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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:05RECUTATION OF THE VIEW OF SOME THINKERS
0:05–0:1015. This view of certain teachers is also untenable.
0:10–0:16In the case of the reason smoke, the reason's non-occurrence in a place distinct from the
0:16–0:20locus of the probandum is not found, because smoke occurs in a kitchen, while the kitchen
0:20–0:23is distinct from the fiery mountain.
0:23–0:28PREVASION ALSO CANNOT BE THE NON-OCCURRENCE OF THE REASON IN A PLACE DISTINKED FROM
0:28–0:32EVERY LOCUS OF THE PROBANDUM, BECAUSE ALL LOCI OF FIRE ARE DISTINKED FROM EACH
0:32–0:38separate locus of fire. Furthermore, all such definitions of pervasion would involve the defect
0:38–0:44of self-dependence, because reasonhood, probandumhood, and the status of what is taken as reason and
0:44–0:47probandum are themselves to be determined only through pervasion.
0:48–0:53Probandumhood cannot be regarded as the object of proof or as being the object of a desire to
0:53–0:57prove, because neither state is present in the fire of a kitchen that has already been established.
0:57–1:03Nor is the argument tenable that another person, namely the pupil, knows only Pervasian in general,
1:03–1:07otherwise, how could he establish that these definitions fail to establish inference, for example,
1:07–1:12through under extension. Without descriptive knowledge of the nature of Pervasian that
1:12–1:17establishes inference for himself, the pupil cannot enter into an inquiry concerning the nature of
1:17–1:22Pervasian. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tatvasant Mai composed
1:22–1:28by Sri Gadjoptia, the prima facie discussion concerning pervasion comes to an end.
1:28–1:33The prima facie account of pervasion is concluded.
1:33–1:38The definitive definition of pervasion.
1:38–1:42Sidhanta Laka 16.
1:42–1:46Here we, the proponents of the established conclusion, state the definitive definition
1:46–1:51of pervasion based on an invariable relation.
1:51–1:54Pervasion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation
1:54–1:59is not delimited by the delimiter of that counter-positiveness which is determined by an absolute
1:59–2:04absence that is co-located with the reason but not co-located with its own counter-positive.
2:05–2:10Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasint Mai composed by Sri
2:10–2:14Gajyapthiya, the definitive definition of perversion comes to an end.
2:16–2:20The definitive definition of perversion is a definition of perversion in general.
2:20–2:2617. Gagia now clarifies that the definitive characteristic of
2:26–2:31provision is a characteristic of provision in general, because it includes the absence of
2:31–2:37the Probandom universal. Although a particular fire occurring elsewhere, such as in a kitchen,
2:37–2:42may be the counter-positive of the absolute absence of the particular fire occurring on the Smoky
2:42–2:47Mountain, the counter-positiveness determined by such an absence of a particular fire is
2:47–2:52not delimited by the universal firehood. For the absolute absence of fire in general expressed
2:52–2:58by there is no fire is neither cognized nor established in the locus of smoke. The absence
2:58–3:04of fire in general, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by the universal firehood,
3:04–3:09is entirely distinct from the absence of a particular fire, which determines counter-positiveness
3:09–3:16delimited by particular firehood. Otherwise, once the absence of all familiar particular
3:16–3:20colors in air were cognized, and once it were cognized that air is distinct from the loci
3:20–3:25of all familiar colors, general doubts such as, is there color in air or not, and is
3:25–3:30aralocus of color or not, would become impossible, because the collection of the absences of
3:30–3:34all particular colors in air would already have been ascertained.
3:34–3:40Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasintmai, the examination
3:40–3:45of the absence of the Probandan universal comes to an end.
3:45–3:50The absence of a universal is concluded.
3:50–3:53Perversion of a particular reason.
3:53–3:55Vovaipte.
3:55–3:5718.
3:57–4:01Alternatively, perversion may be described as the collocation of a particular reason with
4:01–4:03a particular probandom.
4:03–4:08This particular probandom is not the counter positive of its own absolute absence occurring
4:08–4:13in the locus of the reason, and that absolute absence does not occur in the locus of its
4:13–4:15own counter positive.
4:15–4:20Or pervasion is the co-location of a particular reason with a particular probandom whose
4:20–4:25locus is not the counter-positive of the mutual absence of the locus of the probandom occurring
4:25–4:28in the locus of the reason.
4:28–4:32Or pervasion is the state in which the reason occurs in the locus of the probandom and is
4:32–4:38not the counter-positive of a mutual absence occurring in the locus of the reason.
