MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part11_RadioPlay.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.994399)
Duration: 22:48
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:06No, this नसाखा अजेक्षिन is untenable.
0:06–0:13An inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning is stronger.
0:13–0:17Because this inference, produced with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, sublates
0:17–0:22one of the two means of knowledge producing mutually contradictory cognitions.
0:22–0:27Therefore, the means producing cognition of devduttas' necessary presence inside the
0:27–0:29house can be sublated.
0:29–0:34When, during doubt concerning Devduttas being alive, the evidence for being alive is sublated,
0:34–0:39the means of cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house
0:39–0:42is necessarily sublated as well.
0:42–0:47Thus there is no room for dispute that cognition of Devdutta's external presence arises only
0:47–0:51after decisive hypothetical reasoning.
0:51–0:54An important rule must be understood here.
0:54–0:58If no separate means of knowledge called presumption is accepted, hypothetical reasoning
0:58–1:03in the form of considering economy and complexity does not become a cooperative cause of the
1:03–1:06stated doubt concerning being alive.
1:06–1:11Rather, that reasoning becomes a cooperative cause of an inference from general observation
1:11–1:15that sublates the means of cognizing dev-dupt as necessary presence inside the house and
1:15–1:19establishes his presence outside the house.
1:19–1:23An inference from general observation is necessary.
1:23–1:2913. It cannot be said that no inference from general observation need arise here.
1:29–1:43When one among two mutually uncertain means of knowledge is to be sublated, hypothetical reasoning determines which means is to be sublated, but actual sublation of one means is impossible without an inference from general observation.
1:43–1:50Even after cognition of mutual contradiction, doubt concerning which means is valid and which invalid does not cease until it is
1:50–1:52ascertained that one of the two must be invalid.
1:52–1:59And without such ascertainment, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead also will not cease, because the two means
1:59–2:02respectively ascertain devduttas being alive and is death.
2:04–2:07The inference from general observation is causal.
2:07–2:1314. It may again be said that the inference from general observation terminates after cognition
2:13–2:18of the contradiction, one of the two means is invalid, thereafter doubt concerning being alive
2:18–2:22arises, and from that doubt cognition of dev-dut does external presence arises.
2:23–2:28Therefore cognition of external presence proves the causality of the inference from
2:28–2:35general observation. But this view is untenable. When that same inference from general
2:35–2:40observation is joined with hypothetical reasoning and then remembered again, the inference arises,
2:40–2:45the means establishing devduttas necessary presence in the house is invalid, and this cognition assists
2:45–2:52ascertainment of devduttas external presence. The same means, unjoined with hypothetical reasoning,
2:52–2:56yields only the inference that one among the two uncertain means is invalid.
2:57–3:01The same means produces different results because of different cooperative causes.
3:01–3:07The objection should not be raised that recollection of that same inference from general observation
3:07–3:11after doubt concerning being alive is unestablished. Once the means of cognizing
3:11–3:15devidata's necessary presence in the house no longer remains a means establishing a
3:15–3:19meaning opposed to devidata's being alive, supposition of external presence becomes
3:19–3:23unopposed. Therefore no separate presumption is required.
3:23–3:26The other method cannot be called faultless either.
3:26–3:3215. It may be objected that a definite means known to produce one particular result can,
3:32–3:36when joined with a separate cooperative cause and remembered again, produce another result.
3:37–3:41Thus the inference from general observation, desire resides in the self because it is an
3:41–3:45effect, when joined with the sublation of desires residence in the other eight substances and
3:45–3:49remembered again, can yield cognition of desires residence in the self, in that case purely
3:49–3:54negative inference would be unnecessary. But this objection is untenable.
3:54–3:59In inference, the property delimiting being pervaded is apprehended as a qualifier.
3:59–4:06Qualify cognition that the self is a substance distinct from the other eight substances is established only through purely negative inference.
4:06–4:15It is defective to maintain that an inference from general observation, even when joined with a separate cooperative cause, produces cognition of an entirely different kind.
4:15–4:20Assertainment of external existence is established by inference.
4:20–4:2716. The inference from general observation takes the form, Devduttat is the counter positive
4:27–4:33of being alive or death because he is a living person, like myself. Here, with the assistance
4:33–4:38of economical hypothetical reasoning concerning being alive, Devduttat is determined as the
4:38–4:44counter positive of being alive. Consequently, ascertainment of presence outside the house
4:44–4:48is established through an inference from general observation in which Devduttat's
4:48–4:53being alive has first been ascertained as a qualifier of the reason.
4:53–4:59An equally strong counter-reason against the evidence apprehending being alive.
