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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Detected language: en (0.995104)
Duration: 20:39
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0:02–0:06आपसंश अव आव रह अगिव आपस्शिः
0:06–0:11It may be objected that valid cognition in perception and the other means may be held to arise from merit,
0:11–0:19but in the vader the absence of four defects, error, negligence, desire to deceive, and incapacity of the instrument, causes valid cognition.
0:19–0:26Even in ordinary sentences, valid cognition of sentence meaning arises when error and the other defects are absent.
0:26–0:31This objection is unsound. Under the rule of accepting the more economical cause,
0:31–0:35correct cognition of sentence meaning alone causes valid cognition from ordinary sentences,
0:35–0:39separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless.
0:39–0:44A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are absent,
0:44–0:49without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain
0:49–0:53the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere
0:53–0:58absence of defects is not the cause of that inference. Alternatively, grant that because
0:58–1:03absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of defect and merit cause valid perceptual
1:03–1:10cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition.
1:11–1:16It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness
1:16–1:20and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause
1:20–1:27is needlessly complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means
1:27–1:31of knowledge, moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present,
1:31–1:37so awareness of such complexity does not arise. Ordinary utterances are not eternal,
1:37–1:41and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness in them.
1:42–1:47It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block the causality
1:47–1:51of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic and ordinary
1:51–1:57speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition. Though the
1:57–2:02The Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness.
2:02–2:05This too is untenable.
2:05–2:08The opposing inhibitor can be refuted.
2:08–2:12A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there
2:12–2:17is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow
2:17–2:20to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be
2:20–2:25accepted as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect.
2:25–2:30sentences not depending on another means such as inference would then become like the Veda.
2:31–2:35Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person,
2:35–2:42deceiver or parrot are not valid. An objection arises on the Nayayika view,
2:42–2:46how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver or a parrot be valid or authoritative
2:46–2:51when they are not produced from merit? It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a
2:51–2:55a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object
2:55–3:00of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence,
3:00–3:04an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted.
3:04–3:08Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic
3:08–3:13fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker,
3:13–3:19an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot
3:19–3:24is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its object.
3:24–3:28On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and
3:28–3:33such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot.
3:33–3:38It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence
3:38–3:41meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind.
3:41–3:44This too is unsound.
3:44–3:49When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present,
3:49–3:53The experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied.
3:53–3:57When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy
3:57–4:02testimony, its validity too is experienced.
4:02–4:06On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke, that
4:06–4:10inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke
4:10–4:11as the mark.
4:11–4:15Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for recognition
4:15–4:18takes the same fire as its object.
4:18–4:22In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow, it is also impossible to
4:22–4:26make a different substancehood the probandom, identity with another substancehood cannot
4:26–4:28be superimposed.
4:28–4:33Pervasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation.
4:33–4:37Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains
4:37–4:42valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom.
4:42–4:45The traditionalists reply
4:45–4:51The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot,
4:51–4:55only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause.
4:55–5:00Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy
5:00–5:04person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting
5:04–5:07in cognition of sentence meaning.
5:07–5:11Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the
5:11–5:15utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda.
5:15–5:19It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements
5:19–5:23disappear because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God.
5:23–5:26This objection is unsound.
5:26–5:31A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition.
5:31–5:34If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference
5:34–5:38is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the
5:38–5:42probandom fire, not the false component of the mark.
5:42–5:45This is the traditionalist view.
5:45–5:52The Neyayaka reply, Semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits.
5:52–5:57The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence
5:57–6:01meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition.
6:01–6:06For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct
6:06–6:10cognition of that fitness, are the merit.
6:10–6:15In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception, correct cognition
6:15–6:19of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated.
6:19–6:24Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning
6:24–6:28different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition
6:28–6:31of fitness is absent.
6:31–6:35But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is
6:35–6:40valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there.
6:40–6:44It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even
6:44–6:46in the sense of a lion.
6:46–6:50The speaker may intend Vyu, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention,
6:50–6:54understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to the
6:54–6:56lion sense may be present.
6:56–6:59Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid.
6:59–7:03Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted.
7:03–7:07But if the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended
7:07–7:12by the speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in
7:12–7:17the sense of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition
7:17–7:23of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid cognition.
7:23–7:28The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda.
7:28–7:32Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is
7:32–7:36accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition
7:36–7:39must also be accepted as a merit in the Veda.
7:39–7:44The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person,
7:44–7:47because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning,
7:47–7:50like the sentence, bring the cow.
7:50–7:53This inference establishes God as the speaker.
7:53–7:55This objection is unsound.
7:55–7:59The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct
7:59–8:03cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably
8:03–8:08present, as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless.
8:10–8:14A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted
8:14–8:18as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda
8:18–8:23without such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its
8:23–8:27meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will
8:27–8:32understand the sentence meaning from these words. There is no need initially to make the speaker's
8:32–8:36own cognition of sentence meaning a cause. That cognition is not the cause of using the
8:36–8:41complete collection of words constituting the sentence, as with the words of a parrot,
8:41–8:45sentence formation is possible through the separate cause of the use of each word.
