MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part10_RadioPlay.mp4

Collection

Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.998165)

Duration

21:27

Source

Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:02–0:04विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
2. 0:04–0:06विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
3. 0:06–0:08विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
4. 0:08–0:10विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
5. 0:10–0:12विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
6. 0:12–0:14विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
7. 0:14–0:16विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
8. 0:16–0:18विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
9. 0:18–0:36The proponent of the established conclusion replies, once the self has been established as the substratum of desire and the eight substances such as earth have been established as not being substrata of desire, the inference the self differs from the eight substances is established on the basis of an obstructive property.
10. 0:36–0:49In other words, only after being the substratum of desire, or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance that is the self-does-negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom.
11. 0:49–0:54Second objection, the reason would become affirmative.
12. 0:54–1:02Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance.
13. 1:02–1:06Once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative.
14. 1:06–1:15Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative provision, even though negative provision is remembered.
15. 1:15–1:19The reasons on commonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason,
16. 1:19–1:25and the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom.
17. 1:26–1:33For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood,
18. 1:33–1:37on commonness is defective in special contexts, not universally.
19. 1:38–1:41Negative inference is not unnecessary.
20. 1:41–1:47Objection. Once the absence of desire in the Eight Substances has been established,
21. 1:47–1:52desires' residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality,
22. 1:52–1:55therefore negative inference is unnecessary.
23. 1:55–2:02Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self.
24. 2:02–2:08The specific probandom, the self differs from the other Eight Substances, is not established without negative pervasion.
25. 2:08–2:14If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the
26. 2:14–2:18probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative
27. 2:18–2:24inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property.
28. 2:24–2:29Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established separately.
29. 2:29–2:34Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur
30. 2:34–2:39and the self, therefore the self differs from the eight substances.
31. 2:39–2:44But how is the substratum that is the self directly known?
32. 2:44–2:48The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire
33. 2:48–2:53may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other
34. 2:53–2:57eight substances arises through negative inference.
35. 2:57–3:02In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably
36. 3:02–3:07known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially
37. 3:07–3:12the difference of the substratum that is the self.
38. 3:12–3:14Views of some scholars concerning negative inference
39. 3:14–3:2150. Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the
40. 3:21–3:25eight substances beginning with Earth, and do not understand the absence of desire in
41. 3:25–3:29the eight substances, can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference
42. 3:29–3:32The substratum of desire differs from the eight substances.
43. 3:33–3:38Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter reason.
44. 3:38–3:43Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger.
45. 3:44–3:47Another view, absence is the probandom.
46. 3:49–3:55Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference.
47. 3:56–4:00A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference.
48. 4:01–4:07Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water,
49. 4:07–4:11therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth.
50. 4:11–4:18In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is already directly known.
51. 4:18–4:24Selfhood can be established in a living body.
52. 4:24–4:30In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars,
53. 4:30–4:37where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire.
54. 4:37–4:41Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire,
55. 4:41–4:45the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example.
56. 4:45–4:5152, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jah serves as the negative example.
57. 4:51–4:55But a living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence,
58. 4:55–4:58because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body
59. 4:58–5:01and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition.
60. 5:01–5:06For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inirtness,
61. 5:06–5:10inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire.
62. 5:10–5:14Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with
63. 5:14–5:18a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property
64. 5:18–5:24delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire.
65. 5:24–5:29Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus.
66. 5:29–5:3553. In this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference, invalid cognition
67. 5:35–5:40does not produce successful activity in a competent person.
68. 5:40–5:45In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent
69. 5:45–5:50person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property.
70. 5:50–5:55Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly
71. 5:55–6:00perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent.
72. 6:01–6:06This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of
73. 6:06–6:11cognition. It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established,
74. 6:11–6:15how can cognition qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason?
75. 6:16–6:20This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference
76. 6:20–6:24of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is
77. 6:24–6:29is the Qualificant and the Subject the Qualifier, just as in the Cognition, there is no jar
78. 6:29–6:33on the ground, Absence is the Qualificant and the Ground the Qualifier.
