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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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1. 0:02–0:07Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum,
2. 0:07–0:11but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory.
3. 0:11–0:18Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances
4. 0:18–0:21because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory,
5. 0:21–0:25although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference.
6. 0:25–0:28Such a reason is at most merely common,
7. 0:28–0:33because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances.
8. 0:34–0:39In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect.
9. 0:40–0:48A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory.
10. 0:49–0:53Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
11. 0:54–1:0233. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
12. 1:02–1:12Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandom unless co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known.
13. 1:12–1:27Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom.
14. 1:27–1:36Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandum and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum.
15. 1:36–1:47To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the provision of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent.
16. 1:47–1:52With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends.
17. 1:52–1:56The established doctrine of the contradictory reason.
18. 1:56–2:01The established doctrine is now stated.
19. 2:01–2:09Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom.
20. 2:09–2:19It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known.
21. 2:19–2:29The causal complexes producing cognition of the counter positive of the reason's absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct.
22. 2:29–2:39Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear.
23. 2:39–2:42Alternative definitions
24. 2:42–2:4835. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing
25. 2:48–2:53a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom,
26. 2:53–2:57not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while
27. 2:57–3:02occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence
28. 3:02–3:06while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject.
29. 3:06–3:10These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood.
30. 3:10–3:15It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons.
31. 3:15–3:20In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established,
32. 3:20–3:25the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established.
33. 3:25–3:31A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason,
34. 3:31–3:36because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated.
35. 3:36–3:41from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition.
36. 3:41–3:4636, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance
37. 3:46–3:50possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating
38. 3:50–3:54occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible
39. 3:54–3:59without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom.
40. 3:59–4:02This objection is not sound.
41. 4:02–4:05Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is
42. 4:05–4:09entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing
43. 4:09–4:14the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with
44. 4:14–4:18the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless,
45. 4:18–4:21the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone.
46. 4:23–4:27Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes
47. 4:27–4:32cognition of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition
48. 4:32–4:38of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation
49. 4:38–4:41in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion.
50. 4:42–4:443 types of contradictory reason
51. 4:46–4:5037. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in
52. 4:50–4:54inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness,
53. 4:54–4:58because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment
54. 4:58–4:59of the relation among the word meanings.
55. 4:59–5:02This argument is not sound.
56. 5:02–5:11Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandum depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect.
57. 5:11–5:16Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason.
58. 5:16–5:20The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds.
59. 5:20–5:24First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandum.
60. 5:24–5:30Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom,
61. 5:30–5:36and third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom.
62. 5:36–5:40Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended,
63. 5:40–5:46because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir.
64. 5:46–5:51Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons.
65. 5:51–6:0138. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandom is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold.
66. 6:01–6:13Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandom, a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom or by the absence of what pervades the probandom produces the defective contradiction.
67. 6:13–6:18Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence
68. 6:18–6:22of smoke, yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason.
69. 6:22–6:26Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes
70. 6:26–6:31provision by the pro-bandim, such provision is possible even without the absence of mutual
71. 6:31–6:34absence.
72. 6:34–6:37Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence
73. 6:37–6:42of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions
74. 6:42–6:46of the deviating or inconclusive reason.
75. 6:46–6:50In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three
76. 6:50–6:55kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct cognition
77. 6:55–7:00of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of something opposed
78. 7:00–7:03to what pervades the pro-bandom.
79. 7:03–7:07Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire,
80. 7:07–7:13because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke.
81. 7:13–7:18All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers.
82. 7:18–7:22For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe, because
83. 7:22–7:26it possesses sharp, odorless, white smoke.
84. 7:26–7:32With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends.
85. 7:32–7:35Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter-reason.
86. 7:35–7:4039. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter-reason
87. 7:40–7:45of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason
88. 7:45–7:50and counter-reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its
89. 7:50–7:52absence.
90. 7:52–7:57Nor can the strength of reason and counter-reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence
91. 7:57–8:01in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there
92. 8:01–8:06There is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance.
93. 8:06–8:11Recutation of alternative definitions.
94. 8:11–8:15Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute
95. 8:15–8:17counterbalance.
96. 8:17–8:22Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of
97. 8:22–8:24them.
