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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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Detected language: en (0.965154)
Duration: 56:36
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:08रेविताषन अपजेक्षन्ज अग्धन्झ अटम्स.
0:08–0:12दूस, मेर्र्ली भाई अस्टबलिष्छिंग दाध वान आटम् can be
0:12–0:19conjoint with many other atoms, all objections based on the alleged impossibility of one
0:19–0:25atom being conjoint with six atoms situated in the six directions, the necessity
0:25–0:32of assigning different places to atoms, the casting of shadows upon atoms and so forth
0:32–0:40are refuted. Continuation of the refutation. The other reasons offered to establish the
0:40–0:47non-atomicity of atoms are refuted by whichever proof establishes either the reality or the
0:47–0:55non-establishment of atoms. Another minor objection and its refutation. It is wholly impossible
0:55–1:00for space to enter the interior of an atom.
1:00–1:04General refutation of all the foregoing objections.
1:04–1:12The two terms occurring in the subject statements of all these inferences are mutually contradictory.
1:12–1:19For example, in the subject statement the atom possesses parts, the word atom itself
1:19–1:21means a partless entity.
1:21–1:28Moreover, since the probandom is absent from the subject, the inference also suffers from
1:28–1:32the defect of a subject devoid of the probandom.
1:32–1:38Reduxio arguments such as if an atom were partless, it would have no determinate size
1:38–1:45and could not be conjoint with six distinct atoms are wish-eated by an unestablished
1:45–1:52subject and an unestablished concomitance because if atoms do not exist there can be no example
1:52–1:59exhibiting the concomitance. Further, the undesirable consequence of an infinite series
1:59–2:06of subordinate parts arises against the divisibility of atoms. Along with it comes the
2:06–2:13contrary consequence that if atoms were not partless, a minute whole composed of three
2:13–2:20atoms would become immeasurably vast. Both points support the partlessness of atoms.
2:21–2:28Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Let atoms then be regarded as destructible.
2:29–2:38No. No proof establishes their destructibility. Every reason offered to establish that atoms
2:38–2:44possess parts generates the defect of an infinite series of parts.
2:44–2:50Thus the atom is a curious entity, like the demon named Raktaabja, who tears open the
2:50–2:57belly of the demoness of logic and emerges again in the form of an atom.
2:57–3:03The point is that the reasons offered to refute atoms ultimately establish those very
3:03–3:05atoms.
3:05–3:12of the first objection and its refutation. Can a reduction not proceed on the basis of
3:12–3:21an imagined subject and an imagined concomitance? No. If affirmation, negation and the like
3:21–3:28are based only on imagined notions, the very meaning of real affirmation and negation
3:28–3:34disappears. And if customary practice is to be followed in this matter, the original
3:34–3:41statement that a whole cannot inherit in its parts, being opposed to ordinary practice,
3:41–3:49cannot be accepted at all. This point has already been clarified repeatedly.
3:49–3:56Continuation of the refutation. Otherwise, that is, if even non-standard and defective
3:56–4:02arguments are regarded as acceptable, all the foregoing arguments against atoms will
4:02–4:09apply to cognition as well. Cognition too may be established as possessing parts on the
4:09–4:17ground that it can be related to 6 objects at once. But how will cognition's conjunction,
4:17–4:25determinate size, and so forth be established? By inference alone. For example, cognition
4:25–4:32is simultaneously conjoined with 6 objects and possesses a determinate size because
4:32–4:37Because it is real and is treated in practice like the objects known by it.
4:37–4:43But will this inference not be groundless, since the proof establishing the reality of
4:43–4:47cognition establishes the opposite conclusion?
4:47–4:53Very well, if the inference is abandoned on that ground, the same consideration must
4:53–4:56be given priority in the case of atoms.
4:56–5:02The related questions should be resolved in the same way.
5:02–5:07Another disputant, the Madhyamika, closes his eyes to escape danger and says,
5:07–5:10then consciousness too must disappear.
5:10–5:17When even the mention of reason, probandom, subject, and the rest has been abandoned,
5:17–5:20what can be said about this assertion?
5:20–5:24Can there not be an illusory mention of them?
5:24–5:29There can, provided at least the full reality of illusions,
5:29–5:35at least the full reality of illusion or illusory cognition is accepted.
5:35–5:46Otherwise, just as there will be neither a real object nor an illusory object, illusion itself may be illusory regarded as real.
5:46–5:55Yes, but if this second illusion is also unreal, nothing new has been stated by the foregoing assertion.
5:55–6:03And if the second illusion is admitted as holy real, it is itself consciousness whose reality
6:03–6:06cannot be denied.
6:06–6:12Can this illusory cognition be real, sublated, and therefore only illusorily real?
6:12–6:14No.
6:14–6:18If it is definitely real, what could sublate it?
6:18–6:24And if it is sublated, how can the object it apprehends be real?
6:24–6:27Refutation of the Madhyamaka view.
6:27–6:34Experience establishes that whatever is not clearly sublated is regarded as real.
6:34–6:40It must therefore be admitted that what is accompanied by the property of reality, or
6:40–6:44what is real, cannot be sublated.
6:44–6:53Why then, should the reality of what is accompanied by sublation, or what is sublated, not be denied?
6:53–6:59If that can be done, the reality of sublation itself can also be denied.
6:59–7:05Very well, let both reality and sublation be regarded as unavoidable.
7:05–7:12Yes, that is precisely the fact, what must be denied is their coexistence, which would
7:12–7:20generate contradiction. The coexistence of mutually opposed things, or the mutual opposition
7:20–7:26of things that coexist, can be maintained only within one's private doctrine, in debate
7:26–7:33it is improper merely to assert one's private belief. Consequently, the more the Buddhists
7:33–7:40try to extinguish consciousness, the brighter its light becomes. Even the negation of consciousness
7:40–7:48must be known. Thus the Buddhist is trying to create darkness by extinguishing one lamp
7:48–7:51with another lamp.
7:51–7:57Refutation of another objection. This answer also refutes the assertion that nothing is
7:57–8:04real because the cause-effect relation cannot be established. Whether the Buddhist attempt
8:04–8:12to refute the cause, effect relation succeeds or fails, that relation cannot be denied.
8:12–8:18If the attempt succeeds, a cause, effect relation between the attempt and the established conclusion
8:18–8:24must be accepted, if it fails, the relation remains unsublated.
8:24–8:30If, by denying the relation, the Buddhist wishes to refute the doctrine that the effect
8:30–8:37already exists in the cause, that is acceptable. But if he wishes to refute the doctrine that
8:37–8:43an effect is newly produced, the view is unacceptable because it contradicts perception.
8:44–8:50Moreover, if the assertion that points out a defect in the doctrine of newly
8:50–8:58arisen effects already exists, there is no need to produce it again. If it did not already exist,
8:58–9:02The Buddhist's utterance produces it anew.
9:02–9:10Consequently, the reason in the inference whatever is unreal is not produced is shown to be deviant.
9:10–9:14Objection to the refutation and its refutation.
9:14–9:17Let the objection then be this.
9:17–9:23Although all the foregoing criticisms of the whole have proved fruitless,
9:23–9:28non-cognition of the whole may still constitute a powerful objection.
9:28–9:37In the place where a hole is supposed to exist, I perceive no entity different from the collection of atoms.
9:37–9:43But this is merely the resentful outcry of one who has been defeated.
9:43–9:49The reality of gross holes is a matter of universal experience.
9:49–9:54Refutation of the objection that cognition of grossness is false.
9:54–10:02Can it not be said that the cognition, the whole is one object is conceptual and therefore false?
10:02–10:03No.
10:03–10:09This cognition apprehends its object with extreme clarity.
10:09–10:15Should it be said that the clarity of this cognition depends only upon a condition?
10:15–10:16No.
10:16–10:23If a non-conceptual cognition having the same object is the basis of this conceptual cognition
10:23–10:28and the clarity of the first cognition is superimposed upon the second,
10:28–10:32the truth of the conceptual cognition is established by itself.
10:33–10:39If a non-conceptual cognition having a different object is regarded as its basis,
10:39–10:46the clarity of non-conceptual cognition of blue, yellow, and the light must likewise be regarded
10:46–10:51as conditional, with the result that no cognition remains wholly clear.
10:51–11:00Only that which is apprehended in both non-conceptual and conceptual cognition can be regarded as
11:00–11:03the object of veridical perception.
11:03–11:10If the object of conceptual cognition is not real, the object of non-conceptual cognition
11:10–11:13too will cease to be real.
11:13–11:19Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation can atoms themselves not
11:19–11:20be gross.
11:20–11:24No, then they would cease to be atoms.
11:24–11:27Can a collection of atoms be gross?
11:27–11:29No.
11:29–11:35The Buddhist does not admit a unitary aggregate entity based upon the collected things.
11:35–11:42If such an entity is accepted, what defect is there in accepting a whole?
11:42–11:48Can atoms in their collected state themselves appear as a gross object?