79. 6:33–6:38Here Cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment
80. 6:38–6:41of the Probandom and negative inference.
81. 6:41–6:45This Cognition actually has the form that the Absence of the Absence of the Probandom
82. 6:45–6:49is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive
83. 6:49–6:54of an absence pervading the absence of the Probandom.
84. 6:54–7:00of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary.
85. 7:02–7:0654 may be objected that recollection of the probandum, earth's difference from the other
86. 7:06–7:11eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that,
87. 7:11–7:15for cognizing the probandum, it is enough that the subject earth possesses the reason
88. 7:15–7:18earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the
89. 7:18–7:23probandum, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible.
90. 7:23–7:29This objection is untenable. In Earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference
91. 7:29–7:33from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of Earthhood.
92. 7:33–7:37Here Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the
93. 7:37–7:41probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the
94. 7:41–7:45probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom.
95. 7:45–7:50This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself.
96. 7:50–8:04In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method.
97. 8:04–8:10With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end.
98. 8:10–8:19The theory of presumption. Objection, presumption is not a separate means of knowledge.
99. 8:19–8:261. Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there
100. 8:26–8:32is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved
101. 8:32–8:36by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through
102. 8:36–8:40purely negative inference itself.
103. 8:40–8:44The Msaaka view of presumption based on doubt.
104. 8:44–8:502. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Msaaka view is as follows.
105. 8:50–8:54That Devdutta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another
106. 8:54–8:56scientifically accepted cause.
107. 8:56–9:01Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdutta, who lives for a hundred
108. 9:01–9:04years, stays only inside the house.
109. 9:04–9:09When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdutta, is not found in the
110. 9:09–9:13house, his absence within the house is ascertained.
111. 9:13–9:18This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house.
112. 9:18–9:23His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta
113. 9:23–9:25alive or not?
114. 9:25–9:30According to the Memsaka, Devadatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning
115. 9:30–9:32his being alive.
116. 9:32–9:35From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devadatta's being alive and his
117. 9:35–9:38necessary presence.
118. 9:38–9:41Without supposing Devadatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these
119. 9:41–9:46two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living Devadatta is outside the house,
120. 9:46–9:50is only after the entire specified causal complex.
121. 9:50–9:53Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through
122. 9:53–9:57affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being
123. 9:57–10:01alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary
124. 10:01–10:04cause of the presumption of external presence.
125. 10:04–10:08Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the
126. 10:08–10:12cause of presumption, because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental
127. 10:12–10:15operation.
128. 10:15–10:19Some sakkas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive
129. 10:19–10:26and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption.
130. 10:26–10:30On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta
131. 10:30–10:35is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house.
132. 10:35–10:39But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the
133. 10:39–10:43reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption
134. 10:43–10:48must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
135. 10:48–10:52Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection.
136. 10:52–10:543.
137. 10:54–10:58It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument,
138. 10:58–11:02then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative
139. 11:02–11:04would also become inevitable.
140. 11:04–11:08Nor is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition.
141. 11:08–11:12If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would
142. 11:12–11:18disease, and if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference.
143. 11:18–11:22If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises
144. 11:22–11:28on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary.
145. 11:28–11:33Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation,
146. 11:33–11:36this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence.
147. 11:36–11:39But this argument is untenable.
148. 11:39–11:44What about devduttas being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause
149. 11:44–11:46of presumption.
150. 11:46–11:50For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce
151. 11:50–11:54that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of
152. 11:54–11:57the person's presence outside.
153. 11:57–12:01The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive,
154. 12:01–12:06the living devdutta, is not itself doubt about devduttas being alive.
155. 12:06–12:10Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent.
156. 12:10–12:154. It may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of Devadatta's
157. 12:15–12:19being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong. How then is
158. 12:19–12:22supposition of external presence possible?
159. 12:22–12:26No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition
160. 12:26–12:30is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and preserve
161. 12:30–12:34the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external
162. 12:34–12:39presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal.
163. 12:41–12:46Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view.
