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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:075 forms of controversy in the MMA with Makron essay with Makron view
0:07–0:15A men's aaka may say that the validity of the first cognition is known intrinsically from the complete causal aggregate that produces the cognition
0:15–0:19But 5 kinds of doubt arise concerning this view
0:19–0:25First, does the complete causal aggregate producing cognition determine validity alone and not produce in validity?
0:25–0:32Second, is validity known by that very cognition itself, and not by a distinct cognition taking validity as its object?
0:32–0:38If validity is said to be known extrinsically by another means, such as inference, it can
0:38–0:42be known only in a cognition already apprehended.
0:42–0:46If validity is known intrinsically from the complete set of the cognition's own causes,
0:46–0:50only cognition is qualified by validity will be established.
0:50–0:55The third doubt is whether validity is determined by the causes producing the cognition that
0:55–0:57is its substrate.
0:57–1:03The fourth is whether validity is known by the cognition that is its substrate or separately.
1:03–1:08Some say that validity is intrinsically known by its substrate, the first cognition, through
1:08–1:13an apprehension relation qualified by a universal property, thus the attempt to prove it
1:13–1:18inferentially would be partly vitiated by proving what is already established.
1:18–1:24Hence the probandom, validity, should be qualified as not arising from mental concentration.
1:24–1:27This is not correct.
1:27–1:31The validity of the first cognition cannot be established in any substrate other than
1:31–1:32the cognizer.
1:32–1:38Further, if validity alone, apart from its substrate, is made the subject of inference,
1:38–1:42validity will be known only through the first cognition that is its substrate, then the defect
1:42–1:46of an already established probandom does not arise, because the probandom has not
1:46–1:50previously been established at all.
1:50–1:54The fifth doubt is whether the validity of the first cognition, this as a pot
1:54–1:59is known through the second, reflexive cognition, I know that this is a pot, or not.
1:59–2:04Or is the validity of the first cognition known from the complete set of causes producing
2:04–2:07the second cognition, or not?
2:07–2:13The prima facie theorist says, let its determination be through itself, that is, as soon as cognition
2:13–2:17arises, let its validity be known intrinsically.
2:17–2:21Thus the mutually opposed alternatives are these, a, is the validity of cognition
2:21–2:25necessarily apprehended by the causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the cognition
2:25–2:30but not apprehension of invalidity or not. B is the validity of that first cognition apprehended
2:30–2:35by a cognition not produced by the cognition that takes the first cognition as its object or not.
2:36–2:40In the theory of extrinsic validity, validity is apprehended only when cognition itself has
2:40–2:45been apprehended. In the theory of intrinsic validity, cognition apprehends itself as qualified
2:45–2:47by validity.
2:47–2:53C. Is validity apprehended only by the cognition that apprehends its substrate, or not?
2:53–2:58D. Is validity apprehended only by its own substrate, or not?
2:58–3:02And does this occur in every case, or not?
3:02–3:09Objection. Through an extraordinary relation consisting in yogically generated merit or in universal characteristic presentation,
3:09–3:13validity of a cognition is sometimes apprehended in its own substrate and only by that very
3:13–3:19substrate, you Niaiikas yourselves say so. If this much is admitted, the men's arc airs
3:19–3:23attempt to prove his thesis will be partly subject to the defect of proving what is already
3:23–3:27established. The qualifier, not through yogically generated merit and the like, must
3:27–3:29therefore be added.
3:29–3:36Gangesa, this is mistaken. Such a point is not admitted with respect to the other
3:36–3:42themsakas. Moreover, the subject of themsaka thesis is validity in general, therefore what
3:42–3:47is to be proved, that validity is apprehended only by its substrate is not something already
3:47–3:52admitted by all parties. Thus there is not even a partial defect of proving what is
3:52–3:55already established.
3:55–3:58The following questions also arise.
3:58–4:03E. Is the validity of the cognition this is a pot apprehended by that very cognition
4:03–4:09itself or not? And is validity apprehended only by the apprehending cognition that apprehends
4:09–4:15the cognition serving is the substrate of validity or not?
4:15–4:19Objection against the Memsaka Prima-Facey theorist. In this context no definition of
4:19–4:22validity compatible with intrinsic validity is possible on the basis of which it could
4:22–4:28be known intrinsically. Whether validity is defined as
4:28–4:31d to the power of one being a cognition that does not present as a mode of its
4:31–4:35qualificant a mode absent from that qualificant, that is, one that does not present a known
4:35–4:38object in a form which in reality is absent from it.
4:38–4:44d squared, being a cognition that apprehends an object not previously apprehended.
