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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 23:48
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0:02–0:06Alternative Definitions
0:06–0:23Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence.
0:23–0:36Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid.
0:36–0:48Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid.
0:48–0:54In the illusion, this shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate.
0:54–1:01The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension.
1:01–1:06Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct.
1:06–1:13In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs.
1:13–1:16Both definitions apply properly.
1:16–1:23But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities.
1:23–1:30When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise.
1:30–1:34Nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not.
1:34–1:44Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended.
1:44–1:54Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition.
1:54–2:03Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition.
2:03–2:09This specific objecthood is not self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing.
2:09–2:16Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended.
2:16–2:22Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity.
2:23–2:27The relation is itself the nature of cognition.
2:27–2:33Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition?
2:33–2:38Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition.
2:38–2:45In the case of Qualificative Status or Objecthood II, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition.
2:45–2:49If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows.
2:49–2:56In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part,
2:56–3:02the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition.
3:02–3:08Otherwise, once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt
3:08–3:12about each specific objecthood would become impossible.
3:12–3:16In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inheritance
3:16–3:20are known, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or
3:20–3:23an inference concerning a pot?
3:23–3:26This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general
3:26–3:29cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition.
3:29–3:36Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood.
3:36–3:39Conclusion
3:39–3:56Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualifcant cognition, there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific objecthood of pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualifcant cognition.
3:56–3:58This view is unsound.
3:58–4:05The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the objecthood of pot-absence.
4:05–4:14If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualificon cognition, infinite regress follows.
4:14–4:24The difference between qualifier, qualificon cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers.
4:24–4:28It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is
4:28–4:32a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that
4:32–4:34qualifier as its object.
4:34–4:38Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in
4:38–4:43the perception section.
4:43–4:48The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion.
4:48–4:50The theory of misapprehension.
4:50–4:55Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible.
4:56–5:00Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical.
5:00–5:05No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition.
5:05–5:09Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualifcant, in the definition
5:09–5:16of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition.
5:16–5:19Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced
5:19–5:23by desire for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness
5:23–5:28as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver.
5:28–5:32This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason.
5:32–5:36The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous
5:36–5:39condition of this pervasion.
5:39–5:43Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object
5:43–5:47head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver.
5:47–5:51In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because
5:51–5:55in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be
5:55–5:57a mode though the object is not silver.
5:57–6:01Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition.
6:01–6:06The defect of lacking an example in the inference.
6:06–6:11Object of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted.
6:11–6:19If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell.
6:19–6:23Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition,
6:23–6:27the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity,
6:27–6:31therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished.
6:31–6:36Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition,
6:36–6:39and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver,
6:39–6:41become extraneous conditions of the inference.
6:41–6:45One activity cannot be generalized here, if one is removed,
6:45–6:51even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established.
6:52–6:55Therefore, inference does not establish invalid cognition.
6:56–6:59The Nayayaka establishment of invalid cognition
7:01–7:14The Nayayaka applies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell.
7:14–7:19Being activity toward the desired object is not an extraneous condition because activity
7:19–7:22hood itself is a distinct reason here.
7:22–7:27Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualificon of a cognition
7:27–7:32that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire
7:32–7:37for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of
7:37–7:38a shell.
7:38–7:43An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition
7:43–7:50of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as deritical cognition of silver does.
7:50–7:55If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction
7:55–7:59or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will
7:59–8:02alone be the subject.
8:02–8:06Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted
8:06–8:11cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing
8:11–8:17objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained.
8:17–8:21Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and
8:21–8:26the shell as qualificand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the shell, the
8:26–8:29substrate of absence of silverness.
8:29–8:34Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced
8:34–8:39by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and
8:39–8:41the like.
8:41–8:46An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualificon regularly
8:46–8:49produces activity.
8:49–8:56The Prabhupra view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity.
8:56–9:03The Prabhupra says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary.
9:03–9:06Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference
9:06–9:11between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver.
9:11–9:16To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Neayaka himself accepts non-apprehension
9:16–9:19of difference.
9:19–9:24Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly
9:24–9:25complex.
9:25–9:30It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause
9:30–9:32of activity.
9:32–9:36The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive
9:36–9:44status of silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode.
9:44–9:57Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference.
9:57–10:04Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects.
10:04–10:10Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition
10:10–10:14of identity with unknown silver is impossible.