4:59–5:0317. It may be objected that an inference from general observation, with the assistance
5:03–5:08of economical hypothetical reasoning, apprehends the special property of Devadatta's being
5:08–5:12alive, but opposed to the evidence establishing his being alive is an inference of his death
5:12–5:16whose reason is ascertainment of Devadatta's necessary presence inside the house.
5:16–5:20A single valid reason can sublate many reasons.
5:20–5:24It cannot be said that the inference from general observation is stronger because of
5:24–5:28economical hypothetical reasoning.
5:28–5:32Pervasion and subject propertyhood are the grounds of the strength of an inferential
5:32–5:37reason, the strength is equal in the general reason and the counter reason.
5:37–5:41Economical hypothetical reasoning leads the general inference to the specific conclusion
5:41–5:45of Duttas' presence in the house, therefore the establishment of pervasion in both
5:45–5:51inferential reasons is equally strong. The Neyayaka replies that if this were accepted,
5:51–5:56no inference could establish any specific probandom, because whenever an inference empowered by
5:56–6:01general subject property had produced a specific conclusion, a counter reason based on the
6:01–6:07opposite specific property would always become possible. And non-establishment of the counter
6:07–6:13probandom would remain equally doubtful. Here cognition of dev-dut-tas necessary presence
6:13–6:18and the house is insufficient to establish his actual presence there.
6:18–6:23The inference from general observation establishing dev-dut-tas being alive is ver-ritical because
6:23–6:27it rests upon evidence such as astrology.
6:27–6:33Through cognition of per-vasion it sublates the counter-inference concerning dev-dut-tas-deaf.
6:33–6:37Therefore an inference arising from a general property, because of hypothetical reasoning
6:37–6:42is a special cooperative cause, establishes a special property, evidence apprehending
6:42–6:48the opposite special property does not become its valid counter reason.
6:48–6:50Hypothetical reasoning is cooperative.
6:50–6:5118.
6:51–6:55The objection is untenable that hypothetical reasoning cannot be a special cooperative cause
6:55–7:00of the inference from general observation because it is sublated by some means of knowledge.
7:00–7:04When hypothetical reasoning does not arise, the inference from general observation does
7:04–7:08not operate to establish a special property and therefore does not conflict with its counter
7:08–7:09reason.
7:09–7:17but when hypothetical reasoning arises, that same inference acquires additional force and establishes the special property of Devadatta's presence outside the house.
7:18–7:22If hypothetical reasoning were not the cause of this inference's additional force,
7:22–7:28the possibility of an equally strong counter-reason would not cease even after hypothetical reasoning arose.
7:29–7:33Nor can hypothetical reasoning be regarded as a cooperative cause in presumption,
7:33–7:37because there an opposing inference is present as a sublater.
7:37–7:43Subposition of Devdutta's death conflicts with the ascertainment Devdutta who lives for
7:43–7:46a hundred years remains only in the house.
7:46–7:51Nevertheless, sublation of qualified cognition does not arise merely from sublation of the
7:51–7:53qualificand.
7:53–7:57Even if Devdutta has died, the qualificand Devdutta and the sentenced Devdutta who
7:57–8:02lives for a hundred years remains only in the house is not sublated, only the qualifier
8:02–8:05being alive is sublated.
8:05–8:10Should it be held that the absence of qualified cognition is automatically established by
8:10–8:13the absence of the qualifier?
8:13–8:17In the presence of the qualificand, the absence of qualified cognition has only the form of
8:17–8:23absence of the qualifier, it is improper to admit a separate absence of qualified cognition
8:23–8:27distinct from cognition of the qualifier.
8:27–8:28The view of some sakas
8:28–8:3619. Some Saka say that among the three cognitions, Devdutta lives for a hundred years, Devdutta
8:36–8:40who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the
8:40–8:46house, the first two are not mutually contradictory. The contradiction arises, in light of the
8:46–8:51third cognition, between Devdutta remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house.
8:51–8:58According to this view, Devdutta's presence outside the house is supposed as the opposite
8:58–9:02of the invalid cognition, although Devdutta lives for a hundred years, he does not remain
9:02–9:08only in the house. That external presence is opposed not by cognitions consistent with
9:08–9:12Devdutta's being alive but by the invalid cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred
9:12–9:16years remains only in the house.
9:16–9:19The nature of this doubt is held to be such that it apprehends the object opposed to
9:19–9:23the actual invalid cognition, ascertainment of actual invalidity itself determines the
9:23–9:26opposition.
9:26–9:33of the view of some Sakas. 20. This view is trivial.
9:33–9:38Sometimes invalid cognition may appear valid, therefore, nearly after doubt, without direct
9:38–9:43apprehension of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause, the cognition
9:43–9:49devdatta is outside the house is not established. It is improper to accept presumptions solely
9:49–9:53on the basis of the resulting external presence.
