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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:00–0:04त्यच्छ विश्फिल्टिंजूल, दे लाटा हाफ।
0:04–0:06The Gavaya and the Word.
0:07–0:19Tonight's assembly, the Sutradhara, Gadjaya Upadyoya, the Bhayi Chha Memsaka, the Prabhakara Memsaka, the Buddhist, the Vaika, the disciple, a forest dweller, the assembly.
0:20–0:21Prologue.
0:22–0:24The Sutradhara enters.
0:24–0:30Last night, in this assembly, Gadjia Upadyoya put two of the four pramas to the touchstone,
0:30–0:35perception, by which we see the conch, and inference, by which we travel from smoke all
0:35–0:37the way to fire.
0:37–0:41But Nair accepts four pramas, not two.
0:41–0:46Tonight it is the turn of the remaining two, and those two are but two forms of a single
0:46–0:49question, how does a word reach its meaning?
0:49–0:54A child hears the word, cow, and looks toward an animal, who type that invisible chord between
0:54–0:58that sound and that animal, and how is it known?
0:58–1:03And when a word stands for a thing which the hearer has never seen, an animal of the forest,
1:03–1:09a custom of a distant land, a deity of the Vader, how then is that chord to be grasped?
1:09–1:14The first answer bears the name Upamana, knowledge from similarity.
1:14–1:18The second bears the name Saptar, knowledge from trustworthy speech.
1:18–1:22It both must stand before their respective opponents.
1:22–1:26And keep your attention on that second figure placed upon the table, the animal that is like
1:26–1:29a cow but is not a cow.
1:29–1:33No one in this assembly yet knows its name.
1:33–1:37By the time the evening ends, everyone will know it, and how they will come to know it,
1:37–1:40that is the entire debate of tonight.
1:40–1:41Exit
1:41–1:45Act 1
1:45–1:48The Animal of the Forest
1:48–1:53Upamana, where the similarity is a separate category.
1:53–1:55Gadia is seated.
1:55–1:59A forest dweller enters and makes his abasins.
1:59–2:03Akaria, I have come from the forest of the north.
2:03–2:08A merchant of my village sent this message for your assembly, yesterday, in the forest,
2:08–2:12he saw an animal which he had never seen before, and yet the moment he saw it he
2:12–2:15cried out, this is a gavaia.
2:15–2:20Although he had heard that word only once, a year earlier, from my own mouth, when I had
2:20–2:23said, a gavaia is like a cow.
2:23–2:28He asks, by which prama did this knowledge arise in him?
2:28–2:33Smiling, turning toward the assembly, and tonight's debate could not have opened more
2:33–2:35fittingly than this.
2:35–2:40Hear this story again, slowly, for three events lie hidden within it, and upon each
2:40–2:43of them some school will stake its claim.
2:43–2:49The first, in the village, the merchant heard a sentence, a gavaya is like a cow.
2:49–2:54The second, in the forest, he saw an animal and perceived in it the similarity of the
2:54–2:56cow.
2:56–3:01The third, in that very moment this determination arose, this is the animal which the word
3:01–3:03gavaya denotes.
3:03–3:06Whence came this third cognition?
3:06–3:10Not from perception, for the eye shows only horns and hooves, not the meaning
3:10–3:13of a word.
3:13–3:18from the mere memory of the sentence, four to one who has never seen a cow-like animal,
3:18–3:23that sentence never yields that determination. This is the cognition which our sastra calls
3:23–3:26opomity and its instrument, opomanna.
3:26–3:33Rising, and this is the very place, Gagia, where your school in mind part ways, so let
3:33–3:41me speak first. I accept opomanna, but I accept more than you do. That similarity
3:41–3:47which the merchant saw in the forest, the similarity of the cow residing in the Gavaia.
3:47–3:49What is it?
3:49–3:56It is not substance, not quality, not motion, not universal, not particular, not adherence,
3:56–3:58not absence.
3:58–4:02Into none of the seven categories does it fit.
4:02–4:04Therefore it is the eighth.
4:04–4:09Similarity is in its own right an independent category and the unobstructed usage of
4:09–4:10the world.
4:10–4:12The cow like animal is a gavaia.
4:13–4:14Is it's proof?
4:15–4:19A bold claim, and I shall give it an examination worthy of its boldness.
4:20–4:23Tell me first, is this similarity one or many?
4:24–4:30If one, a single similarity recurring in all things, as a single countess recurs in all cows,
4:30–4:35then the very similarity which joins the cow and the gavaia would join the pot and the cloth as well,
4:36–4:38and everything in the world would become like every other thing.
4:38–4:48And what the world says, this resembles the cow greatly, this resembles the cow a little, how can there be more and less in a single, partless entity?
4:48–4:56Then say many. Infinite similarities, like conjunction, each residing in its two substrates.
4:56–5:00Then the second snare, more bitter than the first.
5:00–5:10If similarity, like conjunction, resides in both its substrates, then the similarity residing in the Gavaya resides also in the cow.
5:10–5:19Now place the merchant in the forest, where there is no cow, only the Gavaya. His eye touches the Gavaya, not the cow.
5:19–5:29If he sees the similarity, and that similarity resides in the cow as well, then he ought also to have perception of the absent cow, which never happens to anyone.
5:29–5:37And if he does not see it, then your perceived similarity has gone dark in the forest.
5:37–5:41Your bull is caught upon both horns, my friend.
