitted their material cause
22:59–23:05will regularly be the same, so that cognitions having the forms of blue, yellow, and so
23:05–23:13forth, though mutually distinct, may be established as knowing one another as well as themselves.
23:13–23:21No. In order to explain the mutual cognition of distinct forms, one must regard either
23:21–23:27the common material cause as a specific regulator or the capacity of the causal complex as a
23:27–23:33general regulator, otherwise the cognition of a pot would not remain confined to the
23:33–23:41pot but could also take a tree as its object. Once such a regulator must be admitted,
23:41–23:47But very regulator can just as easily explain why cognition is confined to a particular
23:47–23:52object that is dissimilar to and different from itself.
23:52–23:58Therefore, the defect previously pointed out reappears in the reason.
23:58–24:02Consideration of the third initial alternative.
24:02–24:10Then let the third alternative, that the known object is unreal, be accepted as correct.
24:10–24:15It is impossible to define the knowable as either different from or non-different from
24:15–24:22cognition and if the knowable cannot be defined, one cannot even rely upon the capacity of the
24:22–24:27causal complex to determine the cognitive relation.
24:27–24:33Inquiry into causes is meaningful only in the case of entities rationally established,
24:33–24:36not in the case of irrational entities.
24:36–24:43Very well, then we ask, does the impossibility of formulating a definition of nobility abolished
24:43–24:49the nobility of the external object or its reality itself?
24:49–24:52Refutation of the first alternative above.
24:52–24:56The first alternative is unacceptable.
24:56–25:03The existence of an object manifestly perceived cannot be denied merely because its definition
25:03–25:05has not been settled.
25:05–25:12The uncertainty of a definition may also arise from the complexity or subtlety of what is
25:12–25:14to be defined.
25:14–25:21If knowable external objects were not actually known, it would be rational to deny knowledge
25:21–25:25of them, but they are clearly known.
25:25–25:32Refutation of the second alternative The second alternative is also unacceptable.
25:32–25:39The impossibility of defining the knowable would establish its unreality only if the impossibility
25:39–25:44of definition were invariably connected with unreality itself.
25:44–25:51But if definition is impossible whether the knowable is real or unreal, why are you especially
25:51–25:53attached to unreality?
25:53–26:00If it is said that unreality itself is the definition of the knowable, we ask, why not
26:00–26:02reality?
26:02–26:07If reality is a defective definition, so is unreality.
26:07–26:13Formulation and refutation of another definition of nobility.
26:13–26:19Let the definition of nobility then be being the object of practical activity produced
26:19–26:21by cognition.
26:21–26:24Very well, let us accept this.
26:24–26:31But how is it determined that one particular practical activity is produced by one particular
26:31–26:38cognition and not by another. If it is held that a particular causal complex produces
26:38–26:46only a particular cognition and no other cognition, this is possible in the case of a real object,
26:46–26:53not an unreal one. This is the distinctive character of practical activity. When a real
26:53–27:01object is known, desire arises, desire produces effort, effort produces action, and action
27:01–27:09leads to the attainment of the real object. An unreal object cannot be attained, and therefore
27:09–27:18no such sequence occurs in relation to it. If it is attained, it is not unreal. If practical
27:18–27:25activity itself is false, the definition of nobility collapses, because the very practical
27:25–27:30activity upon which the definition is based is unreal.
27:30–27:34The extreme proposal and its refutation.
27:34–27:41Let the world then be regarded as wholly inconceivable, because it is noable as neither different
27:41–27:45from nor identical with cognition.
27:45–27:50Well, does this mean the denial of all true knowledge concerning the world, or does it
27:50–27:52lead to nihilism?
27:52–27:56The first alternative is impossible.
27:56–28:02Does all inquiry yield only the conclusion that nothing beyond ordinary experience
28:02–28:03is real?
28:03–28:05No.
28:05–28:12Even without inquiry every person readily accepts conclusions of this kind, the uneducated
28:12–28:14to possess such a notion.
28:14–28:21More can inquiry be expected merely to turn one away from actions such as sacrifice and
28:21–28:29killing which are held respectively to produce the imaginary fruits of heaven and hell.
28:29–28:35If inquiry turns one away from heaven and hell, then by generating the conviction that
28:35–28:41everything is false or irrational, it can also turn one away from the desired goals
28:41–28:44of this life.
28:44–28:49Otherworldly and worldly goals stand on the same footing.
28:49–28:54Are worldly goals observed, whereas otherworldly goals are not?
28:54–29:00If observed means known, both are equally knowable.
29:00–29:06If it means perceived by the senses, then no one in this world could act toward anything
29:06–29:11known by inference or another non perceptual means.
29:11–29:17Are the imperceptible but known things of this world perceived earlier or later?
29:17–29:21Yes, and so are otherworldly things.
29:21–29:28Otherworldly and worldly pleasures and pains are alike in nature and are therefore equally
29:28–29:31capable of being perceived.
29:31–29:37Is there a natural indifference in people's minds towards supernatural pleasures?
29:37–29:44This does not establish the necessity of inquiry, even without inquiry people may naturally be
29:44–29:48disinclined toward other worldly things.
29:48–29:55Nor is it the case that inquiry merely intensifies this disinclination, for it can also produce
29:55–30:00aversion toward worldly activities.
30:00–30:02Conclusion of the discussion
30:02–30:08The Buddhist strategy of debate resembles the well-known inference of a young monkey.
30:08–30:15Hearing of the prowess of Hanumna, son of the wind, it was fired by rivalry and made
30:15–30:18a mighty leap to cross the ocean.
30:18–30:24After jumping some distance it fell into the sea and declared, this ocean is surely
30:24–30:30boundless, no one can cross it, the tail in the Ramya must be false.
30:30–30:35The Buddhist assertion above is equally pointless.
30:35–30:41The conclusion that the world is inconceivable because it cannot be known or defined is something
30:41–30:49an ordinary person knows without inquiry, therefore an inquiry that yields such a conclusion is
30:49–30:51futile.
30:51–30:56Is it not proper to undertake inquiry even if it bears no fruit?
30:56–30:58No.
30:58–31:04It is possible that the inquiry has reached such a conclusion only because of the Buddhist's
31:04–31:06lack of skill.
31:06–31:12A person blind from birth cannot see or define a blue object, but ordinary people do not
31:12–31:18on that account regard blue objects as unknowable or indefinable.
31:18–31:23Examination and refutation of the second alternative above.
