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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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0:02–0:32अबजेक्षिन, अग्छिन इन्विर्षल सच्छिष्खाविद अछिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्
0:32–0:40With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
0:40–0:44Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject
0:44–0:48propertyhood is the cause.
0:48–0:4914.
0:49–0:53The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition
0:53–0:57involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, thereafter there
0:57–1:01is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by
1:01–1:05fire in cognition of subject propertyhood in the form smoke or light is a property of the
1:05–1:13mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
1:13–1:17In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood
1:17–1:23before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, gaugia, as proponent of the
1:23–1:30established conclusion, regard subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
1:30–1:32Otherness from that is not the reason.
1:32–1:3815. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such,
1:38–1:42otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary breadth
1:42–1:47and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood
1:47–1:50delimits reasonhood.
1:50–1:53Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire.
1:53–1:5716. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded
1:57–2:02only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire.
2:03–2:06Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless.
2:07–2:12The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from
2:12–2:16cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion
2:16–2:22by fire, smoke hood or light hood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual.
2:22–2:29Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not
2:29–2:31inference.
2:31–2:37Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of pervasion and apprehension
2:37–2:42of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition smoke or light pervaded by fire is present
2:42–2:44on the mountain.
2:44–2:47Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the
2:47–2:52qualifier, qualifican relation are decisive.
2:52–2:57of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception.
2:57–3:02It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless
3:02–3:06qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or
3:06–3:10light is pervaded by fire.
3:10–3:12But this objection is untenable.
3:12–3:16Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier,
3:16–3:19through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitants it
3:19–3:23assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire.
3:23–3:28This cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference, there is fire on
3:28–3:31the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by
3:31–3:34fire occurs in the subject.
3:34–3:39In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition smoke or light is pervaded
3:39–3:43by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain because subsumptive reflection,
3:43–3:49therefore cognition of smoke or light is pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference.
3:49–3:54Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire.
3:54–3:5519.
3:55–4:00It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter
4:00–4:05of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in
4:05–4:11each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes.
4:11–4:14But there is no evidence for this view.
4:14–4:19A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established,
4:19–4:24perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke
4:24–4:30is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervasions, substantive reflection
4:30–4:35concerning general perversion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and perversion
4:35–4:39are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together
4:39–4:45with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of
4:45–4:50qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity.
4:50–4:5620. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless
4:56–5:00complexity into inference. Its causality is
5:00–5:30नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ
5:30–5:34smoke's perversion by fire is possible.
5:34–5:39Application is not a separate means of knowledge.
5:39–5:44Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association
5:44–5:48generated by thought, like poetic imagination, subsumptive reflection is possible on the
5:48–5:54basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion.
5:54–5:59Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
5:59–6:05The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent.
6:05–6:1022. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through
6:10–6:14the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular
6:14–6:18mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke.
6:18–6:22For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire
6:22–6:27would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive
6:27–6:31reflection would become obscure.
6:31–6:35of the probandom fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as
6:35–6:41a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex.
6:41–6:45Viridical perception of fire is impossible.
6:45–6:5123, in recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual
6:51–6:55through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta.
6:55–7:00But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier,
7:00–7:06Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression.
7:06–7:11In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known,
7:11–7:16hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance
7:16–7:18of an impression.
7:18–7:21But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a
7:21–7:26property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established
7:26–7:30by an impression alone.
7:30–7:34is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom.
7:34–7:40Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke
7:40–7:44through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain
7:44–7:47fire is not directly perceived.
7:47–7:52Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of
7:52–7:55both reason and probandom.
7:55–7:59The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the pervasion
7:59–8:03by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through subsumptive
8:03–8:06reflection based on recollection.
8:06–8:12Reply, causes of qualified perception.
8:12–8:17Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand,
8:17–8:22non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand, and sense-contact
8:22–8:27are all causes of veridical qualified perception.
8:27–8:31In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion
8:31–8:34and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain.
8:34–8:39The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular
8:39–8:44smokehood and sense contact, substantive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by
8:44–8:46fire arises.
8:46–8:50But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there
8:50–8:55is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire.
8:55–9:01through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood.
9:01–9:0226.
9:02–9:06Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through
9:06–9:10an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded
9:10–9:14by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke.
9:14–9:20From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
9:20–9:23In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being
9:23–9:28pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire.
9:29–9:33The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes.
9:35–9:40But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark,
9:40–9:44the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic
9:44–9:51character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand
9:51–9:57pervasion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke.