4:44–4:49or, on accepting that all cognition presents objects as they are and is therefore veridical,
4:49–4:54and while rejecting a universal called, experientiality, d cubed, being a cognition distinct from
4:54–4:55memory.
4:55–5:00or, d, being cognition of a qualified object.
5:00–5:05However it is defined among these alternatives, validity will not be intrinsically apprehensible,
5:05–5:11nor will it be apprehensible through the reflexive cognition admitted by some schools.
5:11–5:16For the cognition of the qualifier, Qualifikan relation implicit in the definitions beginning
5:16–5:19with D superscript 1 would be impossible.
5:19–5:23For example, the relation being a cognition that does not present a mode absent from
5:23–5:30its qualifikan, cannot be known when its qualifier has not previously been presented.
5:30–5:35Even if cognition is held to be super sensible, the inference establishing the existence of
5:35–5:39that cognition would not apprehend its validity.
5:39–5:43For manifestation and the like, which serve as marks or probative reasons for cognition
5:43–5:47in general, would be deviant with respect to validity, the class of all cognitions is
5:47–5:52broader than the class of valid cognitions.
5:52–5:56Nor can the argument proceed through a special kind of knownness imagined as a basis
5:56–5:59for inferring the production of the target cognition.
5:59–6:04First, it is difficult to determine the existence of such a special knownness.
6:04–6:10Second, even if its existence is admitted, invalidity known through a knownness not confined
6:10–6:17to valid cognition would likewise be apprehended intrinsically, an undesirable consequence.
6:17–6:21Prima-Facey Theorist, although the definitions considered above face those difficulties,
6:21–6:25validity is nevertheless one of the following, d, being a cognition that presents an object
6:25–6:31as phi, or d, being a cognition related as phi to a object. For in ordinary practice,
6:31–6:35unwavering effort and action follow merely from determining validity thus defined.
6:35–6:39This view has the merit of parsimony, any alternative would be comparatively cumbersome.
6:41–6:44In fact, validity is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that produces
6:44–6:49apprehension of the valid cognition. More specifically, in all three MMA with
6:49–6:53macron essay with macron theories, through a reflexive cognition of the target cognition,
6:53–6:57through inference, or through self-liminosity, both the presence of the property in the
6:57–7:01qualificant, the object, and the status of that property as the mode within the cognition are
7:01–7:07apprehended. For cognition is determined by its object. Consequently, when an apprehended cognition
7:07–7:13is cognized, its object too is known. Thus, just as the property and its possessor appear in
7:13–7:18the original or target cognition, the relation between them is also an object of cognition.
7:18–7:22For in the case of the target cognition, that relation too is known through the
7:22–7:25the operative sense object contact in precisely the same manner as the
7:25–7:28qualificant and qualifier of the target cognition unknown.
7:29–7:33Unwavering human activity arises solely from determining validity of
7:33–7:35cognition in this sense.
7:36–7:37This definition is economical.
7:38–7:41It should not be given another more complex form carrying the fault of
7:41–7:43needless complication.
7:45–7:48Validity is known from the causal aggregate of cognition in
7:48–7:49validity extrinsically.
7:51–7:54The massacres hold that the validity of cognition is known
7:54–7:58solely from the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition.
7:58–8:01The validity in the first cognition, namely, the presence of a property in the object or
8:01–8:05cognition of an object with that property as its qualifier, is known, according to the
8:05–8:09guru's school, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the
8:09–8:13misra school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive
8:13–8:17awareness, and according to the bar school, from the causal aggregate of a self-liminous
8:17–8:19inference.
8:19–8:22Cognition is delimited by its object, and the object is known through apprehension
8:22–8:27of the cognitive occurrence. Therefore, as soon as the first cognition is apprehended,
8:27–8:31the property located in the object, it's substrate, and the object qualified by that property all
8:31–8:36become objects of the first cognition. The apprehension relation of the first cognition
8:36–8:41applies equally to the property and to its status as qualifier. A first perceptual
8:41–8:45cognition such as, this is silver, presents the relata in relational form, one and the
8:45–8:48same thing is known as a relatum endowed with the property.
8:48–8:53It should not be said that, because validity was not known in the first cognition, invalidity
8:53–8:57cannot subsequently be superimposed upon it.
8:57–9:00Validity is known through the complete set of causes producing cognition and becomes
9:00–9:04available through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence.
9:04–9:10This is just as correlatness and absences are known from their causal aggregates.
9:10–9:14The nature of cognitive invalidity is this, cognition arises with a property as
9:14–9:18qualifier where that qualifying property is absent.