164. 12:48–12:525. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker,
165. 12:52–12:57the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead
166. 12:57–13:03does not arise. Therefore devduttas presence outside is supposed only when his being alive
167. 13:03–13:09is absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive.
168. 13:10–13:16For this reason, cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference.
169. 13:16–13:22Living devadatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house.
170. 13:22–13:30Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive.
171. 13:30–13:35nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both
172. 13:35–13:39cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence,
173. 13:39–13:43because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause
174. 13:43–13:49ascertainment of that same object. Mutual contradiction of the two ascertainments.
175. 13:50–13:566. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about dev-dut does
176. 13:56–14:01being alive from the specified causal complex reasons as follows, the absence of the living
177. 14:01–14:07devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive,
178. 14:07–14:10namely the living devdutta in the house.
179. 14:10–14:14Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments
180. 14:14–14:19– devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must be
181. 14:19–14:25sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid.
182. 14:25–14:30or either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death,
183. 14:30–14:36or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence.
184. 14:36–14:40In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside
185. 14:40–14:45the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta
186. 14:45–14:49lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains
187. 14:49–14:51only in the house, are sublated.
188. 14:51–14:56Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives
189. 14:56–15:01for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated.
190. 15:01–15:05Doubt produces the supposition of external presence.
191. 15:05–15:067.
192. 15:06–15:11Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period,
193. 15:11–15:17and long period, as in Devdutta is alive today and Devdutta will be alive tomorrow.
194. 15:17–15:22As such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many pervasions concerning
195. 15:22–15:25time would be sublated.
196. 15:25–15:29Compared with these numerous pervasions, the pervasion of Devdatta's presence inside
197. 15:29–15:35the house, which is only one part of all those pervasions, is less extensive.
198. 15:35–15:38Devdatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more
199. 15:38–15:42economical than supposing death, which is negative.
200. 15:42–15:45It may be said that Devdatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical
201. 15:45–15:49an external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and
202. 15:49–15:54mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more
203. 15:54–15:58economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves being alive, is
204. 15:58–16:00what should be supposed.
205. 16:00–16:06Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's external presence can also arise through an inference
206. 16:06–16:10depending on being alive as supposed by presumption.
207. 16:10–16:14Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the
208. 16:14–16:18The assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity,
209. 16:18–16:23supposes Devdutta's external presence.
210. 16:23–16:26Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
211. 16:26–16:278.
212. 16:27–16:32It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical
213. 16:32–16:36meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning
214. 16:36–16:40and inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's
215. 16:40–16:43external presence.
216. 16:43–16:48Any hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate
217. 16:48–16:53in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause
218. 16:53–16:55of a means of knowledge.
219. 16:55–17:00In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other
220. 17:00–17:02means of knowledge.
221. 17:02–17:06When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than
222. 17:06–17:11presumption can establish dev.ta's external presence.
223. 17:11–17:17hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption.
224. 17:17–17:21Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt.
225. 17:21–17:279. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning,
226. 17:27–17:30produces veridical cognition of devadatta's external presence through its own specific
227. 17:30–17:34nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced
228. 17:34–17:39from a doubt in which devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical.
229. 17:39–17:41But this objection is untenable.
230. 17:41–17:46A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory
231. 17:46–17:47illusion.
232. 17:47–17:51In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic
233. 17:51–17:57power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence.
234. 17:57–18:00It may be said that cognition resembling super sensory perception is valid only when
235. 18:00–18:04it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition.
236. 18:04–18:05This is true.
237. 18:05–18:09In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the
238. 18:09–18:13necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality
239. 18:13–18:16of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest.
240. 18:16–18:21Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity
241. 18:21–18:26to produce foridical cognition of deva datas presence outside the house. With this, the
242. 18:26–18:31prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end.
243. 18:31–18:34Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt
244. 18:34–18:4110. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated.
245. 18:42–18:47The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory
246. 18:47–18:51meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning,
247. 18:51–18:55sublates devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas'
248. 18:55–19:01being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference
249. 19:01–19:05establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house.
