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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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  1. 0:02–0:32विश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्�
  2. 0:32–0:37absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation.
  3. 0:37–0:42Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye, because if color
  4. 0:42–0:46were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible.
  5. 0:46–0:51Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were
  6. 0:51–0:55identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would
  7. 0:55–0:58be impossible.
  8. 0:58–1:02In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that locus
  9. 1:02–1:07is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound. Thus Qualifier hood belonging to an object related
  10. 1:07–1:12to the sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence of sound. But the presence of waterhood
  11. 1:12–1:16in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension there, therefore the eye does not apprehend
  12. 1:16–1:25waterhood. Objection, Inherence is the relation of absence. Objection, Qualifier hood is not the
  13. 1:25–1:30apprehensive relation in perception of absence, Inherence alone is the relation. The Qualified
  14. 1:30–1:34cognition that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here.
  15. 1:35–1:40The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound,
  16. 1:40–1:44conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by Inherence would
  17. 1:44–1:49become an absence, could be raised. In the perception of color, Inherence has already
  18. 1:49–1:53been accepted as an apprehensive relation, to accept Inherence for absence is no different
  19. 1:53–1:58from accepting Qualifierhood. Prior absence and destruction in here in the respective
  20. 1:58–2:02locky of their counter positives, destruction produced by the destruction of the counter
  21. 2:02–2:06positives lock as is described as in hearing in space or time.
  22. 2:06–2:10The reply destruction too should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is
  23. 2:10–2:14no answer, for then the destroyed pot would arise again.
  24. 2:14–2:20If destruction were destroyed, another entity capable of destroying it would be required.
  25. 2:20–2:25To say that positive entity hood regulates destructibility is cumbersome and impossible
  26. 2:25–2:27in the case of prior absence.
  27. 2:27–2:34From the sedhantans view too destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction.
  28. 2:34–2:38An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and in
  29. 2:38–2:41hearing in many loci, would become universals.
  30. 2:41–2:46To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of universalhood is cumbersome.
  31. 2:46–2:49There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence on account of which
  32. 2:49–2:53inherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence.
  33. 2:53–2:56This objection is not sound.
  34. 2:56–3:00If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals, their relative extension
  35. 3:00–3:05and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as existence, substancehood
  36. 3:05–3:06and earthhood.
  37. 3:06–3:10If existence, substancehood and earthhood were narrower, their absence would necessarily
  38. 3:10–3:14occur in a pot and if they were wider, they would have to occur in the universal absence
  39. 3:14–3:17of potness.
  40. 3:17–3:20The Cidhantons reply.
  41. 3:20–3:25If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed
  42. 3:25–3:28with the destruction of its inhering cause.
  43. 3:28–3:33To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and
  44. 3:33–3:36impossible for prior absence.
  45. 3:36–3:40If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be
  46. 3:40–3:45destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus.
  47. 3:45–3:49The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise
  48. 3:49–3:52again, is also unsound.
  49. 3:52–3:57conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its purpose
  50. 3:57–4:02will be undone. Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures
  51. 4:02–4:08that the destroyed pot is not produced again. A succession of destructions generated by
  52. 4:08–4:14the successive destruction of inhering loci cannot be accepted. If the destruction
  53. 4:14–4:19of loci from the pot, potchards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted, the final
  54. 4:19–4:23destruction and the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible,
  55. 4:23–4:26the destruction too would become imperceptible.
  56. 4:26–4:31If destruction of the pot inhered only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist
  57. 4:31–4:35on the ground, if it inhered in both the ground and the potchards, then after the
  58. 4:35–4:39potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the
  59. 4:39–4:43pervasion of inheritance must extend throughout its locus.
  60. 4:43–4:47Thus ends the theory of inheritance and the perception section of the Tathasintmai
  61. 4:47–4:51composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
  62. 4:51–4:57The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge.
  63. 4:57–5:01Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge.
  64. 5:01–5:06The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is produced
  65. 5:06–5:12by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter-positive.
  66. 5:12–5:16For when an eligible counter-positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does
  67. 5:16–5:18not arise.
  68. 5:18–5:23It should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced by non-apprehension
  69. 5:23–5:26of its absence rather than by a sense organ.
  70. 5:26–5:31A sense organ is invariably found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity.
  71. 5:31–5:34Otherwise a person with closed eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension
  72. 5:34–5:36of its absence.
  73. 5:36–5:39Therefore, although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately
  74. 5:39–5:43precedes cognition of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ
  75. 5:43–5:46renders it otherwise established.