9:53–9:58If this view is accepted, external presence, internal presence, and death would respectively
9:58–10:04have to be supposed from doubts concerning external presence, internal presence, and death.
10:04–10:09For some persons, some of these three cognitions may actually be invalid, nevertheless, production
10:09–10:13of such erroneous cognition through presumption is unacceptable.
10:13–10:20Consequently, the doctrine of presumption caused by doubt comes to an end here.
10:20–10:23caused by inexplicability.
10:23–10:2921. Suppose doubt concerning devduttas being alive is not the extraordinary or direct cause
10:29–10:36of presumption. Nevertheless, cognition of inexplicability in the form, the absence of the living devdutta
10:36–10:40in the house is impossible without his presence outside it, may be regarded as the direct
10:40–10:43cause of presumption.
10:43–10:47That is, after the cognition the living devdutta is not in the house, the cognition
10:47–10:52produced by presumption, the living devdutta is outside the house, arises from the cognition
10:52–10:57of inexplicability, the absence of the living devdutta from the house is impossible unless
10:57–11:03he is present outside the house. Here cognition of inexplicability, grounded in both affirmative
11:03–11:08and negative pervasions, becomes the extraordinary cause.
11:08–11:13The objection that presumption is unnecessary, refutation.
11:13–11:3322. An objection may be raised. The presence of the living devadatta outside the house can be established through inference. The living devadatta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house, like a jar, or whatever exists but is not in one place is in another place, just as I myself, not being in a corner of the house, a minute central part.
11:33–11:36Why, then, is presumption required?
11:36–11:42This objection, however, is not sound. In the stated inference, no general perversion between
11:42–11:48the reason and the probandom can be ascertained. Since such a general perversion is not cognized,
11:48–11:52cognition of his external presence arises precisely from the cognition of inexplicability that
11:52–11:56the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his presence outside
11:56–12:00it. Therefore presumption alone is necessary.
12:00–12:03The incoherence of inexplicability, objection
12:03–12:0923. An objection may be raised. Whether one holds, the absence of the living devidata from the house
12:09–12:14is impossible without his specific presence outside the house, or holds in general, it is impossible
12:14–12:21without some presence outside, both alternatives are defective. The first alternative is untenable,
12:21–12:26because cognition of inexplicability cannot arise unless devdata's specific presence outside the
12:26–12:31house is already cognized, and if that external presence is already known, presumption is
12:31–12:37futile. If Devdutta's absence from the house itself is held to be known through presumption,
12:37–12:42the defect of mutual dependence arises, because only after the absence of the counter positive
12:42–12:46has first been established can there be cognition that one thing is impossible without another.
12:48–12:54The second alternative is also untenable. The absence of the living Devdutta from the house
12:54–12:58is not impossible without cognition of some other person's presence outside a house.
12:58–13:04Even cognition of some person's external presence in general does not establish dev dutta's
13:04–13:11particular external presence. Thus presumption based on inexplicability itself becomes inexplicable.
13:13–13:15Refutation of the Objection
13:17–13:2224. No, this objection is not sound. A general cognition of inexplicability,
13:22–13:26one thing is impossible without the presence of another, serves as the cause,
13:26–13:30while the cognition of a specific thing within what exists generally is the result.
13:30–13:34The absence of the living devadatta from the house is impossible without the living devadatta's
13:34–13:39presence outside it, from this cognition, external presence is postulated in that case
13:39–13:42where his absence from the house would actually be inexplicable and not elsewhere.
13:43–13:47When it is ascertained that the living devdatta is not in the house,
13:47–13:53presence outside the house is postulated of devdatta. Here external presence is not
13:53–13:59treated as the immediate result in a merely general form, but as the result indirectly.
13:59–14:04Cognition of inexplicability does not generate a general cognition of some other person's
14:04–14:06external presence.
14:06–14:11This may be understood through the example of smoke and fire.
14:11–14:16On the basis of smoke pervaded by fire in general, fire is established on the mountain,
14:16–14:20although fire was not previously known specifically as mountain fire.
14:20–14:27Likewise, Devduttas presence outside the house is established specifically through cognition of external presence in general.
14:28–14:31The argument that presumption is unnecessary.
14:32–14:4125. It may again be said, inexplicability is simply the invariable absence of the reason and the locus where the absence of what is to be established occurs.
14:42–14:47Near absence of the probandum is not sufficient, because overextension would result.
14:47–14:55The probandom can therefore be established solely through a purely negative inference, presumption is consequently unnecessary.
14:55–15:07For example, the living devdutta is outside the house, because, although alive, he is not in the house, whatever is not such as not of this kind, like a dead person or a person who was in the house.
