MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part12_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.995439)
Duration: 22:28
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:05Konjunction come inherences the cause.
0:05–0:12Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherence in an object conjoined with the sense.
0:12–0:16Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object,
0:16–0:21because inherence in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like.
0:21–0:26It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again.
0:26–0:31Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances
0:31–0:36such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception
0:36–0:39of other substances such as whole objects.
0:39–0:43Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent
0:43–0:47in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone.
0:47–0:51A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor,
0:51–0:55conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception
0:55–0:56of odor.
0:56–1:00Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might
1:00–1:03be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor.
1:03–1:07A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with
1:07–1:09the sense, which is unacceptable.
1:09–1:14Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance
1:14–1:18of the odor is present as a qualifier.
1:18–1:22If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with
1:22–1:26If the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot
1:26–1:31would produce perception of the odor of cloth.
1:31–1:36Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause.
1:36–1:39Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause
1:39–1:43perception of odor, while inheritance merely delimits causality.
1:43–1:46This view is equivalent to the view that inheritance in a conjoined object is the
1:46–1:51cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth.
1:51–1:55is the argument sound that inheritance in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither
1:55–2:00conjunction nor inheritance nor both. On the Naayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing
2:00–2:04more than a combination of conjunction and inheritance, inheritance in a conjoined object
2:04–2:09may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction
2:09–2:12in calling this relation conjunction come inheritance, nor does calling it something
2:12–2:18more conflict with Naya. The Naayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction,
2:18–2:23An inheritance and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called
2:23–2:29conjunction-come inheritance. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal
2:29–2:36blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like. Conjunction-come
2:36–2:43inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal. The objection that
2:43–2:46color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance residing in color and
2:46–2:50and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound.
2:50–2:54Though inherent in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color,
2:54–2:58taste, and the like is apprehended through inherence of those qualities in the conjoined
2:58–3:00object.
3:00–3:06Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances.
3:06–3:11Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable,
3:11–3:15therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect
3:15–3:17relation.
3:17–3:21Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ.
3:21–3:28Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established
3:28–3:31by recurrent cognition.
3:31–3:35Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the
3:35–3:37universal colorness.
3:37–3:41Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye, because that
3:41–3:45would overextend to yellow color.
3:45–3:52of super sensible colors and the like is possible only through universals such as colorness.
3:52–3:58Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also be apprehensible.
3:58–4:02On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal and sense
4:02–4:05perceptible.
4:05–4:09Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed of fire or earth, their
4:09–4:14color is identical with the color of a substance, hence the consequence arises that the
4:14–4:18the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible.
4:18–4:23It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance
4:23–4:27but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty.
4:27–4:31If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universals such as
4:31–4:36colorness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities
4:36–4:39mutual dependence would then follow.
4:39–4:45Or is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument?
4:45–4:50Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste,
4:50–4:55or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous
4:55–4:56sense.
4:56–4:59Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of
4:59–5:04color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness.
5:04–5:10Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness, because it overextends to yellowness.
5:10–5:17objection that individual colors are one. Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded
5:17–5:22as one, because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity
5:22–5:29apprehends a single black color. It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing
5:29–5:35in many individuals, would become a universal. A universal is manifested by an aggregate of
5:35–5:41parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance. The relation of broader
5:41–5:45and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to
5:45–5:49individual blueness.
5:49–5:53Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from
5:53–5:56difference between two colors.
5:56–6:02In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion.
6:02–6:06Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their
6:06–6:08production and destruction.
6:08–6:13Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would
6:13–6:20all become one, and comparative cognition such as this as sweeter would be impossible.
6:20–6:26Conclusion of the Prima Facey View that Inherence is not the Cause.
6:26–6:29Sound Inheres in Auditory Space.
6:29–6:33If Inherence were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously
6:33–6:35apprehended.
6:35–6:40It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended,
6:40–6:44there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not
6:44–6:50in here there. Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that
6:50–6:56person, unfit sound is never apprehended. Fitness for a particular person is not the
6:56–7:01nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness
7:01–7:08a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational. Relationality is neither
7:08–7:13limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality
7:13–7:19or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though
7:19–7:24it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all
7:24–7:29sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of
7:29–7:36equality. Establishing Inherence as the Cause.
7:36–7:39The prima facie objection is unsound.
7:39–7:43Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form of
7:43–7:45inheritance.
7:45–7:49It does not follow that, because inheritance is all-pervasive, sounds elsewhere would
7:49–7:51also be apprehended.