10:14–10:17Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause
10:17–10:23Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow,
10:23–10:27not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he
10:27–10:31stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white
10:31–10:32conch and the yellow object.
10:32–10:38Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity.
10:38–10:42Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of
10:42–10:45a subsequent veridical inference of difference.
10:45–10:49Therefore the naiyayika too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause
10:49–10:50of activity.
10:50–10:55If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity,
10:55–10:59cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect
10:59–11:04is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Naya views.
11:04–11:12Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause.
11:12–11:19An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity.
11:19–11:24Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity.
11:24–11:27For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between
11:27–11:32a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not different
11:32–11:35from the east, does not take that difference as its object.
11:35–11:39Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity.
11:39–11:40Objection.
11:40–11:44On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because
11:44–11:48activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from
11:48–11:49the shell.
11:49–11:54awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the
11:54–11:59shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of silver's non-relation.
12:00–12:05Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because
12:05–12:09that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a
12:09–12:14suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to
12:14–12:19a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness
12:19–12:24as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is
12:24–12:28no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression
12:28–12:31respectively apprehend the distinct object's shell and silverness.
12:33–12:36Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition.
12:38–12:42Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately
12:42–12:46remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together.
12:46–12:52Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different
12:52–12:57times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed alternatives
12:57–13:00remembered at two different times.
13:00–13:05It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or
13:05–13:07a person?
13:07–13:11Doubt occurs because the difference of post in person is not apprehended together at
13:11–13:14the time of cognition of both alternatives.
13:14–13:19Your failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because
13:19–13:24through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence.
13:24–13:28After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire
13:28–13:33does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion,
13:33–13:38however, activity also does not arise.
13:38–13:41Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may
13:41–13:47have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke
13:47–13:52illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently
13:52–13:57remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore
13:57–14:04neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived
14:04–14:09in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the perceptual illusion
14:09–14:12I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fired differ.
14:13–14:18In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means,
14:18–14:20in the latter there is such recollection.
14:22–14:26The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object.
14:28–14:33Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell
14:33–14:35causes withdrawal from silver.
14:35–14:41Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the
14:41–14:46cognition this is silver, not shell, does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the
14:46–14:51negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, and invalid cognition would again
14:51–14:56become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of
14:56–15:01withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person
15:01–15:05would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted.
15:06–15:10If mere non-apprehension of difference causes withdrawal, in the case, this is not silver,
15:10–15:13neither activity nor invalid cognition is required.
15:14–15:20In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal
15:20–15:25from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective
15:25–15:31illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively-arisen cognitions,
15:31–15:35apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended.
15:36–15:39Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell would have to be admitted.
15:40–15:45Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects.
15:47–15:52The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualificand.
15:54–15:59Some partial MSAK is say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition,
15:59–16:04which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension.
16:05–16:10Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established,
16:10–16:16being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition,
16:16–16:20thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference.
16:22–16:26In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted.
16:26–16:32The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver is its mode,
16:32–16:36then invalid cognition of, silver alone, cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell.
16:36–16:42If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a collective cognition.
16:42–16:49Knowing one as another, is impossible by the nature of cognition, when the shell is the qualificant, silver cannot be the qualificant.
16:49–16:56Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualificant.
16:56–17:05And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity.
17:05–17:12Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect.
17:12–17:17Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition
17:17–17:21lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood.
17:21–17:26Thus the learned Nyi-Yiika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition.
17:26–17:30When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible
17:30–17:33through any means?
17:33–17:37Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension
17:37–17:43If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established?
17:43–17:46If it takes a non-existent thing as object, the Madhyamaka theory of apprehension of the
17:46–17:49unreal must be accepted.
17:49–17:53No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available.
17:53–17:57The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause
17:57–18:02invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference
18:02–18:04respectively.
18:04–18:09of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness
18:09–18:15or markhood is absent, only veridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended
18:15–18:18non-relation arises there.
18:18–18:21The recognition-like view that the I apprehends remembered sylvanus in a shell has already
18:21–18:27been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition
18:27–18:31produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by
18:31–18:34itself does not produce an effect.
18:34–18:38A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect,
18:38–18:41nor is production of digestive fire an effect.
18:41–18:45After eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest.
18:45–18:49A sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed.
18:49–18:53Ash may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain.
18:53–18:58Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition
18:58–19:04of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust
19:04–19:09in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable.
19:09–19:14Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone.
19:14–19:18Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension.