11:48–11:53No, because none of them individually is gross.
11:53–11:57Does grossness mean occupying different places?
11:57–12:03No, a single atom does not occupy even one place with extension.
12:03–12:12Can many atoms appearing densely as one and occupying many places be regarded as gross on that account?
12:12–12:18No, a gross object is always experienced as one.
12:18–12:24Another defense of cognition of unity among atoms and its refutation.
12:24–12:34Can cognition of the unity of a gross object not be explained by the superimposition of unity upon the atoms constituting its parts?
12:34–12:41That is, if its several parts each appear as one, the whole two will appear as one.
12:41–12:44No, this is impossible.
12:44–12:55No one superimposes unity upon the countless atoms constituting the different limbs of the body, the hands, feet, chin, nose, and so forth.
12:56–13:04Although these limbs appear mutually distinct, cognition of the unity of the entire body is not absent.
13:04–13:12Conversely, unity may be superimposed upon the parts even while they continue to appear distinct.
13:12–13:15Continuation of the refutation.
13:15–13:19Moreover, if there is in reality no single hole,
13:19–13:32one must hold that the millions of atoms constituting the hole or its parts appear as one only because the unity of a single atom is superimposed upon them.
13:32–13:40In that case the object of superimposition would appear only as atoms, not as a gross object.
13:40–13:48Can the appearance of grossness be explained by the inference that the atoms are spread over many places?
13:48–13:53No. This explanation is self-contradictory.
13:53–14:00If atoms spread over different places are known in the form of those distinct places,
14:00–14:06neither unity nor residence in many places can be superimposed upon them.
14:06–14:11If the entities situated in different places are not known,
14:11–14:16what object will there be that occupies those distinct places?
14:16–14:23And if both unity and residence in distinct places are superimposed upon the atoms,
14:23–14:28no other object remains to occupy those different places.
14:28–14:33Here the atoms would appear neither as many nor as places,
14:33–14:37and no occupant of the places would be known.
14:37–14:40Therefore, if unity is superimposed,
14:40–14:44only the atoms will be known, not their grossness.
14:44–14:48A brief question and its answer.
14:48–14:52If this is so, how can the ordinary cognition of grossness
14:52–14:59and unity in a collection of objects from which no single whole has horizon be explained?
14:59–15:16The answer is that the nature of a substance occupying a space equal to the dimensions of the collection is superimposed upon that collection because such a substance occupies a spatial extent equal to that of the collection.
15:16–15:26But this is impossible on your view because veridical cognition of the grossness to be superimposed is available nowhere else.
15:26–15:31Are non-existent unity and grossness themselves known here?
15:31–15:32No.
15:32–15:39All the arguments against unity and grossness have already been refuted.
15:39–15:43Indirect refutation of a possible contrary view.
15:43–15:56The foregoing refutation of the arguments against the whole also refutes the view that the grossness appearing in an object is only the object of conceptual cognition and is therefore unreal.
15:56–16:05such grossness must be one of three kinds, an utterly unreal entity, an imagination constructed
16:05–16:12by cognition or a real thing. Refutation of the claim that invisible atoms cannot become
16:12–16:20perceptible. When every atom is invisible, how can their collection be visible? A mere
16:20–16:26aggregation of invisible things does not make them visible.
16:26–16:32Should it be said that the object produced at each moment from invisible atoms and destroyed
16:32–16:38the next moment is of a special kind and is therefore apprehensible by the senses?
16:38–16:40No.
16:40–16:46You might as well suppose that in a dream you are stretching out your hand and begging,
16:46–16:51the doctrine of momentariness has already been refuted.
16:51–16:54Continuation of the refutation.
16:54–16:58Or let momentary causation be accepted.
16:58–17:04Even so, we have already rejected the reality of the special property called immediate
17:04–17:11efficacy in momentary things, because accepting such a property produces the defect of universal's
17:11–17:14overlapping one another.
17:14–17:27Therefore, if atom poses no such special property, there will be no determination of which atoms possessing the common property of atomhood are invisible and which visible.
17:28–17:34Upon rational examination no difference can be determined among the atoms.
17:34–17:40Further development of the refutation that grossness determines perceptibility.
17:40–17:43Suppose that special property exists.
17:44–17:51Even then, the property determining perceptibility by the senses must be grossness alone.
17:51–18:00Otherwise, an atom that is not gross but possesses the special property of immediate efficacy would become visible.
18:00–18:09The necessary visibility of whatever is distinct from the non-grows establishes only the visibility of the gross.
18:09–18:18Here the cause-effect relation is known from the positive and negative concomitance between grossness and visibility.
18:18–18:23Nor is grossness present in a collection of atoms.
18:23–18:26Objection to the foregoing refutation.
18:26–18:32Can multiplicity itself not be grossness and its absence-minuteness?
18:32–18:33No.
18:33–18:41On that view, many atoms scattered over a vast tract of land would also become visible.
18:41–18:47If it is further required for grossness that there be no interval between two atoms,
18:47–18:51even this condition will not be fulfilled in the present case,
18:51–18:54because according to the Buddhist view,
18:54–19:02atoms of qualities such as taste intervene among the atoms of color in the constitution of an object.
19:02–19:07Nor can the absence of intervals be regarded as superimposed,
19:07–19:16because circularity would result, cognition of grossness arises when the absence of intervals is superimposed,
19:16–19:22and that superimposition is made only after grossness has been cognized.
19:22–19:28Therefore, for an object to be apprehensible by the senses it must be gross.
19:28–19:33Otherwise, even atoms spread far apart would be visible.
19:33–19:38Atoms must therefore be regarded as invisible.
19:38–19:45If no hole is accepted, none of its qualities or properties can be known.
19:45–19:50Another objection to the reality of a hole and its refutation.
19:50–19:56Let a gross object lasting only one moment then be admitted.
19:56–20:06Know this is impossible. On the doctrine of momentariness, parts and whole cannot be perceived at the same time.
20:06–20:19Since the parts are the material cause of the whole, they must exist one moment before it, consequently, as soon as the whole arises, the parts will have ceased to exist.
20:19–20:27Moreover, objects such as pots and cloths, produced and then destroyed in the next moment,
20:27–20:33arise from their causes, pot sherds, threads and the like, yet the successive pot sherds
20:33–20:39and threads that arise at each moment and perish the next are also held to be the
20:39–20:44causes producing the subsequent series of pot sherds and threads.
20:44–20:57Consequently, the material causes of the pot and cloth, the pot sherds and threads would simultaneously produce to distinct entities serving as material effects.
20:57–21:07This contradicts the rule that the production of one material effect from a material cause prevents the production of another such effect.
21:07–21:15logical conclusion. Thus the proof establishing the grossness of a whole also refutes momentariness,
21:15–21:23just as a proof of one thesis may simultaneously establish another thesis already presupposed by it.
21:23–21:30That is, grossness necessarily entails the non-momentariness of a gross object.
21:30–21:34A minor objection and its resolution.
21:34–21:49This conclusion also disposes of the following inference intended to establish that a whole is partless, whatever is real is partless, like cognition, disputed objects such as pots are real.
21:49–22:01The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom is not established because the denial of the proposed universal rule is not sublated.
22:01–22:11Against it, one may offer the following CRVK-like inference, whatever is real has parts, like a pot, cognition is real.
22:11–22:17If this inference is defective, its opposite is equally defective.
22:17–22:21The same answer applies in both cases.
22:21–22:24Continuation of the resolution.
22:24–22:35But consciousness is by nature partless and self-aware, whereas whether parts and the like-poses parts is presently under dispute.
22:35–22:45How, then, can the inference-establishing possession of parts be valid, and how can both inferences be rejected by the same answer?
22:45–22:53No. Groundless reasoning can be directed against consciousness as well, and objection may equally
22:53–23:01be raised against its partlessness. In ordinary experience no one knows a part devoid of its
23:01–23:09neck, rim, sides, belly, and so forth. Or, from the very reason because it is real,
23:09–23:16It may be inferred that consciousness does not inhere in another thing, or that a pot inheres
23:16–23:20in its parts as an entity distinct from them.
23:20–23:26Just as these inferences established nothing, so to the preceding inference intended to
23:26–23:31establish the partlessness of consciousness is fruitless.
23:31–23:34Further development of the resolution.
23:34–23:41Moreover, is the foregoing proof establishing the partlessness of a gross object, a positive
23:41–23:47inference or a conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence?
23:47–23:50The first alternative is impossible.
23:50–23:57If the words, pot and the like in the inference signify qualities such as color or entities
23:57–24:04such as atoms and those are made the subject, the defect of establishing what is already
24:04–24:11established arises. If a unitary grows object is accepted and made the subject,
24:11–24:18there is the defect that the probandom is absent from the subject. And if no such
24:18–24:25object is accepted, the subject itself is unestablished. It may be said that the
24:25–24:32The defect of absence of the probandom occurs only if a unitary gross object is accepted,
24:32–24:39whereas the defect of an unestablished subject occurs only if it is not accepted, so the same
24:39–24:43inference does not contain both defects.
