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Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
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  1. 0:02–0:32खौलटवाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्
  2. 0:32–0:37absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation.
  3. 0:37–0:42Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye, because if color
  4. 0:42–0:46were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible.
  5. 0:46–0:51Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were
  6. 0:51–0:55identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would
  7. 0:55–0:58be impossible.
  8. 0:58–1:01In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that
  9. 1:01–1:06lockus is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound. Thus qualifier hood belonging to
  10. 1:06–1:11an object related to the sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence of sound.
  11. 1:11–1:14But the presence of waterhood in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension
  12. 1:14–1:19there, therefore the eye does not apprehend waterhood.
  13. 1:19–1:23Objection Inherence is the relation of absence.
  14. 1:23–1:26Objection Qualifier hood is not the apprehensive relation
  15. 1:26–1:31in perception of absence, inheritance alone is the relation. The qualified cognition
  16. 1:31–1:35that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here.
  17. 1:35–1:40The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound,
  18. 1:40–1:44conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by Inherence would
  19. 1:44–1:47become an absence, could be raised.
  20. 1:47–1:50In the perception of color, Inherence has already been accepted as an apprehensive
  21. 1:50–1:56relation, to accept Inherence for absence is no different from accepting Qualifierhood.
  22. 1:56–2:00Prior absence and destruction in here in the respective loci of their counter positives,
  23. 2:00–2:04produced by the destruction of the counter-positives locus is described as in hearing in space or time.
  24. 2:06–2:11The reply destruction to should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is no answer,
  25. 2:11–2:16for then the destroyed pot would arise again. If destruction were destroyed,
  26. 2:16–2:21another entity capable of destroying it would be required. To say that positive entity hood
  27. 2:21–2:26regulates destructibility is cumbersome and impossible in the case of prior absence.
  28. 2:26–2:32On the sedhantans view too destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction.
  29. 2:32–2:38An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and
  30. 2:38–2:43inhering in many loci, would become universals. To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of
  31. 2:43–2:48universalhood is cumbersome. There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence
  32. 2:48–2:52on account of which inherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence.
  33. 2:52–2:59This objection is not sound. If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals,
  34. 2:59–3:03their relative extension and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as
  35. 3:03–3:08existence, substancehood, and earthhood. If existence, substancehood, and earthhood were
  36. 3:08–3:12narrower, their absence would necessarily occur in a pot, and if they were wider,
  37. 3:12–3:15they would have to occur in the universal absence of potness.
  38. 3:15–3:18The Sid Hantons reply
  39. 3:18–3:25If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed
  40. 3:25–3:28with the destruction of its inhering cause.
  41. 3:28–3:33To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and
  42. 3:33–3:36impossible for prior absence.
  43. 3:36–3:40If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be
  44. 3:40–3:45destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus.
  45. 3:45–3:49The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise
  46. 3:49–3:52again, is also unsound.
  47. 3:52–3:56Causal conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its
  48. 3:56–3:59purpose will be undone.
  49. 3:59–4:03Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures that the destroyed
  50. 4:03–4:06pot is not produced again.
  51. 4:06–4:11A succession of destructions generated by the successive destruction of inhering loci
  52. 4:11–4:13cannot be accepted.
  53. 4:13–4:18If the destruction of loci from the pot, potchards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted,
  54. 4:18–4:23the final destruction in the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible,
  55. 4:23–4:26the destruction too would become imperceptible.
  56. 4:26–4:31If destruction of the pot inherit only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist
  57. 4:31–4:35on the ground, if it inherit in both the ground and the potchards, then after the
  58. 4:35–4:39potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the
  59. 4:39–4:43The perversion of inherence must extend throughout its locus.
  60. 4:43–4:48Thus sends the theory of inherence and the perception section of the tathasintmai composed
  61. 4:48–4:51by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
  62. 4:51–4:57The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge.
  63. 4:57–5:01Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge.
  64. 5:01–5:06The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is
  65. 5:06–5:12produced by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter-positive.
  66. 5:12–5:18For when an eligible counter-positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does not arise.