  76. 5:46–5:50When sense-object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension
  77. 5:50–5:52of its absence.
  78. 5:52–5:57The Nyayaka objects that in cognition of absence 2 the sense-organ is a cause, because the cognition
  79. 5:57–5:59conforms to it.
  80. 5:59–6:03The BHA replies, the eye and other sense-organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation
  81. 6:03–6:06with absence, they merely produce cognition of the lockers of absence and then cease
  82. 6:06–6:08operating.
  83. 6:08–6:13A sense-organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself.
  84. 6:13–6:17A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence.
  85. 6:17–6:22Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ, therefore
  86. 6:22–6:27that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of absence.
  87. 6:27–6:31Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established, the sense
  88. 6:31–6:35organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either.
  89. 6:35–6:40Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal
  90. 6:40–6:46status of the sense organ has first been established. But because the sense organ has no apprehensive
  91. 6:46–6:52relation with absence, its causal status itself is unestablished. This also refutes the argument
  92. 6:52–6:57that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both causes, like a staff and a wheel,
  93. 6:57–7:03because their separate positive and negative concomitance is known. A sense organ lacking
  94. 7:03–7:06an apprehensive relation with absence cannot produce cognition of absence.
  95. 7:06–7:12nor may it be held that a sense organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood,
  96. 7:12–7:17that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that lacks any other
  97. 7:17–7:21apprehensive relation. On such a view conjunction come inheritance and the other relations would
  98. 7:21–7:26become useless, and an unrelated staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized.
  99. 7:27–7:30A sense organ apprehends only an object apprehensively related to it.
  100. 7:31–7:35Qualifierhood or a self-linking relation is not an apprehensive relation of the sense organ,
  101. 7:35–7:40Otherwise, even if inheritance had not been accepted, its quality would still have to be admitted.
  102. 7:41–7:45Hence the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible.
  103. 7:47–7:48The Danton view
  104. 7:50–7:54The Neayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore,
  105. 7:54–7:59since any other apprehensive relation is impossible, quality that is, the self-linking
  106. 7:59–8:04relation should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence,
  107. 8:04–8:08just as conjunction come inheritance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when
  108. 8:08–8:15conjunction is impossible. The Vedantin replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense
  109. 8:15–8:19organ does not cease after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction
  110. 8:19–8:25come inheritance is the apprehensive relation. But in cognition of absence, through economy,
  111. 8:25–8:30the sense organ ceases after producing cognition of the locus, hence there is no purpose in
  112. 8:30–8:33accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood.
  113. 8:33–8:39Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color, it should likewise
  114. 8:39–8:45not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touches and inferential reason.
  115. 8:45–8:49The Nyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends
  116. 8:49–8:53upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon
  117. 8:53–8:56sensory apprehensibility of absence.
  118. 8:56–8:59Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object.
  119. 8:59–9:04A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations such as conjunction
  120. 9:04–9:06and inherent are causes.
  121. 9:06–9:10From the mutual deviation of conjunction and inherent one cannot formulate the general
  122. 9:10–9:14rule, a sense organ knows an object related to itself, in each instance, the specific
  123. 9:14–9:18relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition.
  124. 9:18–9:21The mere nature of the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception
  125. 9:21–9:26of absence, because a relation must be distinct from the relata, no object is known by
  126. 9:26–9:29itself through its own nature alone.
  127. 9:29–9:33The visual sense organ is not a cause.
  128. 9:33–9:37If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence, cognition of color and
  129. 9:37–9:41the light would also be produced by a self-linking relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive
  130. 9:41–9:46relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration of six kinds of sense-object contact
  131. 9:46–9:47would be fruitless.
  132. 9:47–9:51This also refutes the view that, the eye depends upon the assistance of light because
  133. 9:51–9:54light alone is its auxiliary cause.
  134. 9:54–9:59an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates the
  135. 9:59–10:04counter positive and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that the eye,
  136. 10:04–10:09while producing cognition of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of absence, and
  137. 10:09–10:12that non-apprehension produces cognition of absence in the presence of the other causes
  138. 10:12–10:17apart from the sense organ. But this is not correct. The eye, lacking an apprehensive
  139. 10:17–10:21relation, is not the cause of cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of
  140. 10:21–10:25the locus of absence and then ceases.