31:23–31:28Would emptiness then be the state of supreme peace and bliss?
31:28–31:29No.
31:29–31:36If emptiness has not been established, how can it be said that the world has dissolved
31:36–31:38into emptiness?
31:38–31:44It is easy to make such an irresponsible assertion on any occasion.
31:44–31:50If emptiness is established by a proof different from itself, that proof too must be admitted
31:50–31:58as real, and the definition of nobility must necessarily be satisfied in its case.
31:58–32:04If this other proof is not different from intellect or cognition, there will be no difference
32:04–32:10between the world and emptiness, since both are objects of cognition.
32:10–32:16How, then, can there be emptiness while the world remains unafuted?
32:16–32:23How can the proof be different from cognition, if it requires a proof different from itself
32:23–32:28in order to establish itself, an infinite regress follows.
32:28–32:33An unestablished proof cannot establish emptiness.
32:33–32:38If you regard the emptiness of the world as self-established or self-luminous, you
32:38–32:43have arrived upon the path of Vednita.
32:43–32:45Exposition of the Vedantic view.
32:45–32:52The Vedintin now presents his own view, to which the Buddhist position appears close.
32:52–32:59The ultimate reality, being self-established, is of the nature of experience.
32:59–33:06Because the world is unreal and empty, reality is not delimited by any temporal boundary and
33:06–33:08is therefore eternal.
33:08–33:15For the same reason it is unrestricted by spatial boundaries and is therefore all-pervasive.
33:15–33:22Again, for the same reason it is devoid of every characteristic and hence cannot be apprehended
33:22–33:24by thought.
33:24–33:30All thought operates through the relation of qualifier and qualified, whereas ultimate
33:30–33:33reality transcends that relation.
33:33–33:39For the same reason there is no difference within it, and it therefore transcends all
33:39–33:42difference or duality.
33:42–33:47Because the world is wholly unreal, duality is impossible.
33:47–33:53Since nothing different from it exists, it has no counter-positive, and is therefore
33:53–33:55positive in nature.
33:55–34:02Nevertheless, in contrast to the irrationally supposed reality of the world, it is sometimes
34:02–34:09called emptiness. What relation, then, thus pure experience, understood as the exclusion
34:09–34:16of the world, bear to the world if the relation of knower and known is not admitted. Surely
34:16–34:24the world is not unknowable. The reply is that in reality there is no relation, but
34:24–34:30through error a known known relation appears between them, resembling the relation of substrate
34:30–34:37and dependent. The Nayikas to admit such a relation between space and the ground of the
34:37–34:44celestial world. The only difference in Vednata is that the relation qualifies the knowable
34:44–34:52alone. Ignorance itself is illusorily transformed into the various objects that serve as the
34:52–34:59objects of distinct practical dealings. Experience to appears manifold because it
34:59–35:05It is qualified by different limiting agents superimposed by ignorance.
35:05–35:11This manifold appearance resembles the division of one all-pervasive space into many parts
35:11–35:19by a pot, a hollow in a tree, a heart, and the countless objects experienced in a dream.
35:19–35:25But let this web of words end here, the seller of ginger has no need to worry about the
35:25–35:27boat.
35:27–35:30Statement of the logical conclusion.
35:30–35:36For the reasons already stated, setting aside the Vedantic discussion of emptiness, the
35:36–35:42reality of both conceptual and non-conceptual experience must be admitted.
35:42–35:50Consequently, the acceptance of an object distinct from experience is unavoidable.
35:50–35:56Once the object is established, there must be some definition or determinant of object
35:56–36:12If the external object is not denied and its cognition is regarded as impermanent, the determinant may be regarded as a property of cognition or as a property common to cognition and the external object.
36:12–36:19If external reality is denied, the determinant will be a property of cognition alone.
36:19–36:30If cognition is regarded as eternally real, as in Vednata, the determinant must be held to be a property of the noble object alone.
36:30–36:34What is to be defined here is the cognitive relation.
36:34–36:43This relation is an intrinsic nature of a real cognition, the property of being a cognition of a particular object.
36:43–36:50object. Because it is a natural property of cognition, it requires no cause beyond the
36:50–36:58causes of cognition itself. And because its nature consists in being related to one particular
36:58–37:04object, it does not establish a relation with any other object.
37:04–37:08Defense of the Nya, Vaika account of the cognitive relation.
37:08–37:14The question may be asked, what is the effect of this cognitive relation?
37:14–37:21The answer is outwardly, it initiates practical activity concerning the relation between cognition
37:21–37:26and its object, inwardly, it manifests cognition.
37:26–37:33If it is further asked why cognition is such as to induce practical activity, the answer
37:33–37:39is that the causal complex producing cognition has the capacity to confer such causal efficacy
37:39–37:41upon it.
37:41–37:47This answer is analogous to the answer given when one asks about the casualty of a cause
37:47–37:50with respect to its effect.
37:50–37:56If this answer is wrong and a cause is held to produce some additional assistance in
37:56–38:03In the effect, that assistance, being itself an effect, would require a second assistance
38:03–38:09within it, and that a third, yielding an infinite series of assistances.
38:09–38:16If an assistance produced by the cause is not required for the effect, why does any cause
38:16–38:19not produce any effect whatsoever?
38:19–38:26The answer is that a particular cause produces only a particular effect.
38:26–38:32in the same way that a cognition knows only a particular object. What is the meaning
38:32–38:39of knowing or making something an object? Then the meaning of producing must likewise
38:39–38:48be clarified. Production is bringing an effect into existence. Very well, in that case,
38:48–38:54the arising of cognition as a cognition of a particular object is precisely its knowing
38:54–39:02that object. Likewise, with respect to the assistance supposedly produced in an effect,
39:02–39:10as in the case of cognition, there is no assistance over and above the arising of the effect itself.
39:10–39:17Objection to the defense and its refutation. If the cause-effect relation to is suspended
39:17–39:21because of the foregoing objections, that would be extreme
39:21–39:28rashness. Things would then be either eternal or wholly non-existent.
