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Collection: Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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Duration: 19:23
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0:02–0:04विव अछि।
0:04–0:07अछि।
0:07–0:09अछि।
0:09–0:11अछि।
0:11–0:13अछि।
0:13–0:15अछि।
0:15–0:17अछि।
0:17–0:19अछि।
0:19–0:21अछि।
0:21–0:23अछि।
0:23–0:25अछि।
0:25–0:27अछि।
0:27–0:29अछि।
0:29–0:31अछि।
0:31–0:33of the cause of that obstacle.
0:33–0:40To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the effect arises in the next moment,
0:40–0:46and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise, it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such.
0:46–0:54Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle has this character of being an effect.
0:54–1:06The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency as the operation.
1:06–1:14In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire. May the act I have begun be completed without obstruction.
1:14–1:24This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction would be invalid.
1:24–1:29Even in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation.
1:29–1:38There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the other deities.
1:38–1:44deities. In beginningless sasura, praise of vinyaka must at some time have been performed
1:44–1:49by someone, hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of vinyaka.
1:49–1:53If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason is the
1:53–1:57extreme strength of the obstacle.
1:57–2:03Refutation of the other view in summary of the prima facie position. This view of the
2:03–2:09other teachers is not correct. The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be
2:09–2:14the operation through which invocation produces completion, because, as an enduring relational
2:14–2:19absence, it is merely a cooperating cause of completion.
2:19–2:22It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational
2:22–2:26absence and that this form is also present in prior absence.
2:26–2:31This is not correct, for then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation.
2:31–2:36If an absolute absence established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal status,
2:36–2:40the same objection applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence of its cause.
2:42–2:47The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed,
2:47–2:51therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been established
2:51–2:57through destruction of its cause. Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from
2:57–3:02absence of its cause, invocation neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward
3:02–3:08completion. Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle,
3:08–3:13persisting until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation,
3:13–3:17there is no need to posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them.
3:18–3:23Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka,
3:23–3:27the regular practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established.
3:27–3:33If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot
3:33–3:38be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete
3:38–3:40despite its presence.
3:40–3:45It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs
3:45–3:47after little invocation.
3:47–3:52If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause
3:52–3:54and result.
3:54–3:58Or can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking and
3:58–4:04little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant invocation
4:04–4:08does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without it or with
4:08–4:10only a little?
4:10–4:14On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle is
4:14–4:19suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slight obstacle is suspected,
4:19–4:23little invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference
4:23–4:28to such a Vedic statement. In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete
4:28–4:33an act, while at other times the act is completed in its absence. Even if, much, means three
4:33–4:39or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule can be framed. Therefore
4:39–4:44no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage. In conclusion, auspicious invocation
4:44–4:51is a subsidiary act, a principal act. This is the summary of the Prima-Facey position.
4:51–4:56Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles.
4:57–4:59Gangesa's decisive view is this,
4:59–5:05auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun undertaking, a principal act,
5:05–5:10rather, like expiation, it is a principal act whose result is the destruction of obstacles.
5:11–5:16It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing an undertaking already begun.
5:17–5:22Learned people perform at both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known,
5:22–5:26An absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act.
5:27–5:30Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire,
5:30–5:32may the act I have begun be completed without obstruction.
5:33–5:37Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the obstacle,
5:37–5:42just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire, may I attain heaven.
5:43–5:46Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without apprehending its
5:46–5:51qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included in the desire for
5:51–5:53unobstructed completion of an act.
5:54–5:57Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness,
5:57–6:03because there is irregularity in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness,
6:03–6:06and sometimes fails to occur even after it has been performed.
6:07–6:11Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when
6:11–6:14the impediment capable of producing an obstacle is absent.
6:15–6:19The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness,
6:19–6:24whether accompanied by subsidiaries and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a
6:24–6:30deity. Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty,
6:30–6:35auspiciousness is performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty.