  67. 5:18–5:22It should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced
  68. 5:22–5:27by non-apprehension of its absence rather than by a sense organ. A sense organ is invariably
  69. 5:27–5:32found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity. Otherwise a person with closed
  70. 5:32–5:36eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension of its absence. Therefore,
  71. 5:36–5:40although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately precedes cognition
  72. 5:40–5:46of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ renders it otherwise established.
  73. 5:46–5:50When sense object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension
  74. 5:50–5:54of its absence. The Nayaika objects that in cognition of
  75. 5:54–5:59absence to the sense organ is a cause, because the cognition conforms to it. The
  76. 5:59–6:03BHA replies, the eye and other sense organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation
  77. 6:03–6:08with absence, they merely produce cognition of the locus of absence and then cease operating.
  78. 6:08–6:13A sense organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself.
  79. 6:13–6:18A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence.
  80. 6:18–6:22Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ, therefore
  81. 6:22–6:26that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of
  82. 6:26–6:27absence.
  83. 6:27–6:31Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established, the sense
  84. 6:31–6:35organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either.
  85. 6:35–6:40Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal
  86. 6:40–6:44status of the sense organ has first been established.
  87. 6:44–6:48But because the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, its causal status
  88. 6:48–6:51itself is unestablished.
  89. 6:51–6:55This also refutes the argument that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both
  90. 6:55–6:59causes, like a staff and a wheel, because their separate positive and negative
  91. 6:59–7:04concomitance is known. A sense organ lacking an apprehensive relation with
  92. 7:04–7:09absence cannot produce cognition of absence. Nor may it be held that a sense
  93. 7:09–7:12organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood,
  94. 7:12–7:16that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that
  95. 7:16–7:20lacks any other apprehensive relation. On such a view conjunction come
  96. 7:20–7:23adherence and the other relations would become useless, and an unrelated
  97. 7:23–7:28staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized. A sense organ apprehends
  98. 7:28–7:33only an object apprehensively related to it. Qualified hood or a self-linking relation is
  99. 7:33–7:37not an apprehensive relation of the sense organ, otherwise, even if adherence had not
  100. 7:37–7:42been accepted, its qualifier hood would still have to be admitted. Hence the sense organ
  101. 7:42–7:47has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible.
  102. 7:47–7:50The Vedantan view.
  103. 7:50–7:55The Nayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore, since any
  104. 7:55–8:00other apprehensive relation is impossible, qualityhood, that is, the self-linking relation,
  105. 8:00–8:05should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence, just as conjunction
  106. 8:05–8:09common herance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when conjunction is
  107. 8:09–8:11impossible.
  108. 8:11–8:15The Vedantan replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense organ does not
  109. 8:15–8:20cease after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction come inheritance
  110. 8:20–8:23is the apprehensive relation.
  111. 8:23–8:28But in cognition of absence, through economy, the sense organ ceases after producing cognition
  112. 8:28–8:33of the locus, hence there is no purpose in accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood.
  113. 8:33–8:38Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color,
  114. 8:38–8:43it should likewise not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touches and inferential
  115. 8:43–8:44reason.
  116. 8:44–8:49The Niyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends
  117. 8:49–8:53upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon sensory
  118. 8:53–8:56apprehensibility of absence.
  119. 8:56–8:59Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object.
  120. 8:59–9:03A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations such
  121. 9:03–9:06as conjunction and inherent are causes.
  122. 9:06–9:10From the mutual deviation of conjunction and inherent one cannot formulate the general
  123. 9:10–9:14a sense organ knows an object related to itself. In each instance, the specific
  124. 9:14–9:18relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition. The mere nature of
  125. 9:18–9:21the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception of
  126. 9:21–9:25absence because a relation must be distinct from the relata. No object is
  127. 9:25–9:31known by itself through its own nature alone. The visual sense organ is not a
  128. 9:31–9:36cause. If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence,
  129. 9:36–9:39cognition of color and the light would also be produced by a self-linking
  130. 9:39–9:44relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration
  131. 9:44–9:49of six kinds of sense object contact would be fruitless. This also refutes the view that,
  132. 9:49–9:54the eye depends upon the assistance of light because light alone is its auxiliary cause.