9:18–9:23is known extrinsically through another cause. For in error the substrate in which the qualifier
9:23–9:27is absent is not known and therefore cannot become an object of reflexive cognition. It
9:27–9:31should not be said that, since the second cognition apprehends all the objects of the
9:31–9:36first, error and cognition of error would become intermixed. Such intermixture is expected only
9:36–9:41in the absence of opposition and is automatically blocked when opposition is present. The error
9:41–9:45of silver is not located in the shell before one, therefore a knower who knows another
9:45–9:50persons error need not himself be in error. Consequently, the validity of cognition is known
9:50–9:56intrinsically and invalidity extrinsically. The Msaka refutation of the objection that a
9:56–10:03special mode of qualification is not an object. The Nayaika objects that the definition of
10:03–10:08validity requires not merely being the substrate of a qualifier, but acceptance of the qualifier
10:08–10:13special qualificative status, for example, silverness. Such a special qualificative
10:13–10:18status appears only in the first cognition, not in the reflexive cognition, because the mind
10:18–10:23does not apprehend it independently of the first sensory perception. The Memsaka replies that the
10:23–10:28objection is unsound. The special qualitative status is known by the first cognition,
10:28–10:32and therefore the reflexive cognition can also take it as an object. Besides,
10:32–10:37there is no need to posit any separate, specialness, of qualitative status, this will be refuted
10:37–10:43below. This reply also refutes the objection that validity is not intrinsically known
10:43–10:47in a non-self-luminous reflexive cognition because unless the substrate of the qualificant is known,
10:47–10:53validity as qualifier will also not be known. Once the validity of a self-luminous first cognition,
10:53–10:58such as verbal cognition or olfactory cognition, has been known from its causal aggregate,
10:58–11:03a separate awareness, this cognition is valid, is unnecessary. The causes of a self-luminous
11:03–11:07reflexive cognition illuminate only the cognition, not its property of validity.
11:08–11:12If those causes were capable of apprehending validity as well, they would also apprehend
11:12–11:16and invalidity. In an inferential cognition that is illuminated
11:16–11:20by another cognition, an inference produced through a reason or by the mind cannot determine
11:20–11:25validity except mistakenly, because deviation in the reason is possible.
11:25–11:28Nor should it be maintained that validity residing in cognition must be known intrinsically
11:28–11:32from the causal aggregate, otherwise, by the same reasoning, invalidity residing in
11:32–11:36cognition would also have to be intrinsically known.
11:36–11:39A reflexive cognition or inference is not produced from all the objects of the
11:39–11:43first cognition, therefore the objection that it intrinsically apprehends the first cognition's
11:43–11:47validity does not stand.
11:47–11:51Conclusion of the M. Saka Prima-Facey view
11:51–11:55The M. Saka concludes the Prima-Facey position as follows.
11:55–11:59The nature of the first cognition's validity can be understood in either of two ways.
11:59–12:001.
12:00–12:03Cognition arises with a property as qualifier when that property is present in the object,
12:03–12:05or, 2.
12:05–12:08Cognition arises taking as its object the qualificative status in the substrate
12:08–12:10of the qualifier.
12:10–12:13According to the guru school this validity is intrinsically known from the complete causal
12:13–12:17aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra school, from the causal aggregate
12:17–12:21of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the Baar school, from the
12:21–12:24causal aggregate of inference.
12:24–12:29Whether cognition takes validity as its object or arises with validity as its qualifier,
12:29–12:32in both cases validity is determined by the complete causal aggregate producing
12:32–12:34the cognition.
12:34–12:38If cognitive validity were held to be known extrinsically through another means,
12:38–12:43infinite regress would arise. For the validity of the cognition of validity and of the cognitions
12:43–12:47of the reason, subject, and pervasion proving validity would each have to be determined through
12:47–12:51another means, the validity of that means would require a third, and so on without end.
12:52–12:57Validity would consequently never be established. By elimination it follows that the validity
12:57–13:02of cognition is known intrinsically from the complete set of its own causes. This is the
13:02–13:05the Memsaka Prima facei view.
13:05–13:11The Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically.
13:11–13:17The Neayaka doctrine is that validity is known extrinsically, that is, through another means.
13:17–13:21If validity were intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of cognition,
13:21–13:25then an estate-lacking habituation when a cognition of the same kind has not repeatedly
13:25–13:30arisen, its validity would be automatically certain as soon as the cognition arose,
13:30–13:33and no doubt about validity could ever arise.
13:33–13:38Moreover, it is impossible to hold that the causal aggregate of cognition intrinsically
13:38–13:43makes its validity known when the cognition itself has not yet been apprehended.