6:37–6:40The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining
6:40–6:45auspiciousness is not sound. Sometimes an undertaking remains incomplete because a
6:45–6:49previously accumulated obstacle is excessively powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises
6:49–6:53after auspiciousness has been performed, and sometimes the actual causes known from ordinary
6:53–6:58practice are absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an obstacle present in the desired undertaking
6:58–7:03is impossible without auspiciousness, therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with
7:03–7:05respect to destruction of obstacles is established.
7:07–7:14Auspiciousness destroys obstacles. It cannot be said that a suspected obstacle is removed
7:14–7:18through expiation, because expiation is not enjoined where there is merely a suspicion
7:18–7:24of sin. Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness is conditional on
7:24–7:28desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible.
7:29–7:34Auspiciousness is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment among
7:34–7:40the causes of a begun act, when the obstacle-destroying absence is lacking, completion of the act does not arise.
7:41–7:46Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles,
7:46–7:51it cannot be performed when no obstacle exists. Revelation inferred from the regular conduct
7:51–7:54of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at the commencement of a desired act,
7:54–7:58just as the rambayé is performed at the beginning of the dhāsāpramsa sacrifice.
7:59–8:02The relational absence of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion.
8:03–8:07Sometimes this absence is established automatically by the act's own causes,
8:07–8:12and sometimes it is produced by auspiciousness. The completion without auspiciousness of an act
8:12–8:16undertaken by an inattentive person or an atheist may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles
8:16–8:22continuing from a previous birth. It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is
8:22–8:28sometimes established automatically by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness
8:28–8:34becomes impossible. Auspiciousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is
8:34–8:40performed so long as suspicion of an obstacle remains. For this reason it is performed even
8:40–8:45in the middle of an act of suspicion of an obstacle arises. At the beginning of a great
8:45–8:50undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful obstacle is suspected, and it has
8:50–8:54already been explained how auspiciousness is performed when an obstacle is suspected.
8:56–9:00The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers.
9:02–9:06Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction,
9:06–9:10one should perform auspiciousness. It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity,
9:10–9:14because this definition has neither universal pervasion nor necessary sequence.
9:15–9:19Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing as its
9:19–9:23uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic knowledge of the
9:23–9:28act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become an object of practical
9:28–9:33engagement. Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned
9:33–9:38people with the desire, may the act be completed without obstruction. The Veda is not an effect
9:38–9:42of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice would produce mutual dependence
9:42–9:48between scripture and such practice. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a veda-enjoined
9:48–9:52act performed with a desire for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes
9:52–9:56the desired undertaking, because no separate Vedic sentence enjoining auspiciousness is available.
9:57–10:02Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called, auspicious, in SMTI, the veda is not
10:02–10:07produced from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an act enjoined by the
10:07–10:13The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not merely one should perform
10:13–10:18auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an act
10:18–10:21should praise a deity.
10:21–10:25The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context.
10:25–10:29The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity, obeisance, and the
10:29–10:34like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic-enjoined act destroys obstacles
10:34–10:38or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction, from the desire to complete
10:38–10:47an act without obstruction. The word auspiciousness has many meanings. Therefore bathing in the
10:47–10:52Ganges in similar acts, though destructive of obstacles, are not auspiciousness in the
10:52–10:56strict sense, because no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance as auspiciousness.
10:57–11:01Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as,
11:01–11:05those engaged in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence,
11:05–11:10and performers of sacrifices that Ward-off-Syn should look into a mirror at dawn are called
11:10–11:15auspicious in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act.
11:16–11:18Thus the word auspiciousness has many meanings.
11:19–11:24Otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance, and all such acts would have to be performed
11:24–11:30obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book. The word atha is itself auspicious because
11:30–11:36it destroys obstacles. Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds O and Atha
11:36–11:41first emerged after breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious.
11:42–11:46It should not be said that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great
11:46–11:51sage Gautama's use of this word at the opening of the science of Nyaya would be needless repetition.
11:53–11:56Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as in doubt with qualities.
11:56–12:03Obasins is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself.
12:03–12:09The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an experienced
12:09–12:11common property.
