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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11

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23:30

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1. 0:02–0:08Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum.
2. 0:08–0:1740. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son.
3. 0:17–0:26If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise.
4. 0:26–0:32The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda.
5. 0:32–0:37In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal
6. 0:37–0:42complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant
7. 0:42–0:45from the causal complex of fire.
8. 0:45–0:49But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that
9. 0:49–0:54the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by
10. 0:54–0:59vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition.
11. 0:59–1:03Doubtful extraneous condition.
12. 1:03–1:0841. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous
13. 1:08–1:13condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an
14. 1:13–1:17undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise.
15. 1:17–1:23But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous
16. 1:23–1:27condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom, a certain extraneous condition
17. 1:27–1:31produces acetate of deviation.
18. 1:31–1:38Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
19. 1:38–1:4442. The seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered.
20. 1:44–1:48An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground
21. 1:48–1:52that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom,
22. 1:52–1:57otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended
23. 1:57–2:03by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons.
24. 2:03–2:05Provision and subject propertyhood are not strength.
25. 2:05–2:1243. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the
26. 2:12–2:15reason has greater strength.
27. 2:15–2:19Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single
28. 2:19–2:23reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many
29. 2:23–2:27reasons free from such a condition.
30. 2:27–2:32Subjection and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not
31. 2:32–2:39strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood.
32. 2:39–2:43Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
33. 2:43–2:4444.
34. 2:44–2:48If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness
35. 2:48–2:53produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous
36. 2:53–2:57condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons
37. 2:57–3:04presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics
38. 3:04–3:10of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous
39. 3:10–3:17condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included
40. 3:17–3:19under non-establishment of perversion.
41. 3:19–3:2645. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom,
42. 3:26–3:30It does not pervade what pervades the probando, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible
43. 3:30–3:35without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of
44. 3:35–3:38what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade.
45. 3:39–3:43A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition.
46. 3:44–3:48Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion,
47. 3:48–3:52it does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons.
48. 3:52–4:01Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition
49. 4:01–4:06of the reasons pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by
50. 4:06–4:12something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition
51. 4:12–4:18that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition
52. 4:18–4:23has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because it produces cognition
53. 4:23–4:30that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate
54. 4:30–4:38pseudo reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation.
55. 4:39–4:43Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom,
56. 4:43–4:48so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom.
57. 4:49–4:53The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same.
58. 4:53–4:59Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded
59. 4:59–5:03by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not arise.
60. 5:04–5:09An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason.
61. 5:11–5:16Established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
62. 5:19–5:24If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished
63. 5:24–5:29reason or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandum must be accepted.
64. 5:30–5:34Neither being a counter reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion of the
65. 5:34–5:40probandum. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment
66. 5:40–5:43that it pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason.
67. 5:45–5:46Alternative View
68. 5:49–5:5449. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandum and a reason
69. 5:54–5:59accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus
70. 5:59–6:04where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable that,
71. 6:04–6:08if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition,
72. 6:08–6:13the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter
73. 6:13–6:17reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition,
74. 6:17–6:21nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade
75. 6:21–6:27the probandum. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus
76. 6:27–6:31as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the
77. 6:31–6:36like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is
78. 6:36–6:42occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established
79. 6:42–6:46conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end.
80. 6:46–6:5650. Apparent extraneous conditions are now described.
81. 6:56–7:01The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
82. 7:01–7:06In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness,
83. 7:06–7:10that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom,
84. 7:10–7:13is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
85. 7:13–7:20The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished
86. 7:20–7:26absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness,
87. 7:26–7:30and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom.
88. 7:32–7:37The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of
89. 7:37–7:43the probandom. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial
90. 7:43–7:47is an apparent extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandum.
91. 7:48–7:54The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandum
92. 7:54–7:59that does not pervade the subject. In Earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other
93. 7:59–8:04than Earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandum that
94. 8:04–8:11does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the
95. 8:11–8:17extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an
96. 8:17–8:22equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior
97. 8:22–8:27reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect,
98. 8:27–8:31whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes
99. 8:31–8:38the reason on the other is absent. The sixth apparent extraneous condition is the absence
100. 8:38–8:43of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent,
101. 8:43–8:49eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind.
102. 8:49–8:54The seventh apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference
103. 8:54–8:59from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of
104. 8:59–9:03fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is an
105. 9:03–9:09a parent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence
106. 9:09–9:14of the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of
107. 9:14–9:19fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain
108. 9:19–9:25is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar
109. 9:25–9:29to a property possessing the absence of the probandom and what is other than the
110. 9:29–9:36subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus
111. 9:36–9:42distinct from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The 10th apparent extraneous condition
112. 9:42–9:49is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions,
113. 9:49–9:52these 10 kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference.
114. 9:54–9:59With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions
115. 9:59–10:06comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject.
116. 10:09–10:14Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject,
117. 10:14–10:20subjecthood, is now described. Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a
118. 10:20–10:28probandum. Possession of a doubtful probandum or doubt about the probandum is not subjecthood.
119. 10:30–10:352. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandum is doubtful is not
120. 10:35–10:37subject hood.
121. 10:37–10:41Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after
122. 10:41–10:46perception of the reason and recollection of pervasion, but before substantive reflection
123. 10:46–10:51arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased.
124. 10:51–10:55If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal
125. 10:55–11:00coexistence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is
126. 11:00–11:06possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained.
127. 11:06–11:13The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood.
128. 11:13–11:18The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood.
129. 11:18–11:22The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined
130. 11:22–11:26absence is unnecessary.
131. 11:26–11:30Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences
132. 11:30–11:35such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment
133. 11:35–11:39of the reason themselves prevent inference.
134. 11:39–11:43Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood.
135. 11:43–11:47The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object
136. 11:47–11:51known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred.
137. 11:51–11:57The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another.
138. 11:57–12:02The bearer of a probandom desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish
139. 12:02–12:07it is subjecthood, the earlier view.
140. 12:07–12:11The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandom one wishes to establish
141. 12:11–12:18is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandom is subjecthood.
142. 12:18–12:22A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the
143. 12:22–12:26self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is
144. 12:26–12:27possible.
145. 12:27–12:31But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference
146. 12:31–12:35an object already known, and, one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it
147. 12:35–12:41from its trumpet, are reconciled through the presence or absence of desire.
148. 12:41–12:48Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view.
149. 12:48–12:51This proposal is unacceptable.
150. 12:51–12:55Like doubt about the pro-bandam, the desire to establish it need not remain present before
151. 12:55–13:01the third substantive reflection concerning the inferential mark.
152. 13:01–13:04The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined.
153. 13:04–13:09A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud.
154. 13:09–13:15An unfavorable object too is inferred through the force of the third substantive reflection.
155. 13:15–13:19Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference.
156. 13:19–13:24With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end.
157. 13:24–13:27Established conclusion The entity possessing absence of establishing
158. 13:27–13:35evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject.
159. 13:35–13:40The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together
160. 13:40–13:45with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject.
161. 13:45–13:50But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not
162. 13:50–13:53the subject.
163. 13:53–13:57In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state
164. 13:57–14:02consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire
165. 14:02–14:04to establish it.
166. 14:04–14:10The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject.
167. 14:10–14:15Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing
168. 14:15–14:20evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises
169. 14:20–14:24through a qualified absence.
170. 14:24–14:28Subjecthood through a qualified absence.
171. 14:28–14:32When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence
172. 14:32–14:38of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted
173. 14:38–14:42on the basis of a qualified absence.
174. 14:42–14:47In inference of the self prescribed by scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent,
175. 14:47–14:51in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualifier can in the form of ascertainment
176. 14:51–14:54of the probandom is absent.
177. 14:54–14:59Therefore the definition is not under extended.
178. 14:59–15:03Final doctrine of subjecthood.
179. 15:03–15:09itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state.
180. 15:09–15:15Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject.
181. 15:15–15:21With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end.
182. 15:21–15:27Prima-facy account of subsumptive reflection
183. 15:27–15:31Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason,
184. 15:31–15:36pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause
185. 15:36–15:39of inference.
186. 15:39–15:49The msaka-prima-facidu, recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection.
187. 15:49–15:58The msaka-s say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference.
188. 15:58–16:03There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection.
189. 16:03–16:12The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain.
190. 16:13–16:22These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause.
191. 16:23–16:32It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise.
192. 16:32–16:50Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference.
193. 16:50–17:02But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable.
194. 17:02–17:10If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress.
195. 17:10–17:16Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference.
196. 17:16–17:25For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference.
197. 17:25–17:32But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible.
198. 17:32–17:46Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered, near cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow.
199. 17:46–17:515. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects.
200. 17:51–18:035. It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devidata fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not.
201. 18:03–18:09Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes.
202. 18:09–18:14Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind,
203. 18:14–18:17it also produces dream experience of external objects.
204. 18:17–18:22Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection
205. 18:22–18:26of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the subsumptive
206. 18:26–18:30reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
207. 18:30–18:33But this objection is untenable.
208. 18:33–18:37Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense,
209. 18:37–18:43mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials
210. 18:43–18:48of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available
211. 18:48–18:52even in the absence of sense contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as
212. 18:52–18:56an independent means of external perception.
213. 18:56–19:01Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view.
214. 19:01–19:066. The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is
215. 19:06–19:11application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible. The answer given is
216. 19:11–19:16that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire.
217. 19:17–19:22According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire,
218. 19:22–19:26and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only
219. 19:26–19:30for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is
220. 19:30–19:35pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible.
221. 19:36–19:43Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain
222. 19:43–19:48is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire
223. 19:48–19:55or not. How, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is
224. 19:55–20:00pervaded by fire is present, the determinate perception of smokehood prevents the doubt.
225. 20:00–20:05Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of
226. 20:05–20:13inference, therefore inference is not impossible. Separate ascertainment of perversion is unnecessary.
227. 20:14–20:208. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal
228. 20:20–20:25smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire.
229. 20:26–20:30Cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded
230. 20:30–20:34by fire, jointly cause inference.
231. 20:34–20:37Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that
232. 20:37–20:41particular smoke is cognized.
233. 20:41–20:45Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain,
234. 20:45–20:47is required.
235. 20:47–20:53No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives.
236. 20:53–20:58Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this
237. 20:58–21:03exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together.
238. 21:05–21:10Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason.
239. 21:11–21:16For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke
240. 21:16–21:21or light is the reason. Therefore two alternative no-ability is not incoherent.
241. 21:23–21:27Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of
242. 21:27–21:33of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is
243. 21:33–21:38a property of the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence
244. 21:38–21:45of that cognition of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference. But this view
245. 21:45–21:50is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal
246. 21:50–21:56complex of inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore
247. 21:56–22:00Cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity
248. 22:00–22:04is not an independent cause.
249. 22:04–22:08Qualified cognition is not a cause.
250. 22:08–22:13It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood,
251. 22:13–22:18a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire,
252. 22:18–22:22qualified by smokehood, is necessary.
253. 22:22–22:26But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular
254. 22:26–22:31smoke's pervasion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary.
255. 22:31–22:37And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present.
256. 22:37–22:44Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden.
257. 22:44–22:47Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor.
258. 22:47–22:5212. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct
259. 22:52–22:55inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject
260. 22:55–23:00property is not an abstractor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the
261. 23:00–23:06causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain
262. 23:06–23:11is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather,
263. 23:11–23:15in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain
264. 23:15–23:20to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required.
265. 23:20–23:25Premaphacy Conclusion, a universal as reason