5:41–5:46Recovering himself, my kumarila's kureka gives a subtle answer.
5:46–5:52Similarity is no new category, but a collection of many shared properties, the common properties
5:52–5:59of parts, of qualities, and of motions, which taken together are called similarity.
5:59–6:03as many trees taken together are called a forest.
6:03–6:07Resembles greatly means more shared properties.
6:07–6:11Resembles a little means fewer.
6:11–6:16Now you have come half the road toward my house, in saying, collection, you have abandoned
6:16–6:21the eighth category, but where you have halted, even there it is hard to stand.
6:21–6:26Take two lotus flowers of the same species, between which there is no countable difference
6:26–6:31of parts, and yet the world says, this flower is like that flower.
6:31–6:34What collection is there?
6:34–6:39And here my favorite example, which I have given in my own work, a baby elephant and
6:39–6:40a donkey.
6:40–6:45In the build of the body there is no match anywhere, neither parts, nor qualities, nor
6:45–6:47shape.
6:47–6:52And yet people laugh and say, this donkey eats like a baby elephant.
6:52–6:56What collection of shared properties is there in that?
6:56–7:02a similarity in the manner of eating, a single property, not a collection.
7:02–7:06Your definition does not even reach the places where the tongue of the common people reaches
7:06–7:08every day.
7:08–7:10Then what is similarity?
7:10–7:15A caria, if it is neither an eighth category, nor a collection of properties.
7:15–7:18It requires no new entity at all.
7:18–7:21The gavaia is like a cow, means only this.
7:21–7:25In the gavaia there are many of those properties which are also in the cow, and yet the
7:25–7:28the Gavaya is different from the cow.
7:28–7:33Tadbinatva Sahita had got a by-ode harm of Advah, being possessed of many of its properties
7:33–7:36while remaining different from it.
7:36–7:41Seven categories were sufficient, the eighth was an unnecessary guest, whom we see off
7:41–7:46from the very door, with respect, but without dinner.
7:46–7:52The category I have lost, I conceded, but the Prama is still mine.
7:52–7:58cognition which arose in the merchant, and beyond it the cognition that will arise when
7:58–8:00he returns to the village.
8:00–8:02Why cow is like that gavaya?
8:02–8:06By which prama will ye deliver that?
8:06–8:11Not by perception, for the cow is in the village and the gavaya in the forest, the
8:11–8:15two are never before one pair of eyes together.
8:15–8:21Not by inference, for the hechu of an inference must reside in the paka, and your hechu,
8:21–8:27The similarity located in the Gavaia is in the Gavaia, not in the Cow.
8:27–8:32Therefore this cognition is the separate province of Upamana itself, as we hold.
8:32–8:39Gently, friend, you have pronounced inference impossible far too quickly.
8:39–8:43Search for the Vaipti, and it is found at home.
8:43–8:48I have seen two elephants standing face to face, each like the other, with one and
8:48–8:53same glance, and from that this general vayapti comes to hand, whatever is the counterpart of
8:53–8:58a similarity residing in something, is like that thing.
8:58–9:04Now erect the inference, the paka, the cow, the savya, similarity to the gavaia, the
9:04–9:09hechu, being the counterpart of the similarity residing in the gavaia, the dhinta, the
9:09–9:12brother-elephant-sister-elephant.
9:12–9:16The cognition is obtained, and without any new prama.
9:16–9:21If you call Arthapattie, or an independent Upamana, is in my reckoning a vayatariqi inference
9:21–9:24in disguise.
9:24–9:31Sitting down, half defeated, half astonished, then have you cut Upamana away altogether?
9:31–9:34The third prama of your own school?
9:34–9:35Precisely the opposite.
9:35–9:37I have not cut it away.
9:37–9:43I have given it its own proper work, which until this day no one had rightly recognized.
9:43–9:48And before recognizing it, I must pull down an old wall of my own house.
9:48–9:54My predecessor, John Tobah, used to say, the memory of the sentence and the perception of
9:54–9:58the similarity together yield the determination, this is a gavaya, and that determination
9:58–10:00is opomiti.
10:00–10:03Beautiful, but far too narrow.
10:03–10:06Here another story.
10:06–10:10A traveler of the south, before setting out for the north, asked, what is a donkey
10:10–10:12like there?
10:12–10:15I have never seen one.
10:15–10:20A man of the north told him, and this description is no eulogy, the lowest creature among beasts,
10:20–10:25whose neck is absurdly long, whose lips are long and quivering, who choose twigs both
10:25–10:29hard and soft, and whose body is covered with lice.
10:29–10:34The traveler reached the north, saw such an animal, and the determination arose, this
10:34–10:36is the donkey.
10:36–10:39Now apply Jaunta's definition.
10:39–10:42Where is the similarity?
10:42–10:47This is an identification made through Vaitharmya, through a contemptible peculiarity.
10:47–10:52And without knowledge of Vyapti there can be no inference either.
10:52–10:58Janta's Upamana cannot stand here, and yet the cognition arose, and it was veritical.
10:58–11:02Then what is the true work of Upamana?
11:02–11:05Lifting both the figure of the cow and the figure of the Gavya and setting them
11:05–11:10before the assembly, listen carefully, for this is the fruit of this act.
11:10–11:14When the merchant in the forest said, This is a gavaia, he learned nothing new about
11:14–11:18the animal, the animal was before his eyes.
11:18–11:22He learned something new about the word, that the sound, gavaia, is the denoter of
11:22–11:25an animal of this species.