250. 19:05–19:08This may be explained as follows.
251. 19:08–19:13If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death
252. 19:13–19:19is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house.
253. 19:19–19:24Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred
254. 19:24–19:30years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house are sublated.
255. 19:30–19:34When the evidence for Dev Dutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment
256. 19:34–19:38of Dev Dutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from
257. 19:38–19:43general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one
258. 19:43–19:48is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside
259. 19:48–19:50the house.
260. 19:50–19:54The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it
261. 19:54–19:59does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition
262. 19:59–20:04of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence
263. 20:04–20:08inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment
264. 20:08–20:13of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion
265. 20:13–20:17of being alive, cognition of dev-dupt as external presence is obtained solely through
266. 20:17–20:22inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required.
267. 20:22–20:261. Objection, presumption is necessary.
268. 20:26–20:3111. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house,
269. 20:31–20:35even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains
270. 20:35–20:41only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once
271. 20:41–20:44the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of
272. 20:44–20:49external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of
273. 20:49–20:55external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption,
274. 20:55–20:59the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise.
275. 20:59–21:03Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside
276. 21:03–21:10the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption,
277. 21:10–21:14being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition
278. 21:14–21:21of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house.
279. 21:21–21:22Recutation of the Objection

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विचार-विमर्शक रेक। The proponent of the established conclusion replies, once the self has been established as the substratum of desire and the eight substances such as earth have been established as not being substrata of desire, the inference the self differs from the eight substances is established on the basis of an obstructive property. In other words, only after being the substratum of desire, or the occurrence of desire, has been established in the substance that is the self-does-negative inference established the determinant form of the probandom. Second objection, the reason would become affirmative. Again it may be objected and desire resides in a substance distinct from the eight substances because it occurs in that substance. Once an example is established the reason becomes affirmative. Reply, negative inference is possible in the absence of recollection of affirmative provision, even though negative provision is remembered. The reasons on commonness is defective only when it produces a counter reason, and the present inference unfavorable hypothetical reasoning does not establish the absence of the probandom. For this reason, an inference is such as gold is light because it is luminous or sound is non-eternal because it possesses soundhood, on commonness is defective in special contexts, not universally. Negative inference is not unnecessary. Objection. Once the absence of desire in the Eight Substances has been established, desires' residence in the self will be affirmatively established on the basis of being equality, therefore negative inference is unnecessary. Reply, such an affirmative inference yields only general cognition that desire resides in the self. The specific probandom, the self differs from the other Eight Substances, is not established without negative pervasion. If a collection of beginningless and endless atomic conjunctions is made the subject, the probandom concerning difference from all non-eternal objects can be established only through negative inference, the specific form of the probandom is known on the basis of a pervasive property. Negative concomitance with the eight substances need not be established separately. Objection, God's desire does not occur in the eight substances but does occur and the self, therefore the self differs from the eight substances. But how is the substratum that is the self directly known? The proponent of the established conclusion replies that being the substratum of desire may be directly established, but ascertainment that this substratum differs from the other eight substances arises through negative inference. In qualified cognition such as sandalwood is fragrant, the qualifier is not invariably known through another means of knowledge. Therefore it is proper to ascertain inferentially the difference of the substratum that is the self. Views of some scholars concerning negative inference 50. Some scholars say that even those who do not know the self's difference from the eight substances beginning with Earth, and do not understand the absence of desire in the eight substances, can acquire cognition of difference through the negative inference The substratum of desire differs from the eight substances. Objection, such an inference is not a means of knowledge because it possesses a counter reason. Reply, because the unfavorable reason is sublated, the negative inference is stronger. Another view, absence is the probandom. Other scholars hold that mutual absence or difference alone is the probandom of purely negative inference. A mutual absence not previously known is established through negative inference. Earthhood establishes the pervasive absence of the eight substances beginning with water, therefore the mutual absence of the other eight substances is established in earth. In the counter instances water and the like, cognition of the absence of earthhood is already directly known. Selfhood can be established in a living body. In this way, once desire has been established as residing in the self, all inert objects such as jars, where desire is absent, become loci of the absence of the substratum of desire. Therefore selfhood is established in a living body on the basis of the presence of desire, the absence of desire in inert objects serves as the negative example. 