4:38–4:42Fire occurring in another locus is only the counter-positive of the absolute absence
4:42–4:46of the fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Similarly, the locus of
4:46–4:51fire situated elsewhere is only the counter positive of the mutual absence of the locus
4:51–4:56of fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Therefore smoke and fire
4:56–5:01occurring in different loci cannot pervade each other.
5:01–5:05Pervasion exists only between that particular smoke and that particular fire which are
5:05–5:07co-located.
5:07–5:11It should not be objected that the pervasion of smoke in general by fire in general would
5:11–5:17thereby become impossible. For all particular smokes are pervaded by all particular fires,
5:17–5:21consequently smoke in general is also pervaded by fire in general.
5:23–5:28The pervasion by a particular fire co-located with a particular smoke is likewise intended
5:28–5:34to belong to that very particular smoke. Again, particular individuals that arise and
5:34–5:37perish at the same time are regarded as mutually pervasive.
5:37–5:41Justification of the special definition.
5:41–6:0319. In the inference, this possesses conjunction because it exists. The absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the probandom, is not co-located with its counter-positive. It occurs in action, the locus of the reason existence, but its counter-positive conjunction does not occur in action. Therefore the first special definition is overextended.
6:03–6:09were extended. Hence being delimited by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with
6:09–6:14the counter-positive may be taken as a qualifier of the absolute absence employed in the definition
6:14–6:20of perversion. In action, the absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the probandom,
6:20–6:25is delimited only by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with its counter-positive
6:25–6:30conjunction. Nor should it be objected that in the inference, this tree possesses
6:30–6:35conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree, the mutual absence of the locus of conjunction
6:35–6:41with the monkey is only non-pervasively occurring. For a veridical cognition concerning identity
6:41–6:45with the locus of conjunction with the monkey, that is, the absence of difference from it,
6:45–6:51is possible. Even without cognition of a relation of pervaded and pervader between
6:51–6:56reason and probandom, conjunction with a monkey is in fact that very probandom which is cognized
6:56–7:02is related, it need not be known as a pervader. Therefore, in the Behavari High Compound of
7:02–7:07the definition, the meaning of the genitive case is merely the relation cognized as real,
7:07–7:12not a cognized pervadingness, hence pervation itself does not become part of the definition
7:12–7:16of perversion. The special definition of pervation containing
7:16–7:22the word itself is also not defective through lack of a common factor. For what is to
7:22–7:27be defined as precisely the non-common perversion of a particular individual reason, the question
7:27–7:32which perversion belongs to which reason, confirms this point.
7:32–7:37Removal of the inapplicability of the definitions.
7:37–7:3820.
7:38–7:42It may now be objected, both cognitions, in the locus of smoke there are neither fire
7:42–7:48nor a lake, and the locus of smoke is the locus of neither fire nor a lake, are possible.
7:48–7:54For the absolute absence of fire and the mutual absence of the locus of fire, determining counter-positiveness
7:54–7:59delimited by the property of pervading occurrence, occur in the locus of smoke.
7:59–8:04How, then, can the pervasion of the reason be determined by these two definitions employing
8:04–8:08absolute absence and mutual absence?
8:08–8:11This objection, however, is not sound.
8:11–8:15We do not admit such an absolute absence or mutual absence.
8:15–8:18Even if they were admitted, only the lake and the fiery lake would be the counter-positives
8:18–8:25of those two absences, fire and the locus of fire would not be their counter-positives.
8:25–8:31Revision of the teacher's definition, pervasion is freedom from an extraneous condition.
8:31–8:3221.
8:32–8:36Giving due importance to the notion of freedom from an extraneous condition in the discussion
8:36–8:42of pervasion, Gagia revises the teacher's definition, Tethysintmii, Part 2, Chapter
8:42–8:46section 10, and incorporates that very freedom from an extraneous condition
8:46–8:51into the definition of perversion. Alternatively, the perversion of the
8:51–8:55reason by the probandum is the reason's freedom from an extraneous condition.
8:55–8:59This freedom from an extraneous condition is the collocation of reason and
8:59–9:03probandum that is collocated with the absolute absence of water and the like.
9:03–9:08The counter-positiveness of that absolute absence of water and the like is
9:08–9:13delimited by waterhood and similar delimiters, and that counter-positiveness is in turn
9:13–9:18determined by the absolute absence of water and the light co-located with the reason.
9:18–9:22It should not be objected that on this account pervasion would have to be admitted even in
9:22–9:27a false reason attended by an extraneous condition, such as fire.
9:27–9:31In the conditional inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the probandum
9:31–9:35smoke is not co-located with the absence of conjunction with wet fuel, and that absence
9:35–9:40of conjunction with wet fuel is in turn the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located
9:40–9:42with the reason fire.