39:28–39:32If the cognitive relation is also removed, either cognition will
39:32–39:37exist continuously or there will be no cognition at all, one of
39:37–39:41these two will become the ultimate reality. Can the causal
39:41–39:46relation not be merely conceptual? Then the cognitive relation
39:46–39:53may likewise be conceptual. If there is a powerful proof against the reality of the
39:53–40:01knowable object and the effect, let both relations be regarded as conceptual, otherwise let both
40:01–40:10be real. These are the only two alternatives. Refutation of the skya and related views concerning
40:10–40:17the substrate of the cognitive relation. The true situation is this. In the Buddhist
40:17–40:24view, the cognitive relation cannot qualify both cognition and its object. Permanent, whether
40:24–40:32real or unreal, objects also appear in cognition if the relation were a property of both,
40:32–40:37cognition too would have to be regarded as permanent. Therefore, it is proper to
40:37–40:45regard cognition alone as the substrate of the relation. But if cognition, as a modification
40:45–40:51of the intellect, is held to be eternal while its object is mutable, then according to the
40:51–40:57SCIA view the object cannot be the substrate of the relation, since the SCIA system has
40:57–41:05already been rationally refuted. Discussion of this matter is impossible unless the disappearance
41:05–41:11of the earlier object and the appearance of the later object are admitted, and that is
41:11–41:18opposed to the skya view. Momentary cognition too cannot be the substrate of the relation
41:18–41:24if the knowable object is unreal, for no relation can be established with the unreal,
41:24–41:32and if cognition has no form of its own for it to apprehend. Noor can blue, yellow, and
41:32–41:39the like be held to be superimposed upon cognition, because, being unreal, they are not available
41:39–41:42even for superimposition.
41:42–41:45Objection to the refutation and reply.
41:45–41:52Do unreal, externally imagined objects such as blue and yellow themselves appear as qualifying
41:52–41:54cognition?
41:54–41:55No.
41:55–42:01What does unreal mean, absent at the time and place of cognition, utterly devoid
42:01–42:09of every characteristic or merely of the nature of a particular exclusion. Under the first
42:09–42:15alternative, although the object is unreal, space and time would have to be admitted as
42:15–42:23real. Under the second, an unreal object being devoid of characteristics cannot qualify
42:23–42:30cognition. Under the third, if unreal glue is the exclusion of the non-blue, the non-blue
42:30–42:32Blue will be real.
42:32–42:38If the non blue is unreal, its excluder, blue, will be real.
42:38–42:45If both blue and non blue are unreal, neither can qualify any cognition.
42:45–42:48Objection to the reply and rejoinder.
42:48–42:54Do blue and the light not qualify cognition precisely in their unreal form?
42:54–42:59Very well, then in what other form do they qualify it?
42:59–43:03In the forms of blue, yellow, and the like.
43:03–43:10If so, these forms are different from unreal blue and yellow, being different, they will
43:10–43:11be real.
43:11–43:17If they are not different, they too cannot qualify cognition.
43:17–43:20Objection to the rejoinder and reply.
43:20–43:26An objection may be raised, impelled by certain extraordinary latent impressions,
43:26–43:31An unreal object appears in cognition and qualifies it.
43:31–43:35Let this possibility be admitted.
43:35–43:41There is no doubt about the causal efficacy of an unreal appearance, the doubt is how an
43:41–43:48unreal object devoid of form and characteristics can itself become a qualification of something
43:48–43:50else.
43:50–43:57The emphasis lies on the fact that blue, yellow and the like may be devoid of characteristics
43:57–44:06in their unmanifest aspect, but in their appearance as blue and yellow they must possess some characteristic.
44:06–44:12Are they called unreal merely because they do not withstand rational examination?
44:12–44:20Know that merely restates in other words that blue and yellow are unreal because irrationality
44:20–44:24and possession of characteristics cannot coexist.
44:24–44:31If the two are not opposed, it follows that blue and yellow poses some form or characteristic
44:31–44:36even though they do not withstand your examination.
44:36–44:42In that case your examination itself is defective, since it does not affect even the shadow
44:42–44:45of blue and yellow.
44:45–44:51to parts lie before you, either take refuge in the Vedantic doctrine of an indefinable
44:51–44:58appearance or emerge from the Buddhist intellectual quagmire of unreal appearance and together
44:58–45:04with the Nya Vekas, accept the reality of the external world.
45:04–45:07Brief Statement of the Conclusion
45:07–45:13For this reason, no cognitive relation is possible unless the mutual differences among
45:13–45:19knowing noble objects and their difference from cognition are admitted.
45:19–45:25If these differences are denied, the powerful Vedantic position must be accepted.
45:25–45:31Otherwise, the world must be admitted as real and irrefutable.
45:31–45:37In neither case is there any place for the Buddhist view.
45:37–45:41Explanation of the self-contradictory character of the Buddhist view.
45:41–45:48With regard to the inquiry that is held to ground the view that the world is unreal, inexplicable
45:48–45:55by rational examination, or indeterminate by proof, one may ask, what, after all, is this
45:55–45:59inquiry, and what is its nature?
45:59–46:05The answer may be that a proof supported by a negative reduction is the proper object
46:05–46:07of rational inquiry.
46:07–46:14But if the proof itself does not withstand rational examination, what uses such proof,
46:14–46:19which resembles the conjecture of an uncultivated person?
46:19–46:25A fool saw an elephant at the gate of a royal palace and began to speculate, is this darkness
46:25–46:28swallowing radishes?
46:28–46:32Or is it a cloud that thunders and showers lightning?
46:32–46:39Or is it a kinsman, since the teacher has said that one who accompanies us as far as the
46:39–46:43palace gate or the cremation ground is a kinsman?
46:43–46:48Or is it the shadow of something standing upon the earth?
46:48–46:51He then refuted his own fantasies.
46:51–46:53It is not darkness.
46:53–46:57For darkness would not slap with two winnowing basket like yours.
46:57–46:59It is not a cloud.
46:59–47:02For a cloud does not have four pillars.
47:02–47:04It is not a kinsman.
47:04–47:07For a kinsman does not swing a great club.
47:07–47:08It is not a shadow.
47:08–47:12For a shadow does not swallow hundreds of human heads.
47:12–47:15Therefore it is nothing at all.
47:15–47:22Would such conjecture and its cancellation abolish the reality of the elephant?
47:22–47:29Or should another fool, who says, what exists, exists, be regarded as more trustworthy?
47:29–47:35If the nature of the world can be determined through rational examination, the doctrines
47:35–47:42of its unreality and the like stand refuted by themselves, there is no need to await replies
47:42–47:44to them.
47:44–47:48Defense and refutation of Buddhist inquiry
47:48–47:55The Buddhist may say that a syllogism establishing irrationality may itself accord with common
47:55–48:02reason, the irrationality thereby established, would then escape the defect stated above.