98. 8:24–8:28Nearly knowing the counter reason is endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood
99. 8:28–8:32does not make the original reason counterbalanced.
100. 8:32–8:37of perversion and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both
101. 8:37–8:42be veritical at once, hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason
102. 8:42–8:45such as audibility.
103. 8:45–8:49Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandom is present
104. 8:49–8:53in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandom is present
105. 8:53–8:55in the subject.
106. 8:55–8:59A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence
107. 8:59–9:05cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence
108. 9:05–9:10and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandom nor that of a counter reason pervaded
109. 9:10–9:16by the absence of the probandom is established. Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive
110. 9:16–9:20reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandom and possessing non-difference
111. 9:20–9:26from pervasion by the probandom be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason
112. 9:26–9:30cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist
113. 9:30–9:35in the presence or absence of perversion by the probandum.
114. 9:35–9:40With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter-reason ends.
115. 9:40–9:44The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason
116. 9:44–9:5041. The Established Doctrine is now stated.
117. 9:50–9:54A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition
118. 9:54–9:58of the probandum because of the presence of an equally strong counter-reason capable
119. 9:58–10:05of establishing the absence of the probandum is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
120. 10:05–10:09Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through
121. 10:09–10:13this strength the reason establishes the probandum and the counter-reason establishes
122. 10:13–10:15its absence.
123. 10:15–10:19Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition
124. 10:19–10:24concerning the probandum by a counter-reason endowed with the strength of a subsumptive
125. 10:24–10:28reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom
126. 10:28–10:32is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
127. 10:32–10:36An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original
128. 10:36–10:40reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent
129. 10:40–10:42has not denied either.
130. 10:42–10:46Yet the counter-reason subject, propertyhood and pervasion are not established for both
131. 10:46–10:49parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance
132. 10:49–10:53would be a defect only in inference for oneself.
133. 10:53–10:59argument is not sound. When reason and counter reason are both known continuously as possessing
134. 10:59–11:05perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter reasons. When both are known
135. 11:05–11:09together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one self and inference for
136. 11:09–11:16another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or
137. 11:16–11:23subject propertyhood is necessary. 42, since no object can be the substratum of both the
138. 11:23–11:27the probandom and its absence, either pervasion or subject propertyhood must be upcent in
139. 11:27–11:32the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance.
140. 11:32–11:37It should not be said that the reasons pervasion by the absence of the probandom can be certain
141. 11:37–11:41even if there is no opposition between the probandom and its absence, and therefore the
142. 11:41–11:45rule requiring absence of pervasion is unnecessary.
143. 11:45–11:52If probandom and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandom.
144. 11:52–11:56Or should it be said that absence of the reasons pervasion is necessary in the opposition between
145. 11:56–12:01probandom and its absence, because cognition of absence of pervasion arises after cognition
146. 12:01–12:04of their opposition?
147. 12:04–12:08Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of pervasion, like cognition
148. 12:08–12:13of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance.
149. 12:13–12:18Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness.
150. 12:18–12:2443. In objection may be raised, reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded
151. 12:24–12:28by the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the
152. 12:28–12:34same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain,
153. 12:34–12:37doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment
154. 12:37–12:44of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning
155. 12:44–12:48their perversion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons and
156. 12:48–12:53one subject causes the defective counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from
157. 12:53–12:56the other fallacious reasons.
158. 12:56–13:01Only the subsumptive reflection on the counter reason causes the defective counterbalance,
159. 13:01–13:06by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons,
160. 13:06–13:10it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject.
161. 13:10–13:15of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless
162. 13:15–13:20reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present.
163. 13:20–13:24The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance
164. 13:24–13:29through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood.
165. 13:29–13:34Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a
166. 13:34–13:38cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its
167. 13:38–13:40forces greater.
168. 13:40–13:44Objection. All inferences would be stopped.
169. 13:44–13:5644. An objection may be raised. The proponents thesis and the opponents counter-thesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis. Consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped.
170. 13:56–14:11It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated.
171. 14:11–14:24This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis.
172. 14:24–14:34Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless.
173. 14:35–14:53Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that perversion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason.
174. 14:55–15:01A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
175. 15:01–15:05A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements.
176. 15:05–15:11Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped.
177. 15:11–15:15Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect.
