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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 21:20
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0:02–0:34आप्संस मेथी इंफर्ड, बग्ध नाटक अप्रहेंचन इस नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना�
0:34–0:42If the auxiliary in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished.
0:42–0:48Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion.
0:48–0:55That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension.
0:55–1:01If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence.
1:01–1:06If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension,
1:06–1:10the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted.
1:12–1:16Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be,
1:16–1:22air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air. Why does a person who remembers a pot
1:22–1:27on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the pot from its non-apprehension prior to
1:27–1:33seeing it. If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence
1:33–1:38produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory.
1:39–1:43If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of the pot
1:43–1:50itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence. Refutation of the repetition concerning
1:50–1:53non-apprehension.
1:53–1:58The msaka again says, after Kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether Mica was
1:58–2:00inside.
2:00–2:05Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Mica, Mica
2:05–2:07was not in the house.
2:07–2:11This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not
2:11–2:16remember Mica and therefore had no prior experience of Mica's absence.
2:16–2:20Since microzapscence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of
2:20–2:25a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions
2:25–2:27of absence as well.
2:27–2:31A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another
2:31–2:38person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands microzapscence.
2:38–2:43The Neayaka replies, unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past
2:43–2:49absence, non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive and a distant house is impossible.
2:49–2:54If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension
2:54–2:59is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension.
2:59–3:04Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro, in its unknown form, produce cognition
3:04–3:09of micro's absence, a Mimsaka view apprehension is super sensible, and therefore micro's
3:09–3:13absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
3:15–3:22Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case,
3:22–3:27unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by an eligible micro produces
3:27–3:33cognition of micro's absence in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection
3:33–3:37were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro in the house or not, and contrary cognition
3:37–3:42such as, micro was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection
3:42–3:47is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and
3:47–3:53contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the
3:53–3:58extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established
3:58–4:02that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible micro, which is naturally a means of
4:02–4:08knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging
4:08–4:14to its causes. Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its
4:14–4:19own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it.
4:20–4:25Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge,
4:25–4:30because cognition of microse absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an
4:30–4:36eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge. Non-recollection
4:36–4:41of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition
4:41–4:49of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence is perceptual.
4:51–4:54Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitra is not known by the mind,
4:54–4:58because there is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence,
4:58–5:04an absence of mitra is not eligible for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established
5:04–5:08as produced by a sense organ, qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is
5:08–5:13accepted as the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of colour and the like in air is not
5:13–5:17produced by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ.
5:18–5:23The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark,
5:23–5:27hence cognition of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness
5:27–5:30This is the inferential mark.
5:30–5:34How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise?
5:34–5:38Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential
5:38–5:42mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark.
5:42–5:46A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra,
5:46–5:50uses non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark.
5:50–5:54Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes
5:54–5:58only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding mere non-recollection.
6:00–6:05Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark.
6:06–6:10The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house,
6:10–6:14because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features
6:14–6:19comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so,
6:19–6:22there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot.
6:22–6:28Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception
6:28–6:35section of the Tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
6:35–6:39The Theory of Absence
6:39–6:45The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tathasintmai.
6:45–6:50Mtsaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature.
6:50–6:54The Mtsaka says, The absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from
6:54–6:59the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very
6:59–7:04locus in which the counter positive is not present. Therefore only conjunction and the
7:04–7:09other relations that produce cognition of the locus should be apprehensive relations, there
7:09–7:14is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation called qualifierhood or self-linking
7:14–7:18relation for cognition of absence.
7:18–7:22Reply of the earlier Neayakas.
7:22–7:27The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this
7:27–7:32ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground,
7:32–7:36otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot.
7:37–7:42Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct
7:42–7:48from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone
7:48–7:53is the empty locus, the separate statement there is absence of a pot on the ground becomes
7:53–7:59unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence and
7:59–8:04the container-ship of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would be impossible.
8:05–8:08Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus.
8:10–8:12A particular entity is the locus of absence.
8:14–8:19Objection. The Naya Yuga who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of
8:19–8:23absence because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place on this ground.