24:43–24:49But if the inference is defended in this manner, the subject of an inference establishing
24:49–24:55Fragrance in a sky flower would also have to be accepted as valid, and the defect of
24:55–25:00an unestablished subject would disappear altogether.
25:00–25:04Let such reasoning therefore end here.
25:04–25:07Objection to the resolution and its answer.
25:07–25:13Can the pots and the like known in ordinary experience not be made the subject of an
25:13–25:20inference of partlessness, just as a mountain is made the subject of an inference of fire
25:20–25:24without first determining whether fire exists there.
25:24–25:32Otherwise, since it remains unknown whether the mountain is a real transformation of Brahman
25:32–25:38or merely an illusory appearance, even the inference of fire on the mountain would be
25:38–25:39impossible.
25:39–25:43No, this is not so.
25:43–25:49Neither both Vedantic alternatives there is no incoherence in the inference.
25:49–25:57Even if the world is established as a transformation of Brahman, the subject, such as the mountain,
25:57–26:00does not change its nature.
26:00–26:06For example, in a dream, if an inference occurs, green fire is inferred on a dream
26:06–26:09mountain from dream smoke.
26:09–26:15Contradiction in practice said to arise from ignorance, there is a distinction between
26:15–26:22relative truth and falsehood, and practical activity must depend upon that distinction.
26:22–26:29But in the foregoing inference, the words, pot, and the like make gross objects the subject.
26:29–26:35Therefore, contradiction between the subject in the form of grossness and the partlessness
26:35–26:44to be established in it is unavoidable. Another objection to the resolution and its refutation.
26:44–26:50If the atoms are called the pot and made the subject in the foregoing inference, how can
26:50–26:57the defect of re-establishing what is already established be avoided? Does this defect not
26:57–27:02disappear for a person who doubts the partlessness of atoms?
27:02–27:10No. No one doubts the partlessness of atoms. Could the inference not be useful for removing
27:10–27:16the ordinary person's error that pots and the like possess parts? Perhaps, but if the
27:16–27:22very gross object apprehended by ordinary people is made the subject, contradiction
27:22–27:30between subject and probandom is unavoidable. If some other entity is the subject, the
27:30–27:37effect of re-establishing what is already established is certain. Should it then be said that the
27:37–27:46gross object is not one? If so, proof of that very statement must first be supplied.
27:46–27:52In the inference of partlessness, the reason called reality is as fruitless as the milkless
27:52–28:00on a goat's neck. Nor can reality be the reason in an inference establishing grossness,
28:00–28:06because if cognition of grossness is regarded as false, this reason becomes incompatible
28:06–28:13with the subject. The conclusion, therefore, is that a thing becomes the subject of an
28:13–28:19inference only in the form in which it is not opposed to the desired probandom and in
28:19–28:26in which the presence of the probandom is not already established or undisputed, not in
28:26–28:28any other form.
28:28–28:34Refutation of the second alternative above, the conditional reduction in the form of reversal
28:34–28:36of the consequence.
28:36–28:42The foregoing thesis cannot be a reduction or conditional inference either, because
28:42–28:49its conclusion does not terminate in a form opposed to the statement initially accepted.
28:49–28:56For example, if the pot were real, it would be partless, but it is not partless, therefore
28:56–28:58it is not real.
28:58–29:04In this argument, the Buddhist does not accept that the pot possesses parts.
29:04–29:10Therefore, the Buddhist cannot establish the pot's unreality on the ground that it
29:10–29:17possesses parts, the subject would be unestablished. If the same reason is used in an attempt to
29:17–29:24establish that cognition of possession of parts is false, the defect of mutual contradiction
29:24–29:32also arises because cognition itself is a real entity. Moreover, the reason suffers from
29:32–29:37being excessively narrow because according to the Buddhist neither the unreal hairs
29:37–29:43whore nor consciousness, atoms, and the like poses parts.
29:43–29:49It is not enough to say that the Buddhist can argue on the basis of the opponent's acceptance
29:49–29:55of composite objects, because to derive a negative conclusion through a conditional
29:55–30:01inference the Buddhist must himself accept the reality of the reason.
30:01–30:06Demand for inferential proof of a whole and its refutation.
30:06–30:10What What is the inferential proof of a whole?
30:10–30:17When asking this question, do you intend to say that inference is superior to perception?
30:17–30:24If so, what is the inferential proof of the self-awareness of cognition that you accept?
30:24–30:26The demand is therefore groundless.
30:26–30:32Nevertheless, the following inference with an essential nature as its reason may be
30:32–30:39offered, whatever does not exhibit the coexistence of mutually opposed properties must be regarded
30:39–30:47as one entity, like cognition, and what is known as a unitary gross object is clearly
30:47–30:54of this kind. Practical usage concerning unity depends solely upon the absence of the apparent
30:54–31:02coexistence of opposed properties. This usage can neither be costless nor arise from some
31:02–31:09other cause, otherwise water, earth, air, and fire too would have to be regarded as a single
31:09–31:17thing. A general objection to the reality of external objects and its refutation. Let there
31:17–31:24then always be doubt concerning the reality of external objects, because it is impossible
31:24–31:31to distinguish truth from falsehood. No. This impossibility cannot arise from everything
31:31–31:38being true because the answer to the question now to be asked refutes that assumption.
31:38–31:44The question is, is the ordinary cognition I understood this object incorrectly technically
31:44–31:52called erroneous cognition, true or not? Whatever answer is given, it cannot establish that
31:52–31:55everything is true.
31:55–31:58Objection to the foregoing refutation.
31:58–32:04Would calling the statement I understood this incorrectly, an erroneous cognition be nothing
32:04–32:08more than uttering a meaningless cluster of words?
32:08–32:09No.
32:09–32:15If no cognition lay behind this statement, there would be no disagreement concerning the
32:15–32:19nature of erroneous cognition.
32:19–32:23Learned people do not dispute merely about words.
32:23–32:29Or is it the case that no dispute or disagreement occurs among scholars?
32:29–32:34Is the dispute about the meaning of words such as erroneous cognition?
32:34–32:41If so, what is unknown cannot be denied, and since the purpose of debate is to deny the
32:41–32:47opponent's view, it cannot be said that the disputants have no cognition of what
32:47–32:49they deny.
32:49–32:54for the possibility of conceptual erroneous cognition.
32:54–33:00Cognition of one object cannot impel a person toward another object, otherwise the object
33:00–33:05of cognition and the object of activity would be different.
33:05–33:12That is, unless one thing is understood as another, activity toward the first cannot
33:12–33:13arise.
33:13–33:29Nor can it be said that cognition of one thing produces activity toward the first thing merely because it occurs immediately beside cognition of another thing, for then any cognition could produce any activity.
33:29–33:39Nor can it be said that ignorance of the difference between the two cognitions, together with their proximity, causes the activity.
33:39–33:56If in ignorance of difference ignorance is primary and difference secondary, the same cognition will produce withdrawal as well as pursuit, because at that moment ignorance of difference from the undesired object is also present.
33:56–34:07Just as failure to know difference from the desired object produces pursuit, failure to know difference from the undesired object will produce withdrawal.
34:07–34:14Can it not be said that the cause of withdrawal is not ignorance but knowledge of difference
34:14–34:17from the desired object?
34:17–34:18No.
34:18–34:24On that view withdrawal from an object mistaken for silver would be impossible because at
34:24–34:31that time there is no conceptual cognition this is different from silver.
34:31–34:37And if such cognition of difference is accepted, the reality of erroneous cognition has been
34:37–34:43accepted because a non-different object is being cognized as different.
34:43–34:49Therefore, those who deny the possibility of erroneous cognition must regard ignorance
34:49–34:55of difference as the cause of both pursuit and withdrawal, the undesirable consequence
34:55–35:00of simultaneous pursuit and withdrawal thus remains.
35:00–35:06alternative explanation of ignorance of difference and its resolution.
35:06–35:14If it is said that in ignorance of difference, difference is primary and ignorance secondary,
35:14–35:19cognition of real silver could not impel a person toward silver because the presented
35:19–35:26object and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not mutually different.
35:26–35:32The other consequences of this view may be considered in the same way.
35:32–35:37Objection to the foregoing resolution and its refutation.
35:37–35:44It may be asked, just as, in the case of activity, ignorance of difference from both desired
35:44–35:50and undesired objects is present, so before illusion arises both kinds of ignorance
35:50–35:59are present, why? then, do cognition of difference and cognition of identity not arise at once?
35:59–36:06The answer is that ignorance alone is not sufficient to produce such cognitions.
36:06–36:13Each requires a specific causal complex, some defect for the superimposition of identity
36:13–36:19and the absence of defect and so forth for cognition of difference.
36:19–36:25Once difference is cognized, identity cannot be superimposed.
36:25–36:32The rule is that a defect conjoined with ignorance of difference produces an illusion or superimposition
36:32–36:38of difference, the same should be understood concerning an illusion or superimposition
36:38–36:40of identity.