11:25–11:32That cord between word and meaning, which we call sakti, that is what Upamana grasped.
11:32–11:37And that cord cannot be tied to any one individual animal, otherwise the word, gavaia, would
11:37–11:43not applied to a second gavya at all, it is tied through gavya hood, through that species,
11:43–11:46which was recognized by the pointing of similarity.
11:46–11:52Hence my doctrine, opimity is this cognition, the animal possessing gavya hood is the denotatum
11:52–11:58of the word gavya, and upamana is its instrument, the cognition of similarity assisted by
11:58–12:02the memory of the meaning of the Adidesa sentence, whether that similarity be of common
12:02–12:08properties, of contrary properties, or of an extraordinary property.
12:08–12:13Among the nine means of grasping the power of a word, grammar, lexicon, the sentence of
12:13–12:18a trustworthy person, usage, and the rest, upamana is the one that carries you to the
12:18–12:23word for a thing which the hearer has never seen at all.
12:23–12:27This is its own kingdom, and in this kingdom it is the soul king.
12:27–12:33Slowly, you have taken my category, taken the domain of my prama, and in exchange you
12:33–12:38have set up a manna upon a throne on which it had never sat before.
12:38–12:41I shall go home and ponder this bargain."
12:41–12:45No despotent can ask for more than that.
12:45–12:49And do not leave just yet, for upon the tale of that court of the word which I have
12:49–12:53just told rests the remainder of this assembly's evening, and the other branch of your school
12:53–13:03has come this very day to fight me over it. Act 2. The Sound and the Chord. On Sabda,
13:03–13:09whether the word is an independent prama. The Buddhist and the Vaika come forward. The
13:09–13:14lamp is trimmed. Last night, Gajya, I admitted defeat on the
13:14–13:19unseen maker. Not a complete defeat but an honest one. Today I have come with a
13:19–13:26simple claim, and this time the scales are in my hand. You say that the word is a prama in its own
13:26–13:33right, that upon hearing trustworthy speech, veritical cognition arises. I say, only that is to
13:33–13:39be called a prama, which is the extraordinary cause of cognition. But even when the word is present,
13:39–13:44even when it reaches the ear, if there is no a with-me-kron-ke with-me-kron-ke with-me-kron
13:44–13:52and no yogyata, no understanding of meaning arises at all. Pot, fire, sprinkles. Hear all
13:52–13:58three words. Nothing will be understood. That in whose presence the effect remains uncertain
13:58–14:04is no extraordinary cause. Therefore the word is not an independent prama.
14:04–14:08Calmly, give one moment's attention to the very medium through which you sent me
14:08–14:15your claim. The word is not a prama, this sentence is itself made of words.
14:15–14:20If it is true, then a sentence has given me veritical cognition, and the word stands proved
14:20–14:27a prama. If it is false, then your objection has collapsed. Both roads arrive in my own
14:27–14:35courtyard. And as for auxiliaries, the eye needs light, is the eye, then, no prama.
14:35–14:37Every instrument needs auxiliaries.
14:37–14:42The need for an auxiliary does not destroy instrumentality, it completes it.
14:42–14:49A with Mekran K with Mekran K with Mekran and Yogata are the words light, not its rivals.
14:49–14:53Then hear my attack, which is subtler than the Buddhists.
14:53–14:57I accept the word as a prama, but not an independent one.
14:57–15:00It is absorbed within inference.
15:00–15:04The cognition that arises upon hearing bring the cow arises from this inference,
15:04–15:08This group of words is the informer of mutually connected meanings, because it possesses a
15:08–15:13withme-kran-kay withme-kran-kay withme-kran, yogyatta, and suddenly, like a sentence heard
15:13–15:15before.
15:15–15:21The word is a liga, like smoke, and verbal understanding is an inferential cognition.
15:21–15:27Three pramas instead of forked parsimony, lagava, is on my side.
15:27–15:30Parsimony is a beautiful argument when both roads reach the same village, but
15:30–15:35your road does not arrive at all, as I shall show."
15:35–15:39For inference, one first needs the memory of the viapti, then the knowledge of packet
15:39–15:45harmit, then paramarsa, and only then the inferential cognition.
15:45–15:49Now watch any child to whom his mother says, eat your rice.
15:49–15:52Does that child first recall a viapti?
15:52–15:57Whatever group of words possesses a with makron k with makron k with makron and the rest
15:57–16:00is an informer of syntactic connection.
16:00–16:07infer the trustworthiness of the speaker. Then perform paramarsa. In all that time the
16:07–16:12rice will have gone cold. The moment the sentence is heard, the meaning is understood, that
16:12–16:19very instant, without any intermediate stare. This immediacy is itself the proof that the
16:19–16:24word possesses its own independent power of illumination. Where experience shows
16:24–16:30no staircase, to thrust a staircase into the theory is not parsimony but prolixity,
16:30–16:32gullava, a useless burden.
16:32–16:34Granted.
16:34–16:39But then you tell me a bare heap of words does not thereby become a sentence.
16:39–16:44Pot, objecthood, bringing, volition, throw down these four words, and nothing will be
16:44–16:45understood.
16:45–16:50What is required for bring the pot to be understood?
16:50–16:54For things, and I shall give the definition of each as tightly as I gave the definition
16:54–17:01of viapti yesterday. The first, A with makron k with makron k with makron, that incompleteness
17:01–17:07of one word by which it cannot establish its syntactic connection without another word.