9:42–9:47For an extraneous condition always pervades the probandom.
9:47–9:51The co-location of the reason with the probandom that deviates from everything from which
9:51–9:56the reason itself deviates has been called the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition
9:56–9:59by the earlier teachers.
9:59–10:05An alternative definition of freedom from an extraneous condition.
10:05–10:1022. Alternatively, the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition is merely the state
10:10–10:14in which the reason is not co-located with an absolute absence whose counter-positive
10:14–10:20is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence co-located with the probandom.
10:20–10:24In the conditional inference the mountain has smoked because it has fire, the reason
10:24–10:29fire is co-located with the absolute absence of the extraneous condition, conjunction with
10:29–10:32wet fuel. This absence of the extraneous condition
10:32–10:37is not the counter positive of the absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandome
10:37–10:43smoke, because conjunction with wet fuel does not pervade the reasonfire.
10:43–10:48Possession of the form of the delimiter of relatedness is pervasion.
10:48–10:5423. Another alternative description of pervasion may be given as follows. The pervasion
10:54–10:58of a particular reason is its relatedness to a particular probandome, that is, the
10:58–11:03co-location of the particular reason with the particular probandome, in which the reason
11:03–11:08possesses the property delimiting net relatedness, in other words, the property delimiting co-location
11:08–11:14with the particular pro-bandom. For example, in the inference, the mountain has fire because
11:14–11:19it has smoke, the particular pervasion of smoke is relatedness to fire, that is, the
11:19–11:24co-location of smoke with fire because smoke possesses smokehood, which delimits relatedness
11:24–11:29to fire, and smoke in general is related only to fire. But in the inference, the
11:29–11:33The mountain has smoke because it has fire, the particular perversion of fire is not relatedness
11:33–11:39to smoke, because fire does not possess firehood as the delimiter of relatedness to smoke,
11:39–11:43firing general is also related to what is smokeless.
11:43–11:49It should be noted that an over-pervasive property cannot delimit relatedness.
11:49–11:53Over-pervasive properties such as conjunction and no ability are not experienced as delimiters
11:53–11:58of relatedness to the pro-bandom, that is, of the co-location of smoke with fire.
11:58–12:03By contrast, firehood produced by conjunction with wet fuel is the delimiter, in the reason
12:03–12:09fire, of relatedness to smoke, and that firehood alone is pervaded.
12:09–12:14Being delimited by the delimiter of co-location with that is pervasion.
12:14–12:1924, or it may be said that the reason is an entity whose nature is delimited by the
12:19–12:25delimiter of co-location with the probandom, such a reason is pervaded by that probandom.
12:25–12:28In the sound inference, the mounting has fire because it has smoke, the co-location
12:28–12:33of smoke with fire is delimited by smokehood, therefore the reason smoke is pervaded. But
12:33–12:37in the inference with an extraneous condition, the mountain has smoke because it has fire,
12:37–12:42the collocation of fire with smoke is delimited only by the extraneous condition, conjunction
12:42–12:48with wet fuel, and not by firehood, therefore the reason fire cannot be pervaded.
12:48–12:49For reasons
12:49–12:54Adah-eva-katuya
12:54–12:58The Prabhakras advance the following propositions.
12:58–12:591.
12:59–13:04For this reason namely, because in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter
13:04–13:10of reasonhood is not the delimiter of relatedness to the probandum, Tathasintmai, Part 2, Chapter
13:10–13:152, Section 23, a qualifying property of the reason that, although delimiting reasonhood,
13:15–13:20differs from the delimiter of relatedness to the probandum, delimits the intended reasons
13:20–13:24relation to the probandom that is the extraneous condition of the reason.
13:26–13:302. For this reason, in the inference, this possesses cowwood because it possesses horsehood,
13:30–13:35no such qualifying property is found in an extraneous condition such as possession of a
13:35–13:40do-lap. Therefore the assured characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of
13:40–13:45pervading the probandom delimited by the reason while not itself pervading the reason.
13:45–13:51In an inference with a deviant reason, the probandum and the absence of the probandum are mutually
13:51–13:56opposed in one and the same locus, hence, without a difference between the locus of the probandum
13:56–14:01and the locus of its absence, it is impossible to regard the reason as related both to the
14:01–14:07probandum and to its absence. Therefore the extraneous condition delimits relatedness to
14:07–14:13the probandum. Consequently, in an inference with a deviant reason, that qualifying property
14:13–14:18which pervades the probandom delimited by the reason but does not pervade the reason is the
14:18–14:25extraneous condition. 3. For this reason, an extraneous condition necessarily occurs in the
14:25–14:31reason in an inference with a deviant reason. Otherwise, nearly because of deviation, a deviant
14:31–14:36reason could be regarded as non-indicative, that is, unpervaded, and the inference of an extraneous
14:36–14:41condition, this reason is attended by an extraneous condition because it is deviant,
14:41–14:43would become pointless and unnecessary.
