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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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small

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en (0.997077)

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22:21

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1. 0:02–0:06Activity is not established from non-apprehension of difference.
2. 0:06–0:13Uncorroborated activity is not established merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver.
3. 0:13–0:20In the mutually opposed collective cognitions, this is both shell and silver, and this is both silver and shell,
4. 0:20–0:25activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver would occur simultaneously.
5. 0:25–0:30The objection that there is no proof supporting such collective cognition is also unsound.
6. 0:30–0:36The causal complexes of both collective illusions concerning shell and silver coexist, therefore
7. 0:36–0:40production of the illusion, this is both shell and silver, is established by experience like
8. 0:40–0:44the veridical collective cognition, this is both shell and silver.
9. 0:44–0:48If its absence were accepted, experience of duality and the like in collective cognition
10. 0:48–0:50would disappear.
11. 0:50–0:53The Nayaika need not posit doubt here, because through the power of a sensory defect the
12. 0:53–0:57differences of both shell and silver may be apprehended in each, but the Memsaka
13. 0:57–1:01must admit a separate doubt, is this shell or silver, because the distinct differences
14. 1:01–1:07of shell and silver cannot both be apprehended in one and the same object.
15. 1:07–1:11Refutation of the view that activity and withdrawal arise from non-apprehension of
16. 1:11–1:14their differences.
17. 1:14–1:18It may be objective that activity and withdrawal arise respectively from non-apprehension of
18. 1:18–1:21silver's difference in the shell and shell's difference in silver, because recollection
19. 1:21–1:26of silverness and shellness respectively produces recollection of silver and shell.
20. 1:26–1:30In recollection, only silver as endowed with silverness and shell as endowed with shellness
21. 1:30–1:35are apprehended, not, shell endowed with silverness, or, silver endowed with shellness.
22. 1:35–1:39Thus a person seeking a black gram seed in a heap of black powder acts toward that powder
23. 1:39–1:44because he fails to apprehend its difference from the gram recalled through black color.
24. 1:44–1:47Superimposition of silverness experienced in the shell does not produce both activity
25. 1:47–1:51and withdrawal, otherwise the naiya-yaka would have to posit separate cognitions
26. 1:51–1:54of shell and silver everywhere.
27. 1:54–1:56But this reasoning is unsound.
28. 1:56–2:01When desired silver and undesired shell are remembered through a semblance of testimony
29. 2:01–2:07or perceptual illusion, activity and withdrawal do not arise from cognition of that quality.
30. 2:07–2:12The Neyayaka accepts that cognition of one quality can recall both shell and silver,
31. 2:12–2:18through a sensory defect, mutually opposed qualified cognitions of both arise.
32. 2:18–2:22Activity and withdrawal also do not arise merely from a sensory defect, because the
33. 2:22–2:27The defect is absent in veritical cognition of silver in shell produced by a sound sense
34. 2:27–2:28faculty.
35. 2:28–2:34A general defect does not yield uncorroborated activity, the kinds of defect differ according
36. 2:34–2:38to perception, inference, and testimony.
37. 2:38–2:43Another proposal of the Neo Prabhakara.
38. 2:43–2:47The Neo Prabhakara says that an intense desire to remember the property brightness
39. 2:47–2:51residing in the shell arises with respect to silver because that property is more
40. 2:51–2:54closely related to silverness.
41. 2:54–2:58Once in the shell the property is less closely related to shellness, the desire to recall
42. 2:58–3:00it there is weak.
43. 3:00–3:05The more intense desire to remember the property in silver inhibits the weaker desire to remember
44. 3:05–3:09it in the shell, therefore withdrawal from the shell and activity towards silver do
45. 3:09–3:12not occur together.
46. 3:12–3:15This proposal too is unsound.
47. 3:15–3:19In the illusion, this is both shell and silver produced by a semblance of testimony,
48. 3:19–3:24Both silverness and shellness are equally recalled through words, and thus activity and withdrawal
49. 3:24–3:26would still occur simultaneously.
50. 3:26–3:31Conversely, if silverness and shellness are taken as respectively more and less closely
51. 3:31–3:36related, doubt of intense and weak alternatives in the form is this shell or silver, becomes
52. 3:36–3:38unavoidable.
53. 3:38–3:43There is no proof supporting such a construction of intense and weak desire, intensity of
54. 3:43–3:47desire is itself not evident.
55. 3:47–3:52On Saka objection, non-correspondence of activity is objecthood with respect to the undesired
56. 3:52–3:54object.
57. 3:54–3:59The Msaka says that qualified cognition of silver causes corroborated activity, while
58. 3:59–4:04non-apprehension of difference from silver causes uncorroborated activity, both points
59. 4:04–4:06have already been admitted.
60. 4:06–4:11But truth and falsity of qualified cognition cannot be treated as causes, because their
61. 4:11–4:14causality has not yet been established.
62. 4:14–4:19of the desired silver immediately present causes activity in general, and cognition
63. 4:19–4:25of the undesired shell causes withdrawal in general, hence there is no lack of recurrence.
64. 4:25–4:30Therefore it is unnecessary to make one qualified cognition alone the cause of both activity
65. 4:30–4:33and withdrawal.
66. 4:33–4:37Truth or falsity of qualified cognition is not a cause of activity, because admitting
67. 4:37–4:41its causality creates needless complexity.