9:57–9:59Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the
10:00–10:02विचार-विमर्च्ट नाटक आजि।
10:31–10:35being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason,
10:35–10:41and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom.
10:41–10:45According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades
10:45–10:49the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandoms pervadingness
10:49–10:52are not required.
10:52–10:56In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the
10:56–10:59the probandum's pervadingness.
10:59–11:04But this view is unnecessarily complex, it needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint
11:04–11:09cognition of pervasion by the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something
11:09–11:13pervaded by the probandum.
11:13–11:15Definition of pervadingness.
11:15–11:1629.
11:16–11:17Objection.
11:17–11:21If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of inference,
11:21–11:25then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection, since the collocation of smoke
11:25–11:30and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred.
11:30–11:35Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the
11:35–11:40co-location of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject.
11:41–11:46If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness.
11:48–11:52In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence
11:52–11:57of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke.
11:57–12:01Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire.
12:01–12:06The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the
12:06–12:10subject, only the relation of pervasion is known.
12:10–12:15A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact with a sense
12:15–12:19organ, subsumptive reflection is mental.
12:19–12:23The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and
12:23–12:26negative concomitance.
12:26–12:28Rule concerning the subject as Qualificand
12:28–12:3430. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate
12:34–12:39or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot
12:39–12:42become the principal qualificand in the inferential cognition, there is fire on
12:42–12:46the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition
12:46–12:49is not seen to become the principal qualificand in the resulting cognition.
12:50–12:54It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal
12:54–12:58qualificand in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain,
12:58–13:02because the qualificands of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ.
13:03–13:08For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition,
13:08–13:13the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says,
13:13–13:18In the subsumptive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the
13:18–13:22qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand.
13:23–13:28There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificand
13:28–13:34of the resulting cognition. Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning the reason's presence
13:34–13:38in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom,
13:38–13:40becomes the principal qualificand.
13:42–13:48Substumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference.
13:50–13:53Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference.
13:53–13:57The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause.
13:59–14:03Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion, but subsumptive reflection
14:03–14:07including the reason's perversion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause.
14:07–14:14Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent causality.
14:14–14:23If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense-contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause.
14:23–14:33The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke, but from the subsumptive reflection smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
14:33–14:45The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of subsumptive reflection is unnecessary.
14:46–14:51The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation.
14:52–15:00But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause.
15:00–15:02ब्रपोन्नध अछि।
15:02–15:04अछि।
15:04–15:06ब्रपोन्ध अछि।
15:06–15:08अछि।
15:08–15:10अछि।
15:10–15:12अछि।
15:12–15:14अछि।
15:14–15:16अछि।
15:16–15:18अछि।
15:18–15:20अछि।
15:20–15:22अछि।
15:22–15:24अछि।
15:24–15:26अछि।
15:26–15:28अछि।
15:28–15:35or operation of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the
15:35–15:41cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition
15:41–15:46of the individual reason and substantive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual itself,
15:46–15:52are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark.
15:52–15:5933. The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction
15:59–16:04of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful
16:04–16:09whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction
16:09–16:14will also be doubtful. In the inference there is fire on the mountain because there
16:14–16:20is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present
16:20–16:24time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke as the reason
16:24–16:29incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of
16:29–16:32inference is not smoke, but substantive reflection concerning
16:32–16:36smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular
16:36–16:39inference depends upon the validity or invalidity of the
16:39–16:43particular substantive reflection. Subsumptive reflection in
16:43–16:47general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the
16:47–16:51individual is the extraordinary cause of inference.
16:51–17:02Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
17:02–17:13Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause.
17:13–17:18From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire.
17:18–17:23The subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises.
17:23–17:26This subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference.
17:26–17:33Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation.
17:33–17:41Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation.
17:41–17:47Cognition of perversion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation.
17:48–17:53But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises as the
17:53–17:57result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter.
17:57–18:01Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference.
18:02–18:07The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an
18:07–18:11effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection.
18:13–18:17With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
18:19–18:20Purely Affirmative Inference
18:22–18:25Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference
18:27–18:32Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative.
18:32–18:37An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative.
18:37–18:42Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable.
18:42–18:51Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus of the absence of nameability is impossible.
18:51–18:54Objection to the definition.
18:54–19:02Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible.
19:02–19:09Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative.
19:11–19:17Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative,
19:17–19:23and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be indeterminate.