14:44–14:494. For this reason, in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of
14:49–14:55reasonhood is not the sole delimiter of relatedness to the probandom. Hence a co-extensive property,
14:55–15:00which alone is the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, appears to occur in the intended
15:00–15:07reason. Therefore, in a deviant reason, a co-extensive property is the extraneous condition,
15:07–15:11just as a hibiscus flower is regarded as an extraneous condition in relation to a crystal.
15:13–15:17Now the characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the
15:17–15:20reason's relation to the probandum while not pervading the reason.
15:21–15:26But a qualifying property that is not co-extensive with both reason and probandum cannot be the
15:26–15:31denotation of the word extraneous condition because the ground for applying that word to
15:31–15:34such a meaning is absent.
15:34–15:40The vitiating power of an extraneous condition consists in its causing cognition of deviation.
15:40–15:45But the state of causing cognition of deviation cannot be regarded as the nature of extraneous
15:45–15:50conditionhood, otherwise, both a purposeless property pervading the probandum and a deviant
15:50–15:56property pervading the probandum would have to be regarded as extraneous conditions.
15:56–16:02The discussion of pervasion is concluded.
16:02–16:083. Means of apprehending pervasion
16:10–16:12Viaptigrahopaya
16:13–16:17Prima-facie view, repeated observation is not a cause.
16:19–16:221. The Prabhakras hold the following view here.
16:22–16:28Cognition of such pervasion does not arise from repeatedly observing the concomitance of reason and probandum,
16:28–16:33because each separate observation is not a cause of cognition of either the reason or the probandum.
16:33–16:43Moreover, these transient acts, which perish in a mere moment, cannot possess any unifying factor capable of joining all the observations together at a single moment.
16:44–17:00The Neayaka may now propose that an impression produced by repeated observation of the concomitance of reason and probandom, assisted by a sense organ, is the means of cognizing perversion, since in the case of recognition a sense organ is accepted as a cooperative cause of an impression.
17:00–17:07But this proposal is untenable. An impression is accepted as a cause only of memory and recognition
17:07–17:12concerning the same object. How, then, could an impression assisted by a sense organ produce
17:12–17:17cognition of pervasion in the form of concomitance between different objects? Otherwise, memory
17:17–17:21and recognition of different objects would also arise from one another's impressions,
17:21–17:25and the unacceptable consequence would follow that a jar is recognized through the impression
17:25–17:27of a cloth.
17:27–17:31repeated observation of a relation cannot be defined.
17:31–17:372. Furthermore, repeated observation of the relation between reason and probandom can be
17:37–17:42described neither as observation of the same reason with the same probandom and many loci,
17:42–17:47nor as observation of many reasons with many probanda, nor as many observations of reason
17:47–17:49and probandom.
17:49–17:54Under the first alternative, repeated observation would be observation of reason and probandom
17:54–17:59and many loci, under the second, observation of many reasons and many probanda, and under
17:59–18:03the third, many observations of the same reason and probandum.
18:03–18:08Consequently, under the first alternative cognition that colorhood is pervaded by tastehood
18:08–18:13would have to arise, under the second, cognition that substancehood is pervaded by jarhood
18:13–18:17would have to arise, and under the third, cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire
18:17–18:21would have to arise merely from continuous observation of smoke and fire in the same
18:21–18:28locus, a single kitchen. Moreover, if repeated observation means three or four observations,
18:28–18:35no uninterrupted succession of those observations is established. Not only that, in the inference,
18:35–18:39this is made of earth because it can be scratched with iron, even after earthhood and scratchability
18:39–18:44by iron have been observed together hundreds of times, the perversion of the reason
18:44–18:48by the probandom is not cognized.
18:48–18:54Repetitive observation assisted by hypothetical reasoning is not a means of cognizing perversion.
18:54–18:553.
18:55–19:01The Neyayaka may argue that repeated observation of the reasons concomitance with the probandom,
19:01–19:06assisted by hypothetical reasoning, is the means of cognizing perversion.
19:06–19:10But we Prabhakaraj reply that if the observation of concomitance assisted by the required
19:10–19:15hypothetical reasoning is accepted as the means of cognizing perversion, what purpose
19:15–19:19is served by repeated observation of concomitance.