13:43–13:48And if the cognition serving as the substrate of the first cognition were itself not known,
13:48–13:52no doubt about validity could arise either.
13:52–13:56It may be said that, as soon as the opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition
13:56–14:00perishes immediately before doubt arises, hence there need be no mental doubt of the form,
14:00–14:07is this cognition valid or not, with the first cognition as its qualifcant? This is unsound.
14:07–14:12Doubt must arise about the validity of a first cognition presented through another cognition.
14:12–14:17Therefore the validity of cognition is known only extrinsically.
14:17–14:23Continuation of the Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically. On the
14:23–14:27The remaining Saka view, if the validity of the first cognition is not determined after
14:27–14:32that cognition has perished, doubt about validity would become impossible because the cognition
14:32–14:35that is its substrate is no longer known.
14:35–14:39The M Saka may say that as soon as the two opposing alternatives are remembered, the
14:39–14:44first cognition perishes immediately before doubt, hence there is no need for a mental
14:44–14:48doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, taking the first cognition as its
14:48–14:51qualifacand.
14:51–14:54The Neayaka rejects this.
14:54–14:59Doubt about the validity of the first cognition presented by another cognition requires apprehension
14:59–15:02of that cognition as the substrate.
15:02–15:06The reason in an inference produces certainty, not doubt.
15:06–15:11And if the first cognition is regarded as merely a mental perception, the causal conditions
15:11–15:16producing knowledge of validity would inhibit doubt about validity, because those conditions
15:16–15:18cause certainty.
15:18–15:23Thus the msaka claim that doubt about validity is possible even though validity is intrinsically
15:23–15:25known is not established.
15:25–15:31The validity of cognition is determined only extrinsically.
15:31–15:37Refutation of the msaka argument that doubt about validity is impossible.
15:37–15:40It may be objected that knowledge of the substrate of a property is not the actual cause
15:40–15:42of doubt about that property.
15:42–15:47A first cognition in the form of the doubt, is this cognition valid or not, can arise
15:47–15:51merely from cognition of two opposing alternatives, non-perception of a distinguishing feature,
15:51–15:54and sense contact with the property bearer.
15:54–15:57This objection is unsound.
15:57–16:00If cognition is super sensible, mental doubt about validity taking the first cognition
16:00–16:04as the property bearer cannot arise without knowledge of that property bearer, namely
16:04–16:06the first cognition.
16:06–16:10The inferential reason proving validity likewise does not generate doubt, it is a cause
16:10–16:12of certainty.
16:12–16:15And if the first cognition is taken to be mentally perceptible, the causal conditions
16:15–16:19knowledge of validity would themselves inhibit doubt about validity because they are the conditions
16:19–16:25of certainty about validity. Otherwise doubt about validity could arise even when one of the opposing
16:25–16:31alternatives is directly perceived. It may again be said that when one alternative is remembered and
16:31–16:36the other specific alternative is not perceived, the one alternative is superimposed upon the
16:36–16:41property bearer, but when both alternatives are remembered, doubt about validity arises.
16:41–16:46Thus the conditions of doubt are stronger than the conditions of certainty, when both
16:46–16:52opposing alternatives are remembered, not certainty but only doubt will arise.
16:52–16:56This argument too is unsound.
16:56–17:00Superimposition of both mutually opposed alternatives on one property bearer results
17:00–17:04from the conjunction of two distinct sets of superimposition conditions, and that
17:04–17:08dual superimposition is what is called doubt.
17:08–17:13The conditions superimposing one alternative do not prevent those superimposing the other,
17:13–17:17because the two sets of conditions are not mutually opposed.
17:17–17:21Nor can it be said that the combined conditions superimposing both alternatives block the
17:21–17:26conditions determining one alternative, because there is no distinct set of conditions for
17:26–17:32dual superimposition apart from the conditions for superimposing each alternative.
17:32–17:37Two different causal sets can simultaneously produce two different results, as is observed
17:37–17:43in collective cognition. Therefore, when the conditions determining validity are present,
17:43–17:48doubt about validity cannot arise. In doubt, cognition of the property-bearer
17:48–17:53and prominence of both opposed alternatives are indispensable, hence cognition of the first
17:53–18:00cognition as property-bearer must be accepted as a cause of doubt. Refutation of the argument
18:00–18:07that doubt about validity arises from another defect. The Mtsaka may say that, when there
18:07–18:11There is an ocular defect such as jaundice, an illusion such as this conch is yellow or
18:11–18:16the appearance of a face in a mirror arises even though a particular property is perceived.