17:07–17:12Mark well, this is not in variable co-occurrence. In, blue lotus, neither is every lotus blue
17:12–17:17nor every blue thing a lotus, and yet the two words possess A with makron k with
17:17–17:23Makran K with Makran. Nor is it the hearer's curiosity, as certain
17:23–17:29saka's have said, a sentence is understood even without curiosity. The second, yogyata,
17:29–17:36the absence of the cognition of a contradiction. He sprinkles with fire, A with Makran K with
17:36–17:41Makran K with Makran is present, Sun the is present, but fire has no capacity for
17:41–17:46sprinkling, hence no understanding arises.
17:46–17:50And the subtlety is this, it is the certainty of contradiction that blocks understanding,
17:50–17:57not the doubt of contradiction, even while doubt remains, verbal understanding does arise.
17:57–18:02The third, sonni, the utterance of the words without delay, and the unbroken memory of
18:02–18:03their meanings.
18:03–18:09Say, pot, today and bring, tomorrow, the sentence has died.
18:09–18:14Fourth, Tattparya, the speaker's intention.
18:14–18:20In the middle of a meal, bring Sainthava, the hearer understands salt, not a horse.
18:20–18:25The word has the power for both, but Tattparya selects one.
18:25–18:30And where the primary meaning is blocked, a handlet on the gag, there it is Tattparya
18:30–18:34itself that opens the door of Laka, the bank of the gag.
18:34–18:38These four together make a heap of sounds into a sentence, just as four legs together
18:38–18:44make a stool a stool. Rising now for the first time, all for accepted,
18:44–18:51gadgia, but on one deep matter my school stands apart from you, and I shall set it down here.
18:51–18:55Our doctrine is Anvatar-pidna, the power of words extends only to meaning connected
18:55–19:02with action, meaning joined to a verb. How does a child come to learn words at all?
19:02–19:07An elder says, bring the cow, and the child sees the bringing, tie the cow, and he
19:07–19:12He sees the tying, every time, the word together with an act.
19:12–19:16Therefore the meaning of a word is always connected with action, and a solitary word,
19:16–19:20without a verb, is meaningless.
19:20–19:26Then poetry would die, my friend, and drama, and story, and this is not my sentimentality,
19:26–19:28it is argument.
19:28–19:33The moon has risen, in this sentence there is no task for the hearer, no command,
19:33–19:38yet its meaning is understood and delight arises besides.
19:38–19:43If the power lay only in the action connected, whence this understanding, and the child's
19:43–19:48schooling of which you spoke, that is one door of Saktigraha, not the boundary of Sakti,
19:48–19:53yesterday I proved up a manna, too, to be just such a door.
19:53–19:58The power belongs to each word in its own right, a with makran k with makran k with
19:58–20:03makran, yogyata, and tat paria join them together.
20:03–20:08The words independent, the sentence conjoined, this is a pithetanvya, and it is this that
20:08–20:11accords with the experience of the world.
20:11–20:16Then let us march to the true battlefield, for all of this was but its prelude.
20:16–20:18The Veda.
20:18–20:24On this both our branches, B.H.A. and Prabhikara, are one, the Veda is aparuya.
20:24–20:28It has no composer, never had one.
20:28–20:32The teacher-pupil tradition of recitation is beginningless, like seed and sprout, with
20:32–20:35no first link.
20:35–20:39Therefore the validity of the Vedas rests upon the intention of no person, neither man
20:39–20:40nor God.
20:40–20:43It is valid of itself.
20:43–20:47And this is its glory, into a speech that issued from no one's mouth, no one's fault
20:47–20:49can enter.
20:49–20:55"'Silent for a while, then softly, or grave doctrine, and I shall not laugh it away,
20:55–20:59I shall cut it with that very weapon of yesterday which you also witnessed.
20:59–21:06First, to say, beginningless tradition, is not an answer, it is the postponement of an answer.
21:06–21:16Every recitation rests upon a previous recitation, and that upon the one before it, this chain is either an infinite regress or self dependence.
21:16–21:21And that which we established last night, that the cycle of creation and dissolution turns,
21:21–21:26granted, and then in the dissolution every throat falls silent, every memory is erased.
21:27–21:32The court of the tradition is broken. In the new creation, who retied it?
21:34–21:39Second, and deeper, for the veridical composition of a sentence, veridical knowledge of the
21:39–21:45sentences meaning is required. Composition without a knower, utterance without intention,
21:45–21:51is like handwriting without a hand. Therefore the faultlessness of the Veda does not come from its
21:51–21:57authorlessness, it comes from the omniscience of its author. The Veda is Puruya, the work of that
21:57–22:04person whose knowledge is eternal and faultless, Isvara. And for any custom that is universally
22:04–22:10accepted in society but whose Vedic text is not found today, we infer a lost branch,
22:10–22:15Nasaka the original injunction existed, was lost in a dissolution or in the abyss of time,
22:15–22:18and in the new creation the omniscient one teaches it again.
22:19–22:24Yesterday's inference of Isvara and today's chapter on the word are two pillars of a single
22:24–22:31edifice, neither stands without the other. One final question remains, Gajia, and it is the
22:31–22:38oldest heirloom of my house. Svarga Kamo Yejita led him who desires have and perform this
22:38–22:45sacrifice. The sacrifice ends today, having comes after death. Who carries one across
22:45–22:54this long interval in between? Our answer, a porva, an unseen potency, bored of the sacrifice,
22:54–22:59arising in the self, which endures until the fruit, and it is precisely this that the
22:59–23:05injunctive suffix denotes. Will you cut this away as well?