  133. 9:54–9:59Without an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates
  134. 9:59–10:04the counter positive and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that
  135. 10:04–10:08the eye, while producing cognition of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition
  136. 10:08–10:11of absence, and that non-apprehension produces cognition of absence in the presence of the
  137. 10:11–10:17other causes apart from the sense organ. But this is not correct. The i, lacking an apprehensive
  138. 10:17–10:22relation, is not the cause of cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of the
  139. 10:22–10:27locus of absence and then ceases. Nor is the following argument acceptable, after
  140. 10:27–10:31a blue object has been known through touch, a blind person would cognize absence of blue
  141. 10:31–10:34from non-apprehension of a remembered yellow object, but this fault does not arise
  142. 10:34–10:39if cognition of absence is accepted as produced by the sense organ that apprehends the counter-positive,
  143. 10:39–10:44because the blind person has no eyes. The sense organ that the Naiyayika regards as producing
  144. 10:44–10:50cognition of absence in fact ceases after producing cognition of the locus. It must therefore be
  145. 10:50–10:54accepted that, after the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter-positive has made the
  146. 10:54–10:59locus known, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Otherwise cognition of absence of
  147. 10:59–11:04waterhood would arise in water atoms related to the eye.
  148. 11:04–11:10Awareness of absence of color and the like has not apprehension as its inferential mark.
  149. 11:10–11:14Nyayika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence
  150. 11:14–11:19of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension, because their locky, air
  151. 11:19–11:22and the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending
  152. 11:22–11:24the counter-positives.
  153. 11:24–11:28It should not be asked how the Nyayika can regard such absences as perceptible when
  154. 11:28–11:33the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ. Once air has been known
  155. 11:33–11:37by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible absence of color
  156. 11:37–11:42its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as its qualificant. Eligible cognition
  157. 11:42–11:46of the qualificant is a cause of perception.
  158. 11:46–11:50The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other things
  159. 11:50–11:54is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka
  160. 11:54–11:59himself regards the cognition air is colorless, whose qualificon is air, as inferential.
  161. 12:01–12:05Objection's cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ.
  162. 12:07–12:12The Neyayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by a sense organ,
  163. 12:12–12:19because it is an immediate awareness. Therefore qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation,
  164. 12:19–12:23should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the sense organ with cognition of absence.
  165. 12:24–12:28It is not the case that immediacy is the reason is unestablished.
  166. 12:28–12:37If on the Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as mediate, the distinction of cognition produced by an unknown cause would become impossible.
  167. 12:37–12:44From a trustworthy person's statement it is known that, even after someone entered the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside.
  168. 12:44–12:49From this known non-apprehension the hearer infers, Kaitra was not in the temple.
  169. 12:49–12:55If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced by an unknown cause, because
  170. 12:55–12:59the universal mediate cognition hood is known through an own cause.
  171. 12:59–13:04Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential
  172. 13:04–13:09mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does.
  173. 13:09–13:14Therefore cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate.
  174. 13:14–13:19Being produced by a sense organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality, because
  175. 13:19–13:25perceptuality itself is inferred from being produced by a sense organ.
  176. 13:25–13:32Establishment of the Ba view cognition of absence is mediate and produced by non-apprehension.
  177. 13:32–13:36The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct.
  178. 13:36–13:40Mediate cognition hood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential
  179. 13:40–13:45cognition hood, it is merely cognition hood qualified by difference from immediate awareness.
  180. 13:46–13:49Therefore cognition of absence is mediate like memory.
  181. 13:50–13:54Verbal cognition, though produced by an unknown cause, is not inference.
  182. 13:55–14:01Similarly, cognition of the locus of absence, produced by a sense organ from an unknown cause,
  183. 14:01–14:05is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from cognition produced by a
  184. 14:05–14:08sense organ and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate.
  185. 14:08–14:15If perceptuality were established from being produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition
  186. 14:15–14:20and the like, produced by known causes, would become inferential.
  187. 14:20–14:24Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct effects
  188. 14:24–14:28because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ.
  189. 14:28–14:33Similarly, cognition of absence and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because
  190. 14:33–14:37unknown non-apprehension and the known sense organ differ.
  191. 14:37–14:42being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality, while not being produced by
  192. 14:42–14:45a sense organ establishes mediacy.