18:16–18:22Likewise, when some other defect is present among the causes of cognition, doubt about
18:22–18:27validity may arise even after validity has been determined.
18:27–18:29This analogy is inappropriate.
18:29–18:33If doubt arose in that way even after validity had been determined, the undesirable consequence
18:33–18:37would follow that, as in illusion, one would act toward the object even while in a state
18:37–18:42of doubt. Direct determination of the genuine distinguishing property inhibits a presentational
18:42–18:47illusion. It may again be said that doubt about the validity of the original cognition
18:47–18:51arises from doubt about the validity of the cognition of validity, just as doubt about
18:51–18:54an object arises from doubt about the validity of the first cognition concerning
18:54–19:00it. This argument too fails. If the validity of the cognition of validity is not intrinsically
19:00–19:04determined by its own causal aggregate, there is no basis for doubting that validity, and
19:04–19:09if it is intrinsically determined, there is no room for doubt.
19:09–19:15Recutation of further arguments for doubt about validity
19:15–19:19The Memsaka says that cognition as such does not eliminate a contrary cognition, because
19:19–19:22a sublating cognition arises even after an illusion.
19:22–19:27Only a cognition that is not otherwise established, that is, one not apprehended as erroneous,
19:27–19:29eliminates contrary cognition.
19:29–19:33Therefore, even when cognition of an object is generally possible, doubt about the object
19:33–19:37arises if there is no determination that, this cognition is neither erroneous nor needless
19:37–19:38repetition.
19:38–19:43Likewise, when the cognition of validity is suspected of being erroneous or otherwise
19:43–19:48established, doubt about validity may arise in place of certainty about validity.
19:48–19:53An objection may be made, the first cognition concerning a pot becomes the object of reflexive
19:53–19:56awareness, therefore there is no doubt that, this is cognition of a pot.
19:56–20:01Likewise, because reflexive awareness is certainly valid, there should be no doubt about the
20:01–20:03validity of the first cognition.
20:03–20:07The mensaka replies that even if reflexive awareness is itself invalid, it can apprehend
20:07–20:11the first cognition as cognition and the pot as its object.
20:11–20:15Likewise, though itself invalid, reflexive awareness can take as its object the validity
20:15–20:19of the first cognition as not otherwise established, hence doubt about the first
20:19–20:22cognition's validity is possible.
20:22–20:26The Nayaika replies that being erroneous means absence of being not otherwise established,
20:26–20:28namely being otherwise established.
20:28–20:32Thus doubt about the validity of the first cognition can arise only when there is doubt
20:32–20:36whether the determination of its validity is itself erroneous.
20:36–20:40But no doubt about the erroneousness of reflexive awareness arises merely according
20:40–20:43as its validity is determined or undetermined.
20:43–20:46Likewise, doubt about the erroneousness of the first cognition will not generate
20:46–20:49doubt about the validity of its object.
20:49–20:53And if the validity of the first cognition is held to be intrinsically determined by
20:53–20:57its own causal aggregate, doubt about its erroneousness is impossible.
20:57–21:01Therefore the MMSARC can not properly admit doubt about validity on this basis.

Plain text

5 forms of controversy in the MMA with Makron essay with Makron view A men's aaka may say that the validity of the first cognition is known intrinsically from the complete causal aggregate that produces the cognition But 5 kinds of doubt arise concerning this view First, does the complete causal aggregate producing cognition determine validity alone and not produce in validity? Second, is validity known by that very cognition itself, and not by a distinct cognition taking validity as its object? If validity is said to be known extrinsically by another means, such as inference, it can be known only in a cognition already apprehended. If validity is known intrinsically from the complete set of the cognition's own causes, only cognition is qualified by validity will be established. The third doubt is whether validity is determined by the causes producing the cognition that is its substrate. The fourth is whether validity is known by the cognition that is its substrate or separately. Some say that validity is intrinsically known by its substrate, the first cognition, through an apprehension relation qualified by a universal property, thus the attempt to prove it inferentially would be partly vitiated by proving what is already established. Hence the probandom, validity, should be qualified as not arising from mental concentration. This is not correct. The validity of the first cognition cannot be established in any substrate other than the cognizer. Further, if validity alone, apart from its substrate, is made the subject of inference, validity will be known only through the first cognition that is its substrate, then the defect of an already established probandom does not arise, because the probandom has not previously been established at all. The fifth doubt is whether the validity of the first cognition, this as a pot is known through the second, reflexive cognition, I know that this is a pot, or not. Or is the validity of the first cognition known from the complete set of causes producing the second cognition, or not? The prima facie theorist says, let its determination be through itself, that is, as soon as cognition arises, let its validity be known intrinsically. Thus the mutually opposed alternatives are these, a, is the validity of cognition necessarily apprehended by the causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the cognition but not apprehension of invalidity or not. B is the validity of that first cognition apprehended by a cognition not produced by the cognition that takes the first cognition as its object or not. In the theory of extrinsic validity, validity is apprehended only when cognition itself has been apprehended. In the theory of intrinsic validity, cognition apprehends itself as qualified by validity. C. Is validity apprehended only by