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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Detected language: en (0.997596)
Duration: 24:06
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0:02–0:34रेकॉताषन अद दिवूप, विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-वि
0:34–0:38reasons, in inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements
0:38–0:47employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a
0:47–0:52substantive reflection on a counter reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference.
0:53–0:58For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct
0:58–1:02from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that
1:02–1:07is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual
1:07–1:14absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter
1:14–1:19positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal
1:19–1:25absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not
1:25–1:30cause the defect of counterbalance. When mere opposition of two reasons can cause
1:30–1:36counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless.
1:36–1:42With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends.
1:42–1:46Prima-facive view of non-establishment.
1:46–1:51Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment,
1:51–1:57because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion.
1:57–2:03Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
2:03–2:09The Prima-Facey opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring
2:09–2:16successively in the individual absences of pervasion and of the reason in the subject.
2:16–2:20If the qualified absences held to differ from the individual absences, the definition
2:20–2:27of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine.
2:27–2:31If the qualified absences non-different from the individual absences, it becomes
2:31–2:36merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession.
2:36–2:41Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence
2:41–2:48of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence.
2:48–2:51This proposal, however, is not sound.
2:51–2:55In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of
2:55–2:59the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition or
2:59–3:04demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition
3:04–3:07of a qualified absence is unnecessary.
3:07–3:12Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of
3:12–3:15perversion and subject propertyhood.
3:15–3:20If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated
3:20–3:23as separate fallacious reasons.
3:23–3:27Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment
3:27–3:32only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence.
3:32–3:37Individual absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of
3:37–3:40non-establishment.
3:40–3:43Qualified absence is not the defect.
3:43–3:4458.
3:44–3:49In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment.
3:49–3:53Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can
3:53–3:59constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces
3:59–4:05an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of
4:05–4:11the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by
4:11–4:17raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence.
4:17–4:22For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence
4:22–4:27belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to perversion
4:27–4:31and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences.
4:32–4:36Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment,
4:36–4:39they are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent.
4:40–4:44If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not
4:44–4:49establish perversion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition,
4:49–4:51it is raised through deviation itself.
4:52–4:56If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation,
4:56–5:00then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix,
5:00–5:03no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises.
5:03–5:07Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier.
5:09–5:13This refutation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of
5:13–5:20subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment
5:20–5:26even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two
5:26–5:32is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
5:34–5:4059. Some scholars say that absence of theoretical cognition of perversion and of the reasons
5:40–5:43occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as
5:43–5:49non-establishment of the substratum. If the eridical cognition of perversion and
5:49–5:52subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise.
5:54–6:00This definition too is unacceptable because the eridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier.
6:01–6:06Even when deridical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence
6:06–6:13can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood
6:13–6:21is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion
6:21–6:26and subject propertyhood, and veridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore
6:26–6:30cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is
6:30–6:37impossible. Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject
6:37–6:41propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore
6:41–6:43regardless.
6:43–6:48Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified
6:48–6:53by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid
6:53–6:54reason.
6:54–6:59It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion
6:59–7:02and subject propertyhood of every reason.
7:02–7:07If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood
7:07–7:11is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the
7:11–7:17absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment.
7:17–7:20If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its
7:20–7:24own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of
7:24–7:28inference, inference based on error would become impossible.
7:28–7:31In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object
7:31–7:35of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition,
7:35–7:39Therefore it could not be a fallacious reason.
7:39–7:44This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of deridical cognition of perversion
7:44–7:50or absence of deridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment.
7:50–7:56Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition
7:56–7:59does not under extend.
7:59–8:06Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment.
8:06–8:08Let it be granted.
8:08–8:13of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and
8:13–8:19uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, when a
8:19–8:24reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises
8:24–8:30through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when
8:30–8:34a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition
8:34–8:40does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain.
8:40–8:44It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious
8:44–8:46reason valid.
8:46–8:51Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason.
8:51–8:55Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect
8:55–8:57of the reason.
8:57–9:02Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as perversion
9:02–9:06and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment.
9:06–9:11Certainty of a property qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference,
9:11–9:18hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result.
9:18–9:21Refutation
9:21–9:2462, no, this view is not sound.
9:24–9:30It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment.
9:30–9:35If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation
9:35–9:40and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment.
9:40–9:44And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty
9:44–9:49of perversion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment
9:49–9:52concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious
9:52–9:56reasons, since certainty of perversion is possible even when cognition of such
9:56–10:00non-establishment is present.
10:00–10:04To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be
10:04–10:06present.