68. 4:41–4:45The undesirable consequence would also follow that apprehension of the shell's difference
69. 4:45–4:49from silver causes withdrawal from the desired silver.
70. 4:49–4:54A general effect does not arise without a specific cause, here two specific causes are
71. 4:54–4:58available, qualified cognition of silver and non-apprehension of silver's difference
72. 4:58–5:00from the shell.
73. 5:00–5:04Therefore mere non-apprehension of difference causes uncorroborated activity toward the
74. 5:04–5:09shell and withdrawal from silver, in the absence of qualified cognition of silver and
75. 5:09–5:13shell there is no corroborated activity or withdrawal.
76. 5:13–5:17The Niyayika says that if silver and shell have not been apprehended as mutually different,
77. 5:17–5:21the general causal complex being present, uncorroborated activity and withdrawal would
78. 5:21–5:22arise.
79. 5:22–5:27If it is said that activity toward real silver is not uncorroborated, then for that very
80. 5:27–5:32reason non-apprehension of difference cannot be the cause of uncorroborated activity.
81. 5:32–5:36The non-correspondence of activity or withdrawal is its failure to accord with the object,
82. 5:36–5:41or non-correspondence of a cause is not determined from its effect.
83. 5:41–5:45The MMSAKA replies that non-correspondence means activity toward an undesired object
84. 5:45–5:48and withdrawal from a desired object.
85. 5:48–5:52Then if non-apprehension of difference causes both uncorroborated acts, how can corroborated
86. 5:52–5:56activity toward the desired object and corroborated withdrawal from the undesired object
87. 5:56–5:59also arise from it?
88. 5:59–6:02Non-apprehension of difference lacks the capacity to produce these two corroborated
89. 6:02–6:04acts.
90. 6:04–6:11The Naya Yaka reply, cognition of the desired object causes activity.
91. 6:11–6:15The Naya Yaka replies that cognition produces activity toward its own object.
92. 6:15–6:20Therefore, for parsimony, one and the same cognition is accepted as causing both a child's
93. 6:20–6:25first activity and corroborated activity in general, when no inhibitor is present.
94. 6:25–6:28Cognition apprehending the shell as a desired object causes activity toward the shell
95. 6:28–6:32because it takes the shell as its object, cognition does not produce activity toward
96. 6:32–6:38something that is not its object. It may be objected that uncorroborated activity
97. 6:38–6:41toward the shell arises merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver together with the
98. 6:41–6:46necessary apprehension or recollection of silver, thus cognition produces activity even
99. 6:46–6:50toward a non-object. It is then unnecessary to make cognition the cause of a child's
100. 6:50–6:56first activity. But this position is unsound. Because of the means of cognition employed
101. 6:56–7:00for the first time, qualified cognition must also be accepted as a cause of uncorroborated
102. 7:00–7:05activity. No other cause contrary to the original causal postulate may be admitted without a
103. 7:05–7:11sublating proof. Complexity in a causal postulate established from the effect is not a defect.
104. 7:11–7:15Otherwise the causality of word power with respect to future effects would also have
105. 7:15–7:19to be abandoned as more cumbersome than the verbal cognition of an already established effect,
106. 7:19–7:25and only the guru view would follow. Cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension
107. 7:25–7:32of difference are causes respectively. One may maintain that cognition produces activity
108. 7:32–7:37toward its own object, which is true. But uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises
109. 7:37–7:41from the foundational cognition, this is silver, not from a cognition of the desired object,
110. 7:41–7:46this shell is desired. Cognition of the desired silver merely delimits the causality present
111. 7:46–7:50in non-apprehension of the shell's difference from silver, for parsimony it is an additional
112. 7:50–7:55element like inertia that is not otherwise established. The status of being an object
113. 7:55–8:00of cognition of silver, that is, being the object of a cognition favorable to activity
114. 8:00–8:04toward that object is absent from the shell, otherwise cognition of silver would take the
115. 8:04–8:09shell as its object. The men's arc a two accepts that cognition of desired silver produces corroborated
116. 8:09–8:14activity, such cognition is itself cognition favorable to activity and therefore is not a mere
117. 8:14–8:20delimiter. The Niyayika replies that on the basis of independent positive and negative concomitants,
118. 8:20–8:25cognition of the desired object causes activity and is not merely a delimiter of causality.
119. 8:25–8:29Cognition of the desired object cannot be made merely a delimiter because positive and
120. 8:29–8:33and negative concomitance between non-apprehension of difference and uncorroborated activity
121. 8:33–8:38toward the shell cannot be established without including cognition of the desired object.
122. 8:38–8:42Positive and negative concomitance between cognition of the desired object and corroborated
123. 8:42–8:46activity has been admitted together with non-apprehension of difference, hence non-apprehension
124. 8:46–8:51of difference is not unnecessary like Pothood. If cognition of desired silver produces
125. 8:51–8:54activity even when its difference from the shell is not apprehended, the reversed
126. 8:54–8:57claim that cognition of silver is the cause and non-apprehension of difference
127. 8:57–9:02merely delimits its causality is groundless. Therefore independent positive and negative
128. 9:02–9:06concomitance establishes cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference
129. 9:06–9:11as causes respectively of corroborated and uncorroborated activity.
130. 9:11–9:15Varidical cognition of desired silver causes activity in general, therefore uncorroborated
131. 9:15–9:19activity toward the undesired shell must arise from invalid cognition of the desired
132. 9:19–9:24object, because no effect occurs without the accepted cause. Activity toward the
133. 9:24–9:28desired object does not delimit effect hood because that supposition is needlessly complex.