12:11–12:15Therefore the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the hands
12:15–12:21against the head but also for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you.
12:21–12:26On an alternative view, distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and
12:26–12:31verbal obeisance, the word obeisance would then have several meanings.
12:31–12:35Some Prabhakras say that the word cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition
12:35–12:40that they are preceded by a particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only
12:40–12:45the mental resolve, while the other three acts are understood by secondary implication.
12:45–12:50This view is unsound, because one cannot know that an act is preceded by a mental resolve
12:50–12:56without first understanding the specific bodily or other act.
12:56–13:01The nature of a learned person and of learned practice.
13:01–13:05A person who accepts the authority of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received
13:05–13:07tradition.
13:07–13:12In defining learned practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by
13:12–13:17the Veda, that is, that it possesses the condition of not being censured.
13:17–13:22Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces
13:22–13:26super-sensible merit brings a begun act to completion.
13:26–13:30Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error.
13:30–13:35The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes
13:35–13:40a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced,
13:40–13:46such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result.
13:46–13:51In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed to heretical
13:51–13:56or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority.
13:56–14:00Other uses of learned and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of agency
14:00–14:03in acts prohibited by the Veda.
14:03–14:09Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda prohibited
14:09–14:13acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited
14:13–14:15act is unlearned.
14:15–14:20Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda prohibited act, is not learned,
14:20–14:24because he does not accept the authority of the Veda.
14:24–14:28But it is not proper to regard is learned merely someone free from performing prohibited
14:28–14:32acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Vedas
14:32–14:40authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin.
14:40–14:44Conclusion of the discussion of auspicious invocation
14:44–14:48Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar
14:48–14:51of the received tradition.
14:51–14:55Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him, because omniscience
14:55–15:01is required in them. The Veda is inferred from the uncentured conduct of such traditionally
15:01–15:07learned persons. This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars, who have not directly observed
15:07–15:12the conduct of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage in auspicious invocation.
15:13–15:17It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and others from that of modern
15:17–15:21learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu and others before engaging
15:21–15:26in auspiciousness. But then the conduct of modern scholars itself, by assisting the inference
15:26–15:30of man as conduct, may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the Veda, what need
15:30–15:34is there for a separate inference from modern conduct to man as conduct.
15:34–15:40Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition. SMTI states
15:40–15:44that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age, provided it is not
15:44–15:49contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper conduct.
15:49–15:53is no proof that only the omniscient man of first performed auspicious invocation.
15:54–15:59Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in sintis composed by Manu and others,
15:59–16:05only omniscient persons perform it. An author of sinti need not be omniscient,
16:05–16:08he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a sinti text.
16:09–16:13Some may further say that conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference that
16:13–16:18invocation is obligatory, why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it?
16:18–16:25The answer is that, in the case of a lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary, as I'll admit.
16:25–16:30With this the discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends.
16:30–16:36The discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends.
16:36–16:47The theory of epistemic validity. The doctrine of determining validity slash theory of apprehension.
16:47–16:51Statement of purpose.
16:51–16:57After the auspicious invocation, the supremely compassionate sage Godama,
16:57–17:02desiring to rescue the world submerged in the mire of suffering, composed in Kik,
17:02–17:05the science of Nyaya, the most cherished among the 18 branches of learning.
17:06–17:11At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the true nature of
17:11–17:16the 16 categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest human good,
17:16–17:21liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct a discerning person
17:21–17:26toward the supreme goal. But the ordered division of the 16 categories depends on knowledge
17:26–17:32of the first category, the means of knowledge. Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first
17:32–17:39examines the true nature of a means of knowledge, that is, the validity of cognition. The objection
17:39–17:46of the Madhyamaka Buddhists. The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold
17:46–17:51that Nyaya teaches the real nature of the 16 categories beginning with means of knowledge
17:51–17:56is indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means
17:56–18:01of knowledge is impossible. Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining
18:01–18:07the nature of Prama, veritical cognition. But the nature of Prama is established neither
18:07–18:12intrinsically by the complete set of causes of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another
18:12–18:17means of knowledge, because, as will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives.