48:02–48:09Yes, but the soundness of the auxiliary causal complex of the proof must likewise accord with
48:09–48:16the rules of common reason. Once those rules are broken, the resulting inquiry becomes
48:16–48:23nothing more than the arbitrary utterance of words. In general, only a sentence whose
48:23–48:32component words are connected by expectancy, semantic fitness and proximity, which is unambiguous,
48:32–48:38whose meaning is not contradicted by another means of knowledge, which is free from contradiction
48:38–48:45with the speaker's own words, actions, or cognition, and which does not necessarily entail
48:45–48:53a view opposed to its own meaning, can be an instrument of verbal knowledge. An example
48:53–49:00is, this mountain has fire. A sentence lacking these conditions is not an instrument of true
49:00–49:08verbal cognition. The following sentences fail to satisfy them. This mountain, devdatta
49:08–49:14is fair, the reservoir filled with water has fire, the mountain attained by devdatta has
49:14–49:22fire, a white wooden elephant is running, a hurry has horns, my mother is barren, I am
49:22–49:30I do not know this and the elephant entering my ear trumpets and says, prescribe a remedy for this.
49:30–49:33The purpose of a syllogism.
49:33–49:40The purpose of a syllogism or of any of its members is establishment and refutation.
49:40–49:48Establishment is accomplished by a reason possessing the five characteristics that secure the invariable
49:48–49:55comittance between reason and probandum and the presence of the reason in the subject.
49:55–50:01For example, a continuous column of smoke is rising from here is a valid reason for the
50:01–50:09probandum there is fire here. Being a reservoir is a pseudo reason for that probandum. The
50:09–50:16auxiliary of a valid reason is a negative reduction. Its nature consists in showing
50:16–50:24an undesirable consequence based on the invariable concomitance between the absence of the probandom
50:24–50:31and the absence of the reason. An undesirable consequence is of two kinds, abandonment of
50:31–50:39something validly established or acceptance of something contradicted. For example, if
50:39–50:45water did not relieve the pain of thirst, it would not be drunk if it produced burning
50:45–50:52in another body, it would produce burning in my body as well is a valid reduction.
50:52–50:58It's opposite if water did not relieve thirst, it would not be white like the sky, if it
50:58–51:04caused burning in another's body, it would produce fragrance in mine is a defective
51:04–51:12argument. A defect capable of refutation is one that does not entail a conclusion opposed
51:12–51:18to its own assertion is invariably connected with the refutation of the opposing reason
51:18–51:26and is already established. In the inference of fire on a mountain, existence is not a valid
51:26–51:33reason because it deviates from fire, therefore deviation is an appropriate defect to charge
51:33–51:41against it. A defect that does not satisfy these conditions does not refute anything.
51:41–51:48For example, the statement this smoke does not establish fire, because there is doubt
51:48–51:54concerning an utterly unknowable condition that determines its invariable concomitance,
51:54–52:01or because it possesses existence and is opposed to the presence of fire in its substrate does
52:01–52:04not refute the probandom.
52:04–52:10Perception, testimony, and the other means of knowledge also produce inquiry only as
52:10–52:17auxiliaries to inference because they operate with the aid of reductio and necessary relation.
52:17–52:22Therefore, the same explanation applies to them as well.

Plain text

Art 2. Examination of the Doctrine Denying External Reality. Introduction to the Subject of Debate. When the Vijnabdin maintains that nothing exists outside consciousness, what room remains for the existence of the self? Very well, let the Vijnavdine be asked whether his meaning is that the two components of a cognitive state, the knowable object and the knowing consciousness, are ultimately real but mutually non-different, or that both belong to one generic kind, or that the knowable component is imaginary. Statement of the defects in the Vijnavdine's inference Whatever reason is advanced to prove the probandom of the first of the three inferences necessary co-appearance, cognition hood, humanosity or anything else is plainly defective. Explanation of the defect. The admission in the preceding inference that cognitions having mutually incompatible forms such as blue and white arise gives birth to a monster that destroys those very cognitions. Further explanation of the defect. If the stated cognitions apprehend mutually incompatible objects, how can one cognition, while remaining one, be not different from many objects? If it does not apprehend them, how does it possess their forms? Self-aware cognition cannot remain unconscious of the form of its own object. Ratnakritya's answer and its refutation. It may be objected that difficulty arises only when mutually incompatible properties appear together in external objects, if, despite such appearance, external objects were regarded as non-different, the successful activities arising from them and the movements toward them would intermingle and no distinction among external objects would remain. Consciousness, however, faces no such difficulty. The existence of consciousness does not depend upon producing any successful activity but only upon luminosity. A person desiring an object does not go in search of consciousness. The activity of consciousness is nothing beyond the natural flow of self-luminous moments of consciousness. The person desiring these activities is likewise neither different from nor outside this flow. Non-difference is the ultimate and final nature of consciousness because all consciousness is self-aware. A satirical reply to the preceding answer. Dear brother, Does this mean that just as creatures that are natural enemies, such as snake and mongoose, abandon their innate hostility when they approach the hermitage of a peaceful sage, So mutually opposed objects such as blue and white abandon their natural opposition when apprehended by cognition. Or do they retain their opposition but abandon its consequence, mutual difference, refutation of the two alternatives. The first alternative is untenable. If objects whose presence and absence are respectively pervaded by the absence and presence of the other are not regarded as mutually opposed, all opposition would disappear from the world. The answer, nothing is wrong, let it be so, is improper. The opposed nature of objects cannot be abolished in this way, because mutual exclusion is the very nature of opposition. Establishing this exclusion is establishing difference itself. Therefore the second alternative cannot stand either. Objection to the refutation and the answer. It may be said that the distinct successful activities of external objects were presented as the basis of their opposition. This rule applies only to external objects, not to cognition or consciousness. Therefore cognition need not be different even when its objects differ. But this reasoning is not rational. If apparent coexistence of incompatible properties is taken as the ground for difference among objects, what benefit is gained by mentioning the individual limitation of successful activities? If none, why mention it? The individual limits of successful activities themselves remain only if the activities differ because incompatible properties visibly coexist in them. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Where is the rule that different objects cannot appear in one cognition? Different objects certainly can appear in one cognition. No, our meaning in saying that the appearances of different objects do not overlap is not this. We mean only that blue itself does not appear as yellow, and yellow itself does not appear as blue. This is the basis of all opposition. Justification of the refutation. If this were not so, knowledge and ignorance too would not remain mutually opposed. For example, that which is said to be not known is known, since we can say, this known horse and so forth is not known, ignorance would thereby become manifest. Do knowledge and ignorance not appear respectively in the forms of ignorance and knowledge? Yes, but when distinct objects such as blue and yellow are cognized together, is blue cognized as yellow in that cognition, so that opposition among the objects would disappear. Therefore, opposition at the level of objects and opposition at the level of cognition should be regarded as alike, and each should be understood as possessing an equal capacity to remove identity with its own object. To regard one as superior to the other is mere partiality, like the well-known proverb about the beggar and the housewife. Refutation of an earlier view. The foregoing refutation also disposes of the Buddhist's earlier assertion that there is no differentiation within cognition. The cognition of distinct forms as distinct forms is precisely the differentiation of cognition. Another refutation of the objection. If all externally real things are momentary, then by the time a person who cognizes to external objects such as blue and yellow together tries to know their mutual difference, both will already have perished. How then can that same person know the objects and their difference successively? There is no certainty that another person cognizes this difference, and if there is doubt about the cognition of difference, there will be doubt about the difference itself as well. But if neither an object nor its cognition can be known by anything different from it, how can doubt arise? The Buddhist seeks to establish the identity of the noble and cognition on the ground that no distinction is apprehended within cognition. If that very non-distinction is in turn established on the ground of their identity, the fault of circularity follows. Therefore, presenting identity as the reason is pointless. of the objection that pure cognition is undifferentiated. Then cognition's uniform luminosity may remove its multiplicity or differentiation, while the manifest coexistence within it of incompatible properties may remove its unity. But what effect can these negations have upon the purely luminous nature of the cognition of blue, yellow, and the like, which is supposedly devoid of both unity and multiplicity? None. This reply resembles the weeding of a field by barbarians. When told to remove the weeds, they uprooted the crop as well. To be one means to possess a determinate form, while to be many means to possess indeterminate or mutually distinct forms. If cognition has neither unity nor multiplicity, it can assume neither the form of blue nor the combined forms of blue and yellow. Consequently, no form whatever remains in it. Refutation of the objection that the appearance of incompatible properties in cognition is illusory. The argument for the non-differentiation of cognition would then be this, only the The real coexistence of incompatible properties appearing in something determines its differentiation, whereas here their appearance is merely illusory. Very well. If so, it has been established by your own admission that cognition is pure and formless like crystal, and that the distinct forms appearing in it are not its own. Therefore, whether those forms are real or unreal, the inference of identity between cognition and its object from their Coappearance is initiated by the defect of an example lacking the Probandom. Objection that difference is unreal and reply is not the mere unreal difference that appears in conceptual cognition but not in non-conceptual cognition sufficient for the practical usage of difference? No. Such difference cannot remain immune from the objections concerning its reality or unreality and its appearance or non-appearance in cognition. Defense of the objection and its refutation. Is it only a non-existent or unreal and unknown difference that is apprehended? Yes, but the meaning of the word apprehension must be clarified. Does it mean being the cause of practical activity concerning the apprehended object? No. If practical activity is something different from cognition, then being itself unreal because it is different from cognition, how can it generate a distinction? If practical activity is cognition itself, why should its cognitive relation, without any regulator, be fixed upon one particular object rather than another? Is the relation of distinct practical activities to distinct differences determined by the causal capacities of those activities? No. This is a Buddhist oddity. They are prepared to maintain that practical activity is a kind of cognition, that its object is an unreal difference and that, even in the absence of any other regulator, the capacities of the causes of practical activity determine their relation, yet they are unwilling to admit a cognitive relation between non-conceptual cognition and its real object. This resembles a man afflicted with a digestive disorder who abandons pure milk and longs for rice water. Objection to the refutation Are the differences among external objects not themselves non-different from the form of the cognition that apprehends them, just as the external objects themselves are held to be cognitive in nature? If difference is definitely unreal, how can it be the form of a real cognition? And if difference is non-different from the form of cognition, how can it be unreal? Let the Buddhist attend to this dilemma. Suppose difference is real. If cognition does not apprehend the substrate and the counter-positive of the difference, how can the difference be known? And if it apprehends both along with the difference, how can a single cognition be non-different from all of them? Should cognition be regarded as having a variegated form? No. The very consideration of the alternatives, whether the variegated form is one or many eliminates this possibility. If the forms are many, how can they be non-different from one cognition? If cognition to becomes many in accordance with the differences among the form, what, after all, is the defect in an object different from cognition being known by cognition? There is none. But on this view the knowable, knower relation between two different things, object and cognition cannot be determined by a process initiated by either one, because no such regular process exists. Nor can the relation be determined by generic similarity, otherwise the cognitive relation would not remain confined to a particular object, and any object could become the object of any cognition. A known cow possessing cowness does not become a non-cow in relation to some other thing. If so, the same defect also applies to the view that cognition and its object are identical. The usage cognition knows itself cannot be grounded in a process since an action of a thing upon itself is impossible. Nor can it be grounded in generic similarity otherwise cognition would take all things as its object. No rule has been observed according to which a cow is generically a cow only in relation to itself and not in relation to other things. Nor does cognitions being self-revealing make it revealing of other cognitions, otherwise every cognition would take every other cognition as its object. Objection to the reply and rejoinder. Should we, on the basis of the object's illuminated nature, merely deny the difference between cognition and its object without affirming their identity? No. The negation of difference is itself the positive affirmation of identity. Objection that variegated cognition is neither different nor non-different and reply. Then let variegated cognition be devoid of both difference and non-difference. If its form is different from cognition, cognition cannot illuminate it. If it is non-different, then, because cognition is one, its form too will be one, there will then be no variegation in a cognition that apprehends blue, yellow, and the like together. This position is untenable. Just as the simultaneous affirmation of mutually opposed properties in a single substrate is incoherent, so too is their simultaneous negation. If it is said, let us accept even this negation, the Buddhist will have to follow in the footsteps of the Jant teacher by accepting every undesirable possibility, becoming shameless like a Dighambara adherent. Refutation of the objection that variegatedness transcends all determination. Then variegated cognition would be devoid of all four mutually opposed properties, difference, identity, absence of difference and absence of identity. The variegated is indeed a wondrous entity, cognition is real although neither one nor many. Let us take this miracle to be the meaning of the word variegated. Very well if so, why not regard cognition as possessing all four properties? The ground for calling cognition miraculous is equal on both views. Moreover, the impossibility of each one of the four predications necessarily entails the opposite