134. 9:29–9:34In the absence of an inhibitor, related entities are generally accepted as cause and effect,
135. 9:34–9:37there is no need to make the condition of activity a causal qualification.
136. 9:39–9:44Further refutation of the view that cognition alone is the cause, restatement of misapprehension.
137. 9:46–9:50It may be said that in corroborated activity, the foundational cognition,
138. 9:50–9:54this is silver, accidentally takes desired silver as its object and produces activity.
139. 9:54–9:59Then let corroborated activity toward the desired object arise merely from foundational
140. 9:59–10:03cognition, known non-apprehension of difference does not produce corroborated activity.
141. 10:03–10:08Consequently the view, veridical cognition of silver does not take the shell as object
142. 10:08–10:12because it does not cause activity toward the shell, is refuted, otherwise the nature
143. 10:12–10:15of veridical cognition would lack an example.
144. 10:15–10:19It may further be said that the pervasion, all cognition is veridical, opposes the
145. 10:19–10:22naiyayika theory of misapprehension.
146. 10:22–10:27cognition and cognition of the desired object, for reasons of parsimony, cause activity in general,
147. 10:27–10:31all scholars accept that in a child's first activity cognition causes activity toward its
148. 10:31–10:37own object. Cognition of the desired object also causes false or uncorroborated activity,
149. 10:37–10:40it is not merely a delimiter of the causality of non-apprehension of difference.
150. 10:41–10:46Therefore misapprehension is not established. But this reasoning is unsound.
151. 10:47–10:51The inference denying misapprehension is based on causality known through superfluous
152. 10:51–10:55positive and negative concomitance, it therefore destroys the alleged pervasion, all cognition
153. 10:55–11:01is veridical. An effect does not arise without an accepted cause. There is no sublating proof
154. 11:01–11:05against the opponent who admits only veridical cognition, but the theory of misapprehension
155. 11:05–11:10can clearly explain the means of unwavering activity toward the shell. This refutation
156. 11:10–11:15also rejects the Memsaka view that, unlike recognition, one cognition of objects unrelated
157. 11:15–11:20to the sense faculty or word is impossible.
158. 11:20–11:26Refutation of the partial Prabhācāra view that misapprehension is unnecessary.
159. 11:26–11:30The partial Prabhācāra says that silver and shell need not each be apprehended as different
160. 11:30–11:34from both silver and shell, therefore activity and withdrawal do not occur together.
161. 11:34–11:38Because of a defect, the difference of the real object present before one from remembered
162. 11:38–11:42silver or shell may be apprehended while that object itself is overlooked, hence invalid
163. 11:42–11:44cognition is unnecessary.
164. 11:44–11:48It is not necessary that every recollection of silver endowed with silverness takes silver
165. 11:48–11:53as object, even though universal relations are alike in silver through universal characteristic
166. 11:53–11:57presentation, a defect may inhibit recollection or perception of all silver.
167. 11:57–12:01In perceptual qualify cognition silverness is the universal presentation, in memory the
168. 12:01–12:04mind and impression are the presentations.
169. 12:04–12:10The impression has no universal cause, because an impression is not itself a means of knowledge.
170. 12:10–12:13This view is unsound.
171. 12:13–12:18of one shell and one silver, or of two shells and two silvers, would entail apprehension
172. 12:18–12:23of the shell's difference from silver in all four contrary alternatives.
173. 12:23–12:30Since difference of a shell from itself is impossible, invalid cognition must be admitted.
174. 12:30–12:36Negative cognition of an unapprehended non-relation is not an inhibitor.
175. 12:36–12:40Some other Prabhakaras say that the negative cognition, this is not silver, concerning
176. 12:40–12:44silver inhibits activity towards silver.
177. 12:44–12:48This cognition may be non-apprehension of silverness as non-relation, that is, apprehension
178. 12:48–12:53of a relation to the absolute absence of silverness, or non-apprehension of the non-relation
179. 12:53–12:56of difference from silver.
180. 12:56–12:59But this position is unsound.
181. 12:59–13:03If the non-relation of silverness and of difference from silver, which exists elsewhere,
182. 13:03–13:09is not apprehended as non-related to the shell, withdrawal from silver would follow.
183. 13:09–13:15If their non-relation to the shell is apprehended, invalid cognition too is established.
184. 13:15–13:19It may be said that withdrawal from silver occurs only when the non-relation of difference
185. 13:19–13:22from silver is not apprehended as related to silver.
186. 13:22–13:26But non-relation of non-relation is actually relation of difference, if non-relation
187. 13:26–13:29of the relation of difference from silver is apprehended, withdrawal from the shell
188. 13:29–13:31would follow.
189. 13:31–13:35If the relation of difference from silver is apprehended as unrelated to the shell,
190. 13:35–13:37misapprehension becomes unavoidable.
191. 13:37–13:41Because activity and withdrawal may occur together in the verbal cognition, this is not
192. 13:41–13:45silver, non-apprehension of difference cannot be an inhibitor.
193. 13:45–13:50Refutation of the view that cognition of absence of counter-positiveness to the desired
194. 13:50–13:54or undesired object is the cause.
195. 13:54–13:58Some others say that activity and withdrawal respectively arise from apprehension, in
196. 13:58–14:02a known difference present in the object before one, of absence of a condition describing
197. 14:02–14:06counter-positiveness to the desired or undesired object.
