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Episode2_Part11_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status: asr-draft
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.997079)
Duration: 23:29
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33परसव्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्
0:33–0:38silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of
0:38–0:43invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object,
0:43–0:47and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object.
0:48–0:52Reflexive awareness is veridical cognition taking an existent entity as object,
0:52–0:56otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be
0:56–1:02required. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there
1:02–1:06is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition.
1:07–1:11Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended,
1:11–1:14reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises.
1:15–1:19One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time
1:19–1:23difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established
1:23–1:29by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver,
1:29–1:33It is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension
1:33–1:39of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness. Therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid
1:39–1:42qualified cognition, the shell as silver, can arise at all.
1:43–1:47The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver.
1:48–1:53The instrumental expression, as silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver,
1:53–1:56qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualifcant.
1:56–2:01The radical qualified cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:01–2:05therefore invalid qualified cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object.
2:05–2:09In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present,
2:09–2:13and qualified cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:13–2:20therefore the Nayayika theory of misapprehension is not the Sautrantika Buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal.
2:20–2:28explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions.
2:28–2:32Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and
2:32–2:36sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain
2:36–2:37fixed.
2:37–2:39This objection is unsound.
2:39–2:43A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator.
2:43–2:47For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective
2:47–2:51and sound sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has
2:51–2:56not yet arisen. When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without
2:56–2:59destroying the previously arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise
2:59–3:03the later cognition would not arise at all.
3:03–3:07The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are
3:07–3:13mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise
3:13–3:19in opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition
3:19–3:25not yet produced sublate in earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition
3:25–3:32not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component of
3:32–3:37illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot
3:37–3:42be sublated, the qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as
3:42–3:48qualify can cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred,
3:48–3:52future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated.
3:53–3:58Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid
3:58–4:05cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition. Confidence in cognitive validity.
4:07–4:11Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika admit
4:11–4:17some cognitions to be invalid. This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity
4:17–4:21has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhakara view too, how can
4:21–4:25there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the non-relation
4:25–4:30of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things are observed in many
4:30–4:35cases. It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an
4:35–4:38existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing,
4:38–4:43is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition
4:43–4:48of an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes
4:48–4:54it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own
4:54–4:59view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained
4:59–5:04merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arc cannot explain confidence in
5:04–5:08in validity without another cognition of an existent object.
5:08–5:11The method by which distrust is removed on the basis that cognition of difference has
5:11–5:13already been explained.
5:13–5:19Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the Niyayika view.
5:19–5:24A third view concerning confidence in validity.
5:24–5:29Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary
5:29–5:33shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it.
5:33–5:38This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence and cognitive validity is
5:38–5:39established.
5:39–5:44When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell, an incapable contrary
5:44–5:50substrate, confidence and validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference.
5:50–5:53This proposal is unsound.
5:53–5:57On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally
5:57–6:01arises through another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens
6:01–6:03the student.
6:03–6:07In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference,
6:07–6:10no cognition explicitly presents identity.
6:10–6:15How then will the MMSARC establish the state of cognition of an existent object?
6:15–6:20A defect causes illusion.
6:20–6:24Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition.
6:24–6:28This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its
6:28–6:31produced result, invalid cognition.
6:31–6:36It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell
6:36–6:39and silver are real and existent?
6:39–6:43Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is
6:43–6:49additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist.
6:49–6:55If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows.
6:55–6:59The superimposed relation need not be unreal here.
6:59–7:04The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent shell
7:04–7:08and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that places a
7:08–7:13qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object had
7:13–7:15opposed to the qualifier.
7:15–7:19This defect is clear in such cognition.
7:19–7:25The earlier Naya Yaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal.
7:25–7:29The earlier Naya Yaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become objects
7:29–7:34of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory
7:34–7:38of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard invalid cognition only as
7:38–7:44cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant.
7:44–7:48There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent
7:48–7:53qualifier and qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability
7:53–7:57of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and
7:57–8:02does not arise. The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already
8:02–8:06been established here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the memsaka view.
8:07–8:11But Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the
8:11–8:15object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object.
8:17–8:21Thus ends the theory of misapprehension in the perception section of the Tathasintmai of
8:21–8:32of Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of the definition of perception.
8:32–8:38Four kinds of valid cognition. Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception,
8:38–8:44inference, comparison, and verbal cognition. Their distinctive instruments, called means
8:44–8:50of knowledge, are correspondingly four, perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means,
8:50–8:55and verbal means. Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to
8:55–9:03their respective natures. This will be explained further below. Cognition produced by sense
9:03–9:08object contact is not the definition of perception.