36:40–36:47Yet nowhere are difference and identity both true together, such that cognitions of
36:47–36:54both might arise simultaneously. The problem should be resolved in this manner.
36:54–36:59Refutation of the second alternative that all cognition is false.
36:59–37:07Nor is the distinction between truth and falsehood impossible because all cognition is false.
37:07–37:14If the cognition such and such cognition is false is true, then not all cognition is
37:14–37:22false. If this cognition is not true, its object, the cognition said to be false, will not in
37:22–37:30fact be false, consequently, at least one true cognition must be admitted. Under both alternatives
37:30–37:37the answer is therefore self-contradictory. The actual situation is that some cognitions
37:37–37:41are veridical and others non-veridical.
37:41–37:47Practical usage concerning this distinction between veridical and non-veridical cognition
37:47–37:52would be impossible unless the distinction were experienced.
37:52–38:00Explanation of how the veridicality of cognition is known and defense of extrinsic validity.
38:00–38:06It will now be clarified whether the veridicality of cognition is known by that cognition
38:06–38:13itself or by an instrument different from it. Under the first alternative, the veridicality
38:13–38:19of a cognition would be known either by that same cognition or by a second cognition that
38:19–38:26knows it. Of these, the first sub-alternative is impossible, cognition does not even know
38:26–38:34itself, so how can it know its own veridicality? Being ominous in nature cannot serve as
38:34–38:42a possible reason because it is not a common property of light and cognition. An inference
38:42–38:49cannot proceed from mere similarity in the usage of the word light. Can perception prove
38:49–38:57this point? No. Since there is doubt whether the knowing cognition is identical with or
38:57–39:04different from the known cognition, the testimony of perception is not useful here. It may,
39:04–39:11However, be objected that if cognition does not know itself, it cannot know its object
39:11–39:18either and if one cognition is known by another, an infinite regress follows.
39:18–39:24Moreover, just as one act of cutting cannot be the object of another act of cutting of
39:24–39:30the same kind, cognition to cannot be the object of another cognition, therefore the
39:30–39:34foregoing doubt does not arise at all.
39:34–39:41objection to the doctrine of self-validity. In the original quotation, thus the word
39:41–39:47indicating arising mean birth or the awareness of cognition, which is expressed elsewhere
39:47–39:54by the word knowledge. If it means birth, the assertion would mean that cognition of
39:54–40:02an object arises only when cognition of that cognition arises. Consequently, every cognition
40:02–40:09would have to know a cognition that has already arisen after its own arising and is therefore
40:09–40:17no longer present. This follows from the explanation that what is not known does not arise. But
40:17–40:24how will this cognition of the object cognition itself arise? It too would have to be known
40:24–40:30by another cognition. Thus the doctrine of cognition's self-awareness ultimately
40:30–40:39establishes the total absence of cognition. Second objection to the doctrine of self-validity.
40:39–40:45If the second meaning of the word, knowledge, is accepted, the defect of re-establishing
40:45–40:53what is already established arises, what is not known is not known, this is obvious. But
40:53–41:00But then, if cognition itself is not known, will its object not remain unknown as well?
41:00–41:01No.
41:01–41:07The cognition that knows the object is not a cognition of cognition, it is itself cognition
41:07–41:09of the object.
41:09–41:16It may be asked, if cognition is not known, how can there be the practical usage cognition
41:16–41:18has occurred?
41:18–41:22The answer is, what need is there for such usage?
41:22–41:29The mere absence of practical usage concerning a thing's existence does not abolish the
41:29–41:31thing's existence.
41:31–41:39Nor can practical usage concerning an object based upon cognition of that object be abandoned.
41:39–41:43Does this dependence not produce an infinite regress?
41:43–41:50No, we do not regard it as necessary that every cognition be known.
41:50–41:56It is like determinate cognition, whose further determinate cognition is not necessary.
41:56–42:03Otherwise, a determinate cognition not itself determinately known could not determinately
42:03–42:06know its object either.
42:06–42:11Yet a determinate cognition is not its own determinate cognition.
42:11–42:18Therefore, this defense of the self-awareness of cognition resembles the plight of a housewife
42:18–42:23who tried to please her husband with her mouth full of lentils but could not conceal the
42:23–42:26foul smell of her breath.
42:26–42:30Continuation of the refutation
42:30–42:36The example of cutting that has been offered cannot by itself satisfies.
42:36–42:43The inference, one cognition is not the object of another cognition, because it is an action
42:43–42:50of the same class as the other cognition, no action of one class is the object of another
42:50–42:56action of the same class. Just as one act of cutting is not the object of another act
42:56–43:04of cutting is defective. If it seeks to establish that cognition, like an act of cutting,
43:04–43:10is wholly different from the object of another cognition of its own class, the probandom
43:10–43:17is absent from the subject because one person's cognition is known by another person's cognition
43:17–43:24and a person's own cognition is known through memory. If it seeks to establish cognition's
43:24–43:31self-objecthood, the example, an act of cutting is devoid of the probandom because an act
43:31–43:38of cutting is not its own object consequently, the reason being an action is incompatible
43:38–43:44with the probandom. Refutation of the view that veridicality is known through reflective
43:44–43:52cognition. The veridicality of cognition is not known through reflective cognition or through
43:52–43:58an inference based upon the known object because this means cannot distinguish veridicality
43:58–44:05from non-veridicality. It is not the case that only veridical cognition is known
44:05–44:13as veridical, erroneous cognition too is understood as veridical. If erroneous cognition were not
44:13–44:18known in this way, it would not impel one to any action.
44:18–44:24Continuation of the refutation Suppose that a second cognition taking the
44:24–44:32first cognition as its object happens to manifest its veridicality. Even so, because there
44:32–44:38is no certainty about such manifestation, it cannot produce the firm conviction that the
44:38–44:46first cognition is not different from veridicality. We require precisely such firm conviction
44:46–44:53because it is a necessary condition for actions performed for otherworldly results. Could doubt
44:53–44:59about veridicality somehow be removed so that no obstacle remains to knowledge of
44:59–45:07of veridicality. Perhaps, but how is the doubt itself removed? If it is removed by some other
45:07–45:14veridical cognition or proof, it will be asked whether that cognition produces firm certainty.
45:14–45:22If not, the doubt is not removed, because removal of doubt is the result of determinate cognition.
45:22–45:29If it does produce firm certainty, the required certainty of veridicality is obtained not
45:29–45:35from reflective cognition and the like, but from that other cognition.
45:35–45:40Objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer.
45:40–45:46Let cognition of cognition and the like merely produce an appearance of veridicality without
45:46–45:48confirming it.
45:48–45:54But if it cannot guide action with certainty, what use is such appearance?
45:54–46:01In fact, cognition of cognition cannot even produce an appearance of veridicality.
46:01–46:07If the property whose presence in the known object determines the veridicality of cognition
46:07–46:12is not known, cognition cannot be known as veridical.
46:12–46:20The mere apprehension of an object by cognition is not its veridicality, an object is apprehended
46:20–46:23in illusion as well.
46:23–46:28Veridicality is in fact apprehending the object as it really is.
46:28–46:34From the fact that cognition apprehends an object it does not follow that it also apprehends
46:34–46:40the object's reality, because such cognition does not apprehend the property of the object
46:40–46:48that removes its illusory character. In some cognitions this property too is apprehended,
46:48–46:56as in this is indeed a pot but not in a cognition that merely takes another cognition as its object.
46:56–47:03Were this not so, doubt concerning the veridicality of an unfamiliar cognition would never
47:03–47:10arise. In the case of a familiar cognition, veridical apprehension of the object arises
47:10–47:16from recollection of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandom,
47:16–47:22this recollection is born from the latent impression left by the first cognition of concomitance
47:22–47:28and is therefore included in another inferentially veridical cognition.
47:28–47:34Consequently, only the doctrine of extrinsic validity remains tenable.
47:34–47:39Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation.
47:39–47:43But will the inferential determination of a cognition's
47:43–47:47veridicality not also generate an infinite regress?
47:47–47:48No.
47:48–47:52The earlier cognition on the basis of whose similarity the
47:52–47:57veridicality of a new cognition is determined is already known
47:57–48:02as veridical, its veridicality need not be established again,
48:02–48:06so no infinite regress arises on that account.
48:06–48:14Admittedly, if the veridicality of the very inference establishing veridicality is questioned,
48:14–48:21the possibility of regress may arise, but an inference need not determine its own veridicality
48:21–48:29every time. An inference is like cognition of an object, which need not first establish
48:29–48:34its own veridicality in order to apprehend its object.
48:34–48:40Very well, then an infinite regress will arise because of the cognition of the subject and
48:40–48:47reason in the inference, since inference does not occur unless subject and reason are
48:47–48:53correctly known, and their correct knowledge cannot arise without knowledge of the veridicality
48:53–48:57of the inference in which they are employed.