198. 14:06–14:09For example, though difference from silver resides in the shell, it is not seen because
199. 14:09–14:13of a defect, while difference from another object is seen.
200. 14:13–14:17Activity toward the shell arises from apprehension, in the difference residing in the shell,
201. 14:17–14:20of absence of counter-positiveness to silver.
202. 14:20–14:23Since absence of counter-positiveness to the shell is not apprehended because of
203. 14:23–14:27a defect, there is no withdrawal from the shell.
204. 14:27–14:30Withdrawal from silver arises from apprehension, in the remembered difference residing
205. 14:30–14:34in silver, of absence of counter-positiveness to the shell.
206. 14:34–14:38Its absence of counter-positiveness to silver is not apprehended because of a defect, activity,
207. 14:38–14:41and withdrawal do not occur together.
208. 14:41–14:45It may be objected that because the condition of difference residing in the shell is also
209. 14:45–14:49present in difference from silver, general object cognitions take specific objects as
210. 14:49–14:53their objects, consequently difference from silver may be manifested as difference residing
211. 14:53–14:54in the shell.
212. 14:54–14:58Then, when absence of counter-positiveness to the shell is apprehended in difference
213. 14:58–15:01from silver, invalid cognition will be established.
214. 15:01–15:06Answer, because of the defect, despite universal presentation, difference from silver is not
215. 15:06–15:09apprehended as difference residing in the shell.
216. 15:09–15:14The Neayaka says that experience through positive and negative concomitance establishes that
217. 15:14–15:19the qualified cognition the shell as silver causes activity.
218. 15:19–15:24In veridical cognition, qualified cognition alone produces activity.
219. 15:24–15:29The only dispute is whether an invalid cognition qualified cognition alone is the cause
220. 15:29–15:33or cognition of absence of the condition of counter-positiveness to silver also causes
221. 15:33–15:35it.
222. 15:35–15:40Making mere cognition of absence the cause of activity contradicts experience.
223. 15:40–15:45In veritical cognition, absence cognition is not a cause, and positing it is more cumbersome
224. 15:45–15:48than qualified cognition.
225. 15:48–15:53In activity from verbal cognition, cognition of difference is absent, the same difficulty
226. 15:53–15:57arises in explaining withdrawal.
227. 15:57–16:06Another view is that a property apprehended as residing in the desired object, silver,
228. 16:06–16:10but not in the undesired shell causes activity toward its substrate, silver.
229. 16:10–16:14In desired silver this property is silverness, in the undesired shell it is resemblance
230. 16:14–16:15to silver.
231. 16:15–16:20Likewise, a property apprehended as residing in the undesired object but not in the desired
232. 16:20–16:23object causes withdrawal from its substrate.
233. 16:23–16:27On this account activity and withdrawal do not occur together.
234. 16:27–16:30But this view is unsound.
235. 16:30–16:34The verbal illusion, this is both shell and silver, would not establish activity toward
236. 16:34–16:39the shell and withdrawal from silver, because the property residing in silver and the property
237. 16:39–16:43residing in the shell are not respectively remembered through the words as being in shell
238. 16:43–16:44and silver.
239. 16:44–16:48Nor is it proper to say that after hearing the words both properties are apprehended
240. 16:48–16:53perceptually, then the word would not cause recollection of the property.
241. 16:53–16:58In fact, belief in the deceiver's invariable words, this is both shell and silver, causes
242. 16:58–17:02activity and withdrawal.
243. 17:02–17:06Qualified cognition causes activity.
244. 17:06–17:11Some others say that, because of a defect, silverness in silver is not apprehended in
245. 17:11–17:15invalid cognition, therefore non-apprehension of difference from all remembered properties
246. 17:15–17:20residing in silver does not produce activity toward silver.
247. 17:20–17:24Activity toward the shell arises from non-apprehension of difference from some one property
248. 17:24–17:28remembered as residing in the shell and apprehended as silver.
249. 17:28–17:32Likewise, withdrawal from the shell does not arise from non-apprehension of difference
250. 17:32–17:37from all properties, but withdrawal from silver arises from non-apprehension of difference
251. 17:37–17:39from one property.
252. 17:39–17:43Just as activity stops when an existent difference is apprehended through another
253. 17:43–17:47means even though non-apprehension of difference persists, apprehension of difference from
254. 17:47–17:53all properties remembered as residing in silver inhibits activity.
255. 17:53–17:55This is unsound.
256. 17:55–17:57Because of parsimony and positive negative concomitance,
257. 17:57–17:59the invalid qualified cognition,
258. 17:59–18:01this shell is silver, causes activity,
259. 18:01–18:02not an elaborate construction
260. 18:02–18:05of non-apprehension of differences.
261. 18:05–18:07Nor is the objection that qualified cognition
262. 18:07–18:10has no cause sound, as in recognition, impression,
263. 18:10–18:12and sense faculty produce one cognition.
264. 18:12–18:15If recognition is treated as two cognitions,
265. 18:15–18:18identity of the earlier and later cognition disappears.
266. 18:18–18:20Nor is it true that impression and sense faculty
267. 18:20–18:23do not cooperate with respect to the same object,
268. 18:23–18:27They cooperate in perception of a named object and in production of cognition as that same
269. 18:27–18:28object.
270. 18:28–18:32This account is not needlessly complex, non-apprehension of difference serves as a cooperating
271. 18:32–18:36cause of qualified cognition.