predication because the negation of an impossible predication is the affirmation of its contrary. Another refutation of the objection. If cognition is truly devoid of all four properties, that is merely another way of saying that these properties, though different from cognition, are either known or unknown. It is incorrect to call them unknown, for they are being known through these very words. If they are admitted to be known, they are known without possessing the defining property of nobility identity with cognition. One must then regard a single cognition as many, and a curious kind of non-dualism will result. But two strange assumptions are already present here, that an object lacking the defining mark of nobility is nevertheless known, and that its cognition is neither one nor many. It is therefore more rational to accept a duality of strange entities. On this admission, both the cognition of many distinct objects and the unity of that cognition are preserved. Examination of the view that an object is non-different from cognition because it is illuminated. The argument for identity would then be this. We admit that neither the internal agent in the form of cognition nor the external The object fulfills the definition of nobility, nevertheless, the illumination of blue, yellow, and the light cannot be denied, and this alone is what we assert. No. This view resembles an attempt to save a cow that has already been sold. What, after all, is this illumination that remains wholly unimpaired in the object even though the object does not satisfy the definition of norability. It is not a relation to illuminating cognition, for the Buddhists themselves have explained that a mere relation, in the absence of any process initiated by cognition or illumination, cannot determine which cognition knows which object. Nor is it identity with illumination, for then variegated cognition would become many by being identical with its several objects. Therefore, one who wishes to preserve the illumination of objects must explain their nobility or else deny their illumination. Otherwise, the Buddhist especially Jhana, who preserves the illumination of internal and external objects even though they utterly fail to satisfy the definition of nobility resembles a man who, holding a piece of gold in his hand, tries to tie a knot in the sky in order to keep it safe. Refutation of the second alternative stated at the beginning. The foregoing denial of the nobility of an external object also refutes the second of the initial alternatives. Nearly admitting generic similarity between an object and cognition does not satisfy the definition of nobility, because the undesirable consequence remains that, if cognition and object are generically similar, any object may become the object of any cognition. The cognition of a pot is generically similar to a tree as well. But if the external object is inert, How can it be illuminated or conscious? If it is illuminated, it must be admitted to be generically similar to cognition. This difficulty is the same for both the inert and the conscious. According to philosophers who do not regard cognition as self-aware, cognition illuminates another thing but not itself. According to those who accept self-aware cognition, Cognition illuminates itself but is inert with respect to another thing and therefore cannot know it. If one cognition can somehow know another cognition as well, it can also know an external object, the reason in the inference would then extend to the counter example and become inconclusive through deviation. Defense of Generic similarity between the object and cognition. If an external object is regarded as dissimilar to its cognition, does it never satisfy the definition of nobility, whereas if generic similarity is admitted their material cause will regularly be the same, so that cognitions having the forms of blue, yellow, and so forth, though mutually distinct, may be established as knowing one another as well as themselves. No. In order to explain the mutual cognition of distinct forms, one must regard either the common material cause as a specific regulator or the capacity of the causal complex as a general regulator, otherwise the cognition of a pot would not remain confined to the pot but could also take a tree as its object. Once such a regulator must be admitted, But very regulator can just as easily explain why cognition is confined to a particular object that is dissimilar to and different from itself. Therefore, the defect previously pointed out reappears in the reason. Consideration of the third initial alternative. Then let the third alternative, that the known object is unreal, be accepted as correct. It is impossible to define the knowable as either different from or non-different from cognition and if the knowable cannot be defined, one cannot even rely upon the capacity of the causal complex to determine the cognitive relation. Inquiry into causes is meaningful only in the case of entities rationally established, not in the case of irrational entities. Very well, then we ask, does the impossibility of formulating a definition of nobility abolished the nobility of the external object or its reality itself? Refutation of the first alternative above. The first alternative is unacceptable. The existence of an object manifestly perceived cannot be denied merely because its definition has not been settled. The uncertainty of a definition may also arise from the complexity or subtlety of what is to be defined. If knowable external objects were not actually known, it would be rational to deny knowledge of them, but they are clearly known. Refutation of the second alternative The second alternative is also unacceptable. The impossibility of defining the knowable would establish its unreality only if the impossibility of definition were invariably connected with unreality itself. But if definition is impossible whether the knowable is real or unreal, why are you especially attached to unreality? If it is said that unreality itself is the definition of the knowable, we ask, why not reality? If reality is a defective definition, so is unreality. Formulation and refutation of another definition of nobility. Let the definition of nobility then be being the object of practical activity produced by cognition. Very well, let us accept this. But how is it determined that one particular practical activity is produced by one particular cognition and not by another. If it is held that a particular causal complex produces only a particular cognition and no other cognition, this is possible in the case of a real object, not an unreal one. This is the distinctive character of practical activity. When a real object is known, desire arises, desire produces effort, effort produces action, and action leads to the attainment of the real object. An unreal object cannot be attained, and therefore no such sequence occurs in relation to it. If it is attained, it is not unreal. If practical activity itself is false, the definition of nobility collapses, because the very practical activity upon which the definition is based is unreal. The extreme proposal and its refutation. Let the world then be regarded as wholly inconceivable, because it is noable as neither different from nor identical with cognition. Well, does this mean the denial of all true knowledge concerning the world, or does it lead to nihilism? The first alternative is impossible. Does all inquiry yield only the conclusion that nothing beyond ordinary experience is real? No. Even without inquiry every person readily accepts conclusions of this kind, the uneducated to possess such a notion. More can inquiry be expected merely to turn one away from actions such as sacrifice and killing which are held respectively to produce the imaginary fruits of heaven and hell. If inquiry turns one away from heaven and hell, then by generating the conviction that everything is false or irrational, it can also turn one away from the desired goals of this life. Otherworldly and worldly goals stand on the same footing. Are worldly goals observed, whereas otherworldly goals are not? If observed means known, both are equally knowable. If it means perceived by the senses, then no one in this world could act toward anything known by inference or another non perceptual means. Are the imperceptible but known things of this world perceived earlier or later? Yes, and so are otherworldly things. Otherworldly and worldly pleasures and pains are alike in nature and are therefore equally