19:19–19:24It cannot be said that hypothetical reasoning does not arise without repeated observation
19:24–19:26of reason and probandom.
19:26–19:31A person skilled in pervasion can reason hypothetically upon seeing reason and probandom together
19:31–19:36for the first time, hence repeated observation is wholly unnecessary.
19:36–19:41Moreover, hypothetical reasoning assisted by repeated observation cannot itself be
19:41–19:46regarded as the means of cognizing perversion, because hypothetical reasoning itself rests
19:46–19:53upon cognition of perversion, leading to infinite regress. The Neayaka may say here that a newborn
19:53–19:57infant acquires cognition of perversion and makes an inference, and from that inference
19:57–20:01arise movement towards suckling and withdrawal from other things, all this occurs without
20:01–20:06hypothetical reasoning, so accepting hypothetical reasoning as a means of cognizing perversion
20:06–20:13does not lead to infinite regress. But we Prabhakaraj reply, because deviation is observed in some cases,
20:13–20:18hypothetical reasoning would be incapable of producing cognition of perversion,
20:18–20:21therefore it cannot be accepted as a means of cognizing perversion.
20:22–20:26It should also be noted here that being produced by hypothetical reasoning is no
20:26–20:31intermediate common property occurring in cognitions of perversion produced by hypothetical
20:31–20:37reasoning. Therefore that very hypothetical reasoning cannot be regarded as a means of cognizing
20:37–20:40perversion.
20:40–20:47Generic character contact is not a means of cognizing perversion. For, the Neayakas now
20:47–20:52say, in the inference of many probanda by many reasons, cognition of all the probanda and
20:52–20:57all the reasons in one locus is obtained only through generic character contact, therefore
20:57–21:01that pervasive contact delimited by a universal alone should be the means of cognizing
21:01–21:06perversion, that is, of cognizing the reason's non-occurrence without the probandom.
21:06–21:11Moreover, the generic forms of reason and probandom cannot be cognized from a single
21:11–21:16joint observation, therefore repeated observation of the reason with the probandom is necessary
21:16–21:19for cognizing perversion.
21:19–21:22But this argument is untenable.
21:22–21:27For the sake of economy, cognition of the universal alone is regarded as the pervasive
21:27–21:32contact, the known individual possessing the universal is not regarded as the pervasive
21:32–21:39contact. Therefore repeated observation is not necessary for cognition of pervasion.
21:39–21:43Nor can it be said that a second and third joint observation are required to remove doubt
21:43–21:48that the copresence of reason and probandum in one locus is accidental, a mere Croan-Palm
21:48–21:53coincidence. For even after a second and third joint observation of reason and probandum
21:53–21:57and one locus, doubt about accidental co-presence cannot be removed.

Plain text

RECUTATION OF THE VIEW OF SOME THINKERS 15. This view of certain teachers is also untenable. In the case of the reason smoke, the reason's non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandum is not found, because smoke occurs in a kitchen, while the kitchen is distinct from the fiery mountain. PREVASION ALSO CANNOT BE THE NON-OCCURRENCE OF THE REASON IN A PLACE DISTINKED FROM EVERY LOCUS OF THE PROBANDUM, BECAUSE ALL LOCI OF FIRE ARE DISTINKED FROM EACH separate locus of fire. Furthermore, all such definitions of pervasion would involve the defect of self-dependence, because reasonhood, probandumhood, and the status of what is taken as reason and probandum are themselves to be determined only through pervasion. Probandumhood cannot be regarded as the object of proof or as being the object of a desire to prove, because neither state is present in the fire of a kitchen that has already been established. Nor is the argument tenable that another person, namely the pupil, knows only Pervasian in general, otherwise, how could he establish that these definitions fail to establish inference, for example, through under extension. Without descriptive knowledge of the nature of Pervasian that establishes inference for himself, the pupil cannot enter into an inquiry concerning the nature of Pervasian. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tatvasant Mai composed by Sri Gadjoptia, the prima facie discussion concerning pervasion comes to an end. The prima facie account of pervasion is concluded. The definitive definition of pervasion. Sidhanta Laka 16. Here we, the proponents of the established conclusion, state the definitive definition of pervasion based on an invariable relation. Pervasion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of that counter-positiveness which is determined by an absolute absence that is co-located with the reason but not co-located with its own counter-positive. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasint Mai composed by Sri Gajyapthiya, the definitive definition of perversion comes to an end. The definitive definition of perversion is a definition of perversion in general. 17. Gagia now clarifies that the definitive characteristic of provision is a characteristic of provision in general, because it includes the absence of the Probandom universal. Although a particular fire occurring elsewhere, such as in a kitchen, may be the counter-positive of the absolute absence of the particular fire occurring on the Smoky Mountain, the counter-positiveness determined by such an absence of a particular fire is not delimited by the universal firehood. For the absolute absence of fire in general expressed by there is no fire is neither cognized nor established in the locus of smoke. The absence of fire in general, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by the universal firehood, is entirely distinct from the absence of a particular fire, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by particular firehood. Otherwise, once the absence of all familiar particular colors in air were cognized, and once it were cognized that air is distinct from the loci of all familiar colors, general doubts such as, is there color in air or not, and is aralocus of color or not, would become impossible, because the collection of the absences of all particular colors in air would already have been ascertained. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasintmai, the examination of the absence of the Probandan universal comes to an end. The absence of a universal is concluded. Perversion of a particular reason. Vovaipte. 18. Alternatively, perversion may be described as the collocation of a particular reason with a particular probandom. This particular probandom is not the counter positive of its own absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, and that absolute absence does not occur in the locus of its own counter positive. Or pervasion is the co-location of a particular reason with a particular probandom whose locus is not the counter-positive of the mutual absence of the locus of the probandom occurring in the locus of the reason. Or pervasion is the state in which the reason occurs in the locus of the probandom and is not the counter-positive of a mutual absence occurring in the locus of the reason. Fire occurring in another locus is only the counter-positive of the absolute absence of the fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Similarly, the locus of fire situated elsewhere is only the counter positive of the mutual absence of the locus of fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Therefore smoke and fire occurring in different loci cannot pervade each other. Pervasion exists only between that particular smoke and that particular fire which are co-located. It should not be objected that the pervasion of smoke in general by fire in general would thereby become impossible. For all particular smokes are pervaded by all particular fires, consequently smoke in general is also pervaded by fire in general. The pervasion by a particular fire co-located with a particular smoke is likewise intended to belong to that very particular smoke. Again, particular individuals that arise and perish at the same time are regarded as mutually pervasive. Justification of the special definition. 19. In the inference, this possesses conjunction because it exists. The absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the probandom, is not co-located with its counter-positive. It occurs in action, the locus of the reason existence, but its counter-positive conjunction does not occur in action. Therefore the first special definition is overextended. were extended. Hence being delimited by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with the counter-positive may be taken as a qualifier of the absolute absence employed in the definition of perversion. In action, the absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the probandom, is delimited only by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with its counter-positive conjunction. Nor should it be objected that in the inference, this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree, the mutual absence of the locus of conjunction with the monkey is only non-pervasively occurring. For a veridical cognition concerning identity with the locus of conjunction with the monkey, that is, the absence of difference from it, is possible. Even without cognition of a relation of pervaded and pervader between reason and probandom, conjunction with a monkey is in fact that very probandom which is cognized is related, it need not be known as a pervader. Therefore, in the Behavari High Compound of the definition, the meaning of the genitive case is merely the relation cognized as real, not a cognized pervadingness, hence pervation itself does not become part of the definition of perversion. The special definition of pervation containing the word itself is also not defective through lack of a common factor. For what is to be defined as precisely the non-common perversion of a particular individual reason, the question which perversion belongs to which reason, confirms this point. Removal of the inapplicability of the definitions. 20. It may now be objected, both cognitions, in the locus of smoke there are neither fire nor a lake, and the locus of smoke is the locus of neither fire nor a lake, are possible. For the absolute absence of fire and the mutual absence of the locus of fire, determining counter-positiveness delimited by the property of pervading occurrence, occur in the locus of smoke. How, then, can the pervasion of the reason be determined by these two definitions employing absolute absence and mutual absence? This objection, however, is not sound. We do not admit such an absolute absence or mutual absence. Even if they were admitted, only the lake and the fiery lake would be the counter-positives of those two absences, fire and the locus of fire would not be their counter-positives. Revision of the teacher's definition, pervasion is freedom from an extraneous condition. 21. Giving due importance to the notion of freedom from an extraneous condition in the discussion of pervasion, Gagia revises the teacher's definition, Tethysintmii, Part 2, Chapter section 10, and incorporates that very freedom from an extraneous condition into the definition of perversion. Alternatively, the perversion of the reason by the probandum is the reason's freedom from an extraneous condition. This freedom from an extraneous condition is the collocation of reason and probandum that is collocated with the absolute absence of water and the like. The counter-positiveness of that absolute absence of water and the like is delimited by waterhood and similar delimiters, and that counter-positiveness is in turn determined by the absolute absence of water and the light co-located with the reason. It should not be objected that on this account pervasion would have to be admitted even in a false reason attended by an extraneous condition, such as fire. In the conditional inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the probandum smoke is not co-located with the absence of conjunction with wet fuel, and that absence of conjunction with wet fuel is in turn the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason fire. For an extraneous condition always pervades the probandom. The co-location of the reason with the probandom that deviates from everything from which the reason itself deviates has been called the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition by the earlier teachers. An alternative definition of freedom from an extraneous condition. 