15:07–15:13By this purely negative inference, devdutta's presence outside the house is established.
15:13–15:18It should not be said that this would lead to overextension, because one thing would become
15:18–15:24inferentially indicative of another through the provision belonging to some different thing.
15:24–15:28What regulates negative inference is precisely being the counter positive of an absence that
15:28–15:32pervades the absence of the pro-bandom.
15:32–15:36Some scholars say that this regulator applies only to presumption and not to inference,
15:36–15:40but there is no basis for such a distinction.
15:40–15:45through presumption does not arise without cognition of inexplicability, and an apparent presumption
15:45–15:50likewise does not arise without deviation.
15:50–15:52Presumption is necessary.
15:52–15:5826. No, the foregoing argument is not sound. In the inference of Dev Dutta's presence
15:58–16:03outside the house, the negative concomitance of the absence of the probandom is determined
16:03–16:09by the absence of the reason, but an affirmative reason is a property present in the subject.
16:09–16:14Hence, although cognition of external presence arises from knowledge of negative perversion,
16:14–16:20it is not a purely negative inferential cognition, because inferential cognition arises from cognition
16:20–16:24of the subject propertyhood of the pervaded reason.
16:24–16:28It should not be objected that cognition of a reason which is the counter positive of
16:28–16:32an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is present here, and that the
16:32–16:35same cognition is used in presumption.
16:35–16:41a cognition is impossible and purely affirmative inference. Compared with it, it is more economical
16:41–16:45to hold that inference arises on the basis of the cognition, the reason is pervaded by
16:45–16:51the probandom. For this reason a distinct role for cognition of inexplicability must
16:51–16:53be accepted.
16:53–16:57Thus, although the cognition of presence outside the house arises from cognition
16:57–17:02of negative perversion, it cannot be called inferential cognition, therefore presumption
17:02–17:08must be admitted to produce such cognition of Dev Dutta's presence outside the house.
17:08–17:12The Msaaka supports his position on the ground that inference arises from cognition of a
17:12–17:16reasoned property present in the subject, but the stated cognition of Dev Dutta's presence
17:16–17:23outside the house does not arise from cognition of a reasoned property situated in the subject.
17:23–17:27The Nayaika objects, cognition of a subject property that is the counter positive of
17:27–17:31an absence pervading the absence of the pro-bandam assists inferential cognition.
17:31–17:35Such cognition of a reason property is present in the current example of presumption as well,
17:35–17:39hence the cognition of devodata's presence outside the house should be held to arise
17:39–17:41solely from inference.
17:41–17:45The memsaka rejects this objection as well.
17:45–17:48According to him, such cognition of a reason property situated in the subject, one that
17:48–17:52is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, cannot be admitted
17:52–17:55in purely affirmative inference.
17:55–17:59Compared with this cognition, the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom,
17:59–18:03is more economical and is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition.
18:03–18:08In the present context, however, no such cognition of perversion is available, inference is therefore
18:08–18:11impossible and presumption necessary.
18:11–18:13The three types of inference.
18:13–18:1927. An objection may be raised, in negative inference, because of the negative concomitance
18:19–18:22between the absence of the pro-bandom and the absence of the reason, only negative
18:22–18:27perversion is apprehended. Thus, since cognition of perversion is based on three
18:27–18:31kinds of concomitants, affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative, inference 2 is of
18:31–18:37three types. Accordingly, a reason such as smoke is affirmative, negative, or affirmative
18:37–18:41negative in three different circumstances.
18:41–18:46Let this be granted. Even so, the absence of the living devdutta inside the house
18:46–18:50cannot serve as a reason for establishing devdutta's presence outside the house, because
18:50–18:56that absence does not reside in devdutta. Nor do absence inside the house and presence
18:56–19:00outside the house possess a pervasion in the form of regular co-location, because their
19:00–19:07loci are not the same. In the inference, the illuminating cause, the sun, has risen above
19:07–19:11the earth, the sun's rising is inferred in the upper region near the illuminated ground,
19:11–19:17but the present case is not established by this illustration. Being the counter positive
19:17–19:22of an absence located in the house is not an inferential mark.
19:22–19:2728. Nor can being the counter-positive of an absence located in Devdutta's house serve
19:27–19:34as the reason in an inference. Such counter-positiveness is certainly a property of Devdutta, but because
19:34–19:40there is no sensory contact with Devdutta, its perceptual cognition is impossible. Consequently,
19:40–19:46a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with Devdutta as the qualificand,
19:46–19:50cannot arise from perception. It should not be said that cognition
19:50–19:55of the absence of the living dev duttat and the house in cognition of negative pervasion
19:55–19:59may both arise through the mind together with auxiliary causes.