  141. 10:25–10:28Nor is the following argument acceptable, after a blue object has been known through
  142. 10:28–10:32touch, a blind person would cognize absence of blue from non-apprehension of a remembered
  143. 10:32–10:37yellow object, but this fault does not arise if cognition of absence is accepted as produced
  144. 10:37–10:41by the sense organ that apprehends the counter positive, because the blind person has no
  145. 10:41–10:42eyes.
  146. 10:42–10:46The sense organ that the Naiyayika regards as producing cognition of absence in fact
  147. 10:46–10:49ceases after producing cognition of the locus.
  148. 10:49–10:53It must therefore be accepted that, after the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter-positive
  149. 10:53–10:58has made the lock as known, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence.
  150. 10:58–11:01Otherwise cognition of absence of waterhood would arise in water atoms related to the
  151. 11:01–11:04eye.
  152. 11:04–11:07Awareness of absence of color and the like has non-apprehension as its inferential
  153. 11:07–11:10mark.
  154. 11:10–11:14Nayayika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence
  155. 11:14–11:19of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension because their loci, air and
  156. 11:19–11:22the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending
  157. 11:22–11:24the counter-positives.
  158. 11:24–11:28It should not be asked how the Naiya Yika can regard such absences as perceptible when
  159. 11:28–11:32the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ.
  160. 11:32–11:36Once air has been known by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible
  161. 11:36–11:40absence of color its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as
  162. 11:40–11:42its qualificant.
  163. 11:42–11:46cognition of the qualificant is a cause of perception.
  164. 11:46–11:50The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other things
  165. 11:50–11:55is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka himself
  166. 11:55–12:02regards the cognition air as colorless, whose qualificant is air, as inferential.
  167. 12:02–12:07Objection of cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ.
  168. 12:07–12:11The Neayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by
  169. 12:11–12:18a sense organ because it is an immediate awareness. Therefore, Qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking
  170. 12:18–12:23relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the sense organ with cognition
  171. 12:23–12:29of absence. It is not the case that immediacy is the reason is unestablished. If on the
  172. 12:29–12:34Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as mediate, the distinction of cognition produced
  173. 12:34–12:40by an unknown cause would become impossible. From a trustworthy person's statement it
  174. 12:40–12:45is known that, even after someone entered the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside, from this
  175. 12:45–12:50known non-apprehension the hearer infers, Kaitra was not in the temple.
  176. 12:50–12:55If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced by an unknown cause, because
  177. 12:55–12:59the universal mediate cognitionhood is known through an own cause.
  178. 12:59–13:04Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential
  179. 13:04–13:09mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does.
  180. 13:09–13:15cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate. Being produced by a sense
  181. 13:15–13:21organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality, because perceptuality itself is inferred from
  182. 13:21–13:28being produced by a sense organ. Establishment of the Bavu cognition of absence is mediate
  183. 13:28–13:36and produced by non-apprehension. The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct.
  184. 13:36–13:41Cognitionhood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential cognitionhood,
  185. 13:41–13:45it is merely cognitionhood qualified by difference from immediate awareness.
  186. 13:46–13:49Therefore Cognition of Absence is Mediate like Memory.
  187. 13:50–13:54Verbal Cognition, though produced by an unknown cause, is not inference.
  188. 13:55–14:00Similarly, Cognition of the Locust of Absence, produced by a sense organ from an unknown cause,
  189. 14:00–14:06is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from cognition produced by a sense organ
  190. 14:06–14:12and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate. If perceptuality were established from being
  191. 14:12–14:18produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition and the like, produced by known causes, would become
  192. 14:18–14:24inferential. Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct
  193. 14:24–14:30effects because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ. Similarly, cognition of absence
  194. 14:30–14:35and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because unknown non-apprehension and the known
  195. 14:35–14:41sense organ differ. Therefore being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality,
  196. 14:41–14:47while not being produced by a sense organ establishes mediacy. To regard production by an unknown
  197. 14:47–14:51cause and production by a known cause as the grounds of perception and mediation is
  198. 14:51–14:56cumbersome, and neither replies to memory.
  199. 14:56–15:01of the objection of the author of the kusumunjali.
  200. 15:01–15:06The author of the kusumunjali may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge of absence,
  201. 15:06–15:12the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces external experience.
  202. 15:12–15:18Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute to the mind's production
  203. 15:18–15:20of external experience.
  204. 15:20–15:24Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense organ alone would produce external
  205. 15:24–15:30experience, inference and the other means of knowledge would cease to exist.