52, the absence of desire in inert objects such as jah serves as the negative example. But a living body does not delimit the counter-positiveness determined by that absence, because desire is directly perceived in a conscious living body and that same body is the substratum of desire or volition. For this reason, the absence of respiration and the like is regarded as pervading inirtness, inirtness in turn delimits being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Consequently, from the presence of respiration and the like, consciousness in doubt with a self is established in a living body, because consciousness is the absence of the property delimiting being the substratum of the continuous absence of desire. Validity is not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus. 53. In this way, validity of cognition is established through the negative inference, invalid cognition does not produce successful activity in a competent person. In invalid cognition there is absence of the state of producing the activity of a competent person, and this absence pervades the state delimited by an opposing property. Therefore, when the capacity to produce successful activity in a competent person is directly perceived in the cognition under dispute, delimitation by the opposing property is absent. This not being delimited by a property occurring in a different locus is called the validity of cognition. It may be objected that if the probandom is not previously established, how can cognition qualified by the probandom arise merely from cognition of the reason? This objection is untenable. When the complete causal complex producing inference of the probandom in the subject is present, a cognition arises in which the probandom is is the Qualificant and the Subject the Qualifier, just as in the Cognition, there is no jar on the ground, Absence is the Qualificant and the Ground the Qualifier. Here Cognition of the subject is possessing the reason property assists establishment of the Probandom and negative inference. This Cognition actually has the form that the Absence of the Absence of the Probandom is present in the subject, because the reason property is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the Probandom. of possessing the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum is necessary. 54 may be objected that recollection of the probandum, earth's difference from the other eight substances, is impossible before that difference is actually established. Nor can it be said that, for cognizing the probandum, it is enough that the subject earth possesses the reason earthhood, which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandum, for in such a case cognition of an apparent negative inference would be impossible. This objection is untenable. In Earth, the absence pervading the probandom, difference from other substances, is established by the absence of the absence of Earthhood. Here Earthhood, a positive reason, is regarded as pervading the absence of the probandom difference from others. Therefore only a reason that follows the probandom and does not deviate from its absence is indicative for establishing the probandom. This method of negative inference applies chiefly to inference for oneself. In inference for others, when the probandom earth's difference from the other eight substances is unfamiliar to the hearer, the members such as the proposition cannot be arranged, therefore inference for others is impossible by this specified method. With this, the established conclusion concerning purely negative inference comes to an end. The theory of presumption. Objection, presumption is not a separate means of knowledge. 1. Once purely negative inference has been established as a valid form of inference, there is no need to regard presumption as a separate means of knowledge. Whatever purpose is achieved by treating presumption as an independent means of knowledge can be achieved through purely negative inference itself. The Msaaka view of presumption based on doubt. 2. This may be admitted, nevertheless, the Msaaka view is as follows. That Devdutta will live for a hundred years as ascertained through astrology or another scientifically accepted cause. Thereafter, through perception, the rule is known that Devdutta, who lives for a hundred years, stays only inside the house. When the eligible counter-positive, namely the living Devdutta, is not found in the house, his absence within the house is ascertained. This absence gives rise to the presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house. His external presence conveys that Devdatta is alive and removes the doubt, is Devdatta alive or not? According to the Memsaka, Devadatta's absence inside the house first produces doubt concerning his being alive. From that doubt arises doubt concerning two rules, Devadatta's being alive and his necessary presence. Without supposing Devadatta's presence outside the house, the relative strength of these two rules is not clear, because the cognition, living Devadatta is outside the house, is only after the entire specified causal complex. Either the absence of devadatta inside the house, which becomes an object of doubt through affirmative