19:59–20:03If that is accepted, those auxiliary causes themselves would have to be admitted as a
20:03–20:07separate means of knowledge.
20:07–20:12The Msaka conclusion, presumption is necessary.
20:12–20:16An objection may be raised, after cognition of the pervasion of smoke, how does inference
20:16–20:21of fire on the mountain arise merely from recollection of smoke?
20:21–20:27Here too the third subsumptive reflection on smoke does not arise from perception.
20:27–20:34The Msaka replies, In such a condition, inferential cognition of fire on the mountain never arises.
20:34–20:39If the Neyayaka asks how cognition of fire arises from cognition of perversion and recollection
20:39–20:43of smoke as a property of the mountain, the answer is that cognition of fire on the
20:43–20:49mountain arises from the cognition of inexplicability, smoke is impossible without fire.
20:49–20:54Thus, after cognition that perceived smoke is impossible without fire, only a presumption
20:54–20:57of fire arises.
20:57–21:01Where smoke is recollected as a reason pervaded by fire, only there does inference of fire
21:01–21:03arise.
21:03–21:08It is for this reason that the Neayaka himself accepts three divisions of inference.
21:08–21:13Therefore, on the basis of negative perversion, the absence of the living Devdutta and
21:13–21:19the house produces a presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house.
21:19–21:22The Neayakas reply.
21:22–21:2330.
21:23–21:29The Neayaka says, even without sensory contact with Devdutta, cognition of the counter-positiveness
21:29–21:33of Devdutta's absence located in the house is perceptual.
21:33–21:38In the perception Devdutta is absent from the house, all three Devdutta, the absence,
21:38–21:43and the relation in the form of the absence's counter-positiveness, are cognized.
21:43–21:47In cognition of an absence, the meaning of its relation to the counter-positive
21:47–21:52consists merely in the delimitation of counter-positiveness, no other relation is required.
21:53–21:58A remembered qualifier of perversion 2 can readily be apprehended in perception,
21:58–22:03because being the counter-positive of Devdutta's absence located in the house is itself perceptible.
22:05–22:10It should not be objected that being the counter-positive of an absence located in the house,
22:10–22:14with Devdutta as its qualificand, is not known as pervaded by presence outside the house.
22:14–22:20Nearly the third subsumptive reflection on the reason present in the subject is the cause of
22:20–22:25inferential cognition, adding a further qualifier is fruitless because it encouraged the defect of
22:25–22:32prolixity. Alternatively, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with a
22:32–22:36remembered devdata as its qualificand, may be held to arise through the mind.
22:37–22:42It arises through the ordinary auxiliary causes of mental cognition, hence no separate means
22:42–22:44of knowledge need be admitted here.

Plain text

No, this नसाखा अजेक्षिन is untenable. An inference from general observation joined with hypothetical reasoning is stronger. Because this inference, produced with the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, sublates one of the two means of knowledge producing mutually contradictory cognitions. Therefore, the means producing cognition of devduttas' necessary presence inside the house can be sublated. When, during doubt concerning Devduttas being alive, the evidence for being alive is sublated, the means of cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house is necessarily sublated as well. Thus there is no room for dispute that cognition of Devdutta's external presence arises only after decisive hypothetical reasoning. An important rule must be understood here. If no separate means of knowledge called presumption is accepted, hypothetical reasoning in the form of considering economy and complexity does not become a cooperative cause of the stated doubt concerning being alive. Rather, that reasoning becomes a cooperative cause of an inference from general observation that sublates the means of cognizing dev-dupt as necessary presence inside the house and establishes his presence outside the house. An inference from general observation is necessary. 13. It cannot be said that no inference from general observation need arise here. When one among two mutually uncertain means of knowledge is to be sublated, hypothetical reasoning determines which means is to be sublated, but actual sublation of one means is impossible without an inference from general observation. Even after cognition of mutual contradiction, doubt concerning which means is valid and which invalid does not cease until it is ascertained that one of the two must be invalid. And without such ascertainment, doubt concerning devduttas being alive or dead also will not cease, because the two means respectively ascertain devduttas being alive and is death. The inference from general observation is causal. 14. It may again be said that the inference from general observation terminates after cognition of the contradiction, one of the two means is invalid, thereafter doubt concerning being alive arises, and from that doubt cognition of dev-dut does external presence arises. Therefore cognition of external presence proves the causality of the inference from general observation. But this view is untenable. When that same inference from general observation is joined with hypothetical reasoning and then remembered again, the inference arises, the means establishing devduttas necessary presence in the house is invalid, and this cognition assists ascertainment of devduttas external presence. The same means, unjoined with hypothetical reasoning, yields only the inference that one among the two uncertain means is invalid. The same means produces different results because of different cooperative causes. The objection should not be raised that recollection of that same inference from general observation after doubt concerning being alive is unestablished. Once the means of cognizing devidata's necessary presence in the house no longer remains a means establishing a meaning opposed to devidata's being alive, supposition of external presence becomes unopposed. Therefore no separate presumption is required. The other method cannot be called faultless either. 