  206. 15:30–15:33The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a positive entity, is the
  207. 15:33–15:38means of cognition of absence, because cognition of absence is an external cognition, is
  208. 15:38–15:39unsound.
  209. 15:39–15:43Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ, because it is an absence, like the absence
  210. 15:43–15:45of an ineligible object.
  211. 15:45–15:50The counter inference is, this cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ,
  212. 15:50–15:53because it is cognition of absence, like cognition of absence produced by an inferential
  213. 15:53–15:59mark and the light. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes the counter-positive
  214. 15:59–16:05also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive of cognition of
  215. 16:05–16:11the counter-positive, also produces cognition of its absence. Inference in verbal testimony,
  216. 16:11–16:15which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce cognition of absence.
  217. 16:16–16:20Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends
  218. 16:20–16:25the counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison.
  219. 16:26–16:31Ihood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence,
  220. 16:31–16:37but comparisonhood is not a universal. It has already been established that the I and other
  221. 16:37–16:41sense organs cannot produce cognition of absence without an apprehensive relation.
  222. 16:43–16:46A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence,
  223. 16:46–16:49non-apprehension produces cognition of absence.
  224. 16:51–16:56Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present is possible,
  225. 16:56–17:02and this is produced by a defect in the instrument. Memory of the counter positive, cognition of
  226. 17:02–17:07the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically defective, the sense organ is impaired by
  227. 17:07–17:11bile and other defects, and the illusion is produced by that impaired sense organ.
  228. 17:11–17:17Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence.
  229. 17:17–17:26Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension.
  230. 17:26–17:32It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise from a known cause,
  231. 17:32–17:38the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition of absence should also be understood in that form,
  232. 17:38–17:43form, making the postulation of a separate means of non-apprehension unnecessary.
  233. 17:44–17:50The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence. A defective sense organ may produce
  234. 17:50–17:54an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye produces an illusion of smell and a stone,
  235. 17:54–17:59but veritical cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because there is no apprehensive
  236. 17:59–18:05relation. Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a
  237. 18:05–18:11positive entity and an absence. Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced
  238. 18:11–18:15neither by a sense organ nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone should
  239. 18:15–18:21be accepted as apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an absence
  240. 18:21–18:26supplied by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ, but
  241. 18:26–18:30cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground, is produced
  242. 18:30–18:36by non-apprehension. Similarly, the i produces the cognition, sandalwood is fragrant, while the
  243. 18:36–18:42nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood. The argument, non-apprehension is not a means
  244. 18:42–18:48of knowledge because it has no operation, is also unsound. The rule is that, apart from
  245. 18:48–18:52non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the action is an instrument,
  246. 18:52–18:57there is no need to add the expression, possessing an operation to the definition of a means of
  247. 18:57–19:04of knowledge. The Neiyaka refutation of non-apprehension.
  248. 19:04–19:09Neiyaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ capable
  249. 19:09–19:14of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence,
  250. 19:14–19:20because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge.
  251. 19:20–19:23Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ, not
  252. 19:23–19:28Not by non-apprehension, non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a trustworthy
  253. 19:28–19:31statement that makes it known.
  254. 19:31–19:36It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension of the existence of color in the light produces
  255. 19:36–19:40cognition of their absence, as non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence of
  256. 19:40–19:43a pot on the ground.
  257. 19:43–19:47On the MSACA view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence
  258. 19:47–19:53cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
  259. 19:53–19:58Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence.
  260. 19:58–20:02To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension
  261. 20:02–20:05contradicts themsaka doctrine.
  262. 20:05–20:09Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension
  263. 20:09–20:14alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known
  264. 20:14–20:16from its non-apprehension.
  265. 20:16–20:22Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension.
  266. 20:22–20:26Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark.
  267. 20:26–20:31Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument, because
  268. 20:31–20:35it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like.
  269. 20:35–20:39Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection
  270. 20:39–20:43of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status
  271. 20:43–20:45of non-apprehension.
  272. 20:45–20:50Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing
  273. 20:50–20:54color inferred from it, the inferential mark.
  274. 20:54–20:58Absence of knownness of possessing color in air is equivalent to absence of color, and
  275. 20:58–21:00therefore would not be known.
  276. 21:00–21:05If absence of knownness of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can
  277. 21:05–21:09equally be regarded as perceptible.
  278. 21:09–21:14Absence cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior.