8:24–8:27Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground.
8:28–8:33That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur
8:33–8:38on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual
8:38–8:42dependence and it cannot be ground-possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction.
8:43–8:45Thus absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus.
8:45–8:52Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty locus
8:52–8:58qualified by absence of a pot. This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal
8:58–9:04but non-recurrent, nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just
9:04–9:10as one pot is the locus of its own single counter-positive.
9:10–9:13Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence.
9:13–9:17Question, where is absence?
9:17–9:20Reply, wherever it is experienced.
9:20–9:23Again, where is it experienced?
9:23–9:27Reply, wherever it actually exists.
9:27–9:31There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence
9:31–9:35of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of
9:35–9:38individual cows.
9:38–9:43Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot.
9:43–9:48the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is
9:48–9:53ground possessing absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time
9:53–9:59of presence and the time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground,
9:59–10:04clearly presents a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct
10:04–10:08from the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the
10:08–10:13lockers of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence is only verbal ingenuity.
10:13–10:17It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary
10:17–10:20and then to call absence merely the ground.
10:20–10:24Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise
10:24–10:29cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground.
10:29–10:33The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely
10:33–10:37of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity agnoma
10:37–10:42is cognition of both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage
10:42–10:46concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object.
10:47–10:50If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone
10:50–10:54immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning
10:54–11:00absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground
11:00–11:06alone produced by sense contact from cognition of pot possessing ground produced by sense contact
11:06–11:10through a difference in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence.
11:11–11:15Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot possessing ground.
11:16–11:21Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground is the grounds possession of absence of a pot,
11:21–11:24and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground.
11:26–11:29The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence.
11:31–11:35Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter positive pot or by something
11:35–11:41pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot. Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition
11:41–11:45of the ground produced by the pot can also be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore
11:45–11:50it is not absence of the pot. Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be
11:50–11:55absence, because on the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to
11:55–12:01be absence, though it is not separately cognized. The alternative, that cognition of ground which
12:01–12:05which does not take a pot as its object is absence of a pot, has already been refuted.
12:05–12:09Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter positive,
12:09–12:13cognition of the ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter positive.
12:14–12:17Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter positive,
12:17–12:19but cognition of absence is not.
12:20–12:24The claim, cognition of the visible counter positive is needed only for usage concerning absence,
12:24–12:28while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience.
12:28–12:33Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object.
12:33–12:38If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were absence,
12:38–12:43then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection of thorns and a traveller would be injured,
12:43–12:49and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place, outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it.
12:49–12:55Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed,
12:55–13:00Since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear.
13:00–13:05If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot
13:05–13:09has been destroyed by a hammer-blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formerly
13:09–13:12possessed the pot?
13:12–13:16Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground, is itself proof of
13:16–13:19an additional absence of the pot.
13:19–13:25Prabhuprā view, cognition of the ground itself is absence.
13:25–13:30The Nayayika objects on the Memsaka view usage concerning absence is impossible because cognition
13:30–13:33of absence and cognition of the empty lockers depend upon one another.
13:33–13:37The Prabhikara replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot-possessing
13:37–13:42ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot.
13:42–13:47Merely because cognition of pot-possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot,
13:47–13:51that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically
13:51–13:56distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot.
13:57–14:01An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground.
14:02–14:07In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never
14:07–14:12arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing
14:12–14:16the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence.
14:16–14:29Correferential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated.
14:29–14:42On the Neayaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus.
14:42–14:48But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot,
14:48–14:51otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot.
14:51–14:57Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence,
14:57–15:03because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises.
15:03–15:09It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus.
15:09–15:15If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition
15:15–15:19of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground.
15:19–15:23If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence
15:23–15:24and ground.
15:24–15:29The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension
15:29–15:33of possession of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground.
15:33–15:37But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before,
15:37–15:42possible, hence this cause 2 is not indispensable.
15:42–15:45The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is
15:45–15:48merely a difference in the natures of their objects.
15:48–15:53If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result.
