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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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1. 0:02–0:08Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum.
2. 0:08–0:1740, it cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son.
3. 0:17–0:26If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise.
4. 0:26–0:32The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda.
5. 0:32–0:44In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire.
6. 0:45–0:57But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition.
7. 0:59–1:01Doubtful extraneous condition.
8. 1:03–1:07In verse 21, some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful
9. 1:07–1:12extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise,
10. 1:12–1:17an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise.
11. 1:17–1:19But this objection is untenable.
12. 1:19–1:23Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that
13. 1:23–1:28the reason deviates from the pro-bandam, a certain extraneous condition produces ascertainment
14. 1:28–1:31of deviation.
15. 1:31–1:38a faecy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the
16. 1:38–1:43seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous
17. 1:43–1:49condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter-reason,
18. 1:49–1:53it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom, otherwise, raising an extraneous
19. 1:53–1:57condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless
20. 1:57–2:02series of further counter-reasons.
21. 2:02–2:06Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength.
22. 2:06–2:0743.
23. 2:07–2:12It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has
24. 2:12–2:14greater strength.
25. 2:14–2:18Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single
26. 2:18–2:22reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many
27. 2:22–2:26reasons free from such a condition.
28. 2:26–2:31and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength,
29. 2:31–2:37because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood.
30. 2:37–2:42Subject Otherness is not an extraneous condition.
31. 2:42–2:4344.
32. 2:43–2:47If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness
33. 2:47–2:51produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous
34. 2:51–2:55condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the
35. 2:55–3:02reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics
36. 3:02–3:08of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject,
37. 3:08–3:13an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation.
38. 3:13–3:19An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion.
39. 3:19–3:2445. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom,
40. 3:24–3:28It does not pervade what pervades the probandum, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible
41. 3:28–3:31without cognition of the extraneous condition?
42. 3:31–3:35The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely
43. 3:35–3:37from the absence of what fails to pervade.
44. 3:37–3:41A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous
45. 3:41–3:43condition.
46. 3:43–3:46Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it
47. 3:46–3:52does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons.
48. 3:52–3:59of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the
49. 3:59–4:04reason's pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion
50. 4:04–4:09by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause
51. 4:09–4:15of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous
52. 4:15–4:20condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because it produces
53. 4:20–4:24cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom.
54. 4:24–4:29Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason.
55. 4:29–4:3647, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation.
56. 4:36–4:40Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom,
57. 4:40–4:46so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom.
58. 4:46–4:51The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same.
59. 4:51–4:59Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different sub-
60. 5:00–5:02अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
61. 5:02–5:04अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
62. 5:04–5:06अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
63. 5:06–5:08अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
64. 5:08–5:10अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
65. 5:10–5:12अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
66. 5:12–5:14अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
67. 5:14–5:17अविशार-विमर्शक रेक।
68. 5:17–5:21condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason, or
69. 5:21–5:27a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted.
70. 5:27–5:31Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion
71. 5:31–5:33of the probandom.
72. 5:33–5:37Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it
73. 5:37–5:43pervades the probandom and fails to pervade the reason.
74. 5:43–5:45Alternative View
75. 5:45–5:5149. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandom and a reason
76. 5:51–5:55accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus
77. 5:55–6:01where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable but,
78. 6:01–6:05if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition,
79. 6:05–6:10the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter
80. 6:10–6:14reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition,
81. 6:14–6:17non-existence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not
82. 6:17–6:23pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in
83. 6:23–6:27a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and
84. 6:27–6:32the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition
85. 6:32–6:35is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason.
86. 6:37–6:41Thus the established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous
87. 6:41–6:45condition comes to an end.
88. 6:45–6:48Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions
89. 6:48–6:5050.
90. 6:50–6:54Apparent extraneous conditions are now described.
91. 6:54–6:58The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
92. 6:58–7:03In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness,
93. 7:03–7:06that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the
94. 7:06–7:11probandom, is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
95. 7:11–7:15The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished
96. 7:15–7:18absence of the probandom.
97. 7:18–7:23In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous
98. 7:23–7:27conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom.
99. 7:27–7:32The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence
100. 7:32–7:34of the probandom.
101. 7:34–7:39For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is an
102. 7:39–7:44a parent extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom.
103. 7:44–7:48The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the
104. 7:48–7:52probandom that does not pervade the subject.
105. 7:52–7:56In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated
106. 7:56–8:01in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend
107. 8:01–8:04throughout the entire subject.
108. 8:04–8:08The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in
109. 8:08–8:11the absence of the prior reason.
110. 8:11–8:15In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the
111. 8:15–8:20negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous
112. 8:20–8:25condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the
113. 8:25–8:30reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent.
114. 8:30–8:34The sixth apparent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the
115. 8:34–8:36prior reason.
116. 8:36–8:41In an inference of being without an agent, eternality and the like are apparent extraneous
117. 8:41–8:44conditions of this kind.