15. It may be objected that a definite means known to produce one particular result can, when joined with a separate cooperative cause and remembered again, produce another result. Thus the inference from general observation, desire resides in the self because it is an effect, when joined with the sublation of desires residence in the other eight substances and remembered again, can yield cognition of desires residence in the self, in that case purely negative inference would be unnecessary. But this objection is untenable. In inference, the property delimiting being pervaded is apprehended as a qualifier. Qualify cognition that the self is a substance distinct from the other eight substances is established only through purely negative inference. It is defective to maintain that an inference from general observation, even when joined with a separate cooperative cause, produces cognition of an entirely different kind. Assertainment of external existence is established by inference. 16. The inference from general observation takes the form, Devduttat is the counter positive of being alive or death because he is a living person, like myself. Here, with the assistance of economical hypothetical reasoning concerning being alive, Devduttat is determined as the counter positive of being alive. Consequently, ascertainment of presence outside the house is established through an inference from general observation in which Devduttat's being alive has first been ascertained as a qualifier of the reason. An equally strong counter-reason against the evidence apprehending being alive. 17. It may be objected that an inference from general observation, with the assistance of economical hypothetical reasoning, apprehends the special property of Devadatta's being alive, but opposed to the evidence establishing his being alive is an inference of his death whose reason is ascertainment of Devadatta's necessary presence inside the house. A single valid reason can sublate many reasons. It cannot be said that the inference from general observation is stronger because of economical hypothetical reasoning. Pervasion and subject propertyhood are the grounds of the strength of an inferential reason, the strength is equal in the general reason and the counter reason. Economical hypothetical reasoning leads the general inference to the specific conclusion of Duttas' presence in the house, therefore the establishment of pervasion in both inferential reasons is equally strong. The Neyayaka replies that if this were accepted, no inference could establish any specific probandom, because whenever an inference empowered by general subject property had produced a specific conclusion, a counter reason based on the opposite specific property would always become possible. And non-establishment of the counter probandom would remain equally doubtful. Here cognition of dev-dut-tas necessary presence and the house is insufficient to establish his actual presence there. The inference from general observation establishing dev-dut-tas being alive is ver-ritical because it rests upon evidence such as astrology. Through cognition of per-vasion it sublates the counter-inference concerning dev-dut-tas-deaf. Therefore an inference arising from a general property, because of hypothetical reasoning is a special cooperative cause, establishes a special property, evidence apprehending the opposite special property does not become its valid counter reason. Hypothetical reasoning is cooperative. 18. The objection is untenable that hypothetical reasoning cannot be a special cooperative cause of the inference from general observation because it is sublated by some means of knowledge. When hypothetical reasoning does not arise, the inference from general observation does not operate to establish a special property and therefore does not conflict with its counter reason. but when hypothetical reasoning arises, that same inference acquires additional force and establishes the special property of Devadatta's presence outside the house. If hypothetical reasoning were not the cause of this inference's additional force, the possibility of an equally strong counter-reason would not cease even after hypothetical reasoning arose. Nor can hypothetical reasoning be regarded as a cooperative cause in presumption, because there an opposing inference is present as a sublater. Subposition of Devdutta's death conflicts with the ascertainment Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. Nevertheless, sublation of qualified cognition does not arise merely from sublation of the qualificand. Even if Devdutta has died, the qualificand Devdutta and the sentenced Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house is not sublated, only the qualifier being alive is sublated. Should it be held that the absence of qualified cognition is automatically established by the absence of the qualifier? In the presence of the qualificand, the absence of qualified cognition has only the form of absence of the qualifier, it is improper to admit a separate absence of qualified cognition distinct from cognition of the qualifier. The view of some sakas 19. Some Saka say that among the three cognitions, Devdutta lives for a hundred years, Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house, the first two are not mutually contradictory. The contradiction arises, in light of the third cognition, between Devdutta remains only in the house, and Devdutta is not in the house. According to this view, Devdutta's presence outside the house is supposed as the opposite of the invalid cognition, although Devdutta lives for a hundred years, he does not remain only in the house. That external presence is opposed not by cognitions consistent with Devdutta's being alive but by the invalid cognition Devdutta who lives for a hundred years remains only in the house. The nature of this doubt is held to be such that it apprehends the object opposed to the actual invalid cognition, ascertainment of actual invalidity itself determines the opposition. of the view of some Sakas. 