  193. 14:45–14:49To regard production by an unknown cause and production by a known cause as the grounds
  194. 14:49–14:56of perception and mediation is cumbersome, and neither applies to memory.
  195. 14:56–15:01Refutation of the Objection of the Author of the Kusumungeli
  196. 15:01–15:05The author of the Kusumungeli may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means
  197. 15:05–15:10of knowledge of absence, the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces
  198. 15:10–15:16external experience. Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute
  199. 15:16–15:22to the mind's production of external experience. Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense
  200. 15:22–15:27organ alone would produce external experience, inference and the other means of knowledge
  201. 15:27–15:33would cease to exist. The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a positive
  202. 15:33–15:38entity is the means of cognition of absence because cognition of absence is an external cognition is
  203. 15:38–15:43unsound. Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ because it is an absence like the absence
  204. 15:43–15:49of an ineligible object. The counter inference is this cognition of absence is not produced by a
  205. 15:49–15:53sense organ because it is cognition of absence like cognition of absence produced by an inferential
  206. 15:53–15:59mark and the like. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes the counter
  207. 15:59–16:04positive also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive of cognition
  208. 16:04–16:11of the counter positive, also produces cognition of its absence. Inference in verbal testimony,
  209. 16:11–16:15which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce cognition of absence.
  210. 16:16–16:21Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends the
  211. 16:21–16:25counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison.
  212. 16:25–16:31I-hood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence,
  213. 16:31–16:35but comparisonhood is not a universal.
  214. 16:35–16:39It has already been established that the I and other sense organs cannot produce cognition
  215. 16:39–16:43of absence without an apprehensive relation.
  216. 16:43–16:48A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence, not apprehension produces cognition
  217. 16:48–16:50of absence.
  218. 16:50–16:56Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present is possible,
  219. 16:56–17:00and this is produced by a defect in the instrument.
  220. 17:00–17:05Memory of the counter positive, cognition of the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically
  221. 17:05–17:09defective, the sense organ is impaired by bile and other defects, and the illusion
  222. 17:09–17:13is produced by that impaired sense organ.
  223. 17:13–17:18Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence.
  224. 17:18–17:24Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation
  225. 17:24–17:28to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension.
  226. 17:28–17:32It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise
  227. 17:32–17:36from a known cause, the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition
  228. 17:36–17:41of absence should also be understood in that form, making the postulation of a separate
  229. 17:41–17:44means of non-apprehension unnecessary.
  230. 17:44–17:48The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence.
  231. 17:48–17:53A defective sense organ may produce an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye produces an
  232. 17:53–17:57illusion of smell and a stone, but veritical cognition of absence is not produced by a
  233. 17:57–18:01sense organ because there is no apprehensive relation.
  234. 18:01–18:06Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a positive
  235. 18:06–18:08entity and an absence.
  236. 18:08–18:12Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced neither by a sense organ
  237. 18:12–18:16nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone should be accepted as
  238. 18:16–18:21apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an absence supplied
  239. 18:21–18:26by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ,
  240. 18:26–18:30but cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground,
  241. 18:30–18:35is produced by non-apprehension. Similarly, the eye produces the cognition, sandalwood
  242. 18:35–18:40is fragrant, while the nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood.
  243. 18:40–18:44The argument non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge because it has no operation is
  244. 18:44–18:46also unsound.
  245. 18:46–18:51The rule is that, apart from non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the action
  246. 18:51–18:55is an instrument, there is no need to add the expression possessing an operation to
  247. 18:55–18:59the definition of a means of knowledge.
  248. 18:59–19:04The Neyayaka refutation of non-apprehension.
  249. 19:04–19:08Neyayaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ
  250. 19:08–19:14capable of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence,
  251. 19:14–19:18because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge.
  252. 19:19–19:23Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ,
  253. 19:23–19:28not by non-apprehension, non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a
  254. 19:28–19:33trustworthy statement that makes it known. It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension
  255. 19:33–19:38of the existence of color and the like produces cognition of their absence, as not
  256. 19:38–19:43Non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence of a pot on the ground.
  257. 19:43–19:47On the Msaaka view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence
  258. 19:47–19:54cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
  259. 19:54–19:58Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence.