48:57–49:04No. In an inference establishing the veridicality of cognition, the duality of veridicality
49:04–49:12and non-veridicality is not present. In this inference cognition is the subject and veridicality
49:12–49:20the probandom, therefore doubt about veridicality does not enter into the inference itself.
49:20–49:26Wherever cognition of the subject or reason allows both truth and falsehood that is,
49:26–49:32However the cognition is doubtful, the reason remains afflicted by doubt concerning its
49:32–49:36defectiveness and is therefore invalid.
49:36–49:43But where cognition of the subject or reason is related only to veridicality, their veridicality
49:43–49:49is determined merely by the absence of cognition of non-veridicality.
49:49–49:56A cognition that apprehends only one qualifier of its substantive is a determinate cognition.
49:56–50:06It is established that a cognition apprehending an entity together with its property does not contain the duality of truth and falsehood.
50:06–50:16Yet if the veridicality of this cognition to must be determined, it will be determined through an external means, namely inference.
50:16–50:19This is the view current in Nya.
50:19–50:38Because of this special character of inferential cognition, Kasperati, the great author of the Takparyak, has said that the veridicality of inference is known by itself, that is, ordinarily no doubt of non-veridicality arises concerning an inference.
50:38–50:47Why the duality of truth and falsehood does not occur in reflective cognition, question and answer?
50:47–50:55It may be asked, how is it itself determined that the reflective cognition concerning a cognitions'
50:55–51:02veridicality apprehends only veridicality and not non-veridicality as the qualifier of its
51:02–51:09substantive? If this is not determined, an infinite regress follows.
51:09–51:15The answer is that when the veridicality of the entire class of reflective cognitions
51:15–51:21has been known, and the invariable concomitance between being a reflective cognition and
51:21–51:28veridicality has been determined, the reflective cognitions of the subject, reason, and so
51:28–51:34forth are known as possessing the same nature because they possess that same class property,
51:34–51:38and are therefore regarded as veridical.
51:38–51:45Once it has been generally determined that every reflective cognition is veridical,
51:45–51:51There is no room for duality concerning any particular instance falling under that class
51:51–51:52property.
51:52–51:59For example, in the sentence, a word conveys meaning, the word word employed in the sentence
51:59–52:05does not explicitly state its own capacity to convey meaning, because it has no such
52:05–52:08separate power within the sentence.
52:08–52:14Nevertheless, the wordhood on the basis of which all words are said to convey meaning
52:14–52:22is also present in the word word in that sentence. Therefore, no one doubts whether the word
52:22–52:29word conveys meaning nor does understanding the meaningfulness of the word produce an
52:29–52:37infinite regress. Further elaboration of the answer. The foregoing concomitances are
52:37–52:43also supported by reductio arguments in the form of reversal of the consequence. For
52:43–52:50For example, if cognition of the subject or substantive were false, it would either be
52:50–52:55objectless or have a false object, but this is unacceptable.
52:55–53:01If reflective cognition were non-veredical, it would not even apprehend the objecthood
53:01–53:07of the cognition that is its object, because nothing different from cognition becomes an
53:07–53:09object directly.
53:09–53:15If a cognition such as the cognition of the pervaders presence wherever the pervaded
53:15–53:22is present were established as non-veredical, no locus or basis would remain for the absence
53:22–53:28of invariable concomitance because absence of concomitance is itself a kind of false
53:28–53:36apprehension. Its negation is possible only after reality has been admitted since the
53:36–53:40The negation depends upon that very reality.
53:40–53:43Logical Conclusion
53:43–53:49Once the distinction between true and false cognition has thus been established, the assertion
53:49–53:55that there is no difference between the states of consciousness in dream and waking comes
53:55–53:57to an end.
53:57–54:03The doctrine of the appearance of non-existent objects and the doctrine of pure objectless
54:03–54:11consciousness have already been refuted. Moreover, a theory of erroneous cognition cannot operate
54:11–54:19without admitting the possibility of cognition of real objects. Therefore, if no real cognition
54:19–54:25occurs even in the waking state, such cognition will occur nowhere.
54:25–54:32Explanation of the difference between waking and dream. Even so, it may be asked how these
54:32–54:39to states are to be distinguished. The answer is, in the manner in which they are distinguished
54:39–54:48in ordinary practice. If it is further asked what their definitions are, the answer is this.
54:48–54:54Green is the state in which some accidental coherence appears among internal events,
54:54–55:01but no continuity is maintained among the agents, actions, instruments, places, and
55:01–55:09times that appear there. Waking is the state in which only some of its objects are subsequently
55:09–55:17sublated and an accidental continuity among different objects is maintained. On this basis,
55:17–55:23green and waking may alternatively be defined as follows. Green is the state in which
55:23–55:29the continuity of objects is liable to sublation. Waking is the state that begins with the
55:29–55:36sublation of the former continuity and ends in that state called dream in which all continuity
55:36–55:42is sublated. Their difference should be understood in this way.
55:42–55:43Final Conclusion
55:43–55:52Therefore, the world is certainly real. Yet seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically
55:52–55:59neglected the world's reality because reflection upon the world appears to be of no special
55:59–56:07use to them. If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality?
56:07–56:13The answer is that if the world is abruptly denied without understanding its relevance
56:13–56:19to liberation, defective reasoning may produce profound confusion concerning all the sources
56:19–56:27of knowledge. Consequently, even a subtle-minded and logically inclined person, acting with
56:27–56:30With such haste, may fail to reach the truth.

Plain text

रेविताषन अपजेक्षन्ज अग्धन्झ अटम्स. दूस, मेर्र्ली भाई अस्टबलिष्छिंग दाध वान आटम् can be conjoint with many other atoms, all objections based on the alleged impossibility of one atom being conjoint with six atoms situated in the six directions, the necessity of assigning different places to atoms, the casting of shadows upon atoms and so forth are refuted. Continuation of the refutation. The other reasons offered to establish the non-atomicity of atoms are refuted by whichever proof establishes either the reality or the non-establishment of atoms. Another minor objection and its refutation. It is wholly impossible for space to enter the interior of an atom. General refutation of all the foregoing objections. The two terms occurring in the subject statements of all these inferences are mutually contradictory. For example, in the subject statement the atom possesses parts, the word atom itself means a partless entity. Moreover, since the probandom is absent from the subject, the inference also suffers from the defect of a subject devoid of the probandom. Reduxio arguments such as if an atom were partless, it would have no determinate size and could not be conjoint with six distinct atoms are wish-eated by an unestablished subject and an unestablished concomitance because if atoms do not exist there can be no example exhibiting the concomitance. Further, the undesirable consequence of an infinite series of subordinate parts arises against the divisibility of atoms. Along with it comes the contrary consequence that if atoms were not partless, a minute whole composed of three atoms would become immeasurably vast. Both points support the partlessness of atoms. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Let atoms then be regarded as destructible. No. No proof establishes their destructibility. Every reason offered to establish that atoms possess parts generates the defect of an infinite series of parts. Thus the atom is a curious entity, like the demon named Raktaabja, who tears open the belly of the demoness of logic and emerges again in the form of an atom. The point is that the reasons offered to refute atoms ultimately establish those very atoms. of the first objection and its refutation. Can a reduction not proceed on the basis of an imagined subject and an imagined concomitance? No. If affirmation, negation and the like are based only on imagined notions, the very meaning of real affirmation and negation disappears. And if customary practice is to be followed in this matter, the original statement that a whole cannot inherit in its parts, being opposed to ordinary practice, cannot be accepted at all. This point has already been clarified repeatedly. Continuation of the refutation. Otherwise, that is, if even non-standard and defective arguments are regarded as acceptable, all the foregoing arguments against atoms will apply to cognition as well. Cognition too may be established as possessing parts on the ground that it can be related to 6 objects at once. But how will cognition's conjunction, determinate size, and so forth be established? By inference alone. For example, cognition is simultaneously conjoined with 6 objects and possesses a determinate size because Because it is real and is treated in practice like the objects known by it. But will this inference not be groundless, since the proof establishing the reality of cognition establishes the opposite conclusion? Very well, if the inference is abandoned on that ground, the same consideration must be given priority in the case of atoms. The related questions should be resolved in the same way. Another disputant, the Madhyamika, closes his eyes to escape danger and says, then consciousness too must disappear. When even the mention of reason, probandom, subject, and the rest has been abandoned, what can be said about this assertion? Can there not be an illusory mention of them? There can, provided at least the full reality of illusions, at least the full reality of illusion or illusory cognition is accepted. Otherwise, just as there will be neither a real object nor an illusory object, illusion itself may be illusory regarded as real. Yes, but if this second illusion is also unreal, nothing new has been stated by the foregoing assertion. And if the second illusion is admitted as holy real, it is itself consciousness whose reality cannot be denied. Can this illusory cognition be real, sublated, and therefore only illusorily real? No. If it is definitely real, what could sublate it? And if it is sublated, how can the object it apprehends be real? Refutation of the Madhyamaka view. Experience establishes that whatever is not clearly sublated is regarded as real. It must therefore be admitted that what is accompanied by the property of reality, or what is real, cannot be sublated. Why then, should the reality of what is accompanied by sublation, or what is sublated, not be denied? If that can be done, the reality of sublation itself can also be denied. Very well, let both reality and sublation be regarded as unavoidable. Yes, that is precisely the fact, what must be denied is their coexistence, which would generate contradiction. The coexistence of mutually opposed things, or the mutual opposition of things that coexist, can be maintained only within one's private doctrine, in debate it is improper merely to assert one's private belief. Consequently, the more the Buddhists try to extinguish consciousness, the brighter its light becomes. Even the negation of consciousness must be known. Thus the Buddhist is trying to create darkness by extinguishing one lamp with another lamp. Refutation