10:06–10:10Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both
10:10–10:15for cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration in inference
10:15–10:18for another.
10:18–10:23The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved.
10:23–10:27If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons,
10:27–10:33absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did
10:33–10:38not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious.
10:40–10:47Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here,
10:47–10:51in sleep or waking, even when perversion and subject propertyhood actually exist,
10:51–10:56inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because
10:56–11:00of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation.
11:01–11:03Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown.
11:05–11:09It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of perversion and the like
11:09–11:13an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as
11:13–11:18deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of
11:18–11:22perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general.
11:22–11:31This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately
11:31–11:37become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on
11:37–11:41the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have
11:41–11:47to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference
11:47–11:53occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause.
11:53–11:56Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of
11:56–12:01a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise if fire
12:01–12:05itself is absent.
12:05–12:10Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons.
12:10–12:14It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a
12:14–12:17fallacious reason.
12:17–12:21But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be
12:21–12:23causes of inference.
12:23–12:27If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject-propertyhood occurred
12:27–12:33only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious
12:33–12:34reason.
12:34–12:39And if certainty of perversion and subject-propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference,
12:39–12:44then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status
12:44–12:49of the remaining factors would become pointless.
12:49–12:53Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view.
12:53–12:57Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to
12:57–13:02inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence,
13:02–13:05is fallacious reasonhood.
13:05–13:09Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength
13:09–13:11is counterbalance.
13:11–13:14Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment,
13:14–13:20a reason in which these absences up evaded is respectively deviating or contradictory.
13:20–13:27It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment.
13:27–13:31When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason
13:31–13:36is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of
13:36–13:40difference functions separately in erroneous cognition.
13:40–13:43But this view too is not sound.
13:43–13:47Non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood,
13:47–13:50while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier.
13:51–13:55Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion and
13:55–13:59subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of
13:59–14:04non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of
14:04–14:09non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment.
14:09–14:14The established doctrine is now stated.
14:14–14:19Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature,
14:19–14:23and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons,
14:23–14:28because cognition or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form.
14:28–14:33Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion,
14:33–14:37or absence of perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood,
14:37–14:41is not a separate non-establishment, the qualification is unnecessary.
14:41–14:46Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form.
14:46–14:52Definitions are fashioned according to experience. Experience is not bent to fit definitions.
14:52–14:57The sage described all three generally as non-establishment that becomes the object of
14:57–15:02substantive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor
15:02–15:05the established five-fold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted.
15:07–15:14Restatement of the established doctrine. For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement,
15:14–15:19non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood
15:19–15:23are divisions of non-establishment, while defects distinct from these are called deviation
15:23–15:27and so forth according to context, confirms our own position.
15:28–15:32The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and
15:32–15:36and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction
15:36–15:41are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain
15:41–15:47scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear.
15:47–15:51Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like,
15:51–15:57its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends.
15:57–16:03defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract.
16:03–16:08Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment.
16:08–16:15Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject
16:15–16:17be raised?
16:17–16:21It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare
16:21–16:25and denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied
16:25–16:29in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn in
16:29–16:31a cow is impossible.
16:31–16:37Answer, in the Inferent, a sky flower is fragrant because it is a flower, the sky flower is cognized
16:37–16:42as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference.
16:42–16:46Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualific
16:46–16:52end in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent.
16:52–16:57In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does
16:57–17:03not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed,
17:03–17:11occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion.
17:14–17:18It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous
17:18–17:24condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the
17:24–17:28probandum fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished,
17:28–17:31its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke.
17:33–17:38In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those loci
17:38–17:43deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an extraneous condition, is pervasion.
17:44–17:49A property pervasive in the probandum but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct
17:49–17:55extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition,
17:55–17:58What is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition.
17:59–18:04An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently,
18:04–18:07it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it.
18:08–18:12Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason.
18:13–18:19In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property,
18:19–18:21is not an independent extraneous condition.
18:21–18:27In Earth is different from water because it possesses odor, Earthhood is not an extraneous
18:27–18:31condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of Earthhood.
18:33–18:37If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of
18:37–18:42pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of pervasion and in
18:42–18:48the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from
18:48–18:51non-establishment of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason.
18:53–18:58Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose
18:58–19:04cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom
19:04–19:09and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition
19:09–19:15the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that
19:15–19:19that the gold hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference.
19:19–19:23It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like.
19:23–19:27Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference,
19:27–19:31destroying the nature of veridical inference.
19:31–19:34Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions.
