MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part6_CartoonFilm.mp4

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Collection
Part 11 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 11
Status
asr-draft
Human verified
No
Editorial review
not-reviewed
ASR model
small
Detected language
en (0.996354)
Duration
23:11
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Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

  1. 0:02–0:33विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार
  2. 0:33–0:37Sun being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition
  3. 0:37–0:44because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable. Under this
  4. 0:44–0:48definition possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous
  5. 0:48–0:52condition in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum
  6. 0:52–0:56of perceptible touch although it pervades the probandom perceptibility
  7. 0:56–1:00delimited by the property of the subject. Likewise in the inference water
  8. 1:00–1:05is knowable because it possesses taste, earthhood would become an extraneous condition because
  9. 1:05–1:10it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result.
  10. 1:11–1:15Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire,
  11. 1:15–1:20the reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom smoke because it is accompanied
  12. 1:20–1:26by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading the probandom delimited
  13. 1:26–1:33by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition. The defect
  14. 1:33–1:41of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem.
  15. 1:42–1:47Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum or establishment of the unqualified
  16. 1:47–1:51absence of the probandum would become possible only after deviation of the reason from a
  17. 1:51–1:57qualified probandum or the qualified absence of the probandum had been established through a deviant
  18. 1:57–2:01extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition.
  19. 2:01–2:07Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would arise.
  20. 2:07–2:14The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified pro-bandom or the unqualified absence of the pro-bandom,
  21. 2:14–2:20not deviation from a qualified pro-bandom or the qualified absence of the pro-bandom.
  22. 2:20–2:24It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the reason
  23. 2:24–2:29from the unqualified pro-bandom, deviation from the qualified pro-bandom should first be established.
  24. 2:30–2:34But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely and
  25. 2:34–2:37unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified pro-bandom.
  26. 2:39–2:47Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason
  27. 2:47–2:53from the unqualified pro-bandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from
  28. 2:53–2:58the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition
  29. 2:58–3:05is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples,
  30. 3:05–3:10sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is mitra's son,
  31. 3:10–3:15the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates
  32. 3:15–3:19from the contextually relevant probandom, because that condition does not establish
  33. 3:19–3:25the reasons deviation from the probandom. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons
  34. 3:25–3:31deviation through something that pervades the probandom delimited by a property of the subject,
  35. 3:31–3:36because that alone produces the reasons deviation from the probandom. Therefore no separate
  36. 3:36–3:43description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine
  37. 3:43–3:51of the author of the Ratnokosa. 23, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason
  38. 3:51–3:55while pervading the finally determined probandom is a deviant extraneous condition.
  39. 3:56–4:01Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reason's
  40. 4:01–4:07presence in the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct
  41. 4:07–4:11from the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable,
  42. 4:11–4:16producedness is a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason
  43. 4:16–4:20no ability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality.
  44. 4:22–4:25On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound,
  45. 4:25–4:28non-eternality alone becomes the extraneous condition.
  46. 4:28–4:33In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous
  47. 4:33–4:37condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the
  48. 4:37–4:40seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom,
  49. 4:40–4:44even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that
  50. 4:44–4:47extraneous condition.
  51. 4:47–4:51This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandum delimited
  52. 4:51–4:57by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandum ultimately
  53. 4:57–5:00becomes the finally determined probandum.
  54. 5:00–5:00Refutation of the
  55. 5:00–5:05अछि।
  56. 5:05–5:09अछि।
  57. 5:09–5:13अछि।
  58. 5:13–5:17अछि।
  59. 5:17–5:21अछि।
  60. 5:21–5:25अछि।
  61. 5:25–5:29अछि।
  62. 5:29–5:31is the finally determined probandum.
  63. 5:32–5:35Whatever property pervades this probandum but not the reason,
  64. 5:35–5:38being a produced substance lacking magnitude,
  65. 5:38–5:42would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result.
  66. 5:43–5:47Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain
  67. 5:47–5:51through the subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless.