capable of being perceived. Is there a natural indifference in people's minds towards supernatural pleasures? This does not establish the necessity of inquiry, even without inquiry people may naturally be disinclined toward other worldly things. Nor is it the case that inquiry merely intensifies this disinclination, for it can also produce aversion toward worldly activities. Conclusion of the discussion The Buddhist strategy of debate resembles the well-known inference of a young monkey. Hearing of the prowess of Hanumna, son of the wind, it was fired by rivalry and made a mighty leap to cross the ocean. After jumping some distance it fell into the sea and declared, this ocean is surely boundless, no one can cross it, the tail in the Ramya must be false. The Buddhist assertion above is equally pointless. The conclusion that the world is inconceivable because it cannot be known or defined is something an ordinary person knows without inquiry, therefore an inquiry that yields such a conclusion is futile. Is it not proper to undertake inquiry even if it bears no fruit? No. It is possible that the inquiry has reached such a conclusion only because of the Buddhist's lack of skill. A person blind from birth cannot see or define a blue object, but ordinary people do not on that account regard blue objects as unknowable or indefinable. Examination and refutation of the second alternative above. Would emptiness then be the state of supreme peace and bliss? No. If emptiness has not been established, how can it be said that the world has dissolved into emptiness? It is easy to make such an irresponsible assertion on any occasion. If emptiness is established by a proof different from itself, that proof too must be admitted as real, and the definition of nobility must necessarily be satisfied in its case. If this other proof is not different from intellect or cognition, there will be no difference between the world and emptiness, since both are objects of cognition. How, then, can there be emptiness while the world remains unafuted? How can the proof be different from cognition, if it requires a proof different from itself in order to establish itself, an infinite regress follows. An unestablished proof cannot establish emptiness. If you regard the emptiness of the world as self-established or self-luminous, you have arrived upon the path of Vednita. Exposition of the Vedantic view. The Vedintin now presents his own view, to which the Buddhist position appears close. The ultimate reality, being self-established, is of the nature of experience. Because the world is unreal and empty, reality is not delimited by any temporal boundary and is therefore eternal. For the same reason it is unrestricted by spatial boundaries and is therefore all-pervasive. Again, for the same reason it is devoid of every characteristic and hence cannot be apprehended by thought. All thought operates through the relation of qualifier and qualified, whereas ultimate reality transcends that relation. For the same reason there is no difference within it, and it therefore transcends all difference or duality. Because the world is wholly unreal, duality is impossible. Since nothing different from it exists, it has no counter-positive, and is therefore positive in nature. Nevertheless, in contrast to the irrationally supposed reality of the world, it is sometimes called emptiness. What relation, then, thus pure experience, understood as the exclusion of the world, bear to the world if the relation of knower and known is not admitted. Surely the world is not unknowable. The reply is that in reality there is no relation, but through error a known known relation appears between them, resembling the relation of substrate and dependent. The Nayikas to admit such a relation between space and the ground of the celestial world. The only difference in Vednata is that the relation qualifies the knowable alone. Ignorance itself is illusorily transformed into the various objects that serve as the objects of distinct practical dealings. Experience to appears manifold because it It is qualified by different limiting agents superimposed by ignorance. This manifold appearance resembles the division of one all-pervasive space into many parts by a pot, a hollow in a tree, a heart, and the countless objects experienced in a dream. But let this web of words end here, the seller of ginger has no need to worry about the boat. Statement of the logical conclusion. For the reasons already stated, setting aside the Vedantic discussion of emptiness, the reality of both conceptual and non-conceptual experience must be admitted. Consequently, the acceptance of an object distinct from experience is unavoidable. Once the object is established, there must be some definition or determinant of object If the external object is not denied and its cognition is regarded as impermanent, the determinant may be regarded as a property of cognition or as a property common to cognition and the external object. If external reality is denied, the determinant will be a property of cognition alone. If cognition is regarded as eternally real, as in Vednata, the determinant must be held to be a property of the noble object alone. What is to be defined here is the cognitive relation. This relation is an intrinsic nature of a real cognition, the property of being a cognition of a particular object. object. Because it is a natural property of cognition, it requires no cause beyond the causes of cognition itself. And because its nature consists in being related to one particular object, it does not establish a relation with any other object. Defense of the Nya, Vaika account of the cognitive relation. The question may be asked, what is the effect of this cognitive relation? The answer is outwardly, it initiates practical activity concerning the relation between cognition and its object, inwardly, it manifests cognition. If it is further asked why cognition is such as to induce practical activity, the answer is that the causal complex producing cognition has the capacity to confer such causal efficacy upon it. This answer is analogous to the answer given when one asks about the casualty of a cause with respect to its effect. If this answer is wrong and a cause is held to produce some additional assistance in In the effect, that assistance, being itself an effect, would require a second assistance within it, and that a third, yielding an infinite series of assistances. If an assistance produced by the cause is not required for the effect, why does any cause not produce any effect whatsoever? The answer is that a particular cause produces only a particular effect. in the same way that a cognition knows only a particular object. What is the meaning of knowing or making something an object? Then the meaning of producing must likewise be clarified. Production is bringing an effect into existence. Very well, in that case, the arising of cognition as a cognition of a particular object is precisely its knowing that object. Likewise, with respect to the assistance supposedly produced in an effect, as in the case of cognition, there is no assistance over and above the arising of the effect itself. Objection to the defense and its refutation. If the cause-effect relation to is suspended because of the foregoing objections, that would be extreme rashness. Things would then be either eternal or wholly non-existent. If the cognitive relation is also removed, either cognition will exist continuously or there will be no cognition at all, one of these two will become the ultimate reality. Can the causal relation not be merely conceptual? Then the cognitive relation may likewise be conceptual. If there is a powerful proof against the reality of the knowable object and the effect, let both relations be regarded as conceptual, otherwise let both be real. These are the only two alternatives. Refutation of the skya and related views concerning the substrate of the cognitive relation. The true situation is this. In the Buddhist view, the cognitive relation cannot qualify both cognition and its object. Permanent, whether real or unreal, objects also appear in cognition if the relation were a property of both, cognition too would have to be regarded as permanent. Therefore, it is proper to regard cognition alone as the substrate of the relation. But if cognition, as a modification of the intellect, is held to be eternal while its object is mutable, then according to the SCIA view the object cannot be the substrate of the relation, since the SCIA system