8:45–8:49Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the
8:49–8:54speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that
8:54–8:57the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative
8:57–9:01sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too.
9:01–9:05The Nayaika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence
9:05–9:08meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity.
9:08–9:12The speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group.
9:12–9:17The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions.
9:17–9:20Intention is not a merit.
9:20–9:24It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object
9:24–9:26of a speaker's intention.
9:26–9:31is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary
9:31–9:35people like us cannot obtain super-sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters
9:35–9:39the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention
9:39–9:44to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda,
9:44–9:49mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda
9:49–9:53with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or
9:53–9:58cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of
9:58–10:02God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit.
10:04–10:09This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme
10:09–10:14with Mechran as a with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with
10:14–10:19the intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge
10:19–10:25of Vedic meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands
10:25–10:30the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless
10:30–10:37succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately
10:37–10:43except God? Objection, how can a later teacher recite the Veda with the intention of communicating
10:43–10:46a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning?
10:46–10:51Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic meaning would not remain authoritative
10:51–10:53speech and its meaning could not be determined.
10:53–10:56Answer, this is unsound.
10:56–10:59In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of
10:59–11:03Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgahs and the like, and at some time must
11:03–11:07have recited the Vedic with the intention of communicating those meanings.
11:07–11:13That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered with intention.
11:13–11:19The Prabhupākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced.
11:19–11:24The Prabhupākaraṃsākas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete
11:24–11:28causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known.
11:28–11:33Varidicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause
11:33–11:38of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition.
11:38–11:42This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither
11:42–11:48merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition
11:48–11:55is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated,
11:55–12:01for the sublating cognition is equally cognition. The name invalidity is applied to cognition
12:01–12:06only under the extraneous condition that it produces contrary activity.
12:06–12:11Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition,
12:11–12:15This is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically
12:15–12:18by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate?
12:18–12:23Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid.
12:23–12:27Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary conduct.
12:27–12:30Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property
12:30–12:35and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically
12:35–12:39through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect
12:39–12:43produced non apprehension of non relation or through relation to a defect after cognition
12:43–12:48has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise
12:48–12:53there would be deviation in invalid cognition. In validity as the causality of contrary
12:53–12:57activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the complete
12:57–13:02aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition.
13:02–13:05Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition because there is
13:05–13:10deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not
13:10–13:16from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity
13:16–13:21is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a non-existent
13:21–13:25object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated
13:25–13:29non-existent object.
13:29–13:32Varidicality is intrinsically known.
13:32–13:37Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect
13:37–13:39causes invalidity.
13:39–13:44Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity.
13:44–13:47Answer, this is unsound.
13:47–13:51One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a nonexistent object, depend
13:51–13:55on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object
13:55–13:58it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition.
13:58–14:02With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect
14:02–14:04and absence of defect.
14:04–14:08Therefore, defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity
14:08–14:11and invalidity.
14:11–14:14Cognitive validity is the condition of taking as object a thing possessing the qualifier
14:14–14:18mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing
14:18–14:19in the thing.
14:19–14:24As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically
14:24–14:28delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form
14:28–14:32of taking as object the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional
14:32–14:38validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof.
14:38–14:41An alternative Prabhupāra view.
14:41–14:45Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive
14:45–14:49aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing
14:49–14:54validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining
14:54–14:59an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may
14:59–15:03be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on knowledge of
15:03–15:09cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as this thing
15:09–15:13has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity
15:13–15:18depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically
15:18–15:23delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
15:23–15:27The Prabhikara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently
15:27–15:31of determination of validity, is not determination of the object.
15:31–15:35Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object
15:35–15:36either.
15:36–15:41Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination.
15:41–15:45A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity,
15:45–15:49and a third for the second, producing infinite regress.
15:49–15:53The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of
15:53–15:57defect also produces regressive only a second cognition whose validity has previously been
15:57–16:02known determines the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity
16:02–16:06determines the validity of the first, and a third cognition of unknown validity determines
16:06–16:12that of the second. Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object.
16:12–16:16Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity,
16:16–16:22the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity. Even the Nayaika
16:22–16:26accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known.
16:27–16:31When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of
16:31–16:36unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress. The validity of an unknown
16:36–16:41object is likewise determined through identity. After cognition arises, no doubt of the form,
16:41–16:46is the object thus or not, occurs. To the question how object cognition can determine
16:46–16:50its own validity without knowing the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the
16:50–16:54The self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even the Naya Yaka accepts that cognitive
16:54–17:00validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
17:00–17:03The Prabhakara conclusion.
17:03–17:08Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the
17:08–17:10cognitive aggregate.
17:10–17:14Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would
17:14–17:18be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted.
17:18–17:23about an object, is it thus or otherwise? arises from suspicion of the objects in validity.
17:24–17:28Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition
17:28–17:31does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here.
17:33–17:38Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or
17:38–17:43falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition
17:43–17:48is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of
17:48–17:52distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives.
17:53–17:57Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity
17:57–18:01extrinsically and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it.
18:02–18:06The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality,
18:06–18:11which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause,
18:11–18:14therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate.