272. 18:36–18:40This is silver is one cognition.
273. 18:40–18:45Objection, though recognition is one cognition, its, that-ness, component is not perceptual
274. 18:45–18:49because it lacks sense contact, cognition of that-ness arises from an impression.
275. 18:49–18:53Thus only memoryhood belongs to the that-ness component, while perceptuality belongs
276. 18:53–18:58to the identity component of the object present before one. Memoryhood and perceptuality are
277. 18:58–19:03neither universals nor extrinsic conditions, so there is no defect of overlap between them.
278. 19:03–19:08Answer, you yourself admit that an object not in contact with the sense faculty is
279. 19:08–19:13manifested through an impression. Therefore, on your own view, the invalid qualified cognition,
280. 19:13–19:17this shell is silver, like recognition, can be one cognition when the causal
281. 19:17–19:22complex is present. Perceptuality in both the thatness and silverness components is
282. 19:22–19:27produced by the sense faculty, the two properties do not overlap.
283. 19:27–19:30It may again be said that perceptual cognition of a particular object arises from direct
284. 19:30–19:34sense contact with that particular object, whereas invalid cognition of silver has no
285. 19:34–19:36contact with silver.
286. 19:36–19:39This objection is unsound.
287. 19:39–19:43Recognition is perceptual cognition because it is produced by sense contact, indirectness
288. 19:43–19:47cannot be admitted in the thatness or silverness component.
289. 19:47–19:50or memory functions as a presentation establishing perceptuality in darkness.
290. 19:52–19:55Nor is Inherence in a related object the cause of directly perceived
291. 19:55–20:00silverness. There is no proof that perception of silverness is impossible without such
292. 20:00–20:04Inherence. Inherence weakened by cognition of a distinction does not cause qualified
293. 20:04–20:08cognition of silverness, because when the cognitive aggregate is fully present,
294. 20:08–20:09qualified cognition is not delayed.
295. 20:11–20:13Illusion is false cognition.
296. 20:13–20:18Cognition of the qualifier is a presentation of the qualificant,
297. 20:18–20:23non-apprehension of non-relation between qualifier and qualificant causes qualifed perception.
298. 20:24–20:28This non-apprehension of non-relation, common to recognition and veridical perception,
299. 20:28–20:33is also possible in illusory and valid cognition. Contact of the eye with a particular silver
300. 20:33–20:36object causes perception of silver, but only in the capacity of presentation of a
301. 20:36–20:41qualificant in general, not as a special relation to that particular silver. For in
302. 20:41–20:45In general, whatever entity of a class causes an effect of a class, a particular entity
303. 20:45–20:50of that class causes a particular effect of that class.
304. 20:50–20:53Contact with particular silver becomes redundant beside the other causal conditions for perception
305. 20:53–20:58of a general qualifcant, therefore no separate causal complex need be posited for perception
306. 20:58–21:02of particular silver, and doing so would be needlessly complex.
307. 21:02–21:06A particular qualifcant or particular qualify cognition may be established through presentation
308. 21:06–21:08of a qualifcant in general.
309. 21:08–21:13Thus making the causality of qualified cognition depend on general presentation of a qualificant
310. 21:13–21:16is more economical than making activity depend on non-apprehension of difference from an
311. 21:16–21:20independently remembered desired object.
312. 21:20–21:24In fact, the rule that a silver illusion arises from a sensory defect is established
313. 21:24–21:26in both traditions.
314. 21:26–21:29But silver illusion cannot mean non-apprehension of non-relation.
315. 21:29–21:33If absence of non-relation is foundational, it is not established, and if it is absence
316. 21:33–21:38of cognition of the foundation, then, being veridical cognition of the foundation,
317. 21:38–21:43cannot arise from a defective sense faculty. Nor is it correct that a superimposed veridical
318. 21:43–21:47cognition in place of illusion arises solely from a sensory defect, because such veridical
319. 21:47–21:52cognition arises from an entirely different causal aggregate. Therefore illusion must
320. 21:52–21:57be false, that is, invalid cognition. Consequently it must be admitted that cognition of an
321. 21:57–22:02object not in contact with the sense faculty also arises from a sensory defect. The
322. 22:02–22:06operation through which a sensory defect produces uncoroperated activity is only
323. 22:06–22:10invalid qualified cognition, because the causality of the sensory defect towards such activity
324. 22:10–22:12is already admitted.
325. 22:12–22:16Non-apprehension of difference is not the cause of that activity, since its causality remains
326. 22:16–22:17to be established.