  260. 19:58–20:02To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension
  261. 20:02–20:05contradicts the Msaaka doctrine.
  262. 20:05–20:09Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension
  263. 20:09–20:16alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known from its non-apprehension.
  264. 20:16–20:23Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension.
  265. 20:23–20:26Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark.
  266. 20:26–20:31Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument, because
  267. 20:31–20:35it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like.
  268. 20:35–20:39Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection
  269. 20:39–20:43of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status
  270. 20:43–20:45of non-apprehension.
  271. 20:45–20:50Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing
  272. 20:50–20:54color inferred from it, the inferential mark.
  273. 20:54–20:58Absence of knownness of possessing color in air is equivalent to absence of color,
  274. 20:58–21:00and therefore would not be known.
  275. 21:00–21:05If absence of knownness of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can
  276. 21:05–21:09equally be regarded as perceptible.
  277. 21:09–21:14Absence cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior.
  278. 21:14–21:19Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person,
  279. 21:19–21:21existence remains.
  280. 21:21–21:25In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while
  281. 21:25–21:28absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

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खौलटवाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश्वाश् absence of an eligible conjunction come inheritance relation. Absence of manifest color in the gross element air is perceived by the eye, because if color were present, non-apprehension of manifest color would be impossible. Similarly, absence of identity with a ghost is perceived in a pillar, if a ghost were identical with the pillar, non-apprehension of a ghost comparable to the pillar would be impossible. In the same way absence of sound too is perceived, because the presence of sound in that lockus is incompatible with non-apprehension of sound. Thus qualifier hood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is the apprehensive relation of absence of sound. But the presence of waterhood in the eye is not incompatible with its non-apprehension there, therefore the eye does not apprehend waterhood. Objection Inherence is the relation of absence. Objection Qualifier hood is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence, inheritance alone is the relation. The qualified cognition that establishes Inherence as an apprehensive relation has equal force here. The argument, an absence residing by Inherence would become a positive entity, is not sound, conversely, the equally forceful objection, a positive entity residing by Inherence would become an absence, could be raised. In the perception of color, Inherence has already been accepted as an apprehensive relation, to accept Inherence for absence is no different from accepting Qualifierhood. Prior absence and destruction in here in the respective loci of their counter positives, produced by the destruction of the counter-positives locus is described as in hearing in space or time. The reply destruction to should be destroyed when its in hearing locus is destroyed is no answer, for then the destroyed pot would arise again. If destruction were destroyed, another entity capable of destroying it would be required. To say that positive entity hood regulates destructibility is cumbersome and impossible in the case of prior absence. On the sedhantans view too destruction, being produced, would be liable to destruction. An objection may arise that mutual absence and absolute absence, being eternal and inhering in many loci, would become universals. To accept positive entityhood as the regulator of universalhood is cumbersome. There is no special distinction in qualified cognition of absence on account of which inherence should be rejected as the apprehensive relation of absence. This objection is not sound. If absences such as absence of potness were accepted as universals, their relative extension and restriction would become inconsistent with universals such as existence, substancehood, and earthhood. If existence, substancehood, and earthhood were narrower, their absence would necessarily occur in a pot, and if they were wider, they would have to occur in the universal absence of potness. The Sid Hantons reply If an absence were held to reside by inheritance, destruction would necessarily be destroyed with the destruction of its inhering cause. To regard positive entityhood as the regulating cause of destructibility is cumbersome and impossible for prior absence. If absence does not reside by inheritance, destruction, though produced, need not be destroyed with the destruction of an inhering locus. The argument, destruction must not be destroyed, for otherwise the destroyed pot would arise again, is also unsound. Causal conditions do not refrain from producing their effect merely through fear that its purpose will be undone. Therefore such non-inherents should be accepted in destruction as ensures that the destroyed pot is not produced again. A succession of destructions generated by the successive destruction of inhering loci cannot be accepted. If the destruction of loci from the pot, potchards, and their parts down to atoms is admitted, the final destruction in the series would reside in an atom, because atoms are imperceptible, the destruction too would become imperceptible. If destruction of the pot inherit only in the potchards, it