9:08–9:13The prima facie theorist Johnta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant,
9:13–9:18that is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense faculty and object. Such a
9:18–9:23definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition, because
9:23–9:27inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as
9:27–9:33It under extends to God's perceptual cognition which is not produced by any relation.
9:33–9:38Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized.
9:38–9:43If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing
9:43–9:47it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness.
9:47–9:51The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty
9:51–9:54or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by
9:54–9:59either one of the two would overextend to universal cognition, which two is produced by either the
9:59–10:04mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense
10:04–10:10faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence. Nor can perception be defined as
10:10–10:14veritical experience not produced by a previously known specific instrument.
10:15–10:19Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception,
10:19–10:24If an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to
10:24–10:30inferential cognition. Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition,
10:30–10:35because that under extends to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier.
10:36–10:41Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular
10:41–10:47manifestor. If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition
10:47–10:52of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal
10:52–11:00called directness. Directness is the definition of perception.
11:00–11:04The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition. In
11:04–11:09perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present,
11:09–11:14reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness.
11:14–11:18Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise
11:18–11:22the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense
11:22–11:26faculty itself would become super sensible.
11:26–11:30The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor is
11:30–11:32unsound.
11:32–11:35Experientiality produced by instruments such as the eye may irregularly manifest the
11:35–11:40universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad.
11:40–11:44A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestors
11:44–11:49are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain.
11:49–11:54Conversely, presence of a regular manifesto may itself obstruct establishing a universal,
11:54–11:57because the manifesto can produce recurrent cognition.
11:57–12:02In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established
12:02–12:06through the means producing cognition of its substrate.
12:06–12:12Produced Directness is the definition of produced perception.
12:12–12:16The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced
12:16–12:21from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition
12:21–12:25concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation,
12:25–12:31and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects.
12:31–12:34Such cognition is produced direct cognition.
12:34–12:38Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through
12:38–12:42universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related
12:42–12:45to an object generated by a sense faculty.
12:45–12:49Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its
12:49–12:50own object.
12:50–12:56In inference, verbal cognition and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant,
12:56–12:59because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only
12:59–13:02as in hearing cause.
13:02–13:08Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty.
13:08–13:13A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore
13:13–13:18the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity.
13:18–13:23The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood,
13:23–13:29otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions.
13:29–13:33Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition
13:33–13:37whose cause is cognition.
13:37–13:42Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition
13:42–13:44but not memory.
13:44–13:48Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind
13:48–13:51of which they are substrates produces memory.
13:51–13:56Alternatively, sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces
13:56–14:01cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested
14:01–14:03sound.
14:03–14:08The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition
14:08–14:10is perception.
14:10–14:14In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it
14:14–14:17has no operation there.
14:17–14:22Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception concerning that qualifier,
14:22–14:27but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of qualified perception,
14:27–14:30because there is no proof for this.
14:30–14:35In recognition this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is
14:35–14:39not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would
14:39–14:41be memory.
14:41–14:46For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating
14:46–14:51memory, a mental impression causes memory alone.
14:51–14:56The Prabhupāda view, direct cognition is perception.
14:56–15:01The Prabhupāda Kāra says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition.
15:01–15:06is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor. Nor is cognition arising independently
15:06–15:11of determinate cognition, a definition, because it fails to apply to perception of similarity,
15:11–15:16duality, and recognition. A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from
15:16–15:21determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning that object. In manifesting
15:21–15:25cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual, because it is not produced by
15:25–15:31another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal is perceptual because it
15:31–15:36is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual. Cognition of a qualified does
15:36–15:41not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified cognition of an object in
15:41–15:46sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is
15:46–15:50not required for perception of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning
15:50–15:55the long object. Inference and recognition are indirect in the probandom and thatness components,
15:55–15:58but both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components.
16:00–16:08Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partialmsaka view. A partialmsaka says that
16:08–16:13recognition I know that this is that manifests thatness only as reflexive awareness of thatness,
16:13–16:18not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness, therefore recognition is perceptual in
16:18–16:20in the thatness component.
16:20–16:25But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom
16:25–16:30as cognition of the mark.
16:30–16:33Recutation of the Prabhupākāra view.
16:33–16:38The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness
16:38–16:43component, it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent.