23:05–23:10cut away, put in its proper place, and mark the difference, for this is the final lesson
23:10–23:12of this evening.
23:12–23:17I too accept the need for an intermediate link, between the momentary sacrifice and the
23:17–23:22heaven of a later time something is needed, and let it be unseen, on this there is no
23:22–23:23dispute.
23:23–23:29The dispute is here, what is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix?
23:29–23:31You say, a porva.
23:31–23:36I say, I as Danat, this act is the means to your desired end, and together with it
23:36–23:42to its diet and the non-entailment of a stronger evil, Balavadani and Abhenditva.
23:42–23:44Why all three?
23:44–23:45Listen.
23:45–23:48The drinking of poison is tisdhya.
23:48–23:52It can be accomplished by effort, and yet no healthy man drinks it, because it is
23:52–23:55not a means to what is desired.
23:55–24:00Rain is a means to what is desired, and yet no one sets about, making, rain,
24:00–24:04it is not achievable by effort.
24:04–24:10And the Sainah sacrifice, a means to the slaying of an enemy, and achievable by effort as well,
24:10–24:16yet the discerning man does not perform it, because hell is bound to it, a stronger evil.
24:16–24:20The knowledge of all three together begets activity, and the injunctive suffix expresses
24:20–24:22all three.
24:22–24:24A Purva.
24:24–24:28When the direct link appears impossible, then it is brought in, by Arthapati or by
24:28–24:34laka through the side door not onto the seat of honor. The end is heaven not a
24:34–24:39pārva to give the means the throne and to stand the end at the door that is
24:39–24:45garava and legava which yesterday was the vāika's argument today is mine.
24:45–24:49Releasing a long breath yesterday you told the Buddhist that you had not
24:49–24:54come to win by speaking last. Today I bear witness that you have kept your
24:54–25:00word, my category, my prama, my authorlessness, my apuva, all for you removed not by shouting,
25:00–25:03but by counting.
25:03–25:07And in the place of each of the four I set something, that is the difference between demolishing
25:07–25:09and building.
25:09–25:14In the place of similarity, the possession of many shared properties, in the place of
25:14–25:18an independent opumity, saktigraha, in the place of authorlessness, the speech of the
25:18–25:23omniscient, in the place of apuva, I asdenat.
25:23–25:26I sent no one away empty-handed.
25:26–25:28Epilogue
25:28–25:31The Sutradhara returns.
25:31–25:34He lifts the figure of the Govaya.
25:34–25:39At the beginning of the evening, no one in this assembly knew this figure's name.
25:39–25:44Now all know it, and they also know by which stairs that name climbed up to reach them,
25:44–25:50a forest-dweller's sentence, a vision of a similarity, the grasping of a power.
25:50–25:55The tale of Gajya Upadyoya's four pramas is complete today, perception, inference, comparison,
25:55–26:00word, and at the end of all four, one and the same lesson returned again and again, no
26:00–26:07prama received its throne without examination, and none was sent into exile without a hearing.
26:07–26:11The words you carry away from here tonight, the chord by which they reached their meanings
26:11–26:17was also, you now know, tied at some time by someone. May that chord never break,
26:17–26:20This is the entire prayer of this science.
26:20–26:23All the characters depart.
26:23–26:24The lamp goes out at the last.

Plain text

त्यच्छ विश्फिल्टिंजूल, दे लाटा हाफ। The Gavaya and the Word. Tonight's assembly, the Sutradhara, Gadjaya Upadyoya, the Bhayi Chha Memsaka, the Prabhakara Memsaka, the Buddhist, the Vaika, the disciple, a forest dweller, the assembly. Prologue. The Sutradhara enters. Last night, in this assembly, Gadjia Upadyoya put two of the four pramas to the touchstone, perception, by which we see the conch, and inference, by which we travel from smoke all the way to fire. But Nair accepts four pramas, not two. Tonight it is the turn of the remaining two, and those two are but two forms of a single question, how does a word reach its meaning? A child hears the word, cow, and looks toward an animal, who type that invisible chord between that sound and that animal, and how is it known? And when a word stands for a thing which the hearer has never seen, an animal of the forest, a custom of a distant land, a deity of the Vader, how then is that chord to be grasped? The first answer bears the name Upamana, knowledge from similarity. The second bears the name Saptar, knowledge from trustworthy speech. It both must stand before their respective opponents. And keep your attention on that second figure placed upon the table, the animal that is like a cow but is not a cow. No one in this assembly yet knows its name. By the time the evening ends, everyone will know it, and how they will come to know it, that is the entire debate of tonight. Exit Act 1 The Animal of the Forest Upamana, where the similarity is a separate category. Gadia is seated. A forest dweller enters and makes his abasins. Akaria, I have come from the forest of the north. A merchant of my village sent this message for your assembly, yesterday, in the forest, he saw an animal which he had never seen before, and yet the moment he saw it he cried out, this is a gavaia. Although he had heard that word only once, a year earlier, from my own mouth, when I had said, a gavaia is like a cow. He asks, by which prama did this knowledge arise in him? Smiling, turning toward the assembly, and tonight's debate could not have opened more fittingly than this. Hear this story again, slowly, for three events lie hidden within it, and upon each of them some school will stake its claim. The first, in the village, the merchant heard a sentence, a gavaya is like a cow. The second, in the forest, he saw an animal and perceived in it the similarity of the cow. The third, in that very moment this determination arose, this is the animal which the word gavaya denotes. Whence came this third cognition? Not from perception, for the eye shows only horns and hooves, not the meaning of a word. from the mere memory of the sentence, four to one who has never seen a cow-like animal, that sentence never yields that determination. This is the cognition which our sastra calls opomity and its instrument, opomanna. Rising, and this is the very place, Gagia, where your school in mind part ways, so let me speak first. I accept opomanna, but I accept more than you do. That similarity which the merchant saw in