could not be said to exist on the ground, if it inherit in both the ground and the potchards, then after the potchards were destroyed it could not be said to exist without them, because the The perversion of inherence must extend throughout its locus. Thus sends the theory of inherence and the perception section of the tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge. Bhavyu non-apprehension is a means of knowledge. The boss hold that cognition of absence is not produced by any sense organ, it is produced by non-apprehension, that is, non-obtainment, of an eligible counter-positive. For when an eligible counter-positive is perceived, cognition of its absence does not arise. It should not be said that cognition of a positive entity must then likewise be produced by non-apprehension of its absence rather than by a sense organ. A sense organ is invariably found as the producer of cognition of a positive entity. Otherwise a person with closed eyes would know the existence of a pot from non-apprehension of its absence. Therefore, although non-apprehension of the absence of a positive entity immediately precedes cognition of that entity, it is not its cause, because the sense organ renders it otherwise established. When sense object contact is present, cognition of a positive entity does not await non-apprehension of its absence. The Nayaika objects that in cognition of absence to the sense organ is a cause, because the cognition conforms to it. The BHA replies, the eye and other sense organs have no obtainment or apprehensive relation with absence, they merely produce cognition of the locus of absence and then cease operating. A sense organ produces cognition only of an object related to itself. A sense organ is not the means of knowledge of absence. Objection, cognition of the locus of absence is an operation of the sense organ, therefore that cognition does not render the sense organ otherwise established in cognition of absence. Otherwise, since sense object contact would render it otherwise established, the sense organ would not be a cause of cognition of a positive entity either. Reply, it's being an operation of the sense organ is established only after the causal status of the sense organ has first been established. But because the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, its causal status itself is unestablished. This also refutes the argument that cognition of the locus and the sense organ are both causes, like a staff and a wheel, because their separate positive and negative concomitance is known. A sense organ lacking an apprehensive relation with absence cannot produce cognition of absence. Nor may it be held that a sense organ possessing an apprehensive relation in the form of qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, produces cognition of an absence that lacks any other apprehensive relation. On such a view conjunction come adherence and the other relations would become useless, and an unrelated staff belonging to a related chitra would also have to be cognized. A sense organ apprehends only an object apprehensively related to it. Qualified hood or a self-linking relation is not an apprehensive relation of the sense organ, otherwise, even if adherence had not been accepted, its qualifier hood would still have to be admitted. Hence the sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence, and absence is super sensible. The Vedantan view. The Nayaka may say, absence is known only through a sense organ, therefore, since any other apprehensive relation is impossible, qualityhood, that is, the self-linking relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the perception of absence, just as conjunction common herance is accepted in the perception of color and the like when conjunction is impossible. The Vedantan replies, in apprehending color and the like, the sense organ does not cease after merely producing cognition of the locus, therefore conjunction come inheritance is the apprehensive relation. But in cognition of absence, through economy, the sense organ ceases after producing cognition of the locus, hence there is no purpose in accepting the cumbersome relation of qualifierhood. Otherwise, since the tactile sense organ produces cognition of air without color, it should likewise not be taken to cease in producing cognition of touches and inferential reason. The Niyayika view incurs mutual dependence, sensory apprehensibility of absence depends upon the relation of qualifierhood, and the relation of qualifierhood depends upon sensory apprehensibility of absence. Qualifierhood is merely the nature of the object. A self-linking relation is not a cause in sensory cognition, specific relations such as conjunction and inherent are causes. From the mutual deviation of conjunction and inherent one cannot formulate the general a sense organ knows an object related to itself. In each instance, the specific relation actually found is the cause of perceptual cognition. The mere nature of the apprehensible object is not the apprehensive relation in perception of absence because a relation must be distinct from the relata. No object is known by itself through its own nature alone. The visual sense organ is not a cause. If a self-linking relation were the cause of cognition of absence, cognition of color and the light would also be produced by a self-linking relation, then inherent and the other apprehensive relations would be unnecessary and the enumeration of six kinds of sense object contact would be fruitless. This also refutes the view that, the eye depends upon the assistance of light because light alone is its auxiliary cause. Without an apprehensive relation, the eye is not a cause of any cognition. Light illuminates the counter positive and makes its cognition eligible. On