  68. 5:52–5:56And when the probandum smoke is not established because the reason fire
  69. 5:56–6:01not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum
  70. 6:01–6:07smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not
  71. 6:07–6:12established because of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous
  72. 6:12–6:18condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum. Here the prima facie account of
  73. 6:18–6:24the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. 25, here we proponents of the established
  74. 6:24–6:31conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition. That whose deviation causes the reason
  75. 6:31–6:37to deviate from the probandom is the extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that
  76. 6:37–6:42which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an
  77. 6:42–6:48extraneous condition. In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession
  78. 6:48–6:53of manifest color is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the
  79. 6:53–6:58probandum perceptibility owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color.
  80. 6:59–7:02But in the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke,
  81. 7:02–7:06the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition,
  82. 7:06–7:10because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandum fire owing to the
  83. 7:10–7:16deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandum.
  84. 7:19–7:2426. The probandum familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is
  85. 7:24–7:29regarded through the relation of collocation as the finally determined probandum delimited by
  86. 7:29–7:36that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood,
  87. 7:36–7:42and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandum due to the
  88. 7:42–7:48deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous
  89. 7:48–7:53condition deviates from the probandum because the extraneous condition pervading the probandum
  90. 7:53–7:58itself deviates from the probandum, this extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with
  91. 7:58–8:04erasimetrically pervaded by the probandum. An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum
  92. 8:04–8:08while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the
  93. 8:08–8:14probandum, consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from
  94. 8:14–8:20the probandum. For example, in the inference, destruction is non-eternal, existence,
  95. 8:20–8:26serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction in the inference
  96. 8:26–8:31air is perceptible possession of manifest color serving as an extraneous condition deviates from
  97. 8:31–8:38the perceptibility of air therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates
  98. 8:38–8:44from the respective probandum when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier its deviation
  99. 8:44–8:49from the qualified probandum depends upon its deviation from the qualifier can that is from
  100. 8:49–8:56the unqualified probandom. No defective irrelevant diversion arises.
  101. 8:58–9:0327. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the
  102. 9:03–9:08qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the
  103. 9:08–9:15qualifier can, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises. For example, in the inference
  104. 9:15–9:20error is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, being the substratum of
  105. 9:20–9:25perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier perceptibility, its deviation from
  106. 9:25–9:30qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts with the qualificon probandom air,
  107. 9:30–9:36that is, with the property of the subject. If the reasons deviation from the qualified
  108. 9:36–9:42probandom were not held to depend upon its deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandom,
  109. 9:42–9:46cognition of deviation from the qualified probandom would not be decisive.
  110. 9:46–9:51Therefore, when deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon deviation from the
  111. 9:51–9:57unqualified qualificand probandom or the original probandom, establishing deviation from the
  112. 9:57–10:00qualified probandom does not incur the defect of irrelevant diversion.
  113. 10:00–10:05Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion.
  114. 10:05–10:1528. Alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition may be explained as follows.
  115. 10:15–10:20In the inference, air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
  116. 10:20–10:27the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something,
  117. 10:27–10:32such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood.
  118. 10:33–10:38Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's sun, the reason being Mitra's
  119. 10:38–10:43sun deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading the status
  120. 10:43–10:48of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun, just as non-jarhood
  121. 10:48–10:54deviates from a jar. Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it
  122. 10:54–10:59it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason,
  123. 10:59–11:04being Mitra's son, and such non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting
  124. 11:04–11:06in difference from a jar.
  125. 11:06–11:12Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates
  126. 11:12–11:16from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom.
  127. 11:16–11:21Such extraneous condition hood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore,
  128. 11:21–11:25In the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced.
  129. 11:25–11:30No defect of irrelevant diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified
  130. 11:30–11:34pro-bandom, is the extraneous condition.
  131. 11:34–11:37Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect.
  132. 11:37–11:42In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition.
  133. 11:42–11:48Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect.
  134. 11:48–11:51It may be objected that under this definition nonaudibility would become an extraneous condition
  135. 11:51–11:56in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference,
  136. 11:56–11:59water is knowable because it possesses taste.
  137. 11:59–12:02But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative
  138. 12:02–12:06pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while nonaudibility and earthhood do not pervade
  139. 12:06–12:10the qualified pro-bandom.