18:15–18:20Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive
18:20–18:26aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination
18:26–18:30of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the
18:30–18:36cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Nayaika himself
18:36–18:41infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from
18:41–18:47experientiality because memory would be a counter example. In scholastic usage, experience and memory
18:47–18:51are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence from independence upon a latent
18:51–18:56impression. Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on
18:56–19:00an impression. Recutation of the Prabhukara view
19:02–19:07Some massakas refute the Prabhukara view. Experience establishes that determination of
19:07–19:12of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity, causes unwavering activity,
19:12–19:15the Nayaika 2 accepts this.
19:15–19:18Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object.
19:18–19:22In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the
19:22–19:27object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt
19:27–19:29about cognitive validity.
19:29–19:33If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object
19:33–19:37validity will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form of 2 opposing
19:37–19:42cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion-like
19:42–19:47cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering activity, activity arises from
19:47–19:53cognition excluded from illusion. Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity
19:53–19:58arises, because the validity of the object is determined. There is only doubt whether the
19:58–20:02cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition.
20:02–20:09This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition, activity arises.
20:09–20:17Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity.
20:17–20:23Therefore only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity.
20:23–20:30Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion and activity sometimes fails despite its presence.
20:30–20:36Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the cause is needlessly complex.

Plain text

आपसंश अव आव रह अगिव आपस्शिः It may be objected that valid cognition in perception and the other means may be held to arise from merit, but in the vader the absence of four defects, error, negligence, desire to deceive, and incapacity of the instrument, causes valid cognition. Even in ordinary sentences, valid cognition of sentence meaning arises when error and the other defects are absent. This objection is unsound. Under the rule of accepting the more economical cause, correct cognition of sentence meaning alone causes valid cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause of that inference. Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge, moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of such complexity does not arise. Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness in them. It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block the causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic and ordinary speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition. Though the The Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness. This too is untenable. The opposing inhibitor can be refuted. A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect. sentences not depending on another means such as inference would then become like the Veda. Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person, deceiver or parrot are not valid. An objection arises on the Nayayika view, how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver or a parrot be valid or authoritative when they are not produced from merit? It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted. Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind. This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, The experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced. On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke, that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as the mark. Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for recognition takes the same fire as its object. In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow, it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom, identity with another substancehood cannot be superimposed. Pervasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation. Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom. The traditionalists reply The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause. Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition of sentence meaning. Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda. It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements disappear because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God. This objection is unsound. A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition. If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the probandom fire, not the false component of the mark. This is the traditionalist view. The Neyayaka reply, Semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits. The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition. For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct cognition of that fitness, are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception, correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated. Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there. It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even in the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend Vyu, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to the lion sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid. Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted. But if the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by the speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in the sense of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid cognition. The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda. Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted as a merit in the Veda. The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person, because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning, like the sentence, bring the cow. This inference establishes God as the speaker. This objection is unsound. The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present, as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless. A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda without such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence meaning from these words. There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause. That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the separate cause of the use of each word. Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayaika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity. The speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group. The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions. Intention is not a merit. It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object of a speaker's intention. is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super-sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit. This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme with Mechran as a with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately except God? Objection, how can a later teacher recite the Veda with the intention of communicating a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning? Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic meaning would not remain authoritative speech and its meaning could not be determined. Answer, this is unsound. In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgahs and the like, and at some time must have recited the Vedic with the intention of communicating those meanings. That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered with intention. The Prabhupākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced. The Prabhupākaraṃsākas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known. Varidicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition. This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition is equally cognition. The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that it produces contrary activity. Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition, This is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary conduct. Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect produced non apprehension of non relation or through relation to a defect after cognition has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition. In validity as the causality of contrary activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition. Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition because there is deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a non-existent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated non-existent object. Varidicality is intrinsically known. Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect causes invalidity. Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity. Answer, this is unsound. One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a nonexistent object, depend on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition. With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect and absence of defect. Therefore, defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity and invalidity. Cognitive validity is the condition of taking as object a thing possessing the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing in the thing. As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking as object the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof. An alternative Prabhupāra view. Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as this thing has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity, is not determination of the object. Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object either. Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination. A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite regress. The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect also produces regressive only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first, and a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second. Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object. Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity, the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity. Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known. When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress. The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity. After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs. To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the The self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even the Naya Yaka accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara conclusion. Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted. about an object, is it thus or otherwise? arises from suspicion of the objects in validity. Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here. Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity extrinsically and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it. The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality, which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause, therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate. Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Nayaika himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from experientiality because memory would be a counter example. In scholastic usage, experience and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression. Recutation of the Prabhukara view Some massakas refute the Prabhukara view. Experience establishes that determination of of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity, causes unwavering activity, the Nayaika 2 accepts this. Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object. In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt about cognitive validity. If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object validity will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form of 2 opposing cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion-like cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering activity, activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion. Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises, because the validity of the object is determined. There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition. This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition, activity arises. Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity. Therefore only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity. Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion and activity sometimes fails despite its presence. Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the cause is needlessly complex.

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