178. 15:15–15:23Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons,
179. 15:23–15:28Therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defect of counterbalance.
180. 15:30–15:31This view is not sound.
181. 15:32–15:36A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately.
182. 15:36–15:42If the two are treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance.
183. 15:43–15:48Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out,
184. 15:48–15:56the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance.
185. 15:57–15:59This view too is not sound.
186. 16:00–16:07The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously.
187. 16:08–16:13Doubt concerning the probandom is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors.
188. 16:13–16:2047. The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate
189. 16:20–16:25inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt.
190. 16:25–16:30The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence
191. 16:30–16:36counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum.
192. 16:36–16:41An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the
193. 16:41–16:44The counter reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandom is certain
194. 16:44–16:48as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the
195. 16:48–16:52probandom arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandom would
196. 16:52–16:55have to be regarded as destroyed.
197. 16:55–17:0047, this argument, however, is not sound.
198. 17:00–17:04Because cognition of the absence of the probandom is stronger, it obstructs inference
199. 17:04–17:06of the probandom.
200. 17:06–17:11The two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning
201. 17:11–17:17their respective probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes.
202. 17:17–17:21It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition
203. 17:21–17:26concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which
204. 17:26–17:32can produce cognition of the absence of the probandum, is not itself the obstruction.
205. 17:32–17:35It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing
206. 17:35–17:40reasons establishing the probandum and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the
207. 17:40–17:45probandum. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning
208. 17:45–17:51the probandum, although neither reason separately produces doubt.
209. 17:51–17:53Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view
210. 17:53–18:0048. This view of the Ratnikosa author's is unacceptable. Probandum and absence of
211. 18:00–18:05probandum are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandum, opposes cognition
212. 18:05–18:10of the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason
213. 18:10–18:15pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently,
214. 18:15–18:18cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom
215. 18:18–18:23also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object
216. 18:23–18:29is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition.
217. 18:29–18:30Definitions of the fallacious reasons
218. 18:30–18:3649. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results.
219. 18:37–18:42A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative
220. 18:42–18:47concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result.
221. 18:48–18:53A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom.
222. 18:54–18:59Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition
223. 18:59–19:05of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom
224. 19:05–19:10is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated,
225. 19:10–19:16not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced,
226. 19:16–19:21the intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect.
227. 19:22–19:26In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason,
228. 19:26–19:32a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation is the result.
229. 19:33–19:38In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its
230. 19:38–19:44subject propertyhood is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason.
231. 19:46–19:50Fifty, in counterbalance, as with audibility and produce-ness, neither absence of perversion
232. 19:50–19:55nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's
233. 19:55–19:59pervasions pervasion and the like remain present.
234. 19:59–20:03Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not
235. 20:03–20:05invariably arise.
236. 20:05–20:10Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not
237. 20:10–20:12separately applied.
238. 20:12–20:17Its result is merely the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained?
239. 20:17–20:22Thus cognition of pervasion and cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject,
240. 20:22–20:27which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandham, constitute
241. 20:27–20:30the characteristic of counterbalance.
242. 20:30–20:34When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandham,
243. 20:34–20:39no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandham arises, then only the
244. 20:39–20:43reason's pervasion by the probandham is ascertained.
245. 20:43–20:46The prakharasama produces inquiry.
246. 20:46–20:4851.
247. 20:48–20:50An objection may be raised.
248. 20:50–20:54is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from
249. 20:54–20:59cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom. How,
250. 20:59–21:03then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter reason establishing the absence of the
251. 21:03–21:09probandom without doubt concerning the probandom? This argument is not sound.
252. 21:10–21:15In the absence of a counter reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises,
253. 21:15–21:21It arises only when a counter-reason is present. Through this affirmative and negative concomitance,
254. 21:21–21:28counterbalance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason. In
255. 21:28–21:32deviation, doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom,
256. 21:32–21:37whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises.
257. 21:38–21:42The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously.
258. 21:42–21:44Objection
259. 21:44–21:48Subsubtive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time.
260. 21:48–21:52How, then, can one reason obstruct the other?
261. 21:52–21:56Two subsubtive reflections arising successively cannot coexist.
262. 21:56–21:58Answer
263. 21:58–22:02After the subsubtive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second
264. 22:02–22:07reason arises, the first reflection ceases.