7:51–7:58The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity.
7:58–8:02Conjunction with the ear cavity specifies substratehood described by inheritance.
8:02–8:08The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere.
8:08–8:13Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year is apprehended,
8:13–8:18sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not.
8:18–8:22Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not
8:22–8:27by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited
8:27–8:29by hand conjunction.
8:29–8:34Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere.
8:36–8:40The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not arise.
8:40–8:43Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inherent,
8:43–8:47but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualitative status.
8:48–8:52Even if inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places.
8:52–9:02Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal, because of the
9:02–9:08unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited by the VA with Macron should
9:08–9:15be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing
9:15–9:19sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one would experience sound is only in the
9:19–9:25opening of the year. Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with macron S and
9:25–9:30other delimiters produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of
9:30–9:35sound locations, the prima facie theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of
9:35–9:39instruments such as the VA with macron S substrates is established, but it is groundless
9:39–9:43complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound
9:43–9:47series in infinitely many directions.
9:47–9:52The reply that nearby and distant persons experienced differences of loud and soft sound,
9:52–9:57thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound.
9:57–10:03One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed.
10:03–10:08When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear
10:08–10:11opening causes perception.
10:11–10:16This sound is not apprehended when the ear opening is covered.
10:16–10:22The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the ear is the auditory sense.
10:22–10:26The preceding view is unsound.
10:26–10:30Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the ear opening, because the opening is
10:30–10:35the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense.
10:35–10:39Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of
10:39–10:41sound perception.
10:41–10:46a perceptual instrument conjoined with the body is a sense faculty, the experience I hear the sound
10:46–10:50of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space to be the auditory sense.
10:52–10:58V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception. V.A. with Macron
10:58–11:03s are infinitely many, not all pervasive, and are not common causes of sound perception.
11:04–11:08V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not
11:08–11:12a sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V.A. with Macron.
11:14–11:17How then arises the cognition sound is in the V.A. with Macron?
11:18–11:23It is unnecessary to apprehend the V.A. with Macron as the substrate of every sound.
11:24–11:28The V.A. with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly
11:28–11:32assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body,
11:32–11:36the body is not the in hearing cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate.
11:36–11:42Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds.
11:42–11:52Objection, if it is a limited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously.
11:52–12:01The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory.
12:01–12:06Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound.
12:06–12:13If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable.
12:13–12:18Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity.
12:18–12:26If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition such as,
12:26–12:30I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before.
12:30–12:38A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound.
12:38–12:45Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted.
12:47–12:49The manner of sound production.
12:51–12:59One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, otherwise sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person.
12:59–13:06The initial sound can join with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction.
13:07–13:11An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction,
13:12–13:17thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider region.
13:18–13:22Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place.
13:22–13:29Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first,
13:29–13:30apprehension is swift.
13:30–13:36Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air.
13:36–13:41On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds in
13:41–13:47the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds.
13:47–13:50Support for the cadamba sphere model.
13:50–13:56Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions?
13:56–14:01Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences,
14:01–14:04many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere.
14:04–14:08It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike, near difference
14:08–14:12of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects.
14:12–14:16Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates, and difference of
14:16–14:20prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate.
14:20–14:25Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the
14:25–14:26same.
14:26–14:30Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of
14:30–14:35prior absence and destruction of previous color.
14:35–14:39There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color
14:39–14:42to be the same cause everywhere.
14:42–14:47prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences
14:47–14:52of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior
14:52–14:55absence of odor in the taste of water.
14:55–15:02Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant.
15:02–15:08Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes.
15:08–15:13Alternatively, though prior absences alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors
15:13–15:17such as fragrance and stench arise at different times from special conjunctions with fire.
15:18–15:23Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be
15:23–15:29deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must
15:29–15:35be accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is
15:35–15:39not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is
15:39–15:45unsound. Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators
15:45–15:49are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general
15:49–15:55cause. It is not true that one causal aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production
15:55–16:00of an effect results from absence of its aggregate. The view that causality is obtained
16:00–16:06through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly complex. Co-existence of
16:06–16:10non-production of the effect with an inhering cause qualified by destruction establishes
16:10–16:15only the existent inhering cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality.
16:17–16:21Even without accepting inherance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness,
16:21–16:26the universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as
16:26–16:32colorness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception
16:32–16:40and the perception section of the Tatbhisentmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
16:40–16:42The theory of Inherence
16:42–16:47Inherence is an apprehensive relation.