of another objection. This answer also refutes the assertion that nothing is real because the cause-effect relation cannot be established. Whether the Buddhist attempt to refute the cause, effect relation succeeds or fails, that relation cannot be denied. If the attempt succeeds, a cause, effect relation between the attempt and the established conclusion must be accepted, if it fails, the relation remains unsublated. If, by denying the relation, the Buddhist wishes to refute the doctrine that the effect already exists in the cause, that is acceptable. But if he wishes to refute the doctrine that an effect is newly produced, the view is unacceptable because it contradicts perception. Moreover, if the assertion that points out a defect in the doctrine of newly arisen effects already exists, there is no need to produce it again. If it did not already exist, The Buddhist's utterance produces it anew. Consequently, the reason in the inference whatever is unreal is not produced is shown to be deviant. Objection to the refutation and its refutation. Let the objection then be this. Although all the foregoing criticisms of the whole have proved fruitless, non-cognition of the whole may still constitute a powerful objection. In the place where a hole is supposed to exist, I perceive no entity different from the collection of atoms. But this is merely the resentful outcry of one who has been defeated. The reality of gross holes is a matter of universal experience. Refutation of the objection that cognition of grossness is false. Can it not be said that the cognition, the whole is one object is conceptual and therefore false? No. This cognition apprehends its object with extreme clarity. Should it be said that the clarity of this cognition depends only upon a condition? No. If a non-conceptual cognition having the same object is the basis of this conceptual cognition and the clarity of the first cognition is superimposed upon the second, the truth of the conceptual cognition is established by itself. If a non-conceptual cognition having a different object is regarded as its basis, the clarity of non-conceptual cognition of blue, yellow, and the light must likewise be regarded as conditional, with the result that no cognition remains wholly clear. Only that which is apprehended in both non-conceptual and conceptual cognition can be regarded as the object of veridical perception. If the object of conceptual cognition is not real, the object of non-conceptual cognition too will cease to be real. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation can atoms themselves not be gross. No, then they would cease to be atoms. Can a collection of atoms be gross? No. The Buddhist does not admit a unitary aggregate entity based upon the collected things. If such an entity is accepted, what defect is there in accepting a whole? Can atoms in their collected state themselves appear as a gross object? No, because none of them individually is gross. Does grossness mean occupying different places? No, a single atom does not occupy even one place with extension. Can many atoms appearing densely as one and occupying many places be regarded as gross on that account? No, a gross object is always experienced as one. Another defense of cognition of unity among atoms and its refutation. Can cognition of the unity of a gross object not be explained by the superimposition of unity upon the atoms constituting its parts? That is, if its several parts each appear as one, the whole two will appear as one. No, this is impossible. No one superimposes unity upon the countless atoms constituting the different limbs of the body, the hands, feet, chin, nose, and so forth. Although these limbs appear mutually distinct, cognition of the unity of the entire body is not absent. Conversely, unity may be superimposed upon the parts even while they continue to appear distinct. Continuation of the refutation. Moreover, if there is in reality no single hole, one must hold that the millions of atoms constituting the hole or its parts appear as one only because the unity of a single atom is superimposed upon them. In that case the object of superimposition would appear only as atoms, not as a gross object. Can the appearance of grossness be explained by the inference that the atoms are spread over many places? No. This explanation is self-contradictory. If atoms spread over different places are known in the form of those distinct places, neither unity nor residence in many places can be superimposed upon them. If the entities situated in different places are not known, what object will there be that occupies those distinct places? And if both unity and residence in distinct places are superimposed upon the atoms, no other object remains to occupy those different places. Here the atoms would appear neither as many nor as places, and no occupant of the places would be known. Therefore, if unity is superimposed, only the atoms will be known, not their grossness. A brief question and its answer. If this is so, how can the ordinary cognition of grossness and unity in a collection of objects from which no single whole has horizon be explained? The answer is that the nature of a substance occupying a space equal to the dimensions of the collection is superimposed upon that collection because such a substance occupies a spatial extent equal to that of the collection. But this is impossible on your view because veridical cognition of the grossness to be superimposed is available nowhere else. Are non-existent unity and grossness themselves known here? No. All the arguments against unity and grossness have already been refuted. Indirect refutation of a possible contrary view. The foregoing refutation of the arguments against the whole also refutes the view that the grossness appearing in an object is only the object of conceptual cognition and is therefore unreal. such grossness must be one of three kinds, an utterly unreal entity, an imagination constructed by cognition or a real thing. Refutation of the claim that invisible atoms cannot become perceptible. When every atom is invisible, how can their collection be visible? A mere aggregation of invisible things does not make them visible. Should it be said that the object produced at each moment from invisible atoms and destroyed the next moment is of a special kind and is therefore apprehensible by the senses? No. You might as well suppose that in a dream you are stretching out your hand and begging, the doctrine of momentariness has already been refuted. Continuation of the refutation. Or let momentary causation be accepted. Even so, we have already rejected the reality of the special property called immediate efficacy in momentary things, because accepting such a property produces the defect of universal's overlapping one another. Therefore, if atom poses no such special property, there will be no determination of which atoms possessing the common property of atomhood are invisible and which visible. Upon rational examination no difference can be determined among the atoms. Further development of the refutation that grossness determines perceptibility. Suppose that special property exists. Even then, the property determining perceptibility by the senses must be grossness alone. Otherwise, an atom that is not gross but possesses the special property of immediate efficacy would become visible. The necessary visibility of whatever is distinct from the non-grows establishes only the visibility of the gross. Here the cause-effect relation is known from the positive and negative concomitance between grossness and visibility. Nor is grossness present in a collection of atoms. Objection to the foregoing refutation. Can multiplicity itself not be grossness and its absence-minuteness? No. On that view, many atoms scattered over a vast tract of land would also become visible. If it is further required for grossness that there be no interval between two atoms, even this condition will not be fulfilled in the present case, because according to the Buddhist view, atoms of qualities such as taste intervene among the atoms of color in the constitution of an object. Nor can the absence of intervals be regarded as superimposed, because circularity would result, cognition of grossness arises when the absence of intervals is superimposed, and that superimposition is made only after grossness has been cognized. Therefore, for an object to be apprehensible by the senses it must be gross. Otherwise, even atoms spread far apart would be visible. Atoms must therefore be regarded as invisible. If no hole is accepted, none of its qualities or properties can be known. Another objection to the reality of a hole and its refutation. Let a gross object lasting only one moment then be admitted. Know this is impossible. On the doctrine of momentariness, parts and whole cannot be perceived at the same time. Since the parts are the material cause of the whole, they must exist one moment before it, consequently, as soon as the whole arises, the parts will have ceased to exist. Moreover, objects such as pots and cloths, produced and then destroyed in the next moment, arise from their causes, pot sherds, threads and the like, yet the successive pot sherds and threads that arise at each moment and perish the next are also held to be the causes producing the subsequent series of pot sherds and threads. Consequently, the material causes of the pot and cloth, the pot sherds and threads would simultaneously produce to distinct entities serving as material effects. This contradicts the rule that the production of one material effect from a material cause prevents the production of another such effect. logical conclusion. Thus the proof establishing the grossness of a whole also refutes momentariness, just as a proof of one thesis may simultaneously establish another thesis already presupposed by it. That is, grossness necessarily entails the non-momentariness of a gross object. A minor objection and its resolution. This conclusion also disposes of the following inference intended to establish that a whole is partless, whatever is real is partless, like cognition, disputed objects such as pots are real. The invariable concomitance between reason and probandom is not established because the denial of the proposed universal rule is not sublated. Against it, one may offer the following CRVK-like inference, whatever is real has parts, like a pot, cognition is real. If this inference is defective, its opposite is equally defective. The same answer applies in both cases. Continuation of the resolution. But consciousness is by nature partless and self-aware, whereas whether parts and the like-poses parts is presently under dispute. How, then, can the inference-establishing possession of parts be valid, and how can both inferences be rejected by the same answer? No. Groundless reasoning can be directed against consciousness as well, and objection may equally be raised against its partlessness. In ordinary experience no one knows a part devoid of its neck, rim, sides, belly, and so forth. Or, from the very reason because it is real, It may be inferred that consciousness does not inhere in another thing, or that a pot inheres in its parts as an entity distinct from them. Just as these inferences established nothing, so to the preceding inference intended to establish the partlessness of consciousness is fruitless. Further development of the resolution. Moreover, is the foregoing proof establishing the partlessness of a gross object, a positive inference or a conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence? The first alternative is impossible. If the words, pot and the like in the inference signify qualities such as color or entities such as atoms and those are made the subject, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. If a unitary grows object is accepted and made the subject, there is the defect that the probandom is absent from the subject. And if no such object is accepted, the subject itself is unestablished. It may be said that the The defect of absence of the probandom occurs only if a unitary gross