19:34–19:4075, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then
19:40–19:44for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated,
19:44–19:50that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning,
19:50–19:54neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule
19:54–19:58of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no
19:58–20:03necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not
20:03–20:08render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not
20:08–20:11stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason.
20:11–20:17Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat.
20:17–20:2376. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons
20:23–20:27collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious,
20:27–20:30because the obstruction to inference is the same in both.
20:30–20:34The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation,
20:34–20:38and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example,
20:38–20:42For example, firehood and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
20:43–20:45Answer, this is not sound.
20:46–20:56When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary.
20:58–21:07If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not defeat.
21:08–21:1377. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded
21:13–21:18by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the
21:18–21:23probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the
21:23–21:29absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain.
21:29–21:32If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an
21:32–21:36opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all
21:36–21:41characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious.
21:42–21:45A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength.
21:47–21:52Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength.
21:53–21:59From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously,
21:59–22:03on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made an independent
22:03–22:09defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason.
22:10–22:1578. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat,
22:15–22:19but establishment of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom.
22:20–22:24Otherwise mutual dependence would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation,
22:24–22:28and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer.
22:28–22:32Absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom
22:32–22:38is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance
22:38–22:44with the known absence of the probandom. Further objection, veridical cognition of the
22:44–22:48absence of the probandom in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the
22:48–22:54fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known
22:54–23:00deviation, not independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom
23:00–23:04Probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference
23:04–23:08by becoming the basis of known deviation.
23:08–23:12For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate
23:12–23:15fallacious reason.
23:15–23:20The radical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent
23:20–23:22defect.
23:22–23:27Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence
23:27–23:31Absence of the probandom and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore
23:31–23:36it should be regarded as the same defect in inference.
23:36–23:42Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason.
23:42–23:46Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandom and
23:46–23:50the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference.
23:50–23:55Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other
23:55–24:00means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference.
24:00–24:02Here the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

Plain text

रेकॉताषन अद दिवूप, विचार-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-विमर्शक रेकूर-वि reasons, in inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a substantive reflection on a counter reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of counterbalance. When mere opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends. Prima-facive view of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and absence of the reason and the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The Prima-Facey opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of pervasion and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absences held to differ from the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absences non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood. If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence. Individual absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect. 58. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence. For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences. Defects such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent. If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish perversion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier. This refutation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars say that absence of theoretical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of the substratum. If the eridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable because the eridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when deridical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood, and veridical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible. Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore regardless. Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason. It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment. If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition, Therefore it could not be a fallacious reason. This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of deridical cognition of perversion or absence of deridical cognition of the reasons occurrence in the subject is non-establishment. Either of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend. Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted. of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, when a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain. It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason. Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason. Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as perversion and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result. Refutation 62, no, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty of perversion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons, since certainty of perversion is possible even when cognition of such non-establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment in inference for oneself and for its demonstration in inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If perversion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious. Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when perversion and subject propertyhood actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of perversion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general. This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise if fire itself is absent. Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons. It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious reason. But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes of inference. If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of perversion and subject-propertyhood occurred only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject-propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view. Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence, is fallacious reasonhood. Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength is counterbalance. Absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, a reason in which these absences up evaded is respectively deviating or contradictory. It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment. When the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition. But this view too is not sound. Non-establishment again becomes merely absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier. Gangesa's intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment. The established doctrine is now stated. Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reasons nature, and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form. Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, the qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form. Definitions are fashioned according to experience. Experience is not bent to fit definitions. The sage described all three generally as non-establishment that becomes the object of substantive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established five-fold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted. Restatement of the established doctrine. For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, while defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms our own position. The objection that the recognized five-fold division would be disrupted if defeat and and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear. Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends. defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract. Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment. Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised? It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn in a cow is impossible. Answer, in the Inferent, a sky flower is fragrant because it is a flower, the sky flower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference. Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualific end in the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion. It should be understood here that non-establishment of perversion is not itself an extraneous condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason, in the form of absence of an extraneous condition, is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandum but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition, What is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference, but not independently, it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason. In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition. In Earth is different from water because it possesses odor, Earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of Earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of pervasion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise an inference of pervasion and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that that the gold hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference. Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions. 75, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here, because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason. Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat. 76. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious, because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation, and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, For example, firehood and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition of co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary. If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics favorable to valid inference, it can occur in both. Counterbalance is adventitious. A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength. Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously, on this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason. 78. Objection. Deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation, and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer. Absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandom. Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom Probandom does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. The radical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence Absence of the probandom and the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference. Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason. Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near absence of the probandom and the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference. Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference. Here the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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