  140. 12:10–12:14Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition.
  141. 12:14–12:1929, it may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition,
  142. 12:19–12:23The definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that is
  143. 12:23–12:27not an extraneous condition because cognition of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition
  144. 12:27–12:32is destroyed for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited by a property
  145. 12:32–12:35of the subject is free from defect.
  146. 12:35–12:37This objection is untenable.
  147. 12:37–12:41In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions
  148. 12:41–12:44pervasion of the probandom is absent.
  149. 12:44–12:47Consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained.
  150. 12:47–12:51observation of the reason's invariable relation with the probandom, without the assistance
  151. 12:51–12:55of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that
  152. 12:55–13:00the extraneous condition pervades it. Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject
  153. 13:00–13:04otherness that is not an extraneous condition.
  154. 13:04–13:09Possession of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct
  155. 13:09–13:13from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not.
  156. 13:13–13:1830. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom,
  157. 13:18–13:23favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness as deviating
  158. 13:23–13:26from the probandom is present.
  159. 13:26–13:29But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not
  160. 13:29–13:35an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous
  161. 13:35–13:36conditions.
  162. 13:36–13:41Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession
  163. 13:41–13:45of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition, in an inference
  164. 13:45–13:50concerning the darkness of mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous
  165. 13:50–13:53condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object,
  166. 13:53–13:59existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel
  167. 13:59–14:04increases the intensity of the probandum smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitants not otherwise
  168. 14:04–14:08established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility of a substance,
  169. 14:08–14:12medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness of mitra's
  170. 14:12–14:17sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object.
  171. 14:17–14:21Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective
  172. 14:21–14:31probandom. Objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. 31, it may be objected,
  173. 14:31–14:35is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through evidence.
  174. 14:36–14:39If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible.
  175. 14:40–14:44But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favorable
  176. 14:44–14:49hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect.
  177. 14:49–14:55Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the relationship
  178. 14:55–15:00is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition,
  179. 15:00–15:00because an equal means generates doubt about perv-
  180. 15:00–15:32विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार
  181. 15:32–15:3732, some scholars say that subject-otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades
  182. 15:37–15:40the absence of the probandom.
  183. 15:40–15:44The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject-otherness and the means producing
  184. 15:44–15:49cognition, through subject-otherness, that the reason deviates from the probandom would
  185. 15:49–15:50have equal force.
  186. 15:50–15:55Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the
  187. 15:55–15:59subject, because both something pervading the probandom and something pervading its
  188. 15:59–16:02absence would occur there.
  189. 16:02–16:05But this is impossible.
  190. 16:05–16:09Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandom and its absence.
  191. 16:09–16:15How, then, could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys
  192. 16:15–16:19pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandom merely because there is
  193. 16:19–16:23doubt that it pervades the probandom?
  194. 16:23–16:25This view is untenable.
  195. 16:25–16:29On the basis of being a pervader of the probandom, subject otherness certainly becomes
  196. 16:29–16:35the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom.
  197. 16:37–16:45Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect. 33, it may again be objected that where an
  198. 16:45–16:50extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reasons probandom, but favorable hypothetical
  199. 16:50–16:55reasoning establishing perversion is absent, non-experience of perversion is appropriate.
  200. 16:56–17:01On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning
  201. 17:01–17:06are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because it
  202. 17:06–17:11fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a
  203. 17:11–17:17defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
  204. 17:17–17:21The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence
  205. 17:21–17:26of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion
  206. 17:26–17:30by the probandom, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing
  207. 17:30–17:34cognition of the absence of pervasion.
  208. 17:34–17:37But this rejoinder is untenable.
  209. 17:37–17:42To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable
  210. 17:42–17:47hypothetical reasoning, consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning
  211. 17:47–17:54would be the defect, not the extraneous condition.
  212. 17:54–18:00Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued.
  213. 18:00–18:05of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect.
  214. 18:05–18:1134. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous
  215. 18:11–18:15condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts, in one and the
  216. 18:15–18:19same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore its relations with
  217. 18:19–18:23the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted in different substrata.