19:18–19:23Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present
19:23–19:29as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition.
19:29–19:34In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference.
19:34–19:39The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and,
19:39–19:43because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity
19:43–19:46toward the shell.
19:46–19:50Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by
19:50–19:56By the contrary qualifier silverness, cognition hood resides only in cognition, like veridical
19:56–19:58cognition hood.
19:58–20:02The counter inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition
20:02–20:07different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition
20:07–20:11different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition.
20:11–20:18Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell.
20:18–20:22From this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form
20:22–20:23of difference.
20:23–20:27Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these
20:27–20:31two become the cause of uncorroborated activity.
20:31–20:35Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward
20:35–20:38the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this
20:38–20:43is silver, concerning real silver before one.
20:43–20:47Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence
20:47–20:53activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not
20:53–20:57called non-veridical, but cognition met within different produces unfavorable conduct and
20:57–21:02is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension
21:02–21:09in the perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition.
21:11–21:16The decisive doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired
21:16–21:21object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated
21:21–21:26activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the
21:26–21:30object heard of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition,
21:30–21:35this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is
21:35–21:38apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through
21:38–21:43a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in
21:43–21:45invalid cognition too.
21:45–21:51Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause.
21:53–21:58It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity,
21:58–22:03and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, delimits causality.
22:03–22:08But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference.
22:08–22:13Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated
22:13–22:19and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both.
22:19–22:22But this is unsound.
22:22–22:26Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can
22:26–22:30be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted.
22:30–22:35Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of
22:35–22:39activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection.
22:41–22:45Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition.
22:47–22:51It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity
22:51–22:57introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has
22:57–23:02not been established, that complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the
23:02–23:06result is not considered a defect when admitting a means.
23:06–23:12That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof.
23:12–23:16Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it
23:16–23:20too is activity, like corroborated activity.
23:20–23:25An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is
23:25–23:30established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable.
23:30–23:34Once the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too
23:34–23:38becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition.
23:38–23:43To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest
23:43–23:44proof of the doctrine.

Plain text

Alternative Definitions Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence. Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid. Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid. In the illusion, this shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate. The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension. Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct. In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs. Both definitions apply properly. But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities. When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise. Nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not. Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended. Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition. Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition. Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of Qualificative Status or Objecthood II, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition. If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows. In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inheritance are known, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot? This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood. Conclusion Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualifcant cognition, there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific objecthood of pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualifcant cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the objecthood of pot-absence. If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualificon cognition, infinite regress follows. The difference between qualifier, qualificon cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section. The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualifcant, in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition. The defect of lacking an example in the inference. Object of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized here, if one is removed, even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established. Therefore, inference does not establish invalid cognition. The Nayayaka establishment of invalid cognition The Nayayaka applies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being activity toward the desired object is not an extraneous condition because activity hood itself is a distinct reason here. Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualificon of a cognition that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as deritical cognition of silver does. If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained. Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and the shell as qualificand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualificon regularly produces activity. The Prabhupra view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhupra says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Neayaka himself accepts non-apprehension of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition of identity with unknown silver is impossible. Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore the naiyayika too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Naya views. Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity. Objection. On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell. awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct object's shell and silverness. Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition. Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together. Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed alternatives remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or a person? Doubt occurs because the difference of post in person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives. Your failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence. After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however, activity also does not arise. Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fired differ. In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, in the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver. Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell, does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, and invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension of difference causes withdrawal, in the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively-arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell would have to be admitted. Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects. The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualificand. Some partial MSAK is say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension. Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference. In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted. The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver is its mode, then invalid cognition of, silver alone, cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell. If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a collective cognition. Knowing one as another, is impossible by the nature of cognition, when the shell is the qualificant, silver cannot be the qualificant. Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualificant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Nyi-Yiika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means? Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established? If it takes a non-existent thing as object, the Madhyamaka theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available. The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively. of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or markhood is absent, only veridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition-like view that the I apprehends remembered sylvanus in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect. A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect. After eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest. A sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed. Ash may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veritical cognition. In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference. The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and, because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by By the contrary qualifier silverness, cognition hood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognition hood. The counter inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell. From this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver, concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within different produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the object heard of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too. Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause. It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, delimits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both. But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection. Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting a means. That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof. Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity, like corroborated activity. An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable. Once the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition. To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof of the doctrine.

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