15:53–15:57It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing
15:57–16:01ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions
16:01–16:04on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity.
16:04–16:09Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing
16:09–16:14an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus.
16:14–16:18When the counter positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve
16:18–16:24as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus.
16:24–16:28The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the
16:28–16:33locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence.
16:33–16:38difference of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot possessing
16:38–16:41ground is absence.
16:41–16:45Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object.
16:45–16:49On the Prabhikara view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition
16:49–16:52of absence and cognition of the locus differ?
16:52–16:56Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal
16:56–17:00conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise
17:00–17:03in a stream of cognition.
17:03–17:08Empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of a pot.
17:08–17:12The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot,
17:12–17:16the Prabhakara regards the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground
17:16–17:19merely as the nature of the locus of absence.
17:19–17:24In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs.
17:24–17:27The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground,
17:27–17:31compels even the Neayaka to accept a difference of nature.
17:31–17:35The only distinction is that the Nayayaka calls this negation mutual absence between
17:35–17:40the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it the nature of the locus.
17:40–17:41Objection.
17:41–17:45How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing ground later
17:45–17:47become different from it?
17:47–17:51Reply, the Nayayaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential
17:51–17:55negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either.
17:55–17:58Difference and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually
17:58–18:00contradictory.
18:00–18:04An empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground
18:04–18:08possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it.
18:08–18:13How can both neutral absence and its absence occurring ground delimited by pot and absence
18:13–18:15of pot?
18:15–18:19Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and its absence,
18:19–18:24bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference.
18:24–18:28Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on
18:28–18:32ground are possible through a defect owing to the defect. Difference from pot-
18:32–18:35possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot-
18:35–18:40possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained. If the nature of ground
18:40–18:44and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent usage
18:44–18:49concerning absence? The same problem exists on the view that accepts
18:49–18:53additional absences because it is difficult to establish one universal
18:53–19:00absencehood in diverse absences. A proper definition of absensehood is impossible.
19:02–19:06Absensehood cannot be called a universal, one universal in the form of absensehood cannot
19:06–19:12pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive entity is not absensehood,
19:12–19:17because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence
19:17–19:23and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus. Counterpositiveness determined by a
19:23–19:27a positive entity is not absencehood because counterpositiveness itself is in the form of
19:27–19:32absence of an absence and the counter positive of absence of an absence that is of a positive
19:32–19:38entity is not again the positive entity itself nor is the state of possessing a counter positive
19:38–19:43absencehood for inheritance and similarity also have counter positives if it is called
19:43–19:47the nature residing in an opposed object there is overextension to cognition and the
19:47–19:52like and the word nature in the sense of its own form is not recurrent nor is
19:52–19:57lack of existence, absencehood, because lack itself is an absence.
19:57–20:02Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence.
20:02–20:07One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation
20:07–20:09to another absence.
20:09–20:13Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence
20:13–20:18in universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence
20:18–20:23to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus.
20:23–20:29If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates
20:29–20:31self dependence.
20:31–20:35If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the locus
20:35–20:39is neutral absence, self dependence again follows.
20:39–20:43Determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence.
20:43–20:48If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished
20:48–20:55even on the Nayakavu. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence?
20:55–21:00Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because
21:00–21:06existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one and the same absence
21:06–21:10of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were eternal, usage-concerning absence
21:10–21:15of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence
21:15–21:16and the like would be inconsistent.