object is accepted, whereas the defect of an unestablished subject occurs only if it is not accepted, so the same inference does not contain both defects. But if the inference is defended in this manner, the subject of an inference establishing Fragrance in a sky flower would also have to be accepted as valid, and the defect of an unestablished subject would disappear altogether. Let such reasoning therefore end here. Objection to the resolution and its answer. Can the pots and the like known in ordinary experience not be made the subject of an inference of partlessness, just as a mountain is made the subject of an inference of fire without first determining whether fire exists there. Otherwise, since it remains unknown whether the mountain is a real transformation of Brahman or merely an illusory appearance, even the inference of fire on the mountain would be impossible. No, this is not so. Neither both Vedantic alternatives there is no incoherence in the inference. Even if the world is established as a transformation of Brahman, the subject, such as the mountain, does not change its nature. For example, in a dream, if an inference occurs, green fire is inferred on a dream mountain from dream smoke. Contradiction in practice said to arise from ignorance, there is a distinction between relative truth and falsehood, and practical activity must depend upon that distinction. But in the foregoing inference, the words, pot, and the like make gross objects the subject. Therefore, contradiction between the subject in the form of grossness and the partlessness to be established in it is unavoidable. Another objection to the resolution and its refutation. If the atoms are called the pot and made the subject in the foregoing inference, how can the defect of re-establishing what is already established be avoided? Does this defect not disappear for a person who doubts the partlessness of atoms? No. No one doubts the partlessness of atoms. Could the inference not be useful for removing the ordinary person's error that pots and the like possess parts? Perhaps, but if the very gross object apprehended by ordinary people is made the subject, contradiction between subject and probandom is unavoidable. If some other entity is the subject, the effect of re-establishing what is already established is certain. Should it then be said that the gross object is not one? If so, proof of that very statement must first be supplied. In the inference of partlessness, the reason called reality is as fruitless as the milkless on a goat's neck. Nor can reality be the reason in an inference establishing grossness, because if cognition of grossness is regarded as false, this reason becomes incompatible with the subject. The conclusion, therefore, is that a thing becomes the subject of an inference only in the form in which it is not opposed to the desired probandom and in in which the presence of the probandom is not already established or undisputed, not in any other form. Refutation of the second alternative above, the conditional reduction in the form of reversal of the consequence. The foregoing thesis cannot be a reduction or conditional inference either, because its conclusion does not terminate in a form opposed to the statement initially accepted. For example, if the pot were real, it would be partless, but it is not partless, therefore it is not real. In this argument, the Buddhist does not accept that the pot possesses parts. Therefore, the Buddhist cannot establish the pot's unreality on the ground that it possesses parts, the subject would be unestablished. If the same reason is used in an attempt to establish that cognition of possession of parts is false, the defect of mutual contradiction also arises because cognition itself is a real entity. Moreover, the reason suffers from being excessively narrow because according to the Buddhist neither the unreal hairs whore nor consciousness, atoms, and the like poses parts. It is not enough to say that the Buddhist can argue on the basis of the opponent's acceptance of composite objects, because to derive a negative conclusion through a conditional inference the Buddhist must himself accept the reality of the reason. Demand for inferential proof of a whole and its refutation. What What is the inferential proof of a whole? When asking this question, do you intend to say that inference is superior to perception? If so, what is the inferential proof of the self-awareness of cognition that you accept? The demand is therefore groundless. Nevertheless, the following inference with an essential nature as its reason may be offered, whatever does not exhibit the coexistence of mutually opposed properties must be regarded as one entity, like cognition, and what is known as a unitary gross object is clearly of this kind. Practical usage concerning unity depends solely upon the absence of the apparent coexistence of opposed properties. This usage can neither be costless nor arise from some other cause, otherwise water, earth, air, and fire too would have to be regarded as a single thing. A general objection to the reality of external objects and its refutation. Let there then always be doubt concerning the reality of external objects, because it is impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood. No. This impossibility cannot arise from everything being true because the answer to the question now to be asked refutes that assumption. The question is, is the ordinary cognition I understood this object incorrectly technically called erroneous cognition, true or not? Whatever answer is given, it cannot establish that everything is true. Objection to the foregoing refutation. Would calling the statement I understood this incorrectly, an erroneous cognition be nothing more than uttering a meaningless cluster of words? No. If no cognition lay behind this statement, there would be no disagreement concerning the nature of erroneous cognition. Learned people do not dispute merely about words. Or is it the case that no dispute or disagreement occurs among scholars? Is the dispute about the meaning of words such as erroneous cognition? If so, what is unknown cannot be denied, and since the purpose of debate is to deny the opponent's view, it cannot be said that the disputants have no cognition of what they deny. for the possibility of conceptual erroneous cognition. Cognition of one object cannot impel a person toward another object, otherwise the object of cognition and the object of activity would be different. That is, unless one thing is understood as another, activity toward the first cannot arise. Nor can it be said that cognition of one thing produces activity toward the first thing merely because it occurs immediately beside cognition of another thing, for then any cognition could produce any activity. Nor can it be said that ignorance of the difference between the two cognitions, together with their proximity, causes the activity. If in ignorance of difference ignorance is primary and difference secondary, the same cognition will produce withdrawal as well as pursuit, because at that moment ignorance of difference from the undesired object is also present. Just as failure to know difference from the desired object produces pursuit, failure to know difference from the undesired object will produce withdrawal. Can it not be said that the cause of withdrawal is not ignorance but knowledge of difference from the desired object? No. On that view withdrawal from an object mistaken for silver would be impossible because at that time there is no conceptual cognition this is different from silver. And if such cognition of difference is accepted, the reality of erroneous cognition has been accepted because a non-different object is being cognized as different. Therefore, those who deny the possibility of erroneous cognition must regard ignorance of difference as the cause of both pursuit and withdrawal, the undesirable consequence of simultaneous pursuit and withdrawal thus remains. alternative explanation of ignorance of difference and its resolution. If it is said that in ignorance of difference, difference is primary and ignorance secondary, cognition of real silver could not impel a person toward silver because the presented object and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not mutually different. The other consequences of this view may be considered in the same way. Objection to the foregoing resolution and its refutation. It may be asked, just as, in the case of activity, ignorance of difference from both desired and undesired objects is present, so before illusion arises both kinds of ignorance are present, why? then, do cognition of difference and cognition of identity not arise at once? The answer is that ignorance alone is not sufficient to produce such cognitions. Each requires a specific causal complex, some defect for the superimposition of identity and the absence of defect and so forth for cognition of difference. Once difference is cognized, identity cannot be superimposed. The rule is that a defect conjoined with ignorance of difference produces an illusion or superimposition of difference, the same should be understood concerning an illusion or superimposition of identity. Yet nowhere are difference and identity both true together, such that cognitions of both might arise simultaneously. The problem should be resolved in this manner. Refutation of the second alternative that all cognition is false. Nor is the distinction between truth and falsehood impossible because all cognition is false. If the cognition such and such cognition is false is true, then not all cognition is false. If this cognition is not true, its object, the cognition said to be false, will not in fact be false, consequently, at least one true cognition must be admitted. Under both alternatives the answer is therefore self-contradictory. The actual situation is that some cognitions are veridical and others non-veridical. Practical usage concerning this distinction between veridical and non-veridical cognition would be impossible unless the distinction were experienced. Explanation of how the veridicality of cognition is known and defense of extrinsic validity. It will now be clarified whether the veridicality of cognition is known by that cognition itself or by an instrument different from it. Under the first alternative, the veridicality of a cognition would be known either by that same cognition or by a second cognition that knows it. Of these, the first sub-alternative is impossible, cognition does not even know itself, so how can it know its own veridicality? Being ominous in nature cannot serve as a possible reason because it is not a common property of light and cognition. An inference cannot proceed from mere similarity in the usage of the word light. Can perception prove this point? No. Since there is doubt whether the knowing cognition is identical with or different from the known cognition, the testimony of perception is not useful here. It may, However, be objected that if cognition does not know itself, it cannot know its object either and if one cognition is known by another, an infinite regress follows. Moreover, just as one act of cutting cannot be the object of another act of cutting of the same kind, cognition to cannot be the object of another cognition, therefore the foregoing doubt does not arise at all. objection to the doctrine of self-validity. In the original quotation, thus the word indicating arising mean birth or the awareness of cognition, which is expressed elsewhere by the word knowledge. If it means birth, the assertion would mean that cognition of an object arises only when cognition of that cognition arises. Consequently, every cognition would have to know a cognition that has already arisen after its own arising and is therefore no longer present. This follows from the explanation that what is not known does not arise. But how will this cognition of the object cognition itself arise? It too would have to be known by another cognition. Thus the doctrine of cognition's self-awareness ultimately establishes the total absence of cognition. Second