22. Alternatively, the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition is merely the state in which the reason is not co-located with an absolute absence whose counter-positive is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence co-located with the probandom. In the conditional inference the mountain has smoked because it has fire, the reason fire is co-located with the absolute absence of the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel. This absence of the extraneous condition is not the counter positive of the absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandome smoke, because conjunction with wet fuel does not pervade the reasonfire. Possession of the form of the delimiter of relatedness is pervasion. 23. Another alternative description of pervasion may be given as follows. The pervasion of a particular reason is its relatedness to a particular probandome, that is, the co-location of the particular reason with the particular probandome, in which the reason possesses the property delimiting net relatedness, in other words, the property delimiting co-location with the particular pro-bandom. For example, in the inference, the mountain has fire because it has smoke, the particular pervasion of smoke is relatedness to fire, that is, the co-location of smoke with fire because smoke possesses smokehood, which delimits relatedness to fire, and smoke in general is related only to fire. But in the inference, the The mountain has smoke because it has fire, the particular perversion of fire is not relatedness to smoke, because fire does not possess firehood as the delimiter of relatedness to smoke, firing general is also related to what is smokeless. It should be noted that an over-pervasive property cannot delimit relatedness. Over-pervasive properties such as conjunction and no ability are not experienced as delimiters of relatedness to the pro-bandom, that is, of the co-location of smoke with fire. By contrast, firehood produced by conjunction with wet fuel is the delimiter, in the reason fire, of relatedness to smoke, and that firehood alone is pervaded. Being delimited by the delimiter of co-location with that is pervasion. 24, or it may be said that the reason is an entity whose nature is delimited by the delimiter of co-location with the probandom, such a reason is pervaded by that probandom. In the sound inference, the mounting has fire because it has smoke, the co-location of smoke with fire is delimited by smokehood, therefore the reason smoke is pervaded. But in the inference with an extraneous condition, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the collocation of fire with smoke is delimited only by the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, and not by firehood, therefore the reason fire cannot be pervaded. For reasons Adah-eva-katuya The Prabhakras advance the following propositions. 1. For this reason namely, because in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of reasonhood is not the delimiter of relatedness to the probandum, Tathasintmai, Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 23, a qualifying property of the reason that, although delimiting reasonhood, differs from the delimiter of relatedness to the probandum, delimits the intended reasons relation to the probandom that is the extraneous condition of the reason. 2. For this reason, in the inference, this possesses cowwood because it possesses horsehood, no such qualifying property is found in an extraneous condition such as possession of a do-lap. Therefore the assured characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the probandom delimited by the reason while not itself pervading the reason. In an inference with a deviant reason, the probandum and the absence of the probandum are mutually opposed in one and the same locus, hence, without a difference between the locus of the probandum and the locus of its absence, it is impossible to regard the reason as related both to the probandum and to its absence. Therefore the extraneous condition delimits relatedness to the probandum. Consequently, in an inference with a deviant reason, that qualifying property which pervades the probandom delimited by the reason but does not pervade the reason is the extraneous condition. 3. For this reason, an extraneous condition necessarily occurs in the reason in an inference with a deviant reason. Otherwise, nearly because of deviation, a deviant reason could be regarded as non-indicative, that is, unpervaded, and the inference of an extraneous condition, this reason is attended by an extraneous condition because it is deviant, would become pointless and unnecessary. 4. For this reason, in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of reasonhood is not the sole delimiter of relatedness to the probandom. Hence a co-extensive property, which alone is the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, appears to occur in the intended reason. Therefore, in a deviant reason, a co-extensive property is the extraneous condition, just as a hibiscus flower is regarded as an extraneous condition in relation to a crystal. Now the characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the reason's relation to the probandum while not pervading the reason. But a qualifying property that is not co-extensive with both reason and probandum cannot be the denotation of the word extraneous condition because the ground for applying that word to such a meaning is absent. The vitiating power of an extraneous condition consists in its causing cognition of deviation. But the state of causing cognition of deviation cannot be regarded as the nature of extraneous conditionhood, otherwise, both a purposeless property pervading the probandum and a deviant property pervading the probandum would have to be regarded as extraneous conditions. The discussion of pervasion is concluded. 