  218. 18:24–18:27Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation
  219. 18:27–18:30to the probandom must necessarily be accepted in the reason.
  220. 18:32–18:36Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of
  221. 18:36–18:41provision, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition.
  222. 18:42–18:47Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must
  223. 18:47–18:57be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars say
  224. 18:57–19:02that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject
  225. 19:02–19:08is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose absence produces,
  226. 19:08–19:13in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called
  227. 19:13–19:18an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because
  228. 19:18–19:23there is fire, conjunction with what fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire,
  229. 19:23–19:27because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the
  230. 19:27–19:34absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference
  231. 19:34–19:39destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in
  232. 19:39–19:43the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reasoned producedness and
  233. 19:43–19:49non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the
  234. 19:49–19:54The substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes
  235. 19:54–19:59in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible
  236. 19:59–20:00touch and perceptibility.
  237. 20:00–20:00But subject
  238. 20:00–20:04Subject Otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness cannot
  239. 20:04–20:08be an extraneous condition.
  240. 20:08–20:13The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition.
  241. 20:13–20:1436.
  242. 20:14–20:19Some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting
  243. 20:19–20:24counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive
  244. 20:24–20:26of an absence.
  245. 20:26–20:30Subject Otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition.
  246. 20:30–20:35A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual
  247. 20:35–20:40of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom.
  248. 20:42–20:47But under this definition, subject-otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition
  249. 20:47–20:51in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would
  250. 20:51–20:56arise to regard subject-otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's pervasion
  251. 20:56–20:59by fire.
  252. 20:59–21:03Refutation of the Yatu author's definition.
  253. 21:03–21:0937. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as
  254. 21:09–21:13the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter
  255. 21:13–21:17indicated by the absence of a non-locker possessing the property delimiting the counter positives
  256. 21:17–21:23counter positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition
  257. 21:23–21:26of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject
  258. 21:26–21:30would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation.
  259. 21:31–21:33Therefore the Yatu authors definitions are unacceptable.
  260. 21:35–21:42Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion. 38,
  261. 21:42–21:47some scholars say that either what pervades the pro-bandam or what does not pervade the reason
  262. 21:47–21:52is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject,
  263. 21:52–21:57the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless,
  264. 21:57–22:02its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous
  265. 22:02–22:07condition. The probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason,
  266. 22:07–22:12because the probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the
  267. 22:12–22:19probandom. Otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition
  268. 22:19–22:29is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect. Division of extraneous conditions. 39 extraneous conditions
  269. 22:29–22:35are of two kinds, certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandom but not
  270. 22:35–22:40the reason, and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandom, is a certain
  271. 22:40–22:46extraneous condition. In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire,
  272. 22:46–22:50possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition.
  273. 22:51–22:56Where there is doubt concerning the reasons non-pervasion of the probandom or the conditions
  274. 22:56–23:02pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition. In the inference, the crow
  275. 23:02–23:07is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking is a doubtful extraneous
  276. 23:07–23:11condition relative to the probandum darkness.