Plain text

आप्संस मेथी इंफर्ड, बग्ध नाटक अप्रहेंचन इस नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक ना� If the auxiliary in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished. Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion. That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension. If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence. If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension, the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted. Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be, air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air. Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it. If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory. If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence. Refutation of the repetition concerning non-apprehension. The msaka again says, after Kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether Mica was inside. Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Mica, Mica was not in the house. This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not remember Mica and therefore had no prior experience of Mica's absence. Since microzapscence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions of absence as well. A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands microzapscence. The Neayaka replies, unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence, non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive and a distant house is impossible. If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension. Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro, in its unknown form, produce cognition of micro's absence, a Mimsaka view apprehension is super sensible, and therefore micro's absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by an eligible micro produces cognition of micro's absence in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as, micro was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible micro, which is naturally a means of knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging to its causes. Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it. Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge, because cognition of microse absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge. Non-recollection of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence is perceptual. Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitra is not known by the mind, because there is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, an absence of mitra is not eligible for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of colour and the like in air is not produced by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ. The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence cognition of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness This is the inferential mark. How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise? Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark. A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra, uses non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding mere non-recollection. Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark. The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house, because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot. Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception section of the Tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The Theory of Absence The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tathasintmai. Mtsaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature. The Mtsaka says, The absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which the counter positive is not present. Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation called qualifierhood or self-linking relation for cognition of absence. Reply of the earlier Neayakas. The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement there is absence of a pot on the ground becomes unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence and the container-ship of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would be impossible. Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus. A particular entity is the locus of absence. Objection. The Naya Yuga who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place on this ground. Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground. That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual dependence and it cannot be ground-possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction. Thus absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus. Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty locus qualified by absence of a pot. This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent, nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot is the locus of its own single counter-positive. Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence. Question, where is absence? Reply, wherever it is experienced. Again, where is it experienced? Reply, wherever it actually exists. There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of individual cows. Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot. the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the lockers of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground. Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground. The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity agnoma is cognition of both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition of pot possessing ground produced by sense contact through a difference in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence. Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot possessing ground. Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground is the grounds possession of absence of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence. Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter positive pot or by something pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot. Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot. Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence, though it is not separately cognized. The alternative, that cognition of ground which which does not take a pot as its object is absence of a pot, has already been refuted. Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter positive, cognition of the ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter positive. Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter positive, but cognition of absence is not. The claim, cognition of the visible counter positive is needed only for usage concerning absence, while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience. Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object. If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place, outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it. Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, Since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear. If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot has been destroyed by a hammer-blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formerly possessed the pot? Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground, is itself proof of an additional absence of the pot. Prabhuprā view, cognition of the ground itself is absence. The Nayayika objects on the Memsaka view usage concerning absence is impossible because cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lockers depend upon one another. The Prabhikara replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot-possessing ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot. Merely because cognition of pot-possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot, that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot. An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground. In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence. Correferential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neayaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus. But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence, because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of possession of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground. But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before, possible, hence this cause 2 is not indispensable. The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is merely a difference in the natures of their objects. If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result. It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity. Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus. When the counter positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus. The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence. difference of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot possessing ground is absence. Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object. On the Prabhikara view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition of absence and cognition of the locus differ? Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise in a stream of cognition. Empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of a pot. The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature of the locus of absence. In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs. The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground, compels even the Neayaka to accept a difference of nature. The only distinction is that the Nayayaka calls this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it the nature of the locus. Objection. How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing ground later become different from it? Reply, the Nayayaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either. Difference and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. An empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it. How can both neutral absence and its absence occurring ground delimited by pot and absence of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference. Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on ground are possible through a defect owing to the defect. Difference from pot- possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot- possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained. If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent usage concerning absence? The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences because it is difficult to establish one universal absencehood in diverse absences. A proper definition of absensehood is impossible. Absensehood cannot be called a universal, one universal in the form of absensehood cannot pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive entity is not absensehood, because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus. Counterpositiveness determined by a a positive entity is not absencehood because counterpositiveness itself is in the form of absence of an absence and the counter positive of absence of an absence that is of a positive entity is not again the positive entity itself nor is the state of possessing a counter positive absencehood for inheritance and similarity also have counter positives if it is called the nature residing in an opposed object there is overextension to cognition and the like and the word nature in the sense of its own form is not recurrent nor is lack of existence, absencehood, because lack itself is an absence. Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence. One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation to another absence. Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence in universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus. If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates self dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the locus is neutral absence, self dependence again follows. Determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence. If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even on the Nayakavu. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence? Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one and the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were eternal, usage-concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

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