the cognition that apprehends its substrate, or not? D. Is validity apprehended only by its own substrate, or not? And does this occur in every case, or not? Objection. Through an extraordinary relation consisting in yogically generated merit or in universal characteristic presentation, validity of a cognition is sometimes apprehended in its own substrate and only by that very substrate, you Niaiikas yourselves say so. If this much is admitted, the men's arc airs attempt to prove his thesis will be partly subject to the defect of proving what is already established. The qualifier, not through yogically generated merit and the like, must therefore be added. Gangesa, this is mistaken. Such a point is not admitted with respect to the other themsakas. Moreover, the subject of themsaka thesis is validity in general, therefore what is to be proved, that validity is apprehended only by its substrate is not something already admitted by all parties. Thus there is not even a partial defect of proving what is already established. The following questions also arise. E. Is the validity of the cognition this is a pot apprehended by that very cognition itself or not? And is validity apprehended only by the apprehending cognition that apprehends the cognition serving is the substrate of validity or not? Objection against the Memsaka Prima-Facey theorist. In this context no definition of validity compatible with intrinsic validity is possible on the basis of which it could be known intrinsically. Whether validity is defined as d to the power of one being a cognition that does not present as a mode of its qualificant a mode absent from that qualificant, that is, one that does not present a known object in a form which in reality is absent from it. d squared, being a cognition that apprehends an object not previously apprehended. or, on accepting that all cognition presents objects as they are and is therefore veridical, and while rejecting a universal called, experientiality, d cubed, being a cognition distinct from memory. or, d, being cognition of a qualified object. However it is defined among these alternatives, validity will not be intrinsically apprehensible, nor will it be apprehensible through the reflexive cognition admitted by some schools. For the cognition of the qualifier, Qualifikan relation implicit in the definitions beginning with D superscript 1 would be impossible. For example, the relation being a cognition that does not present a mode absent from its qualifikan, cannot be known when its qualifier has not previously been presented. Even if cognition is held to be super sensible, the inference establishing the existence of that cognition would not apprehend its validity. For manifestation and the like, which serve as marks or probative reasons for cognition in general, would be deviant with respect to validity, the class of all cognitions is broader than the class of valid cognitions. Nor can the argument proceed through a special kind of knownness imagined as a basis for inferring the production of the target cognition. First, it is difficult to determine the existence of such a special knownness. Second, even if its existence is admitted, invalidity known through a knownness not confined to valid cognition would likewise be apprehended intrinsically, an undesirable consequence. Prima-Facey Theorist, although the definitions considered above face those difficulties, validity is nevertheless one of the following, d, being a cognition that presents an object as phi, or d, being a cognition related as phi to a object. For in ordinary practice, unwavering effort and action follow merely from determining validity thus defined. This view has the merit of parsimony, any alternative would be comparatively cumbersome. In fact, validity is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the valid cognition. More specifically, in all three MMA with macron essay with macron theories, through a reflexive cognition of the target cognition, through inference, or through self-liminosity, both the presence of the property in the qualificant, the object, and the status of that property as the mode within the cognition are apprehended. For cognition is determined by its object. Consequently, when an apprehended cognition is cognized, its object too is known. Thus, just as the property and its possessor appear in the original or target cognition, the relation between them is also an object of cognition. For in the case of the target cognition, that relation too is known through the the operative sense object contact in precisely the same manner as the qualificant and qualifier of the target cognition unknown. Unwavering human activity arises solely from determining validity of cognition in this sense. This definition is economical. It should not be given another more complex form carrying the fault of needless complication. Validity is known from the causal aggregate of cognition in validity extrinsically. The massacres hold that the validity of cognition is known solely from the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition. The validity in the first cognition, namely, the presence of a property in the object or cognition of an object with that property as its qualifier, is known, according to the guru's school, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the misra school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the bar school, from the causal aggregate of a self-liminous inference. Cognition is delimited by its object, and the object is known through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence. Therefore, as soon as the first cognition is apprehended, the property located in the object, it's substrate, and the object qualified by that property all become objects of the first cognition. The apprehension relation of the first cognition applies equally to the property and to its status as qualifier. A first perceptual cognition such as, this is silver, presents the relata in relational form, one and the same thing is known as a relatum endowed with the property. It should not be said that, because validity was not known in the first cognition, invalidity cannot subsequently be superimposed upon it. Validity is known through the complete set of causes producing cognition and becomes available