the forest, the similarity of the cow residing in the Gavaia. What is it? It is not substance, not quality, not motion, not universal, not particular, not adherence, not absence. Into none of the seven categories does it fit. Therefore it is the eighth. Similarity is in its own right an independent category and the unobstructed usage of the world. The cow like animal is a gavaia. Is it's proof? A bold claim, and I shall give it an examination worthy of its boldness. Tell me first, is this similarity one or many? If one, a single similarity recurring in all things, as a single countess recurs in all cows, then the very similarity which joins the cow and the gavaia would join the pot and the cloth as well, and everything in the world would become like every other thing. And what the world says, this resembles the cow greatly, this resembles the cow a little, how can there be more and less in a single, partless entity? Then say many. Infinite similarities, like conjunction, each residing in its two substrates. Then the second snare, more bitter than the first. If similarity, like conjunction, resides in both its substrates, then the similarity residing in the Gavaya resides also in the cow. Now place the merchant in the forest, where there is no cow, only the Gavaya. His eye touches the Gavaya, not the cow. If he sees the similarity, and that similarity resides in the cow as well, then he ought also to have perception of the absent cow, which never happens to anyone. And if he does not see it, then your perceived similarity has gone dark in the forest. Your bull is caught upon both horns, my friend. Recovering himself, my kumarila's kureka gives a subtle answer. Similarity is no new category, but a collection of many shared properties, the common properties of parts, of qualities, and of motions, which taken together are called similarity. as many trees taken together are called a forest. Resembles greatly means more shared properties. Resembles a little means fewer. Now you have come half the road toward my house, in saying, collection, you have abandoned the eighth category, but where you have halted, even there it is hard to stand. Take two lotus flowers of the same species, between which there is no countable difference of parts, and yet the world says, this flower is like that flower. What collection is there? And here my favorite example, which I have given in my own work, a baby elephant and a donkey. In the build of the body there is no match anywhere, neither parts, nor qualities, nor shape. And yet people laugh and say, this donkey eats like a baby elephant. What collection of shared properties is there in that? a similarity in the manner of eating, a single property, not a collection. Your definition does not even reach the places where the tongue of the common people reaches every day. Then what is similarity? A caria, if it is neither an eighth category, nor a collection of properties. It requires no new entity at all. The gavaia is like a cow, means only this. In the gavaia there are many of those properties which are also in the cow, and yet the the Gavaya is different from the cow. Tadbinatva Sahita had got a by-ode harm of Advah, being possessed of many of its properties while remaining different from it. Seven categories were sufficient, the eighth was an unnecessary guest, whom we see off from the very door, with respect, but without dinner. The category I have lost, I conceded, but the Prama is still mine. cognition which arose in the merchant, and beyond it the cognition that will arise when he returns to the village. Why cow is like that gavaya? By which prama will ye deliver that? Not by perception, for the cow is in the village and the gavaya in the forest, the two are never before one pair of eyes together. Not by inference, for the hechu of an inference must reside in the paka, and your hechu, The similarity located in the Gavaia is in the Gavaia, not in the Cow. Therefore this cognition is the separate province of Upamana itself, as we hold. Gently, friend, you have pronounced inference impossible far too quickly. Search for the Vaipti, and it is found at home. I have seen two elephants standing face to face, each like the other, with one and same glance, and from that this general vayapti comes to hand, whatever is the counterpart of a similarity residing in something, is like that thing. Now erect the inference, the paka, the cow, the savya, similarity to the gavaia, the hechu, being the counterpart of the similarity residing in the gavaia, the dhinta, the brother-elephant-sister-elephant. The cognition is obtained, and without any new prama. If you call Arthapattie, or an independent Upamana, is in my reckoning a vayatariqi inference in disguise. Sitting down, half defeated, half astonished, then have you cut Upamana away altogether? The third prama of your own school? Precisely the opposite. I have not cut it away. I have given it its own proper work, which until this day no one had rightly recognized. And before recognizing it, I must pull down an old wall of my own house. My predecessor, John Tobah, used to say, the memory of the sentence and the perception of the similarity together yield the determination, this is a gavaya, and that determination is opomiti. Beautiful, but far too narrow. Here another story. A traveler of the south, before setting out for the north, asked, what is a donkey like there? I have never seen one. A man of the north told him, and this description is no eulogy, the lowest creature among beasts, whose neck is absurdly long, whose lips are long and quivering, who choose twigs both hard and soft, and whose body is covered with lice. The traveler reached the north, saw such an animal, and the determination arose, this is the donkey. Now apply Jaunta's definition. Where is the similarity? This is an identification made through Vaitharmya, through a contemptible peculiarity. And without knowledge of Vyapti there can be no inference either. Janta's Upamana cannot stand here, and yet the cognition arose, and it was veritical. Then what is the true work of Upamana? Lifting both the figure of the cow and the figure of the Gavya and setting them before the assembly, listen carefully, for this is the fruit of this act. When the merchant in the forest said, This is a gavaia, he learned nothing new about the animal, the animal was before his eyes. He learned something new about the word, that the sound, gavaia, is the denoter of an animal of this species. That cord between word and meaning, which