  279. 21:14–21:19Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person,
  280. 21:19–21:25remains. In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while
  281. 21:25–21:28absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

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विश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्� absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation. Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye, because if color were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible. Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would be impossible. In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that locus is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound. Thus Qualifier hood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence of sound. But the presence of waterhood in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension there, therefore the eye does not apprehend waterhood. Objection, Inherence is the relation of absence. Objection, Qualifier hood is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence, Inherence alone is the relation. The Qualified cognition that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here. The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound, conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by Inherence would become an absence, could be raised. In the perception of color, Inherence has already been accepted as an apprehensive relation, to accept Inherence for absence is no different from accepting Qualifierhood. Prior absence and destruction in here in the respective locky of their counter positives, destruction produced by the destruction of the counter positives lock as is described as in hearing in space or time. The reply destruction too should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is no answer, for then the destroyed pot would arise again. If destruction were destroyed, another entity capable of destroying it would be required. To say that positive entity hood regulates destructibility is cumbersome and impossible in the case of prior absence. From the sedhantans view too destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction. An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and in hearing in many loci, would become universals. To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of universalhood is cumbersome. There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence on account of which inherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence. This objection is not sound. If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals, their relative extension and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as existence, substancehood and earthhood. If existence, substancehood and earthhood were narrower, their absence would necessarily occur in a pot and if they were wider, they would have to occur in the universal absence of potness. The Cidhantons reply. If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed with the destruction of its inhering cause. To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and impossible for prior absence. If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus. The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise again, is also unsound. conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its purpose will be undone. Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures that the destroyed pot is not produced again. A succession of destructions generated by the successive destruction of inhering loci cannot be accepted. If the destruction of loci from the pot, potchards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted, the final destruction and the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible, the destruction too would become imperceptible. If destruction of the pot inhered only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist on the ground, if it inhered in both the ground and the potchards, then after the potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the pervasion of inheritance must extend throughout its locus. Thus ends the theory of inheritance and the perception section of the Tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge. Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge. The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is produced by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter-positive. For when an eligible counter-positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does not arise. It should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced by non-apprehension of its absence rather than by a sense organ. A sense organ is invariably found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity. Otherwise a person with closed eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension of its absence. Therefore, although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately precedes cognition of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ renders it otherwise established. When sense-object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension of its absence. The Nyayaka objects that in cognition of absence 2 the sense-organ is a cause, because the cognition conforms to it. The BHA replies, the eye and other sense-organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation with absence, they merely produce cognition of the lockers of absence and then cease operating. A sense-organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself. A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence. Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ, therefore that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of absence. Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established, the sense organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either. Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal status of the sense organ has first been established. But because the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, its causal status itself is unestablished. This also refutes the argument that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both causes, like a staff and a wheel, because their separate positive and negative concomitance is known. A sense organ lacking an apprehensive relation with absence cannot produce cognition of absence. nor may it be held that a sense organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that lacks any other apprehensive relation. On such a view conjunction come inheritance and the other relations would become useless, and an unrelated staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized. A sense organ apprehends only an object apprehensively related to it. Qualifierhood or a self-linking relation is not an apprehensive relation of the sense organ, Otherwise, even if inheritance had not been accepted, its quality would still have to be admitted. Hence the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible. The Danton view The Neayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore, since any other apprehensive relation is impossible, quality that is, the self-linking relation should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence, just as conjunction come inheritance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when conjunction is impossible. The Vedantin replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense organ does not cease after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction come inheritance is the apprehensive relation. But in cognition of absence, through economy, the sense organ ceases after producing cognition of the locus, hence there is no purpose in accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood. Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color, it should likewise not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touches and inferential reason. The Nyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon sensory apprehensibility of absence. Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object. A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations such as conjunction and inherent are causes. From the mutual deviation of conjunction and inherent one cannot formulate the general rule, a sense organ knows an object related to itself, in each instance, the specific relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition. The mere nature of the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence, because a relation must be distinct from the relata, no object is known by itself through its own nature alone. The visual sense organ is not a cause. If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence, cognition of color and the light would also be produced by a self-linking relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration of six kinds of sense-object contact would be fruitless. This also refutes the view that, the eye depends upon the assistance of light because light alone is its auxiliary cause. an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates the counter positive and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that the eye, while producing cognition of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of absence, and that non-apprehension produces cognition of absence in the presence of the other causes apart from the sense organ. But this is not correct. The eye, lacking an apprehensive relation, is not the cause of cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of the locus of