20. This view is trivial. Sometimes invalid cognition may appear valid, therefore, nearly after doubt, without direct apprehension of hypothetical reasoning as a special cooperative cause, the cognition devdatta is outside the house is not established. It is improper to accept presumptions solely on the basis of the resulting external presence. If this view is accepted, external presence, internal presence, and death would respectively have to be supposed from doubts concerning external presence, internal presence, and death. For some persons, some of these three cognitions may actually be invalid, nevertheless, production of such erroneous cognition through presumption is unacceptable. Consequently, the doctrine of presumption caused by doubt comes to an end here. caused by inexplicability. 21. Suppose doubt concerning devduttas being alive is not the extraordinary or direct cause of presumption. Nevertheless, cognition of inexplicability in the form, the absence of the living devdutta in the house is impossible without his presence outside it, may be regarded as the direct cause of presumption. That is, after the cognition the living devdutta is not in the house, the cognition produced by presumption, the living devdutta is outside the house, arises from the cognition of inexplicability, the absence of the living devdutta from the house is impossible unless he is present outside the house. Here cognition of inexplicability, grounded in both affirmative and negative pervasions, becomes the extraordinary cause. The objection that presumption is unnecessary, refutation. 22. An objection may be raised. The presence of the living devadatta outside the house can be established through inference. The living devadatta is outside the house because, although alive, he is not in the house, like a jar, or whatever exists but is not in one place is in another place, just as I myself, not being in a corner of the house, a minute central part. Why, then, is presumption required? This objection, however, is not sound. In the stated inference, no general perversion between the reason and the probandom can be ascertained. Since such a general perversion is not cognized, cognition of his external presence arises precisely from the cognition of inexplicability that the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his presence outside it. Therefore presumption alone is necessary. The incoherence of inexplicability, objection 23. An objection may be raised. Whether one holds, the absence of the living devidata from the house is impossible without his specific presence outside the house, or holds in general, it is impossible without some presence outside, both alternatives are defective. The first alternative is untenable, because cognition of inexplicability cannot arise unless devdata's specific presence outside the house is already cognized, and if that external presence is already known, presumption is futile. If Devdutta's absence from the house itself is held to be known through presumption, the defect of mutual dependence arises, because only after the absence of the counter positive has first been established can there be cognition that one thing is impossible without another. The second alternative is also untenable. The absence of the living Devdutta from the house is not impossible without cognition of some other person's presence outside a house. Even cognition of some person's external presence in general does not establish dev dutta's particular external presence. Thus presumption based on inexplicability itself becomes inexplicable. Refutation of the Objection 24. No, this objection is not sound. A general cognition of inexplicability, one thing is impossible without the presence of another, serves as the cause, while the cognition of a specific thing within what exists generally is the result. The absence of the living devadatta from the house is impossible without the living devadatta's presence outside it, from this cognition, external presence is postulated in that case where his absence from the house would actually be inexplicable and not elsewhere. When it is ascertained that the living devdatta is not in the house, presence outside the house is postulated of devdatta. Here external presence is not treated as the immediate result in a merely general form, but as the result indirectly. Cognition of inexplicability does not generate a general cognition of some other person's external presence. This may be understood through the example of smoke and fire. On the basis of smoke pervaded by fire in general, fire is established on the mountain, although fire was not previously known specifically as mountain fire. Likewise, Devduttas presence outside the house is established specifically through cognition of external presence in general. The argument that presumption is unnecessary. 25. It may again be said, inexplicability is simply the invariable absence of the reason and the locus where the absence of what is to be established occurs. Near absence of the probandum is not sufficient, because overextension would result. The probandom can therefore be established solely through a purely negative inference, presumption is consequently unnecessary. For example, the living devdutta is outside the house, because, although alive, he is not in the house, whatever is not such as not of this kind, like a dead person or a person who was in the house. By this purely negative inference, devdutta's presence outside the house is established. It should not be said that this would lead to overextension, because one thing would become inferentially indicative of another through the provision belonging to some different thing. What regulates negative inference is precisely being the counter positive of an absence that pervades the absence of the pro-bandom. Some scholars say that this regulator applies only to presumption and not to inference, but there is no basis for such a distinction. through presumption does not arise without cognition of inexplicability, and an apparent presumption likewise does not arise without deviation. Presumption is necessary. 