we call sakti, that is what Upamana grasped. And that cord cannot be tied to any one individual animal, otherwise the word, gavaia, would not applied to a second gavya at all, it is tied through gavya hood, through that species, which was recognized by the pointing of similarity. Hence my doctrine, opimity is this cognition, the animal possessing gavya hood is the denotatum of the word gavya, and upamana is its instrument, the cognition of similarity assisted by the memory of the meaning of the Adidesa sentence, whether that similarity be of common properties, of contrary properties, or of an extraordinary property. Among the nine means of grasping the power of a word, grammar, lexicon, the sentence of a trustworthy person, usage, and the rest, upamana is the one that carries you to the word for a thing which the hearer has never seen at all. This is its own kingdom, and in this kingdom it is the soul king. Slowly, you have taken my category, taken the domain of my prama, and in exchange you have set up a manna upon a throne on which it had never sat before. I shall go home and ponder this bargain." No despotent can ask for more than that. And do not leave just yet, for upon the tale of that court of the word which I have just told rests the remainder of this assembly's evening, and the other branch of your school has come this very day to fight me over it. Act 2. The Sound and the Chord. On Sabda, whether the word is an independent prama. The Buddhist and the Vaika come forward. The lamp is trimmed. Last night, Gajya, I admitted defeat on the unseen maker. Not a complete defeat but an honest one. Today I have come with a simple claim, and this time the scales are in my hand. You say that the word is a prama in its own right, that upon hearing trustworthy speech, veritical cognition arises. I say, only that is to be called a prama, which is the extraordinary cause of cognition. But even when the word is present, even when it reaches the ear, if there is no a with-me-kron-ke with-me-kron-ke with-me-kron and no yogyata, no understanding of meaning arises at all. Pot, fire, sprinkles. Hear all three words. Nothing will be understood. That in whose presence the effect remains uncertain is no extraordinary cause. Therefore the word is not an independent prama. Calmly, give one moment's attention to the very medium through which you sent me your claim. The word is not a prama, this sentence is itself made of words. If it is true, then a sentence has given me veritical cognition, and the word stands proved a prama. If it is false, then your objection has collapsed. Both roads arrive in my own courtyard. And as for auxiliaries, the eye needs light, is the eye, then, no prama. Every instrument needs auxiliaries. The need for an auxiliary does not destroy instrumentality, it completes it. A with Mekran K with Mekran K with Mekran and Yogata are the words light, not its rivals. Then hear my attack, which is subtler than the Buddhists. I accept the word as a prama, but not an independent one. It is absorbed within inference. The cognition that arises upon hearing bring the cow arises from this inference, This group of words is the informer of mutually connected meanings, because it possesses a withme-kran-kay withme-kran-kay withme-kran, yogyatta, and suddenly, like a sentence heard before. The word is a liga, like smoke, and verbal understanding is an inferential cognition. Three pramas instead of forked parsimony, lagava, is on my side. Parsimony is a beautiful argument when both roads reach the same village, but your road does not arrive at all, as I shall show." For inference, one first needs the memory of the viapti, then the knowledge of packet harmit, then paramarsa, and only then the inferential cognition. Now watch any child to whom his mother says, eat your rice. Does that child first recall a viapti? Whatever group of words possesses a with makron k with makron k with makron and the rest is an informer of syntactic connection. infer the trustworthiness of the speaker. Then perform paramarsa. In all that time the rice will have gone cold. The moment the sentence is heard, the meaning is understood, that very instant, without any intermediate stare. This immediacy is itself the proof that the word possesses its own independent power of illumination. Where experience shows no staircase, to thrust a staircase into the theory is not parsimony but prolixity, gullava, a useless burden. Granted. But then you tell me a bare heap of words does not thereby become a sentence. Pot, objecthood, bringing, volition, throw down these four words, and nothing will be understood. What is required for bring the pot to be understood? For things, and I shall give the definition of each as tightly as I gave the definition of viapti yesterday. The first, A with makron k with makron k with makron, that incompleteness of one word by which it cannot establish its syntactic connection without another word. Mark well, this is not in variable co-occurrence. In, blue lotus, neither is every lotus blue nor every blue thing a lotus, and yet the two words possess A with makron k with Makran K with Makran. Nor is it the hearer's curiosity, as certain saka's have said, a sentence is understood even without curiosity. The second, yogyata, the absence of the cognition of a contradiction. He sprinkles with fire, A with Makran K with Makran K with Makran is present, Sun the is present, but fire has no capacity for sprinkling, hence no understanding arises. And the subtlety is this, it is the certainty of contradiction that blocks understanding, not the doubt of contradiction, even while doubt remains, verbal understanding does arise. The third, sonni, the utterance of the words without delay, and the unbroken memory of their meanings. Say, pot, today and bring, tomorrow, the sentence has died. Fourth, Tattparya, the speaker's intention. In the middle of a meal, bring Sainthava, the hearer understands salt, not a horse. The word has the power for both, but Tattparya selects one. And where the primary meaning is blocked, a handlet on the gag, there it is Tattparya itself that opens the door of Laka, the bank of the gag. These four together make a heap of sounds into a sentence, just as four legs together make a stool a stool. Rising now for the first time, all for accepted, gadgia, but on one deep matter my school stands apart from you, and I shall set it down here. Our doctrine is Anvatar-pidna, the power of words extends only to meaning connected with action, meaning