that basis it may be said that the eye, while producing cognition of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of absence, and that non-apprehension produces cognition of absence in the presence of the other causes apart from the sense organ. But this is not correct. The i, lacking an apprehensive relation, is not the cause of cognition of absence, it merely produces cognition of the locus of absence and then ceases. Nor is the following argument acceptable, after a blue object has been known through touch, a blind person would cognize absence of blue from non-apprehension of a remembered yellow object, but this fault does not arise if cognition of absence is accepted as produced by the sense organ that apprehends the counter-positive, because the blind person has no eyes. The sense organ that the Naiyayika regards as producing cognition of absence in fact ceases after producing cognition of the locus. It must therefore be accepted that, after the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter-positive has made the locus known, non-apprehension produces cognition of absence. Otherwise cognition of absence of waterhood would arise in water atoms related to the eye. Awareness of absence of color and the like has not apprehension as its inferential mark. Nyayika objection, absence of color in air, absence of bitterness in water, and absence of smell in a stone cannot be known through non-apprehension, because their locky, air and the rest, are not known through the eye and other sense organs capable of apprehending the counter-positives. It should not be asked how the Nyayika can regard such absences as perceptible when the particular locus is not eligible for the relevant sense organ. Once air has been known by touch or inference, a visual perception arises that makes eligible absence of color its qualificant, it does not arise as a perception having air as its qualificant. Eligible cognition of the qualificant is a cause of perception. The Vedantin replies that cognition of absence of color and the like in air and other things is an inference whose inferential mark is non-apprehension, just as the Neayaka himself regards the cognition air is colorless, whose qualificon is air, as inferential. Objection's cognition of absence is produced by a sense organ. The Neyayaka infers, cognition of absence of a pot on the ground is produced by a sense organ, because it is an immediate awareness. Therefore qualifierhood, that is, a self-linking relation, should be accepted as the apprehensive relation of the sense organ with cognition of absence. It is not the case that immediacy is the reason is unestablished. If on the Bavu cognition of absence were regarded as mediate, the distinction of cognition produced by an unknown cause would become impossible. From a trustworthy person's statement it is known that, even after someone entered the temple, Kaitra was not seen inside. From this known non-apprehension the hearer infers, Kaitra was not in the temple. If cognition of absence were mediate, it could not be produced by an unknown cause, because the universal mediate cognition hood is known through an own cause. Produced by a known cause means produced by cognition of the cause, the actual inferential mark and word do not themselves produce cognition, but cognition of them does. Therefore cognition of absence produced by an unknown cause is immediate. Being produced by a sense organ is not an extraneous condition of perceptuality, because perceptuality itself is inferred from being produced by a sense organ. Establishment of the Ba view cognition of absence is mediate and produced by non-apprehension. The foregoing Neayaka view is not correct. Mediate cognition hood is not a universal, for otherwise it would overlap with experiential cognition hood, it is merely cognition hood qualified by difference from immediate awareness. Therefore cognition of absence is mediate like memory. Verbal cognition, though produced by an unknown cause, is not inference. Similarly, cognition of the locus of absence, produced by a sense organ from an unknown cause, is perceptual, but cognition of absence, which differs from cognition produced by a sense organ and is produced by non-apprehension, is mediate. If perceptuality were established from being produced by an unknown cause, verbal cognition and the like, produced by known causes, would become inferential. Inference and verbal cognition, though both produced by known causes, are distinct effects because their causes and inferential mark and a word differ. Similarly, cognition of absence and cognition of its locus are distinct effects because unknown non-apprehension and the known sense organ differ. being produced by a sense organ establishes perceptuality, while not being produced by a sense organ establishes mediacy. To regard production by an unknown cause and production by a known cause as the grounds of perception and mediation is cumbersome, and neither applies to memory. Refutation of the Objection of the Author of the Kusumungeli The author of the Kusumungeli may say, non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge of absence, the mind, assisted by a positive mental cognition, alone produces external experience. Reply, the qualification positive is cumbersome and does not contribute to the mind's production of external experience. Otherwise, since the mind assisted by a sense organ alone would produce external experience, inference and the other means of knowledge would cease to exist. The inference, the mind, assisted by the means of cognition of a positive entity is the means of cognition of absence because cognition of absence is an external cognition is unsound. Absence is not apprehensible by a sense organ because it is an absence like the absence