has already been rationally refuted. Discussion of this matter is impossible unless the disappearance of the earlier object and the appearance of the later object are admitted, and that is opposed to the skya view. Momentary cognition too cannot be the substrate of the relation if the knowable object is unreal, for no relation can be established with the unreal, and if cognition has no form of its own for it to apprehend. Noor can blue, yellow, and the like be held to be superimposed upon cognition, because, being unreal, they are not available even for superimposition. Objection to the refutation and reply. Do unreal, externally imagined objects such as blue and yellow themselves appear as qualifying cognition? No. What does unreal mean, absent at the time and place of cognition, utterly devoid of every characteristic or merely of the nature of a particular exclusion. Under the first alternative, although the object is unreal, space and time would have to be admitted as real. Under the second, an unreal object being devoid of characteristics cannot qualify cognition. Under the third, if unreal glue is the exclusion of the non-blue, the non-blue Blue will be real. If the non blue is unreal, its excluder, blue, will be real. If both blue and non blue are unreal, neither can qualify any cognition. Objection to the reply and rejoinder. Do blue and the light not qualify cognition precisely in their unreal form? Very well, then in what other form do they qualify it? In the forms of blue, yellow, and the like. If so, these forms are different from unreal blue and yellow, being different, they will be real. If they are not different, they too cannot qualify cognition. Objection to the rejoinder and reply. An objection may be raised, impelled by certain extraordinary latent impressions, An unreal object appears in cognition and qualifies it. Let this possibility be admitted. There is no doubt about the causal efficacy of an unreal appearance, the doubt is how an unreal object devoid of form and characteristics can itself become a qualification of something else. The emphasis lies on the fact that blue, yellow and the like may be devoid of characteristics in their unmanifest aspect, but in their appearance as blue and yellow they must possess some characteristic. Are they called unreal merely because they do not withstand rational examination? Know that merely restates in other words that blue and yellow are unreal because irrationality and possession of characteristics cannot coexist. If the two are not opposed, it follows that blue and yellow poses some form or characteristic even though they do not withstand your examination. In that case your examination itself is defective, since it does not affect even the shadow of blue and yellow. to parts lie before you, either take refuge in the Vedantic doctrine of an indefinable appearance or emerge from the Buddhist intellectual quagmire of unreal appearance and together with the Nya Vekas, accept the reality of the external world. Brief Statement of the Conclusion For this reason, no cognitive relation is possible unless the mutual differences among knowing noble objects and their difference from cognition are admitted. If these differences are denied, the powerful Vedantic position must be accepted. Otherwise, the world must be admitted as real and irrefutable. In neither case is there any place for the Buddhist view. Explanation of the self-contradictory character of the Buddhist view. With regard to the inquiry that is held to ground the view that the world is unreal, inexplicable by rational examination, or indeterminate by proof, one may ask, what, after all, is this inquiry, and what is its nature? The answer may be that a proof supported by a negative reduction is the proper object of rational inquiry. But if the proof itself does not withstand rational examination, what uses such proof, which resembles the conjecture of an uncultivated person? A fool saw an elephant at the gate of a royal palace and began to speculate, is this darkness swallowing radishes? Or is it a cloud that thunders and showers lightning? Or is it a kinsman, since the teacher has said that one who accompanies us as far as the palace gate or the cremation ground is a kinsman? Or is it the shadow of something standing upon the earth? He then refuted his own fantasies. It is not darkness. For darkness would not slap with two winnowing basket like yours. It is not a cloud. For a cloud does not have four pillars. It is not a kinsman. For a kinsman does not swing a great club. It is not a shadow. For a shadow does not swallow hundreds of human heads. Therefore it is nothing at all. Would such conjecture and its cancellation abolish the reality of the elephant? Or should another fool, who says, what exists, exists, be regarded as more trustworthy? If the nature of the world can be determined through rational examination, the doctrines of its unreality and the like stand refuted by themselves, there is no need to await replies to them. Defense and refutation of Buddhist inquiry The Buddhist may say that a syllogism establishing irrationality may itself accord with common reason, the irrationality thereby established, would then escape the defect stated above. Yes, but the soundness of the auxiliary causal complex of the proof must likewise accord with the rules of common reason. Once those rules are broken, the resulting inquiry becomes nothing more than the arbitrary utterance of words. In general, only a sentence whose component words are connected by expectancy, semantic fitness and proximity, which is unambiguous, whose meaning is not contradicted by another means of knowledge, which is free from contradiction with the speaker's own words, actions, or cognition, and which does not necessarily entail a view opposed to its own meaning, can be an instrument of verbal knowledge. An example is, this mountain has fire. A sentence lacking these conditions is not an instrument of true verbal cognition. The following sentences fail to satisfy them. This mountain, devdatta is fair, the reservoir filled with water has fire, the mountain attained by devdatta has fire, a white wooden elephant is running, a hurry has horns, my mother is barren, I am I do not know this and the elephant entering my ear trumpets and says, prescribe a remedy for this. The purpose of a syllogism. The purpose of a syllogism or of any of its members is establishment and refutation. Establishment is accomplished by a reason possessing the five characteristics that secure the invariable comittance between reason and probandum and the presence of the reason in the subject. For example, a continuous column of smoke is rising from here is a valid reason for the probandum there is fire here. Being a reservoir is a pseudo reason for that probandum. The auxiliary of a valid reason is a negative reduction. Its nature consists in showing an undesirable consequence based on the invariable concomitance between the absence of the probandom and the absence of the reason. An undesirable consequence is of two kinds, abandonment of something validly established or acceptance of something contradicted. For example, if water did not relieve the pain of thirst, it would not be drunk if it produced burning in another body, it would produce burning in my body as well is a valid reduction. It's opposite if water did not relieve thirst, it would not be white like the sky, if it caused burning in another's body, it would produce fragrance in mine is a defective argument. A defect capable of refutation is one that does not entail a conclusion opposed to its own assertion is invariably connected with the refutation of the opposing reason and is already established. In the inference of fire on a mountain, existence is not a valid reason because it deviates from fire, therefore deviation is an appropriate defect to charge against it. A defect that does not satisfy these conditions does not refute anything. For example, the statement this smoke does not establish fire, because there is doubt concerning an utterly unknowable condition that determines its invariable concomitance, or because it possesses existence and is opposed to the presence of fire in its substrate does not refute the probandom. Perception, testimony, and the other means of knowledge also produce inquiry only as auxiliaries to inference because they operate with the aid of reductio and necessary relation. Therefore, the same explanation applies to them as well.

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