joined to a verb. How does a child come to learn words at all? An elder says, bring the cow, and the child sees the bringing, tie the cow, and he He sees the tying, every time, the word together with an act. Therefore the meaning of a word is always connected with action, and a solitary word, without a verb, is meaningless. Then poetry would die, my friend, and drama, and story, and this is not my sentimentality, it is argument. The moon has risen, in this sentence there is no task for the hearer, no command, yet its meaning is understood and delight arises besides. If the power lay only in the action connected, whence this understanding, and the child's schooling of which you spoke, that is one door of Saktigraha, not the boundary of Sakti, yesterday I proved up a manna, too, to be just such a door. The power belongs to each word in its own right, a with makran k with makran k with makran, yogyata, and tat paria join them together. The words independent, the sentence conjoined, this is a pithetanvya, and it is this that accords with the experience of the world. Then let us march to the true battlefield, for all of this was but its prelude. The Veda. On this both our branches, B.H.A. and Prabhikara, are one, the Veda is aparuya. It has no composer, never had one. The teacher-pupil tradition of recitation is beginningless, like seed and sprout, with no first link. Therefore the validity of the Vedas rests upon the intention of no person, neither man nor God. It is valid of itself. And this is its glory, into a speech that issued from no one's mouth, no one's fault can enter. "'Silent for a while, then softly, or grave doctrine, and I shall not laugh it away, I shall cut it with that very weapon of yesterday which you also witnessed. First, to say, beginningless tradition, is not an answer, it is the postponement of an answer. Every recitation rests upon a previous recitation, and that upon the one before it, this chain is either an infinite regress or self dependence. And that which we established last night, that the cycle of creation and dissolution turns, granted, and then in the dissolution every throat falls silent, every memory is erased. The court of the tradition is broken. In the new creation, who retied it? Second, and deeper, for the veridical composition of a sentence, veridical knowledge of the sentences meaning is required. Composition without a knower, utterance without intention, is like handwriting without a hand. Therefore the faultlessness of the Veda does not come from its authorlessness, it comes from the omniscience of its author. The Veda is Puruya, the work of that person whose knowledge is eternal and faultless, Isvara. And for any custom that is universally accepted in society but whose Vedic text is not found today, we infer a lost branch, Nasaka the original injunction existed, was lost in a dissolution or in the abyss of time, and in the new creation the omniscient one teaches it again. Yesterday's inference of Isvara and today's chapter on the word are two pillars of a single edifice, neither stands without the other. One final question remains, Gajia, and it is the oldest heirloom of my house. Svarga Kamo Yejita led him who desires have and perform this sacrifice. The sacrifice ends today, having comes after death. Who carries one across this long interval in between? Our answer, a porva, an unseen potency, bored of the sacrifice, arising in the self, which endures until the fruit, and it is precisely this that the injunctive suffix denotes. Will you cut this away as well? cut away, put in its proper place, and mark the difference, for this is the final lesson of this evening. I too accept the need for an intermediate link, between the momentary sacrifice and the heaven of a later time something is needed, and let it be unseen, on this there is no dispute. The dispute is here, what is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix? You say, a porva. I say, I as Danat, this act is the means to your desired end, and together with it to its diet and the non-entailment of a stronger evil, Balavadani and Abhenditva. Why all three? Listen. The drinking of poison is tisdhya. It can be accomplished by effort, and yet no healthy man drinks it, because it is not a means to what is desired. Rain is a means to what is desired, and yet no one sets about, making, rain, it is not achievable by effort. And the Sainah sacrifice, a means to the slaying of an enemy, and achievable by effort as well, yet the discerning man does not perform it, because hell is bound to it, a stronger evil. The knowledge of all three together begets activity, and the injunctive suffix expresses all three. A Purva. When the direct link appears impossible, then it is brought in, by Arthapati or by laka through the side door not onto the seat of honor. The end is heaven not a pārva to give the means the throne and to stand the end at the door that is garava and legava which yesterday was the vāika's argument today is mine. Releasing a long breath yesterday you told the Buddhist that you had not come to win by speaking last. Today I bear witness that you have kept your word, my category, my prama, my authorlessness, my apuva, all for you removed not by shouting, but by counting. And in the place of each of the four I set something, that is the difference between demolishing and building. In the place of similarity, the possession of many shared properties, in the place of an independent opumity, saktigraha, in the place of authorlessness, the speech of the omniscient, in the place of apuva, I asdenat. I sent no one away empty-handed. Epilogue The Sutradhara returns. He lifts the figure of the Govaya. At the beginning of the evening, no one in this assembly knew this figure's name. Now all know it, and they also know by which stairs that name climbed up to reach them, a forest-dweller's sentence, a vision of a similarity, the grasping of a power. The tale of Gajya Upadyoya's four pramas is complete today, perception, inference, comparison, word, and at the end of all four, one and the same lesson returned again and again, no prama received its throne without examination, and none was sent into exile without a hearing. The words you carry away from here tonight, the chord by which they reached their meanings was also, you now know, tied at some time by someone. May that chord never break, This is the entire prayer of this science. All the characters depart. The lamp goes out at the last.

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