118. 8:44–8:49The seventh apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference
119. 8:49–8:53from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance.
120. 8:53–8:57In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the
121. 8:57–9:01mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition.
122. 9:01–9:06The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandom
123. 9:06–9:11and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence
124. 9:11–9:15of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind.
125. 9:17–9:22The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing
126. 9:22–9:27the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire
127. 9:27–9:32from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel and a locus distinct from the mountain is
128. 9:32–9:38and apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire
129. 9:38–9:44causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten
130. 9:44–9:50kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent
131. 9:50–9:57extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end.
132. 9:57–9:59Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the
133. 10:00–10:03नाटक आजि।
134. 10:34–10:38because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion,
135. 10:38–10:44but before subsumptive reflection arises, doubt about the probandum may already have ceased.
136. 10:44–10:50If doubt about the probandum is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal coexistence,
137. 10:50–10:53it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier,
138. 10:53–10:58and inference is possible even when the probandum has already been ascertained.
139. 10:58–11:03The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood.
140. 11:03–11:10The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood.
141. 11:10–11:16The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is
142. 11:16–11:22unnecessary. Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless,
143. 11:22–11:26in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire,
144. 11:26–11:30the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference.
145. 11:30–11:47Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another.
146. 11:47–11:54The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish
147. 11:54–11:59it is subjecthood, the earlier view.
148. 11:59–12:03The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to
149. 12:03–12:10establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood.
150. 12:10–12:14A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the
151. 12:14–12:19self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible.
152. 12:19–12:23But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an
153. 12:23–12:28object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet,
154. 12:28–12:31a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire.
155. 12:32–12:40Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is
156. 12:40–12:46unacceptable. Like doubt about the pro-bandom, the desire to establish it need not remain
157. 12:46–12:50present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark.
158. 12:52–12:57The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from
159. 12:57–13:03thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object too is inferred
160. 13:03–13:08through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish
161. 13:08–13:13is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end.
162. 13:15–13:20Established conclusion, the entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with
163. 13:20–13:28absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this,
164. 13:28–13:33that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of
165. 13:33–13:38a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is
166. 13:38–13:44present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject.
167. 13:44–13:48In there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state
168. 13:48–13:53consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire
169. 13:53–13:55to establish it.
170. 13:55–14:01The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject.
171. 14:01–14:06Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing
172. 14:06–14:11evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through
173. 14:11–14:15a qualified absence.
174. 14:15–14:19Subjecthood through a qualified absence.
175. 14:19–14:23When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence
176. 14:23–14:28of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted
177. 14:28–14:32on the basis of a qualified absence.
178. 14:32–14:37In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is
179. 14:37–14:42absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of ascertainment
180. 14:42–14:49of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended.
181. 14:49–14:56Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot be
182. 14:56–14:59distinguished from another state. Nevertheless,
183. 15:00–15:05Subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject.
184. 15:05–15:11With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end.
185. 15:11–15:16Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection.
186. 15:16–15:21Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason,
187. 15:21–15:25pervaded by the probandum, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of
188. 15:25–15:26inference.
189. 15:26–15:36Mtsaka Prima face the view, recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection.
190. 15:36–15:47The Mtsaka say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference.
191. 15:47–15:52There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection.
192. 15:52–16:02The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain.
193. 16:02–16:12These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause.
194. 16:12–16:17It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if
195. 16:17–16:23it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise.
196. 16:23–16:28Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference.
197. 16:28–16:32It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition
198. 16:32–16:37arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition
199. 16:37–16:40becomes the cause of inference.
200. 16:40–16:43But this proposal is untenable.
201. 16:43–16:48The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference
202. 16:48–16:51arises, while recognition is not inevitable.
203. 16:51–16:56If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be
204. 16:56–17:01required after it, leading to infinite regress.
205. 17:01–17:06Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference.
206. 17:06–17:11For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain,
207. 17:11–17:17pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without
208. 17:17–17:24sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when pervasion and subject propertyhood are
209. 17:24–17:30remembered, mere cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference,
210. 17:30–17:33otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow.
211. 17:35–17:38The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects.
212. 17:38–17:445. It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external
213. 17:44–17:51objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not?
214. 17:51–17:54Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating
215. 17:54–17:59property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact
216. 17:59–18:05with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects.
217. 18:05–18:09Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection
218. 18:09–18:13of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the subsumptive
219. 18:13–18:18reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
220. 18:18–18:20But this objection is untenable.
221. 18:20–18:25Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense,
222. 18:25–18:27the mind alone cannot take its place.
223. 18:27–18:30Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge.
224. 18:30–18:34The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood
225. 18:34–18:39may be available even in the absence of sense contact, but this does not justify regarding
226. 18:39–18:43the mind as an independent means of external perception.
227. 18:43–18:47Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view.
228. 18:47–18:496.