16:47–16:48Prima-Facey view
16:48–16:52Inherence is not an apprehensive relation.
16:52–16:53Prima-Facey view
16:53–16:57Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot be the apprehensive relation
16:57–17:01in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like.
17:01–17:05Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation
17:05–17:09between qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of
17:09–17:13inheritance as an apprehensive relation. The respondent may say,
17:13–17:17universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually
17:17–17:21related by inheritance, such qualifier cognition and corresponding usage are
17:21–17:24impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of
17:24–17:29inheritance must be accepted. The prima facie objecta, however, says that from
17:29–17:33the experience of related things inheritance itself does not appear as a qualifier,
17:33–17:37because inheritance has not previously been cognized. An experience such as,
17:37–17:41these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience,
17:41–17:46these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does inheritance appear as an independent entity,
17:46–17:49because there is no experience of the form, I know inheritance.
17:51–17:55The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as its object
17:55–17:58the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound.
17:58–18:03In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises,
18:03–18:08as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible.
18:08–18:12If merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject
18:12–18:14becomes pointless.
18:14–18:17Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the
18:17–18:23opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results.
18:23–18:27A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance, because
18:27–18:30it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object, otherwise the
18:30–18:34cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent.
18:34–18:39Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as,
18:39–18:43the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is
18:43–18:48presented. Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates
18:48–18:51the objective reality of that relation.
18:51–18:55Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known
18:55–18:59as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would
18:59–19:05be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized.
19:05–19:09Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid
19:09–19:11of a pot.
19:11–19:15The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in
19:15–19:19some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance.
19:19–19:24A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not
19:24–19:28than established here as a possible relation.
19:28–19:33Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general.
19:33–19:37If this means, the capacity to make known, and the like, you incur the fault of proving
19:37–19:40what is already established.
19:40–19:44Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces
19:44–19:48cognition of that qualifier can.
19:48–19:51Nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition
19:51–19:57of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and
19:57–20:01the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in
20:01–20:05such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not
20:05–20:08inherence.
20:08–20:12Nor can the qualification, conforming to the probandom, be added that the relation
20:12–20:17is distinct from the things related by it. Cognition of absence and the like would
20:17–20:21again constitute a counter-example.
20:21–20:25The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating
20:25–20:27proof, has already been rejected.
20:27–20:31In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving
20:31–20:35reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without
20:35–20:39a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence.
20:39–20:43Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified
20:43–20:47through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists
20:47–20:50either in a distinct qualifierhood or is fixed by modehood and the like.
20:51–20:55But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation
20:55–21:01as a part of the objecthood of cognition. Objection, some of what you say may be true.
21:01–21:04Nevertheless the following argument proves the existence of inheritance.
21:05–21:09Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a hole in its parts,
21:09–21:11a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent,
21:11–21:16and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in, the cloth is in the
21:16–21:20threads, the white color is in the cloth, motion is in this object, and cloth hood is
21:20–21:24in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between container and contained.
21:25–21:29Reason, these are both truth conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form,
21:29–21:34is in this. Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl,
21:34–21:36which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction.
21:37–21:42Prima-facy objecta, no. Your reason has an obvious counter example,
21:42–21:45the cognition, here on the ground there is absence of a pot.
21:46–21:49Do not again at the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof,
21:49–21:54for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because
21:54–21:58the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct
21:58–22:03container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production,
22:03–22:07as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the
22:07–22:11cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition,
22:11–22:15as in a pots assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that
22:15–22:18that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence.
22:18–22:21This dependence is a self-linking relation.