Plain text

Activity is not established from non-apprehension of difference. Uncorroborated activity is not established merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver. In the mutually opposed collective cognitions, this is both shell and silver, and this is both silver and shell, activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver would occur simultaneously. The objection that there is no proof supporting such collective cognition is also unsound. The causal complexes of both collective illusions concerning shell and silver coexist, therefore production of the illusion, this is both shell and silver, is established by experience like the veridical collective cognition, this is both shell and silver. If its absence were accepted, experience of duality and the like in collective cognition would disappear. The Nayaika need not posit doubt here, because through the power of a sensory defect the differences of both shell and silver may be apprehended in each, but the Memsaka must admit a separate doubt, is this shell or silver, because the distinct differences of shell and silver cannot both be apprehended in one and the same object. Refutation of the view that activity and withdrawal arise from non-apprehension of their differences. It may be objective that activity and withdrawal arise respectively from non-apprehension of silver's difference in the shell and shell's difference in silver, because recollection of silverness and shellness respectively produces recollection of silver and shell. In recollection, only silver as endowed with silverness and shell as endowed with shellness are apprehended, not, shell endowed with silverness, or, silver endowed with shellness. Thus a person seeking a black gram seed in a heap of black powder acts toward that powder because he fails to apprehend its difference from the gram recalled through black color. Superimposition of silverness experienced in the shell does not produce both activity and withdrawal, otherwise the naiya-yaka would have to posit separate cognitions of shell and silver everywhere. But this reasoning is unsound. When desired silver and undesired shell are remembered through a semblance of testimony or perceptual illusion, activity and withdrawal do not arise from cognition of that quality. The Neyayaka accepts that cognition of one quality can recall both shell and silver, through a sensory defect, mutually opposed qualified cognitions of both arise. Activity and withdrawal also do not arise merely from a sensory defect, because the The defect is absent in veritical cognition of silver in shell produced by a sound sense faculty. A general defect does not yield uncorroborated activity, the kinds of defect differ according to perception, inference, and testimony. Another proposal of the Neo Prabhakara. The Neo Prabhakara says that an intense desire to remember the property brightness residing in the shell arises with respect to silver because that property is more closely related to silverness. Once in the shell the property is less closely related to shellness, the desire to recall it there is weak. The more intense desire to remember the property in silver inhibits the weaker desire to remember it in the shell, therefore withdrawal from the shell and activity towards silver do not occur together. This proposal too is unsound. In the illusion, this is both shell and silver produced by a semblance of testimony, Both silverness and shellness are equally recalled through words, and thus activity and withdrawal would still occur simultaneously. Conversely, if silverness and shellness are taken as respectively more and less closely related, doubt of intense and weak alternatives in the form is this shell or silver, becomes unavoidable. There is no proof supporting such a construction of intense and weak desire, intensity of desire is itself not evident. On Saka objection, non-correspondence of activity is objecthood with respect to the undesired object. The Msaka says that qualified cognition of silver causes corroborated activity, while non-apprehension of difference from silver causes uncorroborated activity, both points have already been admitted. But truth and falsity of qualified cognition cannot be treated as causes, because their causality has not yet been established. of the desired silver immediately present causes activity in general, and cognition of the undesired shell causes withdrawal in general, hence there is no lack of recurrence. Therefore it is unnecessary to make one qualified cognition alone the cause of both activity and withdrawal. Truth or falsity of qualified cognition is not a cause of activity, because admitting its causality creates needless complexity. The undesirable consequence would also follow that apprehension of the shell's difference from silver causes withdrawal from the desired silver. A general effect does not arise without a specific cause, here two specific causes are available, qualified cognition of silver and non-apprehension of silver's difference from the shell. Therefore mere non-apprehension of difference causes uncorroborated activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver, in the absence of qualified cognition of silver and shell there is no corroborated activity or withdrawal. The Niyayika says that if silver and shell have not been apprehended as mutually different, the general causal complex being present, uncorroborated activity and withdrawal would arise. If it is said that activity toward real silver is not uncorroborated, then for that very reason non-apprehension of difference cannot be the cause of uncorroborated activity. The non-correspondence of activity or withdrawal is its failure to accord with the object, or non-correspondence of a cause is not determined from its effect. The MMSAKA replies that non-correspondence means activity toward an undesired object and withdrawal from a desired object. Then if non-apprehension of difference causes both uncorroborated acts, how can corroborated activity toward the desired object and corroborated withdrawal from the undesired object also arise from it? Non-apprehension of difference lacks the capacity to produce these two corroborated acts. The Naya Yaka reply, cognition of the desired object causes activity. The Naya Yaka replies that cognition produces activity toward its own object. Therefore, for parsimony, one and the same cognition is accepted as causing both a child's first activity and corroborated activity in general, when no inhibitor is present. Cognition apprehending the shell as a desired object causes activity toward the shell because it takes the shell as its object, cognition does not produce activity toward something that is not its object. It may be objected that uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises merely from non-apprehension of difference from silver together with the necessary apprehension or recollection of silver, thus cognition produces activity even toward a non-object. It is then unnecessary to make cognition the cause of a child's first activity. But this position is unsound. Because of the means of cognition employed for the first time, qualified cognition must also be accepted as a cause of uncorroborated activity. No other cause contrary to the original causal postulate may be admitted without a sublating proof. Complexity in a causal postulate established from the effect is not a defect. Otherwise the causality of word power with respect to future effects would also have to be abandoned as more cumbersome than the verbal cognition of an already established effect, and only the guru view would follow. Cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference are causes respectively. One may maintain that cognition produces activity toward its own object, which is true. But uncorroborated activity toward the shell arises from the foundational