Plain text

Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum. 40. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son. If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise. The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire. But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition. Doubtful extraneous condition. 41. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom, a certain extraneous condition produces acetate of deviation. Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42. The seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom, otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons. Provision and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free from such a condition. Subjection and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood. Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 44. If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion. 45. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, It does not pervade what pervades the probando, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons. Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the reasons pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation. Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom. The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not arise. An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason. Established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandum must be accepted. Neither being a counter reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion of the probandum. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason. Alternative View 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandum and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable that, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade the probandum. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end. 50. Apparent extraneous conditions are now described. The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness, that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom, is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness, and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is an apparent extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandum. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandum that does not pervade the subject. In Earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than Earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandum that does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent. The sixth apparent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent, eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind. The seventh apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is an a parent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The 10th apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these 10 kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject. Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood, is now described. Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandum. Possession of a doubtful probandum or doubt about the probandum is not subjecthood. 2. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandum is doubtful is not subject hood. Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after perception of the reason and recollection of pervasion, but before substantive reflection arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased. If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal coexistence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood. The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary. Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference. Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another. The bearer of a probandom desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish it is subjecthood, the earlier view. The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandom one wishes to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandom is subjecthood. A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible. But Kasperti Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an object already known, and, one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet, are reconciled through the presence or absence of desire. Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is unacceptable. Like doubt about the pro-bandam, the desire to establish it need not remain present before the third substantive reflection concerning the inferential mark. The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object too is inferred through the force of the third substantive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end. Established conclusion The entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject. In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject. Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through a qualified absence. Subjecthood through a qualified absence. When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualifier can in the form of ascertainment of the probandom is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subsumptive reflection Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of inference. The msaka-prima-facidu, recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection. The msaka-s say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference. There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain. These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause. It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise. Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference. But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered, near cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow. 5. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects. 5. It may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devidata fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not. Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the subsumptive reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception. Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view. 6. The objection arises, when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible. The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire. According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible. Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not. How, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the determinate perception of smokehood prevents the doubt. Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible. Separate ascertainment of perversion is unnecessary. 8. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. Cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause inference. Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required. No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives. Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together. Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason. For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke or light is the reason. Therefore two alternative no-ability is not incoherent. Neither cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference. But this view is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore Cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent cause. Qualified cognition is not a cause. It may be argued that after recollection of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified by smokehood, is necessary. But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's pervasion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary. And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present. Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden. Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor. 12. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an abstractor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required. Premaphacy Conclusion, a universal as reason

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