26. No, the foregoing argument is not sound. In the inference of Dev Dutta's presence outside the house, the negative concomitance of the absence of the probandom is determined by the absence of the reason, but an affirmative reason is a property present in the subject. Hence, although cognition of external presence arises from knowledge of negative perversion, it is not a purely negative inferential cognition, because inferential cognition arises from cognition of the subject propertyhood of the pervaded reason. It should not be objected that cognition of a reason which is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom is present here, and that the same cognition is used in presumption. a cognition is impossible and purely affirmative inference. Compared with it, it is more economical to hold that inference arises on the basis of the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom. For this reason a distinct role for cognition of inexplicability must be accepted. Thus, although the cognition of presence outside the house arises from cognition of negative perversion, it cannot be called inferential cognition, therefore presumption must be admitted to produce such cognition of Dev Dutta's presence outside the house. The Msaaka supports his position on the ground that inference arises from cognition of a reasoned property present in the subject, but the stated cognition of Dev Dutta's presence outside the house does not arise from cognition of a reasoned property situated in the subject. The Nayaika objects, cognition of a subject property that is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the pro-bandam assists inferential cognition. Such cognition of a reason property is present in the current example of presumption as well, hence the cognition of devodata's presence outside the house should be held to arise solely from inference. The memsaka rejects this objection as well. According to him, such cognition of a reason property situated in the subject, one that is the counter positive of an absence pervading the absence of the probandom, cannot be admitted in purely affirmative inference. Compared with this cognition, the cognition, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, is more economical and is accepted as the cause of inferential cognition. In the present context, however, no such cognition of perversion is available, inference is therefore impossible and presumption necessary. The three types of inference. 27. An objection may be raised, in negative inference, because of the negative concomitance between the absence of the pro-bandom and the absence of the reason, only negative perversion is apprehended. Thus, since cognition of perversion is based on three kinds of concomitants, affirmative, negative, and affirmative negative, inference 2 is of three types. Accordingly, a reason such as smoke is affirmative, negative, or affirmative negative in three different circumstances. Let this be granted. Even so, the absence of the living devdutta inside the house cannot serve as a reason for establishing devdutta's presence outside the house, because that absence does not reside in devdutta. Nor do absence inside the house and presence outside the house possess a pervasion in the form of regular co-location, because their loci are not the same. In the inference, the illuminating cause, the sun, has risen above the earth, the sun's rising is inferred in the upper region near the illuminated ground, but the present case is not established by this illustration. Being the counter positive of an absence located in the house is not an inferential mark. 28. Nor can being the counter-positive of an absence located in Devdutta's house serve as the reason in an inference. Such counter-positiveness is certainly a property of Devdutta, but because there is no sensory contact with Devdutta, its perceptual cognition is impossible. Consequently, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with Devdutta as the qualificand, cannot arise from perception. It should not be said that cognition of the absence of the living dev duttat and the house in cognition of negative pervasion may both arise through the mind together with auxiliary causes. If that is accepted, those auxiliary causes themselves would have to be admitted as a separate means of knowledge. The Msaka conclusion, presumption is necessary. An objection may be raised, after cognition of the pervasion of smoke, how does inference of fire on the mountain arise merely from recollection of smoke? Here too the third subsumptive reflection on smoke does not arise from perception. The Msaka replies, In such a condition, inferential cognition of fire on the mountain never arises. If the Neyayaka asks how cognition of fire arises from cognition of perversion and recollection of smoke as a property of the mountain, the answer is that cognition of fire on the mountain arises from the cognition of inexplicability, smoke is impossible without fire. Thus, after cognition that perceived smoke is impossible without fire, only a presumption of fire arises. Where smoke is recollected as a reason pervaded by fire, only there does inference of fire arise. It is for this reason that the Neayaka himself accepts three divisions of inference. Therefore, on the basis of negative perversion, the absence of the living Devdutta and the house produces a presumption of Devdutta's presence outside the house. The Neayakas reply. 30. The Neayaka says, even without sensory contact with Devdutta, cognition of the counter-positiveness of Devdutta's absence located in the house is perceptual. In the perception Devdutta is absent from the house, all three Devdutta, the absence, and the relation in the form of the absence's counter-positiveness, are cognized. In cognition of an absence, the meaning of its relation to the counter-positive consists merely in the delimitation of counter-positiveness, no other relation is required. A remembered qualifier of perversion 2 can readily be apprehended in perception, because being the counter-positive of Devdutta's absence located in the house is itself perceptible. It should not be objected that being the counter-positive of an absence located in the house, with Devdutta as its qualificand, is not known as pervaded by presence outside the house. Nearly the third subsumptive reflection on the reason present in the subject is the cause of inferential cognition, adding a further qualifier is fruitless because it encouraged the defect of prolixity. Alternatively, a third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, with a remembered devdata as its qualificand, may be held to arise through the mind. It arises through the ordinary auxiliary causes of mental cognition, hence no separate means of knowledge need be admitted here.

← Transcript index