cognition, this is silver, not from a cognition of the desired object, this shell is desired. Cognition of the desired silver merely delimits the causality present in non-apprehension of the shell's difference from silver, for parsimony it is an additional element like inertia that is not otherwise established. The status of being an object of cognition of silver, that is, being the object of a cognition favorable to activity toward that object is absent from the shell, otherwise cognition of silver would take the shell as its object. The men's arc a two accepts that cognition of desired silver produces corroborated activity, such cognition is itself cognition favorable to activity and therefore is not a mere delimiter. The Niyayika replies that on the basis of independent positive and negative concomitants, cognition of the desired object causes activity and is not merely a delimiter of causality. Cognition of the desired object cannot be made merely a delimiter because positive and and negative concomitance between non-apprehension of difference and uncorroborated activity toward the shell cannot be established without including cognition of the desired object. Positive and negative concomitance between cognition of the desired object and corroborated activity has been admitted together with non-apprehension of difference, hence non-apprehension of difference is not unnecessary like Pothood. If cognition of desired silver produces activity even when its difference from the shell is not apprehended, the reversed claim that cognition of silver is the cause and non-apprehension of difference merely delimits its causality is groundless. Therefore independent positive and negative concomitance establishes cognition of the desired object and non-apprehension of difference as causes respectively of corroborated and uncorroborated activity. Varidical cognition of desired silver causes activity in general, therefore uncorroborated activity toward the undesired shell must arise from invalid cognition of the desired object, because no effect occurs without the accepted cause. Activity toward the desired object does not delimit effect hood because that supposition is needlessly complex. In the absence of an inhibitor, related entities are generally accepted as cause and effect, there is no need to make the condition of activity a causal qualification. Further refutation of the view that cognition alone is the cause, restatement of misapprehension. It may be said that in corroborated activity, the foundational cognition, this is silver, accidentally takes desired silver as its object and produces activity. Then let corroborated activity toward the desired object arise merely from foundational cognition, known non-apprehension of difference does not produce corroborated activity. Consequently the view, veridical cognition of silver does not take the shell as object because it does not cause activity toward the shell, is refuted, otherwise the nature of veridical cognition would lack an example. It may further be said that the pervasion, all cognition is veridical, opposes the naiyayika theory of misapprehension. cognition and cognition of the desired object, for reasons of parsimony, cause activity in general, all scholars accept that in a child's first activity cognition causes activity toward its own object. Cognition of the desired object also causes false or uncorroborated activity, it is not merely a delimiter of the causality of non-apprehension of difference. Therefore misapprehension is not established. But this reasoning is unsound. The inference denying misapprehension is based on causality known through superfluous positive and negative concomitance, it therefore destroys the alleged pervasion, all cognition is veridical. An effect does not arise without an accepted cause. There is no sublating proof against the opponent who admits only veridical cognition, but the theory of misapprehension can clearly explain the means of unwavering activity toward the shell. This refutation also rejects the Memsaka view that, unlike recognition, one cognition of objects unrelated to the sense faculty or word is impossible. Refutation of the partial Prabhācāra view that misapprehension is unnecessary. The partial Prabhācāra says that silver and shell need not each be apprehended as different from both silver and shell, therefore activity and withdrawal do not occur together. Because of a defect, the difference of the real object present before one from remembered silver or shell may be apprehended while that object itself is overlooked, hence invalid cognition is unnecessary. It is not necessary that every recollection of silver endowed with silverness takes silver as object, even though universal relations are alike in silver through universal characteristic presentation, a defect may inhibit recollection or perception of all silver. In perceptual qualify cognition silverness is the universal presentation, in memory the mind and impression are the presentations. The impression has no universal cause, because an impression is not itself a means of knowledge. This view is unsound. of one shell and one silver, or of two shells and two silvers, would entail apprehension of the shell's difference from silver in all four contrary alternatives. Since difference of a shell from itself is impossible, invalid cognition must be admitted. Negative cognition of an unapprehended non-relation is not an inhibitor. Some other Prabhakaras say that the negative cognition, this is not silver, concerning silver inhibits activity towards silver. This cognition may be non-apprehension of silverness as non-relation, that is, apprehension of a relation to the absolute absence of silverness, or non-apprehension of the non-relation of difference from silver. But this position is unsound. If the non-relation of silverness and of difference from silver, which exists elsewhere, is not apprehended as non-related to the shell, withdrawal from silver would follow. If their non-relation to the shell is apprehended, invalid cognition too is established. It may be said that withdrawal from silver occurs only when the non-relation of difference from silver is not apprehended as related to silver. But non-relation of non-relation is actually relation of difference, if non-relation of the relation of difference from silver is apprehended, withdrawal from the shell would follow. If the relation of difference from silver is apprehended as unrelated to the shell, misapprehension becomes unavoidable. Because activity and withdrawal may occur together in the verbal cognition, this is not silver, non-apprehension of difference cannot be an inhibitor. Refutation of the view that cognition of absence of counter-positiveness to the desired or undesired object is the cause. Some others say that activity and withdrawal respectively arise from apprehension, in a known difference present in the object before one, of absence of a condition describing counter-positiveness to the desired or undesired object. For example, though difference from silver resides in the shell, it is not seen because of a defect, while difference from another object is seen. Activity toward the shell arises from apprehension, in the difference residing in the shell, of absence of counter-positiveness to silver. Since absence of counter-positiveness to the shell is not apprehended because of a defect, there is no withdrawal from the shell. Withdrawal from silver arises from apprehension, in the remembered difference residing in silver, of absence of counter-positiveness to the shell. Its absence of counter-positiveness to silver is not apprehended because of a defect, activity, and withdrawal do not occur together. It may be objected that because the condition of difference residing in the shell is also present in difference from silver, general object cognitions take specific