22:21–22:24That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

Plain text

Konjunction come inherences the cause. Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherence in an object conjoined with the sense. Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object, because inherence in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like. It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again. Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception of other substances such as whole objects. Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone. A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor, conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception of odor. Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor. A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with the sense, which is unacceptable. Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance of the odor is present as a qualifier. If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with If the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would produce perception of the odor of cloth. Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause. Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause perception of odor, while inheritance merely delimits causality. This view is equivalent to the view that inheritance in a conjoined object is the cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth. is the argument sound that inheritance in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction nor inheritance nor both. On the Naayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a combination of conjunction and inheritance, inheritance in a conjoined object may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction in calling this relation conjunction come inheritance, nor does calling it something more conflict with Naya. The Naayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, An inheritance and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction-come inheritance. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like. Conjunction-come inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal. The objection that color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance residing in color and and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound. Though inherent in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color, taste, and the like is apprehended through inherence of those qualities in the conjoined object. Nor is similarity among colors apprehended nearly through similarity among substances. Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable, therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect relation. Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ. Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by recurrent cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye, because that would overextend to yellow color. of super sensible colors and the like is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance, hence the consequence arises that the the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible. It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty. If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universals such as colorness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities mutual dependence would then follow. Or is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument? Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste, or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense. Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness. Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness, because it overextends to yellowness. objection that individual colors are one. Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one, because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color. It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would become a universal. A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance. The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to individual blueness. Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from difference between two colors. In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion. Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their production and destruction. Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one, and comparative cognition such as this as sweeter would be impossible. Conclusion of the Prima Facey View that Inherence is not the Cause. Sound Inheres in Auditory Space. If Inherence were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously apprehended. It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended, there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there. Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended. Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational. Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality. Establishing Inherence as the Cause. The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form of inheritance. It does not follow that, because inheritance is all-pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended. The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity. Conjunction with the ear cavity specifies substratehood described by inheritance. The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere. Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the year is apprehended, sound delimited by absence of such conjunction is not. Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited by hand conjunction. Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere. The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not arise. Inherence does not reside in its substrate through another inherent, but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualitative status. Even if inherent of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places. Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one would experience sound is only in the opening of the year. Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with macron S and other delimiters produces infinitely many auditory senses and overextends to the omnipresence of sound locations, the prima facie theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments such as the VA with macron S substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely many directions. The reply that nearby and distant persons experienced differences of loud and soft sound, thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound. One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed. When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear opening causes perception. This sound is not apprehended when the ear opening is covered. The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the ear is the auditory sense. The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the ear opening, because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense. Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception. a perceptual instrument conjoined with the body is a sense faculty, the experience I hear the sound of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space to be the auditory sense. V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception. V.A. with Macron s are infinitely many, not all pervasive, and are not common causes of sound perception. V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V.A. with Macron. How then arises the cognition sound is in the V.A. with Macron? It is unnecessary to apprehend the V.A. with Macron as the substrate of every sound. The V.A. with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the in hearing cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate. Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds. Objection, if it is a limited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously. The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one sound, because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory. Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity. If e delimited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by Mitra becomes the object of recognition such as, I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before. A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted. The manner of sound production. One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, otherwise sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person. The initial sound can join with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction. An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction, thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place. Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first, apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds. Support for the cadamba sphere model. Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions? Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences, many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere. It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike, near difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects. Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates, and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate. Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same. Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of prior absence and destruction of previous color. There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere. prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the taste of water. Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant. Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes. Alternatively, though prior absences alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors such as fragrance and stench arise at different times from special conjunctions with fire. Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound. Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general cause. It is not true that one causal aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production of an effect results from absence of its aggregate. The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly complex. Co-existence of non-production of the effect with an inhering cause qualified by destruction establishes only the existent inhering cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality. Even without accepting inherance in the inherent in apprehension of soundness, the universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as colorness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and the perception section of the Tatbhisentmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of Inherence Inherence is an apprehensive relation. Prima-Facey view Inherence is not an apprehensive relation. Prima-Facey view Inherence has not been established, therefore Inherence cannot be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like. Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of inheritance as an apprehensive relation. The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually related by inheritance, such qualifier cognition and corresponding usage are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of inheritance must be accepted. The prima facie objecta, however, says that from the experience of related things inheritance itself does not appear as a qualifier, because inheritance has not previously been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does inheritance appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form, I know inheritance. The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as its object the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound. In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises, as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible. If merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro-bands, the rest of the subject becomes pointless. Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results. A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance, because it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object, otherwise the cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent. Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented. Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective reality of that relation. Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized. Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot. The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance. A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not than established here as a possible relation. Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general. If this means, the capacity to make known, and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established. Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can. Nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inherence. Nor can the qualification, conforming to the probandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it. Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example. The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected. In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence. Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists either in a distinct qualifierhood or is fixed by modehood and the like. But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation as a part of the objecthood of cognition. Objection, some of what you say may be true. Nevertheless the following argument proves the existence of inheritance. Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a hole in its parts, a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in, the cloth is in the threads, the white color is in the cloth, motion is in this object, and cloth hood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between container and contained. Reason, these are both truth conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this. Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction. Prima-facy objecta, no. Your reason has an obvious counter example, the cognition, here on the ground there is absence of a pot. Do not again at the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof, for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production, as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition, as in a pots assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence. This dependence is a self-linking relation. That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

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