absence and then ceases. Nor is the following argument acceptable, after a blue object has been known through touch, a blind person would cognize absence of blue from non-apprehension of a remembered yellow object, but this fault does not arise if cognition of absence is accepted as produced by the sense organ that apprehends the counter positive, because the blind person has no eyes. The sense organ that the Naiyayika regards as producing cognition of absence in fact ceases after producing cognition of the locus. It must therefore be accepted that, after the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter-positive has made the lock as known, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Otherwise cognition of absence of waterhood would arise in water atoms related to the eye. Awareness of absence of color and the like has non-apprehension as its inferential mark. Nayayika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension because their loci, air and the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending the counter-positives. It should not be asked how the Naiya Yika can regard such absences as perceptible when the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ. Once air has been known by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible absence of color its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as its qualificant. cognition of the qualificant is a cause of perception. The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other things is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka himself regards the cognition air as colorless, whose qualificant is air, as inferential. Objection of cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ. The Neayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by a sense organ because it is an immediate awareness. Therefore, Qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the sense organ with cognition of absence. It is not the case that immediacy is the reason is unestablished. If on the Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as mediate, the distinction of cognition produced by an unknown cause would become impossible. From a trustworthy person's statement it is known that, even after someone entered the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside, from this known non-apprehension the hearer infers, Kaitra was not in the temple. If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced by an unknown cause, because the universal mediate cognitionhood is known through an own cause. Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does. cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate. Being produced by a sense organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality, because perceptuality itself is inferred from being produced by a sense organ. Establishment of the Bavu cognition of absence is mediate and produced by non-apprehension. The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct. Cognitionhood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential cognitionhood, it is merely cognitionhood qualified by difference from immediate awareness. Therefore Cognition of Absence is Mediate like Memory. Verbal Cognition, though produced by an unknown cause, is not inference. Similarly, Cognition of the Locust of Absence, produced by a sense organ from an unknown cause, is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from cognition produced by a sense organ and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate. If perceptuality were established from being produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition and the like, produced by known causes, would become inferential. Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct effects because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ. Similarly, cognition of absence and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because unknown non-apprehension and the known sense organ differ. Therefore being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality, while not being produced by a sense organ establishes mediacy. To regard production by an unknown cause and production by a known cause as the grounds of perception and mediation is cumbersome, and neither replies to memory. of the objection of the author of the kusumunjali. The author of the kusumunjali may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge of absence, the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces external experience. Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute to the mind's production of external experience. Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense organ alone would produce external experience, inference and the other means of knowledge would cease to exist. The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a positive entity, is the means of cognition of absence, because cognition of absence is an external cognition, is unsound. Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ, because it is an absence, like the absence of an ineligible object. The counter inference is, this cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ, because it is cognition of absence, like cognition of absence produced by an inferential mark and the light. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes the counter-positive also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive of cognition of the counter-positive, also produces cognition of its absence. Inference in verbal testimony, which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce cognition of absence. Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends the counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison. Ihood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence, but comparisonhood is not a universal. It has already been established that the I and other sense organs cannot produce cognition of absence without an apprehensive relation. A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present is possible, and this is produced by a defect in the instrument. Memory of the counter positive, cognition of the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically defective, the sense organ is impaired by bile and other defects, and the illusion is produced by that impaired sense organ. Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence. Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension. It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise from a known cause, the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition of absence should also be understood in that form, form, making the postulation of a separate means of non-apprehension unnecessary. The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence. A defective sense organ may produce an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye produces an illusion of smell and a stone, but veritical cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because there is no apprehensive relation. Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a positive entity and an absence. Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced neither by a sense organ nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone should be accepted as apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an absence supplied by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ, but cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground, is produced by non-apprehension. Similarly, the i produces the cognition, sandalwood is fragrant, while the nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood. The argument, non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge because it has no operation, is also unsound. The rule is that, apart from non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the action is an instrument, there is no need to add the expression, possessing an operation to the definition of a means of of knowledge. The Neiyaka refutation of non-apprehension. Neiyaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence, because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ, not Not by non-apprehension, non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a trustworthy statement that makes it known. It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension of the existence of color in the light produces cognition of their absence, as non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence of a pot on the ground. On the MSACA view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence. To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension contradicts themsaka doctrine. Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known from its non-apprehension. Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark. Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument, because it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like. Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status of non-apprehension. Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing color inferred from it, the inferential mark. Absence of knownness of possessing color in air is equivalent to absence of color, and therefore would not be known. If absence of knownness of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can equally be regarded as perceptible. Absence cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior. Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person, remains. In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

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