265. 22:07–22:10Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject
266. 22:10–22:14rises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood.
267. 22:15–22:20It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging
268. 22:20–22:25to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both substantive reflections can arise.
269. 22:26–22:30Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject
270. 22:30–22:36propertyhoods is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible.
271. 22:36–22:4253. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions
272. 22:42–22:46of two provisions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both provisions is impossible.
273. 22:47–22:51For this reason, failure to recollect the two provisions causes the defect of counterbalance.
274. 22:53–22:58This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other
275. 22:58–23:01counter reason, are impossible without recollection of both provisions.
276. 23:02–23:04Proponent and opponent each present the provision of their own reason.

Plain text

Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum, but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory. Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory, although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference. Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances. In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect. A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory. Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. 33. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandom unless co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known. Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandum and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum. To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the provision of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent. With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends. The established doctrine of the contradictory reason. The established doctrine is now stated. Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known. The causal complexes producing cognition of the counter positive of the reason's absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct. Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear. Alternative definitions 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established, the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated. from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition. 36, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom. This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion. 3 types of contradictory reason 37. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandum depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect. Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason. The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom, and third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons. 38. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandom is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandom, a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom or by the absence of what pervades the probandom produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence of smoke, yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason. Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes provision by the pro-bandim, such provision is possible even without the absence of mutual absence. Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive reason. In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of something opposed to what pervades the pro-bandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe, because it possesses sharp, odorless, white smoke. With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends. Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter-reason. 39. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter-reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason and counter-reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter-reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there There is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Recutation of alternative definitions. Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter reason is endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced. of perversion and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandom is present in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandom is present in the subject. A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandom nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is established. Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandom and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandom be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of perversion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter-reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason 41. The Established Doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandum because of the presence of an equally strong counter-reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandum is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandum and the counter-reason establishes its absence. Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning the probandum by a counter-reason endowed with the strength of a subsumptive reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent has not denied either. Yet the counter-reason subject, propertyhood and pervasion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance would be a defect only in inference for oneself. argument is not sound. When reason and counter reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter reasons. When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one self and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary. 42, since no object can be the substratum of both the the probandom and its absence, either pervasion or subject propertyhood must be upcent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons pervasion by the absence of the probandom can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandom and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence of pervasion is unnecessary. If probandom and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandom. Or should it be said that absence of the reasons pervasion is necessary in the opposition between probandom and its absence, because cognition of absence of pervasion arises after cognition of their opposition? Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of pervasion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness. 43. In objection may be raised, reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning their perversion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons and one subject causes the defective counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons. Only the subsumptive reflection on the counter reason causes the defective counterbalance, by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject. of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present. The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood. Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its forces greater. Objection. All inferences would be stopped. 44. An objection may be raised. The proponents thesis and the opponents counter-thesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis. Consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis. Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless. Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that perversion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason. A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped. Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons, Therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defect of counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately. If the two are treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance. This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously. Doubt concerning the probandom is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors. 47. The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt. The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the The counter reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandom is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the probandom arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandom would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the probandom is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandom. The two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the probandum, is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandum and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandum. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the probandum, although neither reason separately produces doubt. Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view 48. This view of the Ratnikosa author's is unacceptable. Probandum and absence of probandum are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandum, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition. Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result. A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom. Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect. In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason. Fifty, in counterbalance, as with audibility and produce-ness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's pervasions pervasion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not separately applied. Its result is merely the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of pervasion and cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandham, constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandham, no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandham arises, then only the reason's pervasion by the probandham is ascertained. The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised. is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter reason establishing the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom? This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, It arises only when a counter-reason is present. Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counterbalance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason. In deviation, doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom, whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises. The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously. Objection Subsubtive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time. How, then, can one reason obstruct the other? Two subsubtive reflections arising successively cannot coexist. Answer After the subsubtive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases. Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject rises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood. It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both substantive reflections can arise. Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible. 53. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of two provisions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both provisions is impossible. For this reason, failure to recollect the two provisions causes the defect of counterbalance. This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible without recollection of both provisions. Proponent and opponent each present the provision of their own reason.

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