and negative concomitance, or the doubt concerning the two rules of being alive and necessary presence produced by that absence may be regarded as the extraordinary cause of the presumption of external presence. Alternatively, doubt concerning devadatta's being alive may itself be regarded as the cause of presumption, because the extraordinary cause of cognition is generally some mental operation. Some sakkas hold that awareness of the mutual contradiction between cognitions of being alive and being absent from the house, produced through doubt, is the extraordinary cause of presumption. On this view Devdutta's being alive qualifies the reason in the Nayaka inference, Devdutta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house. But because being alive remains doubtful in this inference, the qualifier of the reason is uncertain, therefore this Nyaya inference is incomplete and presumption must be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. Doubt is not the cause of supposition, refutation of the objection. 3. It may be objected that if doubt causes supposition of one of the two alternatives of an argument, then in doubts concerning a post or a man and the like, supposition of one alternative would also become inevitable. Nor is it tenable that a previously established doubt causes supposition. If devadatta's being alive is already established, doubt about being alive would disease, and if being alive is certain, devadatta's presence outside can be known through inference. If being alive is established only occasionally, then as soon as doubt about being alive arises on the basis of previously established personhood, presumption would have to be accepted as necessary. Doubt about being alive may arise even concerning a dead person, therefore, because of deviation, this doubt cannot cause cognition of external presence. But this argument is untenable. What about devduttas being alive produced by the specified causal complex is the cause of presumption. For this reason, the absence in the house of a dead or unborn person does not produce that kind of doubt about being alive and consequently does not produce cognition of the person's presence outside. The absence determined by the non-apprehension in the house of the eligible counter positive, the living devdutta, is not itself doubt about devduttas being alive. Objection, supposition of external presence is incoherent. 4. It may be objected that both means of knowledge producing cognitions of Devadatta's being alive and his external presence have been regarded as equally strong. How then is supposition of external presence possible? No special strength of the ascertainment of being alive is observed. If supposition is admitted, it would be equally reasonable to suppose Devadatta's death and preserve the rule of his necessary presence inside the house, just as supposition of external presence preserves his known being alive. As objects of doubt, being alive and death are equal. Cognition of external presence through purely negative inference, the Neayaka view. 5. When one of the two stated means of knowledge is stronger in the other weaker, the stronger negates the weaker, consequently, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead does not arise. Therefore devduttas presence outside is supposed only when his being alive is absence inside the house are both certain, this supposition does not occur in a state of doubt about being alive. For this reason, cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house should be regarded as arising through purely negative inference. Living devadatta is outside the house because he is the counter positive of a continuous absence instantiated inside the house. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that cognition of external presence arises through presumption from a reason qualified by doubt concerning being alive. nor is it tenable that ascertainment of absence inside the house produces doubt about both cognitions, being alive and being absent from the house, and then ascertains external presence, because a cognition that produces doubt concerning an object cannot also cause ascertainment of that same object. Mutual contradiction of the two ascertainments. 6. This position is unacceptable. A person who experiences doubt about dev-dut does being alive from the specified causal complex reasons as follows, the absence of the living devdutta inside the house is apprehensible through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive, namely the living devdutta in the house. Since the person's existence is certain, one of the two mutually contradictory ascertainments – devdutta is alive in the house and devdutta is not in the house – must be sublated, both contradictory ascertainments cannot simultaneously be valid. or either the ascertainment of Devdutta's being alive is sublated by supposing death, or the ascertainment he remains in the house is sublated by supposing his external presence. In the supposition of external presence, only the ascertainment of presence inside the house is sublated, but in the supposition of death, both ascertainments, Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, are sublated. Therefore, in opposing his being alive, the combined ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains in the house will necessarily be sublated. Doubt produces the supposition of external presence. 