Plain text

विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार Sun being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition because it pervades darkness. But this proposal is untenable. Under this definition possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch although it pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject. Likewise in the inference water is knowable because it possesses taste, earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading the probandom delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition. The defect of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem. Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum or establishment of the unqualified absence of the probandum would become possible only after deviation of the reason from a qualified probandum or the qualified absence of the probandum had been established through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition. Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would arise. The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified pro-bandom or the unqualified absence of the pro-bandom, not deviation from a qualified pro-bandom or the qualified absence of the pro-bandom. It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the reason from the unqualified pro-bandom, deviation from the qualified pro-bandom should first be established. But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified pro-bandom. Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument. 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason from the unqualified pro-bandom must first be established. Thereafter, if deviation from the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandom, because that condition does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandom. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that pervades the probandom delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces the reasons deviation from the probandom. Therefore no separate description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine of the author of the Ratnokosa. 23, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined probandom is a deviant extraneous condition. Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reason's presence in the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason no ability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality. On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality alone becomes the extraneous condition. In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom, even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that extraneous condition. This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandum delimited by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandum ultimately becomes the finally determined probandum. Refutation of the अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। अछि। is the finally determined probandum. Whatever property pervades this probandum but not the reason, being a produced substance lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result. Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain through the subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not established because the reason fire not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum. Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. 25, here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandom is the extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an extraneous condition. In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandum perceptibility owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandum fire owing to the deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandum. 26. The probandum familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is regarded through the relation of collocation as the finally determined probandum delimited by that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood, and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandum due to the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandum because the extraneous condition pervading the probandum itself deviates from the probandum, this extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with erasimetrically pervaded by the probandum. An extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum, consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum. For example, in the inference, destruction is non-eternal, existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction in the inference air is perceptible possession of manifest color serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the perceptibility of air therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandum when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier its deviation from the qualified probandum depends upon its deviation from the qualifier can that is from the unqualified probandom. No defective irrelevant diversion arises. 27. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the qualifier can, therefore no defective irrelevant diversion arises. For example, in the inference error is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts with the qualificon probandom air, that is, with the property of the subject. If the reasons deviation from the qualified probandom were not held to depend upon its deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandom, cognition of deviation from the qualified probandom would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon deviation from the unqualified qualificand probandom or the original probandom, establishing deviation from the qualified probandom does not incur the defect of irrelevant diversion. Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion. 28. Alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition may be explained as follows. In the inference, air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's sun, the reason being Mitra's sun deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar. Here the non-deviation of the reason being Mitra's sun means that it it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being Mitra's son, and such non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar. Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom. Such extraneous condition hood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore, In the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced. No defect of irrelevant diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified pro-bandom, is the extraneous condition. Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect. In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition. Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect. It may be objected that under this definition nonaudibility would become an extraneous condition in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference, water is knowable because it possesses taste. But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while nonaudibility and earthhood do not pervade the qualified pro-bandom. Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition. 29, it may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, The definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition because cognition of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is destroyed for subject otherness, although pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject is free from defect. This objection is untenable. In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions pervasion of the probandom is absent. Consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained. observation of the reason's invariable relation with the probandom, without the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that the extraneous condition pervades it. Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition. Possession of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not. 30. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness as deviating from the probandom is present. But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition, in an inference concerning the darkness of mitra's sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object, existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel increases the intensity of the probandum smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitants not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness of mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective probandom. Objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. 31, it may be objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through evidence. If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible. But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favorable hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect. Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and the reason of the relationship is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only a doubtful extraneous condition, because an equal means generates doubt about perv- विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार-विचार 32, some scholars say that subject-otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades the absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject-otherness and the means producing cognition, through subject-otherness, that the reason deviates from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandom and something pervading its absence would occur there. But this is impossible. Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandom and its absence. How, then, could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandom merely because there is doubt that it pervades the probandom? This view is untenable. On the basis of being a pervader of the probandom, subject otherness certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom. Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect. 33, it may again be objected that where an extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reasons probandom, but favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing perversion is absent, non-experience of perversion is appropriate. On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because it fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion by the probandom, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable. To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning would be the defect, not the extraneous condition. Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued. of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect. 34. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts, in one and the same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore its relations with the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted in different substrata. Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation to the probandom must necessarily be accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of provision, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition. Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction with what fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire, because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reasoned producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the The substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch and perceptibility. But subject Subject Otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness cannot be an extraneous condition. The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition. 36. Some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive of an absence. Subject Otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition. A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom. But under this definition, subject-otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would arise to regard subject-otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's pervasion by fire. Refutation of the Yatu author's definition. 37. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter indicated by the absence of a non-locker possessing the property delimiting the counter positives counter positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yatu authors definitions are unacceptable. Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars, and conclusion. 38, some scholars say that either what pervades the pro-bandam or what does not pervade the reason is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because the probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the probandom. Otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect. Division of extraneous conditions. 39 extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandom but not the reason, and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandom, is a certain extraneous condition. In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition. Where there is doubt concerning the reasons non-pervasion of the probandom or the conditions pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition. In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

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