objects as their objects, consequently difference from silver may be manifested as difference residing in the shell. Then, when absence of counter-positiveness to the shell is apprehended in difference from silver, invalid cognition will be established. Answer, because of the defect, despite universal presentation, difference from silver is not apprehended as difference residing in the shell. The Neayaka says that experience through positive and negative concomitance establishes that the qualified cognition the shell as silver causes activity. In veridical cognition, qualified cognition alone produces activity. The only dispute is whether an invalid cognition qualified cognition alone is the cause or cognition of absence of the condition of counter-positiveness to silver also causes it. Making mere cognition of absence the cause of activity contradicts experience. In veritical cognition, absence cognition is not a cause, and positing it is more cumbersome than qualified cognition. In activity from verbal cognition, cognition of difference is absent, the same difficulty arises in explaining withdrawal. Another view is that a property apprehended as residing in the desired object, silver, but not in the undesired shell causes activity toward its substrate, silver. In desired silver this property is silverness, in the undesired shell it is resemblance to silver. Likewise, a property apprehended as residing in the undesired object but not in the desired object causes withdrawal from its substrate. On this account activity and withdrawal do not occur together. But this view is unsound. The verbal illusion, this is both shell and silver, would not establish activity toward the shell and withdrawal from silver, because the property residing in silver and the property residing in the shell are not respectively remembered through the words as being in shell and silver. Nor is it proper to say that after hearing the words both properties are apprehended perceptually, then the word would not cause recollection of the property. In fact, belief in the deceiver's invariable words, this is both shell and silver, causes activity and withdrawal. Qualified cognition causes activity. Some others say that, because of a defect, silverness in silver is not apprehended in invalid cognition, therefore non-apprehension of difference from all remembered properties residing in silver does not produce activity toward silver. Activity toward the shell arises from non-apprehension of difference from some one property remembered as residing in the shell and apprehended as silver. Likewise, withdrawal from the shell does not arise from non-apprehension of difference from all properties, but withdrawal from silver arises from non-apprehension of difference from one property. Just as activity stops when an existent difference is apprehended through another means even though non-apprehension of difference persists, apprehension of difference from all properties remembered as residing in silver inhibits activity. This is unsound. Because of parsimony and positive negative concomitance, the invalid qualified cognition, this shell is silver, causes activity, not an elaborate construction of non-apprehension of differences. Nor is the objection that qualified cognition has no cause sound, as in recognition, impression, and sense faculty produce one cognition. If recognition is treated as two cognitions, identity of the earlier and later cognition disappears. Nor is it true that impression and sense faculty do not cooperate with respect to the same object, They cooperate in perception of a named object and in production of cognition as that same object. This account is not needlessly complex, non-apprehension of difference serves as a cooperating cause of qualified cognition. This is silver is one cognition. Objection, though recognition is one cognition, its, that-ness, component is not perceptual because it lacks sense contact, cognition of that-ness arises from an impression. Thus only memoryhood belongs to the that-ness component, while perceptuality belongs to the identity component of the object present before one. Memoryhood and perceptuality are neither universals nor extrinsic conditions, so there is no defect of overlap between them. Answer, you yourself admit that an object not in contact with the sense faculty is manifested through an impression. Therefore, on your own view, the invalid qualified cognition, this shell is silver, like recognition, can be one cognition when the causal complex is present. Perceptuality in both the thatness and silverness components is produced by the sense faculty, the two properties do not overlap. It may again be said that perceptual cognition of a particular object arises from direct sense contact with that particular object, whereas invalid cognition of silver has no contact with silver. This objection is unsound. Recognition is perceptual cognition because it is produced by sense contact, indirectness cannot be admitted in the thatness or silverness component. or memory functions as a presentation establishing perceptuality in darkness. Nor is Inherence in a related object the cause of directly perceived silverness. There is no proof that perception of silverness is impossible without such Inherence. Inherence weakened by cognition of a distinction does not cause qualified cognition of silverness, because when the cognitive aggregate is fully present, qualified cognition is not delayed. Illusion is false cognition. Cognition of the qualifier is a presentation of the qualificant, non-apprehension of non-relation between qualifier and qualificant causes qualifed perception. This non-apprehension of non-relation, common to recognition and veridical perception, is also possible in illusory and valid cognition. Contact of the eye with a particular silver object causes perception of silver, but only in the capacity of presentation of a qualificant in general, not as a special relation to that particular silver. For in In general, whatever entity of a class causes an effect of a class, a particular entity of that class causes a particular effect of that class. Contact with particular silver becomes redundant beside the other causal conditions for perception of a general qualifcant, therefore no separate causal complex need be posited for perception of particular silver, and doing so would be needlessly complex. A particular qualifcant or particular qualify cognition may be established through presentation of a qualifcant in general. Thus making the causality of qualified cognition depend on general presentation of a qualificant is more economical than making activity depend on non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered desired object. In fact, the rule that a silver illusion arises from a sensory defect is established in both traditions. But silver illusion cannot mean non-apprehension of non-relation. If absence of non-relation is foundational, it is not established, and if it is absence of cognition of the foundation, then, being veridical cognition of the foundation, cannot arise from a defective sense faculty. Nor is it correct that a superimposed veridical cognition in place of illusion arises solely from a sensory defect, because such veridical cognition arises from an entirely different causal aggregate. Therefore illusion must be false, that is, invalid cognition. Consequently it must be admitted that cognition of an object not in contact with the sense faculty also arises from a sensory defect. The operation through which a sensory defect produces uncoroperated activity is only invalid qualified cognition, because the causality of the sensory defect towards such activity is already admitted. Non-apprehension of difference is not the cause of that activity, since its causality remains to be established.

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