7. Devdutta's being alive is known as delimited by divisions of time, moment, short period, and long period, as in Devdutta is alive today and Devdutta will be alive tomorrow. As such temporal divisions are regarded as mutually contradictory, many pervasions concerning time would be sublated. Compared with these numerous pervasions, the pervasion of Devdatta's presence inside the house, which is only one part of all those pervasions, is less extensive. Devdatta's presence outside the house is positive, therefore supposing it is more economical than supposing death, which is negative. It may be said that Devdatta's death, being merely negative, is more economical an external presence because the latter requires both conjunction with an external region and mutual absence from the house. Nevertheless, Devadatta's being alive in general is more economical than death, therefore external presence, which preserves being alive, is what should be supposed. Consequently, cognition of Devadatta's external presence can also arise through an inference depending on being alive as supposed by presumption. Doubt about being alive produced by the specified causal complex, with the The assistance of hypothetical reasoning concerning economy and complexity, supposes Devdutta's external presence. Hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. 8. It cannot be said that when hypothetical reasoning does not terminate in the more economical meaning it becomes a pseudo-reason, whereas when it terminates in the economical meaning and inference assisted by that reasoning itself produces cognition of Devdutta's external presence. Any hypothetical reasoning that, in considering economy and complexity, does not terminate in the more complex meaning but determines the more economical one is a cooperative cause of a means of knowledge. In this way hypothetical reasoning also cooperates with perception, verbal testimony, and other means of knowledge. When it does not terminate in the more economical meaning, no means of knowledge other than presumption can establish dev.ta's external presence. hypothetical reasoning is a cooperative cause of presumption. Conclusion of the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt. 9. It may be objected that doubt concerning being alive, joined with hypothetical reasoning, produces veridical cognition of devadatta's external presence through its own specific nature and the force of its cause, then a supposition of external presence produced from a doubt in which devadatta is either in the house or dead should also be veridical. But this objection is untenable. A defect in a sense organ obscures the power of sense perception and thereby produces sensory illusion. In the same way, a defect present in doubt concerning being alive obscures its epistemic power and may produce an illusion concerning the non-apprehension of external presence. It may be said that cognition resembling super sensory perception is valid only when it is non-ironious and produced by beneficial cognition. This is true. In the present context, when one of the two means of knowledge establishing the necessity of being alive and absence inside the house is shown to be erroneous, the artificiality of that collection of cognitions becomes manifest. Alternatively, doubt about being alive joined with absence of defect possesses the capacity to produce foridical cognition of deva datas presence outside the house. With this, the prima facie account of presumption based on doubt comes to an end. Established Conclusion Concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt 10. The established conclusion concerning presumption based on doubt is now stated. The inference from general observation, two means of cognition produce mutually contradictory meanings, therefore one of them is sublated, when joined with hypothetical reasoning, sublates devduttas' necessary presence inside the house and ascertains devduttas' being alive as a qualifier of the reason. In this state, purely negative inference establishes Devdutta's presence outside the house. This may be explained as follows. If the evidence for Devdutta's being alive is regarded as sublated, Devdutta's death is inferred from a reason ascertained by cognition of his necessary presence inside the house. Consequently, both ascertainments regarded as veridical Devdutta lives for a hundred years and Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house are sublated. When the evidence for Dev Dutta's presence inside the house is sublated in ascertainment of Dev Dutta's being alive is produced by some unopposed evidence, the inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning of these two cognitions, only one is sublated by the inference of external presence, sublates cognition of presence inside the house. The inference thus produced indirectly targets only the cause of cognition of death, it does not sublate cognition of being alive, which is the indirect cause of cognition of external presence. Therefore, when cognition of necessary presence inside the house is sublated by an inference from general observation and ascertainment of being alive as the qualifier of the reason is produced through cognition of the perversion of being alive, cognition of dev-dupt as external presence is obtained solely through inference. For this reason no separate presumption is required. 1. Objection, presumption is necessary. 11. It may be objected that without cognition of devadatta's presence outside the house, even Brahma could not sublate the ascertainment, devadatta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Therefore cognition of external presence must arise first. But once the evidence for necessary presence inside the house has been sublated, cognition of external presence does not arise from that same cognition. Consequently, inference of external presence can rest only upon unopposed evidence of being alive. Thus, without presumption, the initial cognition of external presence cannot arise. Nor should it be said that, since equally strong evidence of necessary presence inside the house exists, how can presumption produce cognition of external presence? Presumption, being joined with hypothetical reasoning, is stronger, therefore it produces cognition of external presence and sublates the evidence of necessary presence inside the house. Recutation of the Objection

← Transcript index