19:23–19:28Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative.
19:28–19:35An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject.
19:35–19:40Only a probandom possessing no counter instance is called purely affirmative.
19:40–19:44Defect in the alternative definition.
19:44–19:54It cannot be said that being the counter-positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type.
19:54–20:00type. Both are knowable in a generalized form.
20:00–20:08Only the perversion of a property whose counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative.
20:08–20:16Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter-positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative.
20:16–20:22The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative.
20:22–20:27For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction
20:27–20:32of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere.
20:32–20:37In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying
20:37–20:41the quality cannot coexist.
20:41–20:45Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the
20:45–20:49quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer
20:49–20:51exists.
20:51–20:57the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative.
20:57–21:03The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative.
21:03–21:07Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative.
21:07–21:12If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter
21:12–21:18positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether.
21:18–21:22Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence
21:22–21:28of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative
21:28–21:34merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely
21:34–21:41affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion.
21:43–21:48Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated
21:48–21:54absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute
21:54–21:59absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is
21:59–22:05not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence
22:05–22:11of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it
22:11–22:15is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are
22:15–22:20not the counter-positives of instantiated absolute absences.
22:20–22:24No ability is purely affirmative.
22:24–22:31Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized.
22:31–22:37Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge,
22:37–22:41objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability
22:41–22:45applies to many individuals and can be generalized.
22:45–22:50A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual.
22:50–22:54In cognition of an individual, the relation of the universal is quickly known through
22:54–22:58pervasive cognition such as inheritance.
22:58–23:02At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property
23:02–23:07delimiting the individual must also be admitted.
23:07–23:12of the individual is the denotatum of a word.
23:12–23:17Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual,
23:17–23:21therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

Plain text

अबजेक्षिन, अग्छिन इन्विर्षल सच्छिष्खाविद अछिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष्चिष् With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause. 14. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by fire in cognition of subject propertyhood in the form smoke or light is a property of the mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, gaugia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regard subsumptive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Otherness from that is not the reason. 15. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood. Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire. 16. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire. Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smoke hood or light hood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual. Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference. Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of pervasion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualifican relation are decisive. of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception. It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitants it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire. This cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition smoke or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain because subsumptive reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light is pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference. Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire. 19. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes. But there is no evidence for this view. A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervasions, substantive reflection concerning general perversion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and perversion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is नाटक आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आप आ� आप आ� आ� आप आ� आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ smoke's perversion by fire is possible. Application is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination, subsumptive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent. 22. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure. of the probandom fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex. Viridical perception of fire is impossible. 23, in recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta. But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone. is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom. Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection. Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand, and sense-contact are all causes of veridical qualified perception. In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular smokehood and sense contact, substantive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire. through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood. 26. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand pervasion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the विचार-विमर्च्ट नाटक आजि। being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandoms pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the the probandum's pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex, it needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandum. Definition of pervadingness. 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection, since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred. Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the co-location of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject. If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness. In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the subject, only the relation of pervasion is known. A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. Rule concerning the subject as Qualificand 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualificand in the inferential cognition, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the principal qualificand in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualificand in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificands of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, In the subsumptive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand. There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificand of the resulting cognition. Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning the reason's presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificand. Substumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference. Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause. Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion, but subsumptive reflection including the reason's perversion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause. Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent causality. If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense-contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke, but from the subsumptive reflection smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of subsumptive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause. ब्रपोन्नध अछि। अछि। ब्रपोन्ध अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। or operation of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason and substantive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark. 33. The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke as the reason incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke, but substantive reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity of the particular substantive reflection. Subsumptive reflection in general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference. Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause. From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises. This subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation. Cognition of perversion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter. Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference. The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection. With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Purely Affirmative Inference Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative. An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative. Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable. Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus of the absence of nameability is impossible. Objection to the definition. Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible. Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative. Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative, and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative. An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter instance is called purely affirmative. Defect in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter-positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type. type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the perversion of a property whose counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter-positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative. The absolute absence that destroys equality is not purely affirmative. For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer exists. the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative. Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether. Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter-positives of instantiated absolute absences. No ability is purely affirmative. Objection, no ability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized. Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized. A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual. In cognition of an individual, the relation of the universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance. At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted. of the individual is the denotatum of a word. Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

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