16:43–16:48If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause,
16:48–16:53and the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated. It is needlessly
16:53–16:59complex to hold that sense production independent of cognition of thatness regulates the directness
16:59–17:03of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the thisness component, because
17:03–17:09it arises from a sense faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible to accept
17:09–17:14both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition.
17:14–17:19It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct components
17:19–17:24business and thatness. But both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore
17:24–17:29recognition would not be produced by the sense faculty. Inferential and other cognitions
17:29–17:32are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components, because they are not
17:32–17:37produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes only direct cognition. If the mind
17:37–17:41is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the probandom
17:41–17:47component 2 must be mind-generated. Making the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate
17:47–17:53regulate perceptuality is excessively complex. Cognition in general is not cognition hood because
17:53–17:57cognition hood is unproduced and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established.
17:59–18:06Recutation of the Prima-Facey definition. Cognition has no parts therefore only its
18:06–18:11components are objects of cognition not constituents. Another determinant cognition
18:11–18:15can not cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be
18:15–18:20perceptual regarding their probandom and thatness objects, because those objects are not produced
18:20–18:25from another determinate cognition. It may be said that in recognition cognition
18:25–18:28of thatness taking thatness as object is a cause, in inference cognition of the probandom
18:28–18:32taking the probandom as object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular
18:32–18:37object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizor, business, and substrate,
18:37–18:43the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause. This proposal is unsound. Objecthood
18:43–18:48is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognition
18:48–18:53cannot produce this specific nature of cognition. This definition does not apply to cognition
18:53–18:57of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff as qualifier causes qualify cognition
18:57–19:03concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognitionhood is not an extraneous condition in recognition,
19:03–19:06because it does not pervade the probandom.
19:06–19:09Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual,
19:09–19:12of a universal residing in a previously experienced individual,
19:12–19:18then the previously experienced individual becomes a qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence.
19:18–19:22Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal.
19:22–19:30Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is not an instrument, is impossible.
19:30–19:37Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual cognition
19:37–19:42is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is
19:42–19:47only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an
19:47–19:53impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive.
19:54–19:59This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because perception concerning
19:59–20:05the staffbearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff. Nor does it apply to a
20:05–20:10succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience as cognition of a
20:10–20:17qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression produces nothing except memory,
20:17–20:21otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory.
20:22–20:26Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition.
20:26–20:36Be the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation.
20:36–20:41A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception.
20:41–20:45Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object.
20:45–20:49Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color
20:49–20:52and action arises through conjunction come in hereance.
20:52–20:56Since universals such as colonists in here in color and the like in hearing in the conjoined
20:56–21:01object, their perception arises through conjunction come inheritance in the inherent. Sound is
21:01–21:05perceived through its inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through its inheritance
21:05–21:09in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is perceived through qualitative
21:09–21:14or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through
21:14–21:18qualitative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only
21:18–21:23from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object
21:23–21:26is never a cause.
21:26–21:32Prima-facy view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause.
21:32–21:37Prima-facy view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minitatomic
21:37–21:41parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object
21:41–21:45as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause.
21:45–21:48In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the
21:48–21:50cause.
21:50–21:55The argument that conjunction with the apprehensible object is more economical than conjunction
21:55–22:00with the parts and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause is unsound.
22:00–22:03Conjunction with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction
22:03–22:07with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with
22:07–22:10its parts is also refuted.
22:10–22:14Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction
22:14–22:19delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established
22:19–22:23through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would
22:23–22:29remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest part
22:29–22:34is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable.
22:34–22:39Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause.
22:39–22:44This view is unsound. Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception
22:44–22:48of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the
22:48–22:52itself, dust particles dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles.
22:52–22:56Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular
22:56–23:00substances such as pots.
23:00–23:03Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with
23:03–23:07the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise
23:07–23:10from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object.
23:10–23:15If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction
23:15–23:19with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating
23:19–23:20cause.
23:20–23:25Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible
23:25–23:26by that sense.