18:17–18:24An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition?
18:24–18:29Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination
18:29–18:33of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs
18:33–18:37only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained.
18:37–18:41Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or
18:41–18:45doubt about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity
18:45–18:47causes activity.
18:47–18:50The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity
18:50–18:55of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful.
18:55–18:59Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no
18:59–19:04need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment.
19:04–19:06But this argument is unsound.
19:06–19:11The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise,
19:11–19:15which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity
19:15–19:19of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

Plain text

विव अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। of the cause of that obstacle. To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the effect arises in the next moment, and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise, it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such. Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle has this character of being an effect. The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency as the operation. In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire. May the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction would be invalid. Even in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation. There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the other deities. deities. In beginningless sasura, praise of vinyaka must at some time have been performed by someone, hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of vinyaka. If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason is the extreme strength of the obstacle. Refutation of the other view in summary of the prima facie position. This view of the other teachers is not correct. The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be the operation through which invocation produces completion, because, as an enduring relational absence, it is merely a cooperating cause of completion. It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational absence and that this form is also present in prior absence. This is not correct, for then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation. If an absolute absence established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal status, the same objection applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence of its cause. The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed, therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been established through destruction of its cause. Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from absence of its cause, invocation neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward completion. Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle, persisting until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation, there is no need to posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them. Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka, the regular practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established. If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete despite its presence. It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs after little invocation. If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause and result. Or can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking and little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant invocation does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without it or with only a little? On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle is suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slight obstacle is suspected, little invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference to such a Vedic statement. In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete an act, while at other times the act is completed in its absence. Even if, much, means three or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule can be framed. Therefore no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage. In conclusion, auspicious invocation is a subsidiary act, a principal act. This is the summary of the Prima-Facey position. Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles. Gangesa's decisive view is this, auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun undertaking, a principal act, rather, like expiation, it is a principal act whose result is the destruction of obstacles. It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing an undertaking already begun. Learned people perform at both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known, An absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act. Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire, may the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the obstacle, just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire, may I attain heaven. Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without apprehending its qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included in the desire for unobstructed completion of an act. Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness, because there is irregularity in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness, and sometimes fails to occur even after it has been performed. Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when the impediment capable of producing an obstacle is absent. The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness, whether accompanied by subsidiaries and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a deity. Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty, auspiciousness is performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty. The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining auspiciousness is not sound. Sometimes an undertaking remains incomplete because a previously accumulated obstacle is excessively powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises after auspiciousness has been performed, and sometimes the actual causes known from ordinary practice are absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an obstacle present in the desired undertaking is impossible without auspiciousness, therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with respect to destruction of obstacles is established. Auspiciousness destroys obstacles. It cannot be said that a suspected obstacle is removed through expiation, because expiation is not enjoined where there is merely a suspicion of sin. Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness is conditional on desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible. Auspiciousness is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment among the causes of a begun act, when the obstacle-destroying absence is lacking, completion of the act does not arise. Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles, it cannot be performed when no obstacle exists. Revelation inferred from the regular conduct of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at the commencement of a desired act, just as the rambayé is performed at the beginning of the dhāsāpramsa sacrifice. The relational absence of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion. Sometimes this absence is established automatically by the act's own causes, and sometimes it is produced by auspiciousness. The completion without auspiciousness of an act undertaken by an inattentive person or an atheist may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles continuing from a previous birth. It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is sometimes established automatically by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness becomes impossible. Auspiciousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is performed so long as suspicion of an obstacle remains. For this reason it is performed even in the middle of an act of suspicion of an obstacle arises. At the beginning of a great undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful obstacle is suspected, and it has already been explained how auspiciousness is performed when an obstacle is suspected. The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers. Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction, one should perform auspiciousness. It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity, because this definition has neither universal pervasion nor necessary sequence. Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing as its uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic knowledge of the act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become an object of practical engagement. Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned people with the desire, may the act be completed without obstruction. The Veda is not an effect of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice would produce mutual dependence between scripture and such practice. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a veda-enjoined act performed with a desire for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes the desired undertaking, because no separate Vedic sentence enjoining auspiciousness is available. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called, auspicious, in SMTI, the veda is not produced from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an act enjoined by the The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not merely one should perform auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an act should praise a deity. The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context. The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity, obeisance, and the like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic-enjoined act destroys obstacles or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction, from the desire to complete an act without obstruction. The word auspiciousness has many meanings. Therefore bathing in the Ganges in similar acts, though destructive of obstacles, are not auspiciousness in the strict sense, because no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance as auspiciousness. Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as, those engaged in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence, and performers of sacrifices that Ward-off-Syn should look into a mirror at dawn are called auspicious in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act. Thus the word auspiciousness has many meanings. Otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance, and all such acts would have to be performed obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book. The word atha is itself auspicious because it destroys obstacles. Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds O and Atha first emerged after breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious. It should not be said that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great sage Gautama's use of this word at the opening of the science of Nyaya would be needless repetition. Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as in doubt with qualities. Obasins is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself. The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an experienced common property. Therefore the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the hands against the head but also for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you. On an alternative view, distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and verbal obeisance, the word obeisance would then have several meanings. Some Prabhakras say that the word cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition that they are preceded by a particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only the mental resolve, while the other three acts are understood by secondary implication. This view is unsound, because one cannot know that an act is preceded by a mental resolve without first understanding the specific bodily or other act. The nature of a learned person and of learned practice. A person who accepts the authority of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received tradition. In defining learned practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by the Veda, that is, that it possesses the condition of not being censured. Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces super-sensible merit brings a begun act to completion. Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error. The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced, such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result. In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed to heretical or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority. Other uses of learned and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of agency in acts prohibited by the Veda. Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda prohibited acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited act is unlearned. Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda prohibited act, is not learned, because he does not accept the authority of the Veda. But it is not proper to regard is learned merely someone free from performing prohibited acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Vedas authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin. Conclusion of the discussion of auspicious invocation Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar of the received tradition. Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him, because omniscience is required in them. The Veda is inferred from the uncentured conduct of such traditionally learned persons. This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars, who have not directly observed the conduct of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage in auspicious invocation. It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and others from that of modern learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu and others before engaging in auspiciousness. But then the conduct of modern scholars itself, by assisting the inference of man as conduct, may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the Veda, what need is there for a separate inference from modern conduct to man as conduct. Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition. SMTI states that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age, provided it is not contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper conduct. is no proof that only the omniscient man of first performed auspicious invocation. Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in sintis composed by Manu and others, only omniscient persons perform it. An author of sinti need not be omniscient, he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a sinti text. Some may further say that conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference that invocation is obligatory, why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it? The answer is that, in the case of a lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary, as I'll admit. With this the discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends. The discussion of auspicious invocation and the perception section ends. The theory of epistemic validity. The doctrine of determining validity slash theory of apprehension. Statement of purpose. After the auspicious invocation, the supremely compassionate sage Godama, desiring to rescue the world submerged in the mire of suffering, composed in Kik, the science of Nyaya, the most cherished among the 18 branches of learning. At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the true nature of the 16 categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest human good, liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct a discerning person toward the supreme goal. But the ordered division of the 16 categories depends on knowledge of the first category, the means of knowledge. Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first examines the true nature of a means of knowledge, that is, the validity of cognition. The objection of the Madhyamaka Buddhists. The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold that Nyaya teaches the real nature of the 16 categories beginning with means of knowledge is indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means of knowledge is impossible. Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining the nature of Prama, veritical cognition. But the nature of Prama is established neither intrinsically by the complete set of causes of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another means of knowledge, because, as will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives. An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition? Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained. Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or doubt about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity causes activity. The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful. Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment. But this argument is unsound. The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise, which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

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