objection to the doctrine of self-validity. If the second meaning of the word, knowledge, is accepted, the defect of re-establishing what is already established arises, what is not known is not known, this is obvious. But But then, if cognition itself is not known, will its object not remain unknown as well? No. The cognition that knows the object is not a cognition of cognition, it is itself cognition of the object. It may be asked, if cognition is not known, how can there be the practical usage cognition has occurred? The answer is, what need is there for such usage? The mere absence of practical usage concerning a thing's existence does not abolish the thing's existence. Nor can practical usage concerning an object based upon cognition of that object be abandoned. Does this dependence not produce an infinite regress? No, we do not regard it as necessary that every cognition be known. It is like determinate cognition, whose further determinate cognition is not necessary. Otherwise, a determinate cognition not itself determinately known could not determinately know its object either. Yet a determinate cognition is not its own determinate cognition. Therefore, this defense of the self-awareness of cognition resembles the plight of a housewife who tried to please her husband with her mouth full of lentils but could not conceal the foul smell of her breath. Continuation of the refutation The example of cutting that has been offered cannot by itself satisfies. The inference, one cognition is not the object of another cognition, because it is an action of the same class as the other cognition, no action of one class is the object of another action of the same class. Just as one act of cutting is not the object of another act of cutting is defective. If it seeks to establish that cognition, like an act of cutting, is wholly different from the object of another cognition of its own class, the probandom is absent from the subject because one person's cognition is known by another person's cognition and a person's own cognition is known through memory. If it seeks to establish cognition's self-objecthood, the example, an act of cutting is devoid of the probandom because an act of cutting is not its own object consequently, the reason being an action is incompatible with the probandom. Refutation of the view that veridicality is known through reflective cognition. The veridicality of cognition is not known through reflective cognition or through an inference based upon the known object because this means cannot distinguish veridicality from non-veridicality. It is not the case that only veridical cognition is known as veridical, erroneous cognition too is understood as veridical. If erroneous cognition were not known in this way, it would not impel one to any action. Continuation of the refutation Suppose that a second cognition taking the first cognition as its object happens to manifest its veridicality. Even so, because there is no certainty about such manifestation, it cannot produce the firm conviction that the first cognition is not different from veridicality. We require precisely such firm conviction because it is a necessary condition for actions performed for otherworldly results. Could doubt about veridicality somehow be removed so that no obstacle remains to knowledge of of veridicality. Perhaps, but how is the doubt itself removed? If it is removed by some other veridical cognition or proof, it will be asked whether that cognition produces firm certainty. If not, the doubt is not removed, because removal of doubt is the result of determinate cognition. If it does produce firm certainty, the required certainty of veridicality is obtained not from reflective cognition and the like, but from that other cognition. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer. Let cognition of cognition and the like merely produce an appearance of veridicality without confirming it. But if it cannot guide action with certainty, what use is such appearance? In fact, cognition of cognition cannot even produce an appearance of veridicality. If the property whose presence in the known object determines the veridicality of cognition is not known, cognition cannot be known as veridical. The mere apprehension of an object by cognition is not its veridicality, an object is apprehended in illusion as well. Veridicality is in fact apprehending the object as it really is. From the fact that cognition apprehends an object it does not follow that it also apprehends the object's reality, because such cognition does not apprehend the property of the object that removes its illusory character. In some cognitions this property too is apprehended, as in this is indeed a pot but not in a cognition that merely takes another cognition as its object. Were this not so, doubt concerning the veridicality of an unfamiliar cognition would never arise. In the case of a familiar cognition, veridical apprehension of the object arises from recollection of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandom, this recollection is born from the latent impression left by the first cognition of concomitance and is therefore included in another inferentially veridical cognition. Consequently, only the doctrine of extrinsic validity remains tenable. Objection to the foregoing refutation and its refutation. But will the inferential determination of a cognition's veridicality not also generate an infinite regress? No. The earlier cognition on the basis of whose similarity the veridicality of a new cognition is determined is already known as veridical, its veridicality need not be established again, so no infinite regress arises on that account. Admittedly, if the veridicality of the very inference establishing veridicality is questioned, the possibility of regress may arise, but an inference need not determine its own veridicality every time. An inference is like cognition of an object, which need not first establish its own veridicality in order to apprehend its object. Very well, then an infinite regress will arise because of the cognition of the subject and reason in the inference, since inference does not occur unless subject and reason are correctly known, and their correct knowledge cannot arise without knowledge of the veridicality of the inference in which they are employed. No. In an inference establishing the veridicality of cognition, the duality of veridicality and non-veridicality is not present. In this inference cognition is the subject and veridicality the probandom, therefore doubt about veridicality does not enter into the inference itself. Wherever cognition of the subject or reason allows both truth and falsehood that is, However the cognition is doubtful, the reason remains afflicted by doubt concerning its defectiveness and is therefore invalid. But where cognition of the subject or reason is related only to veridicality, their veridicality is determined merely by the absence of cognition of non-veridicality. A cognition that apprehends only one qualifier of its substantive is a determinate cognition. It is established that a cognition apprehending an entity together with its property does not contain the duality of truth and falsehood. Yet if the veridicality of this cognition to must be determined, it will be determined through an external means, namely inference. This is the view current in Nya. Because of this special character of inferential cognition, Kasperati, the great author of the Takparyak, has said that the veridicality of inference is known by itself, that is, ordinarily no doubt of non-veridicality arises concerning an inference. Why the duality of truth and falsehood does not occur in reflective cognition, question and answer? It may be asked, how is it itself determined that the reflective cognition concerning a cognitions' veridicality apprehends only veridicality and not non-veridicality as the qualifier of its substantive? If this is not determined, an infinite regress follows. The answer is that when the veridicality of the entire class of reflective cognitions has been known, and the invariable concomitance between being a reflective cognition and veridicality has been determined, the reflective cognitions of the subject, reason, and so forth are known as possessing the same nature because they possess that same class property, and are therefore regarded as veridical. Once it has been generally determined that every reflective cognition is veridical, There is no room for duality concerning any particular instance falling under that class property. For example, in the sentence, a word conveys meaning, the word word employed in the sentence does not explicitly state its own capacity to convey meaning, because it has no such separate power within the sentence. Nevertheless, the wordhood on the basis of which all words are said to convey meaning is also present in the word word in that sentence. Therefore, no one doubts whether the word word conveys meaning nor does understanding the meaningfulness of the word produce an infinite regress. Further elaboration of the answer. The foregoing concomitances are also supported by reductio arguments in the form of reversal of the consequence. For For example, if cognition of the subject or substantive were false, it would either be objectless or have a false object, but this is unacceptable. If reflective cognition were non-veredical, it would not even apprehend the objecthood of the cognition that is its object, because nothing different from cognition becomes an object directly. If a cognition such as the cognition of the pervaders presence wherever the pervaded is present were established as non-veredical, no locus or basis would remain for the absence of invariable concomitance because absence of concomitance is itself a kind of false apprehension. Its negation is possible only after reality has been admitted since the The negation depends upon that very reality. Logical Conclusion Once the distinction between true and false cognition has thus been established, the assertion that there is no difference between the states of consciousness in dream and waking comes to an end. The doctrine of the appearance of non-existent objects and the doctrine of pure objectless consciousness have already been refuted. Moreover, a theory of erroneous cognition cannot operate without admitting the possibility of cognition of real objects. Therefore, if no real cognition occurs even in the waking state, such cognition will occur nowhere. Explanation of the difference between waking and dream. Even so, it may be asked how these to states are to be distinguished. The answer is, in the manner in which they are distinguished in ordinary practice. If it is further asked what their definitions are, the answer is this. Green is the state in which some accidental coherence appears among internal events, but no continuity is maintained among the agents, actions, instruments, places, and times that appear there. Waking is the state in which only some of its objects are subsequently sublated and an accidental continuity among different objects is maintained. On this basis, green and waking may alternatively be defined as follows. Green is the state in which the continuity of objects is liable to sublation. Waking is the state that begins with the sublation of the former continuity and ends in that state called dream in which all continuity is sublated. Their difference should be understood in this way. Final Conclusion Therefore, the world is certainly real. Yet seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically neglected the world's reality because reflection upon the world appears to be of no special use to them. If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality? The answer is that if the world is abruptly denied without understanding its relevance to liberation, defective reasoning may produce profound confusion concerning all the sources of knowledge. Consequently, even a subtle-minded and logically inclined person, acting with With such haste, may fail to reach the truth.

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