of an ineligible object. The counter inference is this cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because it is cognition of absence like cognition of absence produced by an inferential mark and the like. Nor is it the case that a means of knowledge that cognizes the counter positive also cognizes its absence, and that therefore a sense organ, being productive of cognition of the counter positive, also produces cognition of its absence. Inference in verbal testimony, which produce cognition of positive entities, do not produce cognition of absence. Nor is it true that a means of knowledge homogeneous with the means that apprehends the counter positive produces cognition of its absence, this deviates in comparison. I-hood and the like occur as universals and instruments producing cognition of absence, but comparisonhood is not a universal. It has already been established that the I and other sense organs cannot produce cognition of absence without an apprehensive relation. A sense organ produces cognition qualified by absence, not apprehension produces cognition of absence. Proposal, an illusion of absence in a locus where the counter positive is present is possible, and this is produced by a defect in the instrument. Memory of the counter positive, cognition of the locus, and absence itself are not intrinsically defective, the sense organ is impaired by bile and other defects, and the illusion is produced by that impaired sense organ. Therefore the sense organ should likewise be the means of veridical cognition of absence. Reply, impairment of a sense organ is merely its relation to a defect, and such relation to a defect is equally possible in non-apprehension. It cannot be accepted that because an illusion produced by a sense organ does not arise from a known cause, the instrumentality of the sense organ and veridical cognition of absence should also be understood in that form, making the postulation of a separate means of non-apprehension unnecessary. The sense organ has no apprehensive relation with absence. A defective sense organ may produce an illusion of a remote absence, as the eye produces an illusion of smell and a stone, but veritical cognition of absence is not produced by a sense organ because there is no apprehensive relation. Objection, a qualified cognition of absence in its locus is cognition of both a positive entity and an absence. Because this would involve an overlap of universals, it can be produced neither by a sense organ nor by non-apprehension nor by both, hence the sense organ alone should be accepted as apprehending both. The BHA replies, cognition of a locus qualified by an absence supplied by non-apprehension, the ground possesses absence, is produced by the sense organ, but cognition of absence in ground supplied by the eye, there is no pot on the ground, is produced by non-apprehension. Similarly, the eye produces the cognition, sandalwood is fragrant, while the nose produces, there is fragrance in sandalwood. The argument non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge because it has no operation is also unsound. The rule is that, apart from non-relation to the action, whatever is related to the action is an instrument, there is no need to add the expression possessing an operation to the definition of a means of knowledge. The Neyayaka refutation of non-apprehension. Neyayaka conclusion, cognition of the locus of absence produced by the sense organ capable of apprehending the counter positive is not an auxiliary cause of cognition of absence, because it deviates in cognitions of past absence produced by other means of knowledge. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is produced by a sense organ, not by non-apprehension, non-apprehension is not previously known, nor is there a trustworthy statement that makes it known. It is not the case that unknown non-apprehension of the existence of color and the like produces cognition of their absence, as not Non-apprehension of a pot produces cognition of absence of a pot on the ground. On the Msaaka view apprehension of a positive entity is super sensible, therefore absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Non-apprehension by itself does not produce cognition of absence. To say that cognition of a positive entity is eligible to be produced by non-apprehension contradicts the Msaaka doctrine. Even if admitted, in the case of absence of a pot on the ground known non-apprehension alone should be the instrument, because apprehension of an eligible pot can be known from its non-apprehension. Thus enough has been said against a separate means of knowledge called non-apprehension. Non-apprehension is not an inferential mark. Objection, cognition of absence of a pot is produced by an unknown instrument, because it arises without investigation of an inferential mark or the like. Reply, cognition of absence of color and the like in air also arises without recollection of an inferential mark, therefore the reason does not establish the instrumental status of non-apprehension. Nor is the absence of knownness of possessing color, or the non-apprehension of possessing color inferred from it, the inferential mark. Absence of knownness of possessing color in air is equivalent to absence of color, and therefore would not be known. If absence of knownness of possessing color is perceptible, absence of color in air can equally be regarded as perceptible. Absence cannot be inferred from absence of bodily or verbal behavior. Even when behavior is absent in indifference cognition and in the dream of a mute person, existence remains. In the mere absence of behavior, absence of any one behavior is always deviant, while absence of all behavior is wholly unknowable.

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