229. 18:49–18:53The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an
230. 18:53–18:58application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible?
231. 18:58–19:02The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded
232. 19:02–19:04as pervaded by fire.
233. 19:04–19:09According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is
234. 19:09–19:13smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable.
235. 19:13–19:16Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the
236. 19:16–19:19form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire.
237. 19:19–19:24For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible.
238. 19:24–19:27Inference is possible despite doubt.
239. 19:27–19:31It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through
240. 19:31–19:35smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not.
241. 19:35–19:39How, then, does inference arise?
242. 19:39–19:44The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the determinant
243. 19:44–19:47perception of smokehood prevents the doubt.
244. 19:47–19:52Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation
245. 19:52–19:56of inference, therefore inference is not impossible.
246. 19:56–19:59ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary.
247. 20:00–20:068. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal
248. 20:06–20:12smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. Cognition
249. 20:12–20:17of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause
250. 20:17–20:19inference.
251. 20:19–20:23Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that
252. 20:23–20:29particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded
253. 20:29–20:33by fire is present on the mountain, is required.
254. 20:33–20:38No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives.
255. 20:38–20:40Objection.
256. 20:40–20:44How is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not
257. 20:44–20:49exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together?
258. 20:49–20:57Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason.
259. 20:57–21:01For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of
260. 21:01–21:04smoke or light is the reason.
261. 21:04–21:08Therefore too alternative no ability is not incoherent.
262. 21:08–21:13Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity
263. 21:13–21:15a cause.
264. 21:15–21:19It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the
265. 21:19–21:24mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition
266. 21:24–21:29of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference.
267. 21:29–21:32But this view is untenable.
268. 21:32–21:37Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces
269. 21:37–21:40the inference, there is fire on the mountain.
270. 21:40–21:45Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition
271. 21:45–21:49of identity is not an independent cause.
272. 21:49–21:53Qualified cognition is not a cause.
273. 21:53–21:57It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood,
274. 21:57–22:03a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified
275. 22:03–22:06by smokehood, is necessary.
276. 22:06–22:11But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's perversion
277. 22:11–22:15by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary.
278. 22:15–22:20And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are
279. 22:20–22:22present.
280. 22:22–22:27treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden.
281. 22:27–22:31Apprehension of difference is not an abstructor.
282. 22:31–22:3612. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct
283. 22:36–22:40inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject
284. 22:40–22:44property is not an abstructor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does
285. 22:44–22:48not destroy the causal complex of inference.
286. 22:48–22:51Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke
287. 22:51–22:56Smokepervated by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive
288. 22:56–23:01reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the
289. 23:01–23:06relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required.
290. 23:06–23:09Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason

Plain text

Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum. 40, it cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son. If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise. The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire. But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition. Doubtful extraneous condition. In verse 21, some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the pro-bandam, a certain extraneous condition produces ascertainment of deviation. a faecy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter-reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom, otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons. Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free from such a condition. and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood. Subject Otherness is not an extraneous condition. 44. If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion. 45. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, It does not pervade what pervades the probandum, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons. of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the reason's pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation. Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom. The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different sub- अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। अविशार-विमर्शक रेक। condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason, or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted. Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion of the probandom. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it pervades the probandom and fails to pervade the reason. Alternative View 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandom and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable but, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition, non-existence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end. Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions 50. Apparent extraneous conditions are now described. The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness, that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom, is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is an a parent extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not pervade the subject. In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent. The sixth apparent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent, eternality and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind. The seventh apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel and a locus distinct from the mountain is and apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the नाटक आजि। because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before subsumptive reflection arises, doubt about the probandum may already have ceased. If doubt about the probandum is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal coexistence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandum has already been ascertained. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood. The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary. Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference. Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another. The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish it is subjecthood, the earlier view. The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood. A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible. But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire. Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is unacceptable. Like doubt about the pro-bandom, the desire to establish it need not remain present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark. The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object too is inferred through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end. Established conclusion, the entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject. In there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject. Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through a qualified absence. Subjecthood through a qualified absence. When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of ascertainment of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, Subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end. Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection. Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandum, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of inference. Mtsaka Prima face the view, recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection. The Mtsaka say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference. There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain. These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause. It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise. Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference. But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when pervasion and subject propertyhood are remembered, mere cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects. 5. It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not? Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the subsumptive reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood may be available even in the absence of sense contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception. Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view. 6. The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible? The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire. According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible. Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not. How, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt. Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible. ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary. 8. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. Cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause inference. Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required. No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives. Objection. How is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together? Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason. For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke or light is the reason. Therefore too alternative no ability is not incoherent. Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference. But this view is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent cause. Qualified cognition is not a cause. It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified by smokehood, is necessary. But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's perversion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary. And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present. treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden. Apprehension of difference is not an abstructor. 12. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an abstructor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke Smokepervated by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required. Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason

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