Plain text

परसव्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष् silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object, and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object. Reflexive awareness is veridical cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be required. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition. Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended, reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises. One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver, It is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness. Therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid qualified cognition, the shell as silver, can arise at all. The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver. The instrumental expression, as silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver, qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualifcant. The radical qualified cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore invalid qualified cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object. In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present, and qualified cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore the Nayayika theory of misapprehension is not the Sautrantika Buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal. explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions. Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain fixed. This objection is unsound. A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator. For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective and sound sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen. When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise at all. The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate in earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated, the qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as qualify can cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred, future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated. Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition. Confidence in cognitive validity. Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika admit some cognitions to be invalid. This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhakara view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things are observed in many cases. It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing, is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arc cannot explain confidence in in validity without another cognition of an existent object. The method by which distrust is removed on the basis that cognition of difference has already been explained. Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the Niyayika view. A third view concerning confidence in validity. Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it. This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence and cognitive validity is established. When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell, an incapable contrary substrate, confidence and validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference. This proposal is unsound. On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student. In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference, no cognition explicitly presents identity. How then will the MMSARC establish the state of cognition of an existent object? A defect causes illusion. Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition. This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its produced result, invalid cognition. It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell and silver are real and existent? Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist. If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows. The superimposed relation need not be unreal here. The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object had opposed to the qualifier. This defect is clear in such cognition. The earlier Naya Yaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal. The earlier Naya Yaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and does not arise. The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the memsaka view. But Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object. Thus ends the theory of misapprehension in the perception section of the Tathasintmai of of Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of the definition of perception. Four kinds of valid cognition. Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition. Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly four, perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means. Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures. This will be explained further below. Cognition produced by sense object contact is not the definition of perception. The prima facie theorist Johnta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant, that is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense faculty and object. Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition, because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as It under extends to God's perceptual cognition which is not produced by any relation. Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized. If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness. The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one of the two would overextend to universal cognition, which two is produced by either the mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence. Nor can perception be defined as veritical experience not produced by a previously known specific instrument. Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception, If an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to inferential cognition. Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under extends to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier. Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular manifestor. If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness. Directness is the definition of perception. The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition. In perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness. Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible. The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor is unsound. Experientiality produced by instruments such as the eye may irregularly manifest the universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad. A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestors are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain. Conversely, presence of a regular manifesto may itself obstruct establishing a universal, because the manifesto can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing cognition of its substrate. Produced Directness is the definition of produced perception. The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation, and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects. Such cognition is produced direct cognition. Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related to an object generated by a sense faculty. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its own object. In inference, verbal cognition and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only as in hearing cause. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty. A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity. The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood, otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions. Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition whose cause is cognition. Sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but not memory. Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind of which they are substrates produces memory. Alternatively, sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound. The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this. In recognition this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental impression causes memory alone. The Prabhupāda view, direct cognition is perception. The Prabhupāda Kāra says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition. is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor. Nor is cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition. A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning that object. In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual, because it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual. Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object. Inference and recognition are indirect in the probandom and thatness components, but both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components. Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partialmsaka view. A partialmsaka says that recognition I know that this is that manifests thatness only as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness, therefore recognition is perceptual in in the thatness component. But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom as cognition of the mark. Recutation of the Prabhupākāra view. The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component, it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent. If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause, and the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated. It is needlessly complex to hold that sense production independent of cognition of thatness regulates the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the thisness component, because it arises from a sense faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition. It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct components business and thatness. But both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced by the sense faculty. Inferential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes only direct cognition. If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the probandom component 2 must be mind-generated. Making the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate regulate perceptuality is excessively complex. Cognition in general is not cognition hood because cognition hood is unproduced and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established. Recutation of the Prima-Facey definition. Cognition has no parts therefore only its components are objects of cognition not constituents. Another determinant cognition can not cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and thatness objects, because those objects are not produced from another determinate cognition. It may be said that in recognition cognition of thatness taking thatness as object is a cause, in inference cognition of the probandom taking the probandom as object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizor, business, and substrate, the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause. This proposal is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff as qualifier causes qualify cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognitionhood is not an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the probandom. Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes a qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is not an instrument, is impossible. Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual cognition is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because perception concerning the staffbearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff. Nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory. Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition. Be the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation. A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception. Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object. Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color and action arises through conjunction come in hereance. Since universals such as colonists in here in color and the like in hearing in the conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come inheritance in the inherent. Sound is perceived through its inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through its inheritance in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is perceived through qualitative or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through qualitative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object is never a cause. Prima-facy view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause. Prima-facy view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minitatomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause. In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the cause. The argument that conjunction with the apprehensible object is more economical than conjunction with the parts and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause is unsound. Conjunction with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also refuted. Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable. Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause. This view is unsound. Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the itself, dust particles dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles. Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular substances such as pots. Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object. If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating cause. Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense.

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