3. Means of apprehending pervasion Viaptigrahopaya Prima-facie view, repeated observation is not a cause. 1. The Prabhakras hold the following view here. Cognition of such pervasion does not arise from repeatedly observing the concomitance of reason and probandum, because each separate observation is not a cause of cognition of either the reason or the probandum. Moreover, these transient acts, which perish in a mere moment, cannot possess any unifying factor capable of joining all the observations together at a single moment. The Neayaka may now propose that an impression produced by repeated observation of the concomitance of reason and probandom, assisted by a sense organ, is the means of cognizing perversion, since in the case of recognition a sense organ is accepted as a cooperative cause of an impression. But this proposal is untenable. An impression is accepted as a cause only of memory and recognition concerning the same object. How, then, could an impression assisted by a sense organ produce cognition of pervasion in the form of concomitance between different objects? Otherwise, memory and recognition of different objects would also arise from one another's impressions, and the unacceptable consequence would follow that a jar is recognized through the impression of a cloth. repeated observation of a relation cannot be defined. 2. Furthermore, repeated observation of the relation between reason and probandom can be described neither as observation of the same reason with the same probandom and many loci, nor as observation of many reasons with many probanda, nor as many observations of reason and probandom. Under the first alternative, repeated observation would be observation of reason and probandom and many loci, under the second, observation of many reasons and many probanda, and under the third, many observations of the same reason and probandum. Consequently, under the first alternative cognition that colorhood is pervaded by tastehood would have to arise, under the second, cognition that substancehood is pervaded by jarhood would have to arise, and under the third, cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire would have to arise merely from continuous observation of smoke and fire in the same locus, a single kitchen. Moreover, if repeated observation means three or four observations, no uninterrupted succession of those observations is established. Not only that, in the inference, this is made of earth because it can be scratched with iron, even after earthhood and scratchability by iron have been observed together hundreds of times, the perversion of the reason by the probandom is not cognized. Repetitive observation assisted by hypothetical reasoning is not a means of cognizing perversion. 3. The Neyayaka may argue that repeated observation of the reasons concomitance with the probandom, assisted by hypothetical reasoning, is the means of cognizing perversion. But we Prabhakaraj reply that if the observation of concomitance assisted by the required hypothetical reasoning is accepted as the means of cognizing perversion, what purpose is served by repeated observation of concomitance. It cannot be said that hypothetical reasoning does not arise without repeated observation of reason and probandom. A person skilled in pervasion can reason hypothetically upon seeing reason and probandom together for the first time, hence repeated observation is wholly unnecessary. Moreover, hypothetical reasoning assisted by repeated observation cannot itself be regarded as the means of cognizing perversion, because hypothetical reasoning itself rests upon cognition of perversion, leading to infinite regress. The Neayaka may say here that a newborn infant acquires cognition of perversion and makes an inference, and from that inference arise movement towards suckling and withdrawal from other things, all this occurs without hypothetical reasoning, so accepting hypothetical reasoning as a means of cognizing perversion does not lead to infinite regress. But we Prabhakaraj reply, because deviation is observed in some cases, hypothetical reasoning would be incapable of producing cognition of perversion, therefore it cannot be accepted as a means of cognizing perversion. It should also be noted here that being produced by hypothetical reasoning is no intermediate common property occurring in cognitions of perversion produced by hypothetical reasoning. Therefore that very hypothetical reasoning cannot be regarded as a means of cognizing perversion. Generic character contact is not a means of cognizing perversion. For, the Neayakas now say, in the inference of many probanda by many reasons, cognition of all the probanda and all the reasons in one locus is obtained only through generic character contact, therefore that pervasive contact delimited by a universal alone should be the means of cognizing perversion, that is, of cognizing the reason's non-occurrence without the probandom. Moreover, the generic forms of reason and probandom cannot be cognized from a single joint observation, therefore repeated observation of the reason with the probandom is necessary for cognizing perversion. But this argument is untenable. For the sake of economy, cognition of the universal alone is regarded as the pervasive contact, the known individual possessing the universal is not regarded as the pervasive contact. Therefore repeated observation is not necessary for cognition of pervasion. Nor can it be said that a second and third joint observation are required to remove doubt that the copresence of reason and probandum in one locus is accidental, a mere Croan-Palm coincidence. For even after a second and third joint observation of reason and probandum and one locus, doubt about accidental co-presence cannot be removed.

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