through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence. This is just as correlatness and absences are known from their causal aggregates. The nature of cognitive invalidity is this, cognition arises with a property as qualifier where that qualifying property is absent. is known extrinsically through another cause. For in error the substrate in which the qualifier is absent is not known and therefore cannot become an object of reflexive cognition. It should not be said that, since the second cognition apprehends all the objects of the first, error and cognition of error would become intermixed. Such intermixture is expected only in the absence of opposition and is automatically blocked when opposition is present. The error of silver is not located in the shell before one, therefore a knower who knows another persons error need not himself be in error. Consequently, the validity of cognition is known intrinsically and invalidity extrinsically. The Msaka refutation of the objection that a special mode of qualification is not an object. The Nayaika objects that the definition of validity requires not merely being the substrate of a qualifier, but acceptance of the qualifier special qualificative status, for example, silverness. Such a special qualificative status appears only in the first cognition, not in the reflexive cognition, because the mind does not apprehend it independently of the first sensory perception. The Memsaka replies that the objection is unsound. The special qualitative status is known by the first cognition, and therefore the reflexive cognition can also take it as an object. Besides, there is no need to posit any separate, specialness, of qualitative status, this will be refuted below. This reply also refutes the objection that validity is not intrinsically known in a non-self-luminous reflexive cognition because unless the substrate of the qualificant is known, validity as qualifier will also not be known. Once the validity of a self-luminous first cognition, such as verbal cognition or olfactory cognition, has been known from its causal aggregate, a separate awareness, this cognition is valid, is unnecessary. The causes of a self-luminous reflexive cognition illuminate only the cognition, not its property of validity. If those causes were capable of apprehending validity as well, they would also apprehend and invalidity. In an inferential cognition that is illuminated by another cognition, an inference produced through a reason or by the mind cannot determine validity except mistakenly, because deviation in the reason is possible. Nor should it be maintained that validity residing in cognition must be known intrinsically from the causal aggregate, otherwise, by the same reasoning, invalidity residing in cognition would also have to be intrinsically known. A reflexive cognition or inference is not produced from all the objects of the first cognition, therefore the objection that it intrinsically apprehends the first cognition's validity does not stand. Conclusion of the M. Saka Prima-Facey view The M. Saka concludes the Prima-Facey position as follows. The nature of the first cognition's validity can be understood in either of two ways. 1. Cognition arises with a property as qualifier when that property is present in the object, or, 2. Cognition arises taking as its object the qualificative status in the substrate of the qualifier. According to the guru school this validity is intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the Baar school, from the causal aggregate of inference. Whether cognition takes validity as its object or arises with validity as its qualifier, in both cases validity is determined by the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition. If cognitive validity were held to be known extrinsically through another means, infinite regress would arise. For the validity of the cognition of validity and of the cognitions of the reason, subject, and pervasion proving validity would each have to be determined through another means, the validity of that means would require a third, and so on without end. Validity would consequently never be established. By elimination it follows that the validity of cognition is known intrinsically from the complete set of its own causes. This is the the Memsaka Prima facei view. The Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically. The Neayaka doctrine is that validity is known extrinsically, that is, through another means. If validity were intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of cognition, then an estate-lacking habituation when a cognition of the same kind has not repeatedly arisen, its validity would be automatically certain as soon as the cognition arose, and no doubt about validity could ever arise. Moreover, it is impossible to hold that the causal aggregate of cognition intrinsically makes its validity known when the cognition itself has not yet been apprehended. And if the cognition serving as the substrate of the first cognition were itself not known, no doubt about validity could arise either. It may be said that, as soon as the opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition perishes immediately before doubt arises, hence there need be no mental doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, with the first cognition as its qualifcant? This is unsound. Doubt must arise about the validity of a first cognition presented through another cognition. Therefore the validity of cognition is known only extrinsically. Continuation of the Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically. On the The remaining Saka view, if the validity of the first cognition is not determined after that cognition has perished, doubt about validity would become impossible because the cognition that is its substrate is no longer known. The M Saka may say that as soon as the two opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition perishes immediately before doubt, hence there is no need for a mental doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, taking the first cognition as its qualifacand. The Neayaka rejects this. Doubt about the validity of the first cognition presented by another cognition requires apprehension of that cognition as the substrate. The reason in an inference produces certainty, not doubt. And if the first cognition is regarded as merely a mental perception, the causal conditions producing knowledge of validity would inhibit doubt about validity, because those conditions cause certainty. Thus the msaka claim that doubt about validity is possible even though validity is intrinsically known is not established. The validity of cognition is determined only extrinsically. Refutation of the msaka argument that doubt about validity is impossible. It may be objected that knowledge of the substrate of a property is not the actual cause of doubt about that property. A first cognition in the form of the doubt, is this cognition valid or not, can arise merely from cognition of two opposing alternatives, non-perception of a distinguishing feature, and sense contact with the property bearer. This objection is unsound. If cognition is super sensible, mental doubt about validity taking the first cognition as the property bearer cannot arise without knowledge of that property bearer, namely the first cognition. The inferential reason proving validity likewise does not generate doubt, it is a cause of certainty. And if the first cognition is taken to be mentally perceptible, the causal conditions knowledge of validity would themselves inhibit doubt about validity because they are the conditions of certainty about validity. Otherwise doubt about validity could arise even when one of the opposing alternatives is directly perceived. It may again be said that when one alternative is remembered and the other specific alternative is not perceived, the one alternative is superimposed upon the property bearer, but when both alternatives are remembered, doubt about validity arises. Thus the conditions of doubt are stronger than the conditions of certainty, when both opposing alternatives are remembered, not certainty but only doubt will arise. This argument too is unsound. Superimposition of both mutually opposed alternatives on one property bearer results from the conjunction of two distinct sets of superimposition conditions, and that dual superimposition is what is called doubt. The conditions superimposing one alternative do not prevent those superimposing the other, because the two sets of conditions are not mutually opposed. Nor can it be said that the combined conditions superimposing both alternatives block the conditions determining one alternative, because there is no distinct set of conditions for dual superimposition apart from the conditions for superimposing each alternative. Two different causal sets can simultaneously produce two different results, as is observed in collective cognition. Therefore, when the conditions determining validity are present, doubt about validity cannot arise. In doubt, cognition of the property-bearer and prominence of both opposed alternatives are indispensable, hence cognition of the first cognition as property-bearer must be accepted as a cause of doubt. Refutation of the argument that doubt about validity arises from another defect. The Mtsaka may say that, when there There is an ocular defect such as jaundice, an illusion such as this conch is yellow or the appearance of a face in a mirror arises even though a particular property is perceived. Likewise, when some other defect is present among the causes of cognition, doubt about validity may arise even after validity has been determined. This analogy is inappropriate. If doubt arose in that way even after validity had been determined, the undesirable consequence would follow that, as in illusion, one would act toward the object even while in a state of doubt. Direct determination of the genuine distinguishing property inhibits a presentational illusion. It may again be said that doubt about the validity of the original cognition arises from doubt about the validity of the cognition of validity, just as doubt about an object arises from doubt about the validity of the first cognition concerning it. This argument too fails. If the validity of the cognition of validity is not intrinsically determined by its own causal aggregate, there is no basis for doubting that validity, and if it is intrinsically determined, there is no room for doubt. Recutation of further arguments for doubt about validity The Memsaka says that cognition as such does not eliminate a contrary cognition, because a sublating cognition arises even after an illusion. Only a cognition that is not otherwise established, that is, one not apprehended as erroneous, eliminates contrary cognition. Therefore, even when cognition of an object is generally possible, doubt about the object arises if there is no determination that, this cognition is neither erroneous nor needless repetition. Likewise, when the cognition of validity is suspected of being erroneous or otherwise established, doubt about validity may arise in place of certainty about validity. An objection may be made, the first cognition concerning a pot becomes the object of reflexive awareness, therefore there is no doubt that, this is cognition of a pot. Likewise, because reflexive awareness is certainly valid, there should be no doubt about the validity of the first cognition. The mensaka replies that even if reflexive awareness is itself invalid, it can apprehend the first cognition as cognition and the pot as its object. Likewise, though itself invalid, reflexive awareness can take as its object the validity of the first cognition as not otherwise established, hence doubt about the first cognition's validity is possible. The Nayaika replies that being erroneous means absence of being not otherwise established, namely being otherwise established. Thus doubt about the validity of the first cognition can arise only when there is doubt whether the determination of its validity is itself erroneous. But no doubt about the erroneousness of reflexive awareness arises merely according as its validity is determined or undetermined. Likewise, doubt about the erroneousness of the first cognition will not generate doubt about the validity of its object. And if the validity of the first cognition is held to be intrinsically determined by its own causal aggregate